Wallet MAC Authentication for PAN-Hidden Checkout

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Solution Overview

Problem

Theft of payment instrument data, such as credit card information, is prevalent due to skimming and other transaction interception methods, compromising both users and merchants.

Innovation Solution

A three-way authentication system using challenge passphrases and encryption ensures secure transactions by encrypting a nonce or challenge, allowing a transaction processor to confirm user interaction with a merchant and substituting the user's PAN, while keeping the PAN data hidden from merchants and acquirers.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional payment processing is used where merchants handle PAN data directly, then transaction processing is simple and direct, but payment instrument data is vulnerable to theft through skimming and interception

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of payment instrument dataVSAvoidcomplexity of authentication system
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a wallet application as an intermediary between the user and the merchant. The wallet app generates and manages cryptographic keys, creates MACs for authentication, and handles challenge-response protocols. This intermediary layer protects PAN data by ensuring it never leaves the user's device, while still enabling secure transaction processing through the added authentication complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If PAN data is transmitted to merchants for transaction processing, then transaction approval can be obtained directly, but PAN data is exposed to potential compromise and skimming

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection of PAN dataVSAvoidtime for authentication and key verification
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary authentication actions before PAN data is ever exposed. The wallet application pre-generates cryptographic keys and establishes authentication protocols in advance. During transactions, the pre-established MAC verification and challenge-response mechanisms enable rapid authentication without requiring PAN transmission, thus protecting data while maintaining efficient processing timing.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If cryptographic authentication protocols are implemented to protect PAN data, then security is improved, but transaction processing complexity and computational requirements increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoidcomputational energy for encryption and decryption
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies cryptographic operations locally on the user's device rather than requiring cloud-based verification. The wallet application performs MAC generation, encryption, and decryption operations locally using stored cryptographic keys. This local processing approach enhances security by keeping sensitive operations offline while managing computational energy requirements through efficient local execution rather than continuous network communication.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS12587386B2Checkout with MAC
Publication Date: 2026.03.24 VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION
  • US12587386B2 patent drawing
  • US12587386B2 patent drawing
  • US12587386B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system for protecting personal information uses a challenge and an encrypted copy of the challenge in the form of a message authentication code (MAC) to provide authentication among multiple parties. The challenge is received by a first party from a second party. The challenge is encrypted by the first party to form the MAC and then both the challenge and the MAC are returned to the second party. The second party authenticates the first party by confirming the challenge. The second party sends the MAC and challenge to the third party. The third party decrypts the MAC using a key shared with the first party. When the decrypted MAC matches the challenge, the first party is authenticated to the third party. The process is applicable to transaction processing to limit compromise of payment instrument details.