Vehicle Locking Device Interference Signal Relay Attack Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing locking devices for motor vehicles can be vulnerable to relay attacks, allowing unauthorized access by extending the range of radio key signals beyond the intended area, enabling theft.
Innovation Solution
The locking device incorporates an evaluation module that sends an interference radio signal outside the frequency range of the response signal to disrupt existing radio communications, preventing the relay attack by interrupting the communication between the theft device's parts and ensuring the response signal is received within a predetermined time interval.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the radio key and locking device transmit signals at a level that allows signal change in a special pattern, then the reliability of signal authentication is improved, but the vulnerability to relay attacks increases due to extended transmission range
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies preliminary anti-action by sending out an interference radio signal before and/or during the request signal transmission. This interference signal, generated at frequencies outside the response signal frequency region, proactively disrupts potential relay attack communications before they can successfully extend the authentication range, thereby preventing the harmful effect while maintaining reliable signal authentication.
Solution Approach 2:
The invention converts the harmful interference into a beneficial security measure. By deliberately introducing an interference radio signal that disrupts external radio communications, the system transforms what would normally be a harmful disturbance into a protective mechanism that prevents relay attacks. The interference signal acts as a countermeasure that benefits system security by blocking unauthorized signal relaying.
2Reliability
If an interference radio signal is sent out to disrupt radio communications, then the security against relay attacks is improved, but the risk of interfering with legitimate radio communications increases
Solution Approach 1:
The interference radio signal is applied locally and selectively rather than globally. The evaluation module determines whether to send out the interference signal based on local conditions - specifically, whether a radio communication is detected outside the response signal frequency region. This localized application ensures that interference is only generated when and where needed for security, minimizing impact on legitimate communications in the response signal frequency band.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically adjusts the interference signal transmission based on real-time detection. The evaluation module continuously monitors for radio communications outside the response signal frequency region and dynamically decides whether to activate the interference signal. This dynamic approach allows the system to adapt to changing conditions, generating interference only when potential relay attacks are detected while remaining inactive during legitimate communication periods.
3Reliability
If the response signal must be received within a predetermined time interval, then the prevention of relay attacks is improved, but the reliability of legitimate key operation may be affected
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by sending out the interference radio signal before the predetermined time interval for response signal reception begins. This preliminary interference disrupts any potential relay attack setup in advance, ensuring that even if a response signal is received within the time interval, the authentication cannot be compromised by pre-established relay connections. Legitimate operations are unaffected because the interference is already in place when the time interval starts.
Solution Approach 2:
The interference signal is transmitted periodically or in pulses during the time interval rather than continuously. This periodic action maintains security by repeatedly disrupting potential relay communications while being less intrusive than continuous interference. The pulsed nature of the interference allows brief windows for legitimate signal exchange while still preventing sustained relay attack communications.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
This solution effectively thwarts relay attacks by disrupting the extended radio communication, ensuring the motor vehicle's locks are only unlocked if the response signal is received within the specified time frame, thereby preventing unauthorized access.
Implementation Method 1
The request signal may be a radio signal, in particular a so-called LF signal (LF—low frequency), which is sent out in a frequency region less than one Megahertz
Implementation Method 2
The response signal in particular is a so-called HF signal (HF—high frequency), which is sent out in a frequency region lying above one Megahertz
Implementation Method 3
the transmitting device sends out an interference radio signal before and/or during, but at least after the sending of the request signal within or during said time interval
Data Source
AI summary
A locking device for a motor vehicle. A transmitting device, which is designed to send out a request signal into a surroundings of the motor vehicle in dependence on a predetermined triggering event, as well as a receiving device, which is designed to receive, within a predetermined time interval from the sending of the request signal in a predetermined frequency region, a response signal of a radio key from the surroundings, and a control device, which is designed, in event of a response signal received within the time interval, to unlock at least one lock of the locking device. An evaluation module is designed so that the transmitting device sends out an interference radio signal after the sending of the request signal within the time interval at least at one radio frequency lying outside the frequency region.