Volatile Encryption Key Management in Distributed Storage
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Solution Overview
Problem
Distributed storage systems face security risks when encryption keys are stored on the same resources as client data, making them vulnerable to data breaches, as hackers can access client data if the encryption keys are compromised.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a distributed storage system where customer-supplied encryption keys are stored only on volatile memory, with wrapped persistent encryption keys stored on non-volatile memory, and using a key map to unwrap and decrypt resources only when requested, ensuring that the encryption keys are deleted after use to prevent unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If encryption keys are stored on the same storage resources as client data, then data accessibility is improved, but security is worsened making the system vulnerable to data breaches
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the encryption key into two separate components: persistent encryption keys stored on non-volatile memory and volatile encryption keys stored only in volatile memory. This segmentation allows the persistent key to remain securely stored while the volatile key provides temporary access, resolving the contradiction between accessibility and security by separating the key's storage and usage functions.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces volatile encryption keys as an intermediary between the persistent encryption keys and the client data. The volatile key acts as a temporary mediator that enables decryption without exposing the persistent key, allowing data accessibility while maintaining security through the intermediary layer.
2Reliability
If encryption keys are persistently stored on storage resources, then key availability is improved, but the risk of data breach is worsened if the storage system is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the encryption key functionality into persistent storage (for availability) and volatile memory (for security). The persistent encryption key ensures key availability across system restarts, while the volatile encryption key provides temporary access without being stored on persistent media, thus resolving the contradiction between reliability and security risk.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent employs volatile encryption keys that are temporary and disposable, existing only in volatile memory during active use. These short-living keys enable data access without the need for persistent storage, reducing the attack surface while maintaining key availability through regeneration from the persistent key when needed.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If encryption keys are stored only on volatile memory, then security is improved by reducing breach risk, but key persistence is worsened requiring key re-provisioning
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments key storage into two layers: volatile memory for active decryption operations (improving security) and non-volatile memory for persistent key storage (eliminating re-provisioning time). This segmentation allows the system to benefit from both volatile and persistent storage characteristics without compromising either security or convenience.
Data Source
AI summary
A method of operating a distributed storage system includes receiving, at data processing hardware of the distributed storage system, a customer-supplied encryption key from a customer device (i.e., a client). The customer-supplied encryption key is associated with wrapped persistent encryption keys for encrypted resources of the distributed storage system. The wrapped persistent encryption keys are stored on one or more non-volatile memory hosts of the distributed storage system. The method also includes unwrapping, by the data processing hardware, a wrapped persistent encryption key that corresponds to a requested encrypted resource using the customer-supplied encryption key. The unwrapped persistent encryption key is configured to decrypt the requested encrypted resource. The method further includes decrypting, by the data processing hardware, the requested encrypted resource using the corresponding unwrapped persistent encryption key. After ceasing access of the decrypted resource, the method includes destroying, by the data processing hardware, the customer-supplied encryption key.