In-Vehicle Tunnel Frames With TMAC for Low-Latency Message Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
In-vehicle communication networks face challenges in ensuring the authenticity and security of messages transmitted over bus-based communication systems, particularly in the context of time-critical vehicle functions, where malicious frames can be injected, and existing security measures often involve higher protocol layers, increasing processing time.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a controller that generates secure tunnel frames by computing a tunnel frame message authentication code (TMAC) based on message characteristics, optionally with freshness values and encrypted headers, to ensure secure communication between network nodes across different bus-based systems.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If security measures are implemented at higher protocol layers, then message authentication and security are improved, but processing time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the security implementation by introducing a dedicated security layer between the data link layer and network layer. This security layer handles authentication and encryption operations separately, allowing the underlying data link layer to maintain its time-critical functions while security operations are performed in a dedicated processing domain, thus reducing overall processing time impact.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary security layer that mediates between the data link layer and network layer. This intermediary handles all security-critical operations including authentication, encryption, and decryption, allowing the time-critical data link layer to operate efficiently while security functions are performed by the specialized intermediary layer.
2Reliability
If encryption is applied to all headers, then security is improved, but processing overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by selectively encrypting only specific header fields that contain sensitive information (such as source and destination addresses, message ID) while leaving other non-sensitive header fields unencrypted. This selective approach maintains security for critical information while reducing processing overhead compared to encrypting entire headers.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements partial encryption of headers rather than full encryption. Only the necessary sensitive portions of headers are encrypted, which provides adequate security while significantly reducing the computational overhead associated with encrypting entire header structures.
3Reliability
If message authentication codes are computed for all messages, then authentication reliability is improved, but processing time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary action by pre-computing and caching authentication codes for frequently accessed or high-priority messages. When time-critical messages need to be transmitted, pre-computed authentication codes can be used immediately, reducing real-time processing time while maintaining authentication reliability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies partial authentication by computing message authentication codes selectively based on message priority and type. Time-critical messages may use pre-computed or simplified authentication mechanisms, while less time-sensitive messages undergo full authentication processing, thus balancing reliability with processing time requirements.
Data Source
AI summary
A controller may receive a set of messages provided by one or more network nodes included in an in-vehicle communication network. The controller may determine a security pattern associated with generating a tunnel frame including the set of messages. The controller may identify one or more messages from the set of messages based on the security pattern. The controller may compute a tunnel frame message authentication code (TMAC) based on one or more characteristics of the one or more messages. The controller may generate the tunnel frame, the tunnel frame including the TMAC and the set of messages.