Secure Vehicle-Device Command Path via Dual Cryptographic Keys

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Solution Overview

Problem

Secure communication between a mobile device and a vehicle is vulnerable to malicious attacks, as existing technologies do not adequately protect against unauthorized access and data tampering during the performance of vehicle functions using mobile devices.

Innovation Solution

A method is implemented to establish a secure communication channel by generating unique private keys for both the mobile device and the vehicle telematics unit, which are then encrypted and signed with different cryptographic keys, allowing for secure authentication and data exchange using short-range wireless communication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If TLS is used for secure communication between mobile device and vehicle, then communication security is improved, but vulnerability to malicious attacks during vehicle function execution remains

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication securityVSAvoidmalicious attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the authentication process into two distinct phases: initial TLS-based channel establishment and subsequent vehicle function authentication. This segmentation allows each phase to use appropriate security mechanisms - TLS for channel security and device-specific cryptographic authentication for command security - thereby addressing vulnerabilities in either single approach alone

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements preliminary action by establishing a secure TLS communication channel before executing vehicle functions. The mobile device and vehicle telematics unit authenticate each other and set up encrypted communication paths in advance, ensuring that subsequent vehicle control commands are transmitted through a pre-secured channel resistant to interception and tampering

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If digital certificates and public key infrastructure are used for authentication, then confidential communication is enabled, but complexity of key management and certificate distribution increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a certificate authority (CA) as an intermediary that issues digital certificates to both mobile devices and vehicle telematics units. This intermediary enables mutual authentication without requiring direct key exchange between the mobile device and vehicle, simplifying the key management process while maintaining strong security through standardized PKI protocols

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses digital certificates as cryptographic copies of identity information. Instead of exchanging actual private keys, the system exchanges certificate files that contain public key information and identity verification data. This copying approach enables secure authentication while keeping sensitive private keys localized and protected on each device

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Data Source

PatentUS9276737B2Securing a command path between a vehicle and personal wireless device
Publication Date: 2016.03.01 GENERAL MOTORS LLC
  • US9276737B2 patent drawing
  • US9276737B2 patent drawing
  • US9276737B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system and a method using that system is provided for establishing a secure communication channel between a vehicle and a mobile device. The method may include providing at least one unique mobile device identifier and at least one unique vehicle telematics unit identifier associated with the mobile device identifier to a call center. At least one of the two identifiers may be provided to a wireless service provider. Two private keys may be generated—a first private key based on the at least one unique mobile identifier and a second private key based on the at least one unique vehicle telematics unit identifier. The first private key may be provided to the mobile device within a first cryptographic envelope signed with a first cryptographic key. And the second private key may be provided to the vehicle telematics unit within a second cryptographic envelope signed with a second cryptographic key.