Virtualized Certificate Provisioning for Verifiable VM Attestation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing virtualized computing platforms face challenges in providing a verifiable and explicit link between the attestation data of different layers, particularly in scenarios with a large number of virtual machines running on the same hypervisor, where the layer binding problem is difficult to solve, leading to inefficiencies in deep attestation processes.
Innovation Solution
Establish secure channels between the hypervisor and a verification entity, and between each virtual machine and the verification entity, using root of trust primitives to ensure that only layers capable of utilizing root of trust services can originate these channels, thereby providing a verifiable and explicit link between the hardware layer hosting the root of trust, the hypervisor, and the virtual machines.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If a single secure channel is used between the hypervisor and verification entity for all virtual machines, then device complexity is reduced, but measurement precision of layer binding deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the attestation process into two distinct phases: a first attestation phase where the hypervisor establishes a secure channel with the verification entity and provides hypervisor attestation data, and a second attestation phase where each virtual machine establishes its own secure channel with the verification entity using cryptographic data from the first phase. This segmentation allows individual verification of each layer while maintaining overall system manageability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic data as an intermediary element that bridges the first and second attestation phases. The verification entity sends cryptographic data through the first secure channel, and this same cryptographic data is used to establish the second secure channels between virtual machines and the verification entity. This intermediary creates a verifiable link between layers without requiring a single complex channel.
2Measurement precision
If separate secure channels are established for each virtual machine, then layer binding verification is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs preliminary actions in the first attestation phase by establishing the secure channel between the hypervisor and verification entity, and by having the verification entity generate and distribute cryptographic data to all virtual machines through this first channel. This preliminary setup eliminates the need for each virtual machine to independently negotiate secure channel parameters, thereby reducing the complexity of managing multiple separate channels while maintaining precise layer binding verification.
3Reliability
If deep attestation is performed for all layers, then reliability of attestation is improved, but loss of time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent structures the attestation process as periodic action with two distinct phases. The first phase (hypervisor attestation) establishes secure channels and distributes cryptographic data, while the second phase (virtual machine attestation) uses these pre-established channels for individual verification. This periodic structure allows the system to perform comprehensive deep attestation of all layers while reducing overall time loss by reusing the secure channel infrastructure across multiple virtual machines rather than establishing new channels for each verification.
Data Source
Figure 1~2A
Figure 2B~4
Figure 3
AI summary
The invention concerns a method (RFA) for providing certificates implemented by a virtualised computing platform (PIV) comprising a root of trust (RoT), a hypervisor (VMM) and at least one virtual machine (VM1, VM2), the hypervisor implementing one virtualised root of trust (vRoT1, vRoT2) per virtual machine and offering root of trust (RoT) services, this method comprising: - a step (F10) of establishing a first secure channel (CSO) between the hypervisor and a verification entity (EV); - a step (F20) of sending certification data (DA_VMM) of the hypervisor in the first secure channel to the verification entity; - a step (F30) in which the hypervisor receives, in the first secure channel, from the verification entity, at least one piece of cryptographic data (TOK); - a step (F50) of establishing a second secure channel (CS1, CS2) between each virtual machine and the verification entity (EV); - a step (F60) of sending certification data (DA_VM1, DA_VM2) of each virtual machine in the second secure channel established for the virtual machine, depending on the associated virtualised root of trust.