Virtual Timer Noise Injection for Side-Channel Attack Prevention

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Solution Overview

Problem

In multi-tenant computing environments, malicious tasks can steal sensitive information from security-sensitive tasks by observing the response time of shared hardware resources, posing a significant risk due to the lack of accurate time stamp counters with sufficient granularity.

Innovation Solution

Introducing a virtual timer value that is derived from the hardware timer value and a random number, either by injecting noise into the timer value or introducing an artificial delay, to prevent malicious tasks from reliably using the time stamp counter for side-channel attacks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If a hardware timer value is provided to tasks for timing operations, then task execution accuracy is improved, but security against side-channel attacks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetiming accuracyVSAvoidside-channel attack risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a virtual timer as an intermediary layer between the hardware timer and tasks. The virtual timer receives the hardware timer value and transforms it by adding noise or artificial delays before providing the modified timer value to tasks. This mediator protects the hardware timer from direct exposure to malicious tasks while still providing timing functionality to legitimate tasks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a virtual copy of the hardware timer value through the virtual timer mechanism. Instead of providing direct access to the real hardware timer value, the system generates a virtual timer value that mimics the functionality of the hardware timer but includes security modifications such as noise injection or artificial delays, thereby preventing side-channel attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

2Productivity

If timer values are shared across multiple tenants on the same computing device, then resource utilization is improved, but security risk from malicious tasks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveresource utilizationVSAvoidinformation theft risk
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the timer access mechanism by creating separate virtual timer instances for different tenants or tasks. Each task receives its own virtual timer value that is derived from the hardware timer but modified independently. This segmentation allows multiple tenants to share the hardware timer resource while isolating them from each other, preventing malicious tasks from observing or interfering with other tenants' timing operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The virtual timer acts as an intermediary that manages timer value distribution to multiple tenants. It receives the hardware timer value and provides customized virtual timer values to each tenant, applying security measures such as noise injection or artificial delays. This intermediary layer enables secure multi-tenant resource sharing by preventing direct access to the hardware timer while maintaining resource utilization efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Measurement precision

If the hardware timer value is provided directly to tasks, then timing precision for security-sensitive tasks is improved, but vulnerability to timing-based attacks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetiming precisionVSAvoidsecurity reliability
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent modifies the timer value parameters by introducing controlled noise or artificial delays to the hardware timer value. The virtual timer changes the timing parameters in a way that preserves functional timing accuracy for legitimate operations while disrupting the precision required for timing-based side-channel attacks. This parameter modification maintains security reliability without completely sacrificing timing precision.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS10146935B1Noise injected virtual timer
Publication Date: 2018.12.04 AMAZON TECH INC
  • US10146935B1 patent drawing
  • US10146935B1 patent drawing
  • US10146935B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Techniques are described for injecting noise in a timer value provided to an instruction requesting the timer value. A plurality of tasks may execute on a processor, wherein the processor may comprise one or more processing cores and each task may include a plurality of computer executable instructions. In accordance with one technique for injecting noise in the timer value, a request for a first timer value is received by one or more computer executable instructions belonging to a first task from the plurality of tasks, and in response, a second timer value is provided to the first task instead of the first timer value, wherein the second timer value is derived from the first timer value and a random number.