Formally Verified Trusted Computing Base for Side-Channel Protection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional virtualization systems lack robust security measures to protect against microarchitecture-based side channel attacks and ensure isolation between guest operating systems, leading to potential leaks of forensic data and telemetry, as well as inadequate policy enforcement for resource access and communication.

Innovation Solution

A formally verified trusted computing base is implemented, comprising a formally verified microkernel, virtual machine monitor (VMM), virtual machine introspection (VMI), and active security policy enforcer (ASPE), which provides continuous monitoring and enforcement of policies at the virtualization layer, ensuring isolation and secure resource access without modifying guest operating systems.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Object-affected harmful factors

If conventional virtualization systems are used, then ease of operation and compatibility with unmodified guest OSs is maintained, but security protection against side channel attacks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection against side channel attacksVSAvoidvirtualization layer complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The virtualization layer is segmented into distinct hyper- processes (VMM, VMI, ASPE) that operate independently but cooperate through formal interfaces. This segmentation allows each component to be formally verified separately while collectively providing comprehensive security protection against side channel attacks without overwhelming complexity in any single component.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Formally verified contracts serve as intermediaries between the microkernel and hyper-processes, and between different hyper-processes themselves. These contracts mediate interactions by precisely specifying allowed behaviors, enabling security protection through formal verification while maintaining operational simplicity through standardized interfaces.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If formal verification is applied to all components, then system reliability and security isolation are improved, but device complexity and verification effort increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveisolation between guest operating systemsVSAvoidformal verification complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system is divided into independently verifiable units (microkernel, VMM, VMI, ASPE) that each have formal contracts specifying their isolation guarantees. This segmentation enables targeted formal verification of critical isolation boundaries while reducing overall verification complexity through modular approaches.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Formal contracts use precise mathematical parameters to specify isolation properties, allowing reliability to be proven through formal logic rather than extensive testing. The contracts define exact conditions for isolation, enabling automated verification tools to prove security properties without manual complexity analysis.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Object-affected harmful factors

If active security policy enforcement is implemented, then policy enforcement capability is improved, but system performance and processing overhead increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepolicy violation preventionVSAvoidsystem processing throughput
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

Security policies are enforced proactively by the ASPE hyper-process that continuously monitors system state and preemptively blocks potential violations before they occur. This preliminary action approach prevents policy violations without requiring reactive response to every system event, reducing processing overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The VMI hyper-process provides self-service capabilities that allow the system to automatically detect and report security-relevant events without requiring constant manual intervention or extensive processing. The system monitors its own state efficiently, enabling policy enforcement with minimal performance impact.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS20250284520A1Formally Verified Trusted Computing Base with Active Security and Policy Enforcement
Publication Date: 2025.09.11 BEDROCK SYSTEMS INC
  • US20250284520A1 patent drawing
  • US20250284520A1 patent drawing
  • US20250284520A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A formally verified trusted computing base with active security and policy enforcement is described. The formally verified trusted computing base includes a formally verified microkernel and multiple formally verified hyper-processes including a virtual machine monitor (VMM), virtual machine introspection (VMI), policy enforcers including an active security policy enforcer (ASPE), and a virtual switch. The active security and policy enforcement continuously monitors for semantic behavior detection or policy violations and enforces the policies at the virtualization layer. Further, policies can be attached to the network layer to provide granular control of the communication of the computing device.