Vehicle Remote Start Verification via Server-Mediated Security Keys
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional vehicle starting methods using mobile terminals are insecure due to transparent transmission of security information, leading to potential leakage and unauthorized vehicle access.
Innovation Solution
A server-based system that securely transmits first and second security information to both the mobile terminal and telematics box using secure protocols, enabling dual verification of vehicle start instructions to prevent leakage and unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If NFC or Bluetooth is used for communication between mobile terminal and telematics box, then the communication can be established, but security information is transparently transmitted and may be leaked
Solution Approach 1:
A server is introduced as an intermediary between the mobile terminal and the telematics box. The server receives the vehicle start instruction from the mobile terminal, verifies it using first security information, generates a second vehicle start instruction with second security information, and sends it to the telematics box. This intermediary architecture prevents direct transparent transmission of security information between the terminal and vehicle, thereby eliminating the security leakage risk associated with NFC and Bluetooth communications.
2Ease of operation
If virtual vehicle key is used to start vehicle, then convenience is improved, but security information transparency transmission enables malicious starting
Solution Approach 1:
The server acts as a trusted intermediary that mediates all communication between the mobile terminal and the telematics box. It implements dual verification using first security information (for verifying the terminal's instruction) and second security information (for generating the response to the vehicle). This intermediary verification mechanism maintains the convenience of virtual key usage while preventing malicious starting by ensuring that only authenticated instructions are executed.
Solution Approach 2:
The server performs preliminary verification of the vehicle start instruction using first security information before generating and sending the second vehicle start instruction to the telematics box. This preliminary action ensures that invalid or malicious instructions are filtered out before they reach the vehicle system, preventing malicious starting while maintaining ease of operation for legitimate users.
3Reliability
If server-based secure transmission is implemented, then security information leakage is prevented, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The server consolidates the complexity of secure transmission management in a centralized location rather than distributing it across multiple devices. The server is responsible for generating and managing both first security information (for terminal verification) and second security information (for vehicle verification), as well as implementing the verification logic. This centralization prevents security information leakage while avoiding the need to increase complexity at the terminal or vehicle ends.
Data Source
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AI summary
A method for starting a vehicle and a related device are disclosed. The method includes: A server (102) sends obtained first security information and obtained second security information to a mobile terminal (101) and a telematics box (103) respectively, so that the telematics box (103) can verify, by using the first security information and the second security information, a vehicle start instruction sent by the mobile terminal (101). When the verification succeeds, the telematics box (103) controls the vehicle to start. The server (102) transmits security information to the mobile terminal (101) and the telematics box (103) through an encrypted secure transmission channel or an encrypted secure transmission protocol, to avoid plaintext transmission of the security information between the mobile terminal (101) and the telematics box (103), thereby avoiding leakage of the security information, and reducing a risk that the vehicle is maliciously started. In addition, even if the vehicle is relatively far away from the mobile terminal (101), the telematics box (103) and the mobile terminal (101) can still obtain the security information sent by the server. Therefore, a transmission process of the security information may not be restricted by a distance between the vehicle and the mobile terminal (101).