Secure Vehicle Messaging With HPCA MAC Verification Routing
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Solution Overview
Problem
Modern vehicles' electronic control units (ECUs) are susceptible to spoofing by imposter or compromised ECUs without proper security, which can compromise the integrity of message transmission within a service-oriented architecture.
Innovation Solution
A secure message system that includes a high performance crypto accelerator (HPCA) and a message authentication code (MAC) generate allow list (MGAL) to verify the authenticity of messages, using a key serial number (KSN) to associate with a key slot in a message authentication code table (MACT) and selectively bypass MGAL enforcement for service events, ensuring only authorized devices can generate MACs.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a MAC generate allow list (MGAL) is used to verify message authenticity, then message security and integrity are improved, but system complexity and processing time increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the MAC verification process into two distinct paths based on message type: service discovery messages go through the MGAL (secure path), while service event messages bypass the MGAL and use HPCA directly (fast path). This segmentation resolves the contradiction by applying different verification levels to different message types, maintaining security where needed while reducing complexity elsewhere.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically adjusts the verification process based on the message type field in the message header. The receiving ECU determines the message type and selectively applies either the MGAL verification path or the HPCA direct verification path. This dynamic adaptation allows the system to maintain high security for critical service discovery messages while using faster, simpler verification for service event messages.
2Reliability
If service discovery messages go through MGAL verification, then authentication security is improved, but processing speed decreases
Solution Approach 1:
The system dynamically routes different message types through different verification paths. Service discovery messages, which require high authentication security, are routed through the MGAL. Service event messages, which can be processed faster, bypass the MGAL and go directly to HPCA verification. This dynamic routing resolves the contradiction by matching the verification level to the actual security requirements of each message type.
3Speed
If MGAL is bypassed for service event messages, then processing speed is improved, but security verification is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies different verification qualities to different parts of the communication system. For service discovery messages, the full MGAL security verification is applied locally. For service event messages, a lighter HPCA-based verification is applied locally. This local quality differentiation allows the system to optimize processing speed for service events while maintaining strong security for service discovery, resolving the contradiction through localized optimization.
4Productivity
If HPCA is used for service event verification, then processing efficiency is improved, but authentication strength is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the authentication verification into two levels: MGAL-based strong authentication for service discovery messages, and HPCA-based efficient verification for service event messages. This segmentation allows the system to accept that service events can use lighter verification while maintaining that service discovery messages receive full authentication strength, resolving the contradiction through functional differentiation.
Data Source
AI summary
A computer-implemented method that causes data processing hardware to perform operations including generating, at a first device, a message having a header including a message type and a service ID, receiving, at a second device, the message including the header and a key serial number (KSN) of the first device, determining, based on the header, the message type of the message, verifying, at a high performance crypto accelerator (HPCA) of the second device, a message authentication code (MAC) of the message based on the determined message type being the service event, obtaining, based on the KSN from the message, a key slot from a message authentication code table (MACT), identifying, based on the key slot, a key associated with the key slot obtained from the MACT, the key including at least one of a primary key and a secondary key, and verifying, using the key and the key slot obtained from the MACT, the MAC.


