Vehicle ECU RoT Verification Using a Monitoring ECU

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing vehicle ECUs face challenges in securely verifying the integrity of their Root of Trust (RoT) due to the need for updating public keys, necessitating replacement of the ECU when the RoT is stored in a secure, non-writable storage, which limits long-term use.

Innovation Solution

The RoT is stored in a writable non-volatile memory and monitored by a duplicate monitoring ECU, which verifies the integrity of the RoT using hash values generated with a secure, read-only hash value generating program, allowing updates without replacing the ECU.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the Root of Trust is stored in a secure non-writable storage, then the integrity verification is secure, but the ECU must be replaced when public keys need updating

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveintegrity verification securityVSAvoidupdate capability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The verification system is segmented into two parts: the Root of Trust (stored securely in non-writable storage) and the verification program (stored in writable storage). This segmentation allows the verification program to be updated without replacing the entire ECU, while the Root of Trust remains secure and immutable.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A verification program acts as an intermediary between the Root of Trust and the startup program. This verification program can be updated in writable storage to support new public keys, while the Root of Trust in non-writable storage remains unchanged and secure.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If the ECU is replaced when RoT needs updating, then security is maintained, but long-term use and cost efficiency are reduced

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidECU service life
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDuration of action of moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The system transitions from a static configuration (fixed Root of Trust in non-writable storage) to a dynamic configuration where the verification program can be updated in writable storage. This allows the ECU to adapt to new security requirements without replacement, extending its service life.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the storage location parameter of the verification program from non-writable to writable storage, while keeping the Root of Trust in non-writable storage. This parameter change enables updates without replacement, extending ECU lifespan while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Adaptability or versatility

If a writable storage is used for verification program, then updates are enabled, but the risk of tampering increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveupdate capabilityVSAvoidtampering risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The monitoring ECU provides feedback by monitoring the control ECU and verifying the integrity of the verification program and startup program. This feedback mechanism detects tampering attempts, allowing the system to maintain writable storage for updates while mitigating tampering risks through continuous verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The monitoring ECU acts as an intermediary that verifies the integrity of programs in writable storage. This intermediary layer enables updates in writable storage while protecting against tampering through cryptographic verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20260003968A1vehicle
Publication Date: 2026.01.01 SUBARU CORP
  • US20260003968A1 patent drawing
  • US20260003968A1 patent drawing
  • US20260003968A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A vehicle includes a control electronic control unit and a monitoring electronic control unit. The control electronic control unit is configured to control an object device mounted on the vehicle, and the monitoring electronic control unit is configured to monitor the control electronic control unit. The control electronic control unit is configured to store a startup program and a first verification program for verifying whether the startup program has been tampered with in a writable first storage medium, calculate a hash value for the first verification program, and output the calculated hash value to the monitoring electronic control unit. The monitoring electronic control unit is configured to determine an abnormality in the control electronic control unit based on the hash value received from the control electronic control unit.