Vehicle Secure Messages Using Private Key Authentication

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Solution Overview

Problem

Autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to malicious attacks and data security breaches due to the susceptibility of their control systems and communication protocols, which can lead to unsafe operations and potential harm to passengers, especially when aftermarket parts are installed without proper configuration or when data transmission is compromised.

Innovation Solution

The implementation of a secure message system using a vehicle private key, which generates and transmits secure messages with anti-replay mechanisms and message authentication codes to ensure the integrity and authenticity of data between the autonomous vehicle and its components, preventing unauthorized modifications and malicious attacks by verifying the authenticity of vehicle parts and configuration updates.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If conventional communication protocols are used in autonomous vehicles, then ease of operation and device compatibility are improved, but security against malicious attacks and data integrity are worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication easeVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The communication system is segmented into multiple independent layers: physical layer for data transmission, data link layer for framing and error detection, network layer for routing, transport layer for reliability, and application layer for specific functions. Each layer has independent security mechanisms, allowing security to be enhanced without affecting overall system operation. The private key is segmented and stored in secure elements within specific control units, separate from the main processing systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A secure communication intermediary layer is introduced between the autonomous vehicle control units and external systems. This intermediary uses public-key cryptography infrastructure, where the vehicle's private key serves as a secret intermediary for authentication. Message authentication codes act as intermediaries to verify data integrity, and secure communication protocols mediate between untrusted external systems and the protected vehicle systems, preventing direct exposure of critical components to attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If secure message systems with authentication are implemented, then security and data integrity are improved, but device complexity and computational requirements are worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Security credentials including private keys and authentication certificates are pre-configured in secure elements during vehicle manufacturing or initial activation. The public-key infrastructure is established beforehand, with the vehicle's private key generated and stored securely before the vehicle enters service. This preliminary setup eliminates the need for complex real-time key generation and distribution, reducing operational complexity while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The autonomous vehicle's control units perform self-authentication using their embedded private keys stored in secure elements. Each control unit independently generates message authentication codes for its communications without requiring external authentication servers for every transaction. The system uses self-contained security mechanisms where the vehicle proves its identity through cryptographic signatures, reducing the need for complex centralized authentication infrastructure.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If cryptographic authentication is used for all communications, then security against malicious attacks is improved, but processing time and energy consumption are worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidenergy consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

Cryptographic authentication is applied selectively to critical communications rather than all data transmissions. Full cryptographic verification is used for safety-critical messages such as control commands, authentication handshakes, and configuration updates. For non-critical telemetry and status data, lighter-weight authentication or trust-based communication is used. This partial application of cryptographic measures maintains security for essential functions while reducing overall computational burden and energy consumption.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The cryptographic system uses different key lengths and algorithm complexities based on the security requirements of specific communications. For high-security transactions, stronger cryptographic parameters are applied, while for lower-risk communications, optimized algorithms with reduced computational requirements are used. The system dynamically adjusts cryptographic parameter strength based on the criticality of the data being transmitted, balancing security needs with energy consumption constraints.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS11618394B2Vehicle secure messages based on a vehicle private key
Publication Date: 2023.04.04 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC
  • US11618394B2 patent drawing
  • US11618394B2 patent drawing
  • US11618394B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An example apparatus comprises a processing resource coupled to a memory resource. The processing resource may be configured to execute instructions stored on the memory resource to generate a first secure key including a private key stored by a vehicle, generate a first secure message including the first secure key, transmit the first secure message over a vehicle bus to a vehicle part associated with the vehicle, and receive, from the vehicle part, a second secure message including at least one of a vehicle identification number (VIN) and a configuration parameter corresponding to the vehicle part in response to a determination that the first secure key matches a secure key corresponding to the vehicle part.