Tamper-Resistant Voting Ledger via Blockchain Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current electronic voting systems lack robust mechanisms for ensuring tamper resistance, voter anonymity, and secure vote counting, making them vulnerable to fraud and manipulation.
Innovation Solution
A method and system for online voting that utilizes secure public ledgers, such as blockchain, to distribute private and public keys anonymously to voters, encrypt votes, and record them on a public ledger, allowing for secure and transparent vote counting while maintaining voter anonymity and preventing tampering.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional electronic voting systems are used, then voting can be conducted electronically, but the system is vulnerable to tampering and fraud
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a public ledger (blockchain) as an intermediary between the voter's encrypted vote and the final count. The ledger immutably records votes without allowing modification, serving as a trusted mediator that prevents tampering while maintaining electronic voting functionality
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces traditional centralized electronic voting infrastructure with a distributed ledger system. Instead of relying on vulnerable central servers, the system uses cryptographic principles and distributed consensus to achieve tamper-resistant vote storage and counting
2Measurement precision
If voter information is stored centrally for verification, then vote verification is possible, but voter anonymity is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments voter information into separate components: public keys are stored on the ledger for verification, while private keys remain with voters for encryption. This segmentation allows verification of vote integrity without exposing voter identity or linking votes to specific individuals
Solution Approach 2:
Cryptographic keys serve as intermediaries that enable verification without revealing identity. The public key verifies the encrypted vote's authenticity and integrity, while the private key protects voter anonymity by allowing only the voter to decrypt and verify their own vote
3Object-affected harmful factors
If physical polling stations are used, then voting security is maintained, but accessibility and convenience are reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces physical polling station infrastructure with a digital system based on cryptographic principles and distributed ledgers. This substitution maintains security through immutability and transparency while enabling remote voting access from any location with internet connectivity
Solution Approach 2:
The system enables voters to independently verify their own votes through cryptographic confirmation without requiring physical presence at polling stations or intervention by election officials. The distributed ledger provides self-verifying transparency that eliminates the need for centralized physical oversight
4Loss of information
If encryption is applied to protect votes, then voter privacy is maintained, but vote counting complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses encrypted copies of votes stored on the public ledger. The encrypted vote data can be freely copied and verified without decryption, allowing multiple independent countings while maintaining voter privacy. The encryption itself becomes part of the verifiable record rather than a barrier to counting
Data Source
AI summary
There is disclosed an electronic voting system for tamper resistant voting. In some embodiments of a system and/or method for allows a voter to verify that his vote was recorded properly and/or allows public counting of votes by any entity. For example, the system may record information on a distributed ledger that prevents changing of votes. For example, enough data may be available to each voter to check that his vote was recorded properly and/or to substantiate and/or prove if it was not recorded properly. For example, public data may be recorded anonymously such that a third party may be able to access the number of votes, but not the identify of individual voters. Optionally, the individual voter may be supplied a way to substantiate a claim that he voted for either party of the election.