Vehicle Network Eavesdropping Detection via Randomized Transit Time

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Solution Overview

Problem

Ethernet networks in vehicles are vulnerable to unauthorized eavesdropping and device replacement, as passive readers can delay packet transit times and mimic legitimate communication, making it difficult to detect unauthorized access.

Innovation Solution

A method that determines the transit time between network subscribers, adds a random value to create a waiting time, and uses time stamps to assess packet arrival times, making it harder for passive readers to predict packet transmission times and increasing security by incorporating true physical randomness without additional hardware.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Loss of substance

If a network is used to interconnect control units, sensors and actuators instead of point-to-point connections, then wiring effort and weight are reduced, but vulnerability to unauthorized eavesdropping increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvewiring effortVSAvoidvulnerability to eavesdropping
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of substanceVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent uses timestamp changes (temporal markers) to detect unauthorized access. By comparing expected timestamps with actual arrival times of data packets, the system can identify when a passive reader has inserted itself into the network, thus detecting eavesdropping while maintaining the network's wiring efficiency

Inventive Principle:
Principle #32Color changes

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements a feedback mechanism where subscribers monitor packet transit times and compare them against expected values. When deviations are detected, the system can respond by blocking functionality or deactivating the vehicle, providing continuous security monitoring without compromising the network's lightweight structure

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Loss of information

If a passive reader is looped into the line path to eavesdrop on communication, then unauthorized access to data is achieved, but packet transit time is delayed

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveunauthorized data accessVSAvoidpacket transit time
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of informationVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by establishing expected timestamp ranges for data packet arrival before eavesdropping can occur. By pre-calculating and storing valid timestamp windows based on known network conditions and packet generation rates, the system can immediately detect when a passive reader causes timing deviations, thus detecting the eavesdropping attempt before significant data loss occurs

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If transit time monitoring is used to detect eavesdropping, then unauthorized access can be identified, but the method is vulnerable to prediction attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection accuracyVSAvoidpredictability of transmission times
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies dynamics by introducing random waiting times between packet transmissions. Instead of using fixed intervals, the system dynamically varies transmission timing within certain bounds, making it difficult for passive readers to predict when packets will be sent. This dynamic approach maintains detection accuracy while preventing prediction attacks, as the timing patterns become unpredictable yet still detectable through timestamp analysis

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Data Source

PatentUS11647045B2Monitoring a network connection for eavesdropping
Publication Date: 2023.05.09 CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGIES GMBH
  • US11647045B2 patent drawing
  • US11647045B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for detecting unauthorized eavesdropping. A first subscriber determines a transit time for the transmission of data to a second subscriber, adds the random value to the transit time to obtain a waiting time, waits for the waiting time, creates a data packet containing a time stamp and transmits this data packet to the second subscriber. The second subscriber records the time it receives the data packet and compares it with the time stamp contained in the data packet, determines that the data packet has arrived either: before the time indicated in the time stamp, more than a predefined tolerance time after the time indicated in the time stamp, or before or more than a predefined tolerance time after a time at which it can be expected in the second subscriber as an indication that communication between the first subscriber and the second subscriber is being eavesdropped on.