Virtual Machine Integrity via Measured Boot and Key Distribution
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Solution Overview
Problem
There is a need for ensuring the integrity and security of virtual machines and their hosting environments, particularly in ensuring that virtual machines are launched in a state compliant with predefined policies and that data stored on virtual storage devices remains secure from unauthorized access.
Innovation Solution
A measured boot process is performed on the host, where cryptographic keys are obtained only if the host is in a state that satisfies specific policies, allowing the decryption of virtual storage devices and the instantiation of virtual machines, with a key distribution service managing the distribution of keys to ensure compliance and security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a virtual machine is launched without verifying host state compliance, then the virtual machine can be instantiated quickly, but the integrity and security of the virtual machine cannot be assured
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs a measured boot process before virtual machine instantiation to establish a trusted state. The host state is measured and verified against policy requirements in advance, ensuring integrity assurance is established before the virtual machine launches, rather than during or after instantiation.
Solution Approach 2:
A key distribution service acts as an intermediary between the host state verification process and the virtual machine instantiation. This service receives measurements of the host state, verifies compliance with policies, and conditionally provides cryptographic keys needed for virtual machine startup, thereby enabling integrity verification without directly blocking the instantiation process.
2Ease of operation
If cryptographic keys are made accessible for virtual machine decryption, then data on virtual storage devices can be accessed, but unauthorized access and security breaches become more vulnerable
Solution Approach 1:
The system changes the state parameters of cryptographic keys based on host compliance status. When the host state satisfies policy requirements, keys are released in an unsealed state for data access. When compliance is not met, keys remain sealed or are not released, preventing unauthorized access while maintaining data accessibility under proper conditions.
Solution Approach 2:
The key distribution service serves as an intermediary that controls key availability based on policy verification. It receives host state measurements, evaluates compliance with security policies, and conditionally distributes cryptographic keys. This intermediary layer ensures data accessibility for authorized operations while blocking unauthorized access attempts.
3Reliability
If host state measurements are performed and verified against policies, then compliance and security are ensured, but the complexity of the system increases
Solution Approach 1:
The key distribution service acts as a specialized intermediary component that handles the complex tasks of state measurement collection, policy evaluation, and key management. By concentrating these complex functions in a dedicated service rather than distributing them throughout the system, the overall architecture remains manageable while still achieving comprehensive policy compliance assurance.
Solution Approach 2:
The measured boot process automatically performs state measurements and the key distribution service automatically evaluates compliance with policies without requiring manual intervention. The system self-verifies its own state and makes automated decisions about key release, reducing operational complexity while maintaining strong compliance assurance.
Data Source
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AI summary
Briefly, aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to virtual machines. In aspects, when a host is reset or powered on, a measured boot is performed. If the measured boot indicates that the host is in a state that satisfies a policy for gaining access to a cryptographic key, the cryptographic key may be obtained. The cryptographic key may be used, directly or indirectly, to decrypt data of a virtual storage device. This decrypted data may then be used to instantiate a virtual machine.