Zero-Day Attack Detection via File Activity Timing Correlation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current security systems are ineffective in detecting zero-day attacks due to their secretive nature and reliance on antivirus or intrusion-detection signatures, which fail to recognize vulnerabilities not yet publicly disclosed, making it difficult to analyze and counter these attacks.

Innovation Solution

A system and method that correlate file activity on endpoint devices with known security vulnerabilities by comparing timing information to determine if a zero-day attack has occurred, using databases of security vulnerabilities and file activity to identify potential exploits before public disclosure.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional security systems use antivirus or intrusion-detection signatures, then they can detect known threats, but they fail to detect zero-day attacks that exploit undisclosed vulnerabilities

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoidability to detect unknown threats
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by collecting and analyzing file activity data before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. It proactively monitors endpoint devices for suspicious file activities and compares timing information against vulnerability disclosure databases to identify potential zero-day exploits before traditional signature-based systems can detect them.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

Instead of waiting for vulnerability signatures to be created and distributed, the system inverts the approach by starting with known vulnerability disclosure dates and working backward to identify file activities that occurred before those dates. This reverse chronological analysis allows detection of exploits that precede public vulnerability information.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

2Reliability

If attackers maintain secrecy of vulnerabilities and exploits, then they can successfully execute zero-day attacks, but it becomes difficult to detect or prevent these attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattack success rateVSAvoiddetection difficulty
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The system establishes feedback loops by continuously monitoring file activity on endpoint devices and comparing observed activities against databases of known vulnerabilities and their disclosure dates. When file activities are detected that precede vulnerability disclosures, the system generates alerts and initiates further analysis to confirm potential zero-day exploits, creating a feedback mechanism that improves detection over time.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The system introduces intermediary databases that serve as mediators between attacker actions and detection systems. These databases store vulnerability disclosure information, file activity data, and timing information, acting as intermediaries that enable comparison and analysis without requiring direct access to attacker communications or proprietary vulnerability information.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Reliability

If security systems analyze all files for threats, then they may detect attacks, but they waste resources on benign files and miss subtle zero-day indicators

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection thoroughnessVSAvoidanalysis efficiency
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The system applies local quality by focusing analysis resources on specific files and time periods that exhibit characteristics consistent with zero-day exploits. Instead of uniformly analyzing all files, it identifies files with suspicious timing patterns (activities occurring before vulnerability disclosures) and concentrates computational resources on these high-priority targets, improving both detection thoroughness and efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes parameters by dynamically adjusting analysis depth and resource allocation based on risk indicators. When files exhibit timing patterns consistent with zero-day activities, the system increases analysis intensity; for benign files, it reduces analysis depth. This parameter adjustment optimizes the balance between detection thoroughness and processing efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS9158915B1Systems and methods for analyzing zero-day attacks
Publication Date: 2015.10.13 GEN DIGITAL INC
  • US9158915B1 patent drawing
  • US9158915B1 patent drawing
  • US9158915B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A computer-implemented method for analyzing zero-day attacks may include 1) identifying, within a database of known security vulnerabilities, disclosure timing information that indicates when a security vulnerability was publicly disclosed, 2) correlating a file with the security vulnerability by searching a database of file activity for at least one file that is associated with an attack that exploits the security vulnerability, 3) identifying, within the database of file activity, activity timing information indicating timing of one or more activities that involve the file and that occurred on endpoint computing devices before the security vulnerability was publicly disclosed, and 4) comparing the disclosure timing information with the activity timing information to investigate a potential zero-day attack that exploits the security vulnerability. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.