Wireless Network Message Integrity with Proxy-Modifiable Headers

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Solution Overview

Problem

In wireless communication networks with service-based architectures, interposing a service communication proxy (SCP) between consumer and producer network functions complicates integrity and confidentiality protection, as direct TLS-based protection is not feasible for indirect communications.

Innovation Solution

Integrity protection is applied to a portion of the message, such as the body, while allowing the SCP to modify the unprotected header, using a digitally signed assertion with integrity verification information, enabling proxy functions like path modification.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If a service communication proxy (SCP) is interposed between consumer and producer network functions, then signaling aggregation, routing, load balancing, and message parameter harmonization are improved, but communication integrity and confidentiality protection deteriorate because direct TLS-based protection is no longer feasible

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignaling aggregation and routing efficiencyVSAvoidcommunication integrity protection
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The message is segmented into two parts: a protected portion (body) and an unprotected portion (headers). The integrity verification information is generated only for the protected portion, allowing the SCP to modify unprotected headers while maintaining integrity protection for the message body.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different parts of the message have different integrity protection properties. The message body is integrity-protected while the headers are left unprotected, allowing each part to serve its specific function - the body maintains data integrity and the headers allow SCP modification for routing purposes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

2Reliability

If integrity verification information is generated for the entire message, then communication integrity is improved, but the ability of the SCP to modify message headers for routing purposes deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage integrity verificationVSAvoidSCP message modification capability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The message is divided into protected and unprotected portions. The integrity verification information is calculated only for the protected portion (message body), which enables the SCP to freely modify unprotected portions (headers) without affecting integrity verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The integrity protection is applied locally only to the message body rather than the entire message. This localized approach preserves the SCP's ability to modify headers while maintaining integrity protection where it is most needed - in the message payload.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS12425858B2Integrity verification in a wireless communication network
Publication Date: 2025.09.23 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)
  • US12425858B2 patent drawing
  • US12425858B2 patent drawing
  • US12425858B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Network equipment implements a network function in a wireless communication network. The network equipment obtains integrity verification information that is a function of only a portion of a message. The message is either a request for a service to be consumed by the network function or a response to a request for a service provided by the network function. The network equipment digitally signs an assertion that includes the integrity verification information, and then sends the message and the digitally signed assertion to a service communication proxy. Other network equipment that receives the message and the digitally signed assertion may check an integrity of the portion of the message, based on integrity verification information that the other network equipment obtains and on the integrity verification information included in the digitally signed assertion.