In-Vehicle Network Controller Integrity Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current vehicles lack adequate security measures to protect against external attacks and theft, particularly in in-vehicle networks where controllers can be stolen or duplicated, leading to financial and safety issues.
Innovation Solution
A method and system that involves a first controller collecting and storing integrity information of second controllers, verifying their authenticity by comparing received integrity information with stored data using encryption and decryption with public and private keys, and determining anomalous controllers to prevent malicious use.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If controllers are connected to wireless communication and surrounding networks to provide customized services, then service functionality and connectivity are improved, but vulnerability to external attacks and network security risks increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary integrity verification of controllers before allowing them to access the in-vehicle network. The verification server checks the integrity information (hash value, serial number, authentication information) of each controller in advance, and only controllers that pass verification are allowed to communicate with other ECUs. This preliminary security check prevents compromised controllers from causing harm while maintaining network connectivity and service functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
A verification server is introduced as an intermediary between controllers and the in-vehicle network. This mediator verifies the integrity of controllers by comparing their provided integrity information with pre-stored reference values. The verification server acts as a security gatekeeper, allowing legitimate controllers to access the network while blocking compromised ones, thus protecting the system from external attacks without affecting service functionality.
2Reliability
If integrity verification of controllers is implemented to detect stolen or duplicated controllers, then security and reliability are improved, but system complexity and verification overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The verification system extracts only the essential integrity information (hash value, serial number, authentication information) from controllers for verification purposes. Instead of verifying the entire controller system, the solution focuses on extracting and verifying these specific key parameters. This extraction approach maintains high reliability in detecting stolen or duplicated controllers while minimizing system complexity by verifying only critical attributes.
Solution Approach 2:
The system pre-stores reference integrity information (hash values, serial numbers, authentication data) for all legitimate controllers in the verification server before they are deployed. This preliminary preparation allows for rapid verification without complex real-time analysis. When a controller connects, its integrity information is simply compared against the pre-stored references, significantly reducing verification overhead and system complexity while maintaining high reliability.
3Measurement precision
If detailed integrity information (boot loader, MAC information) is collected and stored for verification, then verification accuracy is improved, but data storage requirements and processing overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of storing and verifying entire boot loaders and MAC information, the system extracts and stores only the essential integrity indicators: hash values of boot loaders, serial numbers, and authentication information. These extracted parameters are sufficient to verify controller authenticity while occupying minimal storage space. The hash values serve as compact representations that maintain verification accuracy without requiring storage of large binary files.
Solution Approach 2:
The system transforms detailed integrity information (boot loader binaries, MAC addresses) into condensed parameter representations (hash values, serial numbers). This parameter transformation maintains verification accuracy because hash values uniquely represent the original data, while dramatically reducing data storage requirements. The transformed parameters are much smaller in size but retain the essential verification capability.
Data Source
AI summary
According to an aspect, a method is performed by a first controller for providing security for second controllers in an in-vehicle network. An inherent information request is transmitted to a suspicious controller of the plurality of second controllers for an inherent information of the suspicious controller. The inherent information request includes a certificate assigned to the first controller. An encrypted inherent information of the suspicious controller is received from the suspicious controller and a decrypted inherent information is compared with a pre-stored inherent information. The suspicious controller is determined to be an anomalous controller when the decrypted inherent information is different from the pre-stored inherent information. In response to receiving an update request from a backend server for a specified controller out of the plurality of second controllers, the inherent information request including the certificate assigned is transmitted to the specified controller.