Zero-Knowledge Identity Authentication via Hash-Based Key Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current identity authentication methods in cryptography, such as PKI and TKI, face challenges in securely proving ownership of keys without disclosing sensitive information, particularly in resisting quantum computational attacks and ensuring data integrity.
Innovation Solution
A zero-knowledge proof method using hash values and a public medium like a blockchain or bulletin board system, where a user selects and hashes keys with a user identifier, allowing the certificate authority to verify ownership without receiving the actual keys, thus implementing a secure and tamper-proof authentication process.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional identity authentication methods (PKI/TKI) are used to prove key ownership, then the authentication process can be completed, but the user must disclose sensitive key information to the certificate authority, creating security vulnerabilities
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces hash values as an intermediary between the key and the certificate authority. Instead of directly disclosing the key, the user computes hash values of the key and submits these hash values to the certificate authority for verification. This intermediary mechanism allows authentication while preserving the secrecy of the actual key material.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates a cryptographic copy (hash value) of the key that can be used for verification purposes without revealing the original key. The hash value serves as a fingerprint or representation of the key that maintains its identifying properties while being safe to disclose and store publicly.
2Reliability
If key information is disclosed during authentication to prove ownership, then the certificate authority can verify identity, but the system becomes vulnerable to quantum computational attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The hash function acts as a protective intermediary that transforms the key into a form suitable for public verification. The certificate authority can verify ownership by comparing hash values without ever seeing the actual key, thereby eliminating quantum attack vectors that would require access to the key material itself.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the key from its original form into a hash value representation, changing its parameter state. This transformation maintains the essential property of uniqueness and verifiability while removing the vulnerability to quantum attacks that affects the original key material.
3Reliability
If the user submits all keys for verification, then complete authentication can be performed, but the complexity of the authentication process increases significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential verification information (hash values) from the complete key set, separating what is needed for authentication from what is not. This allows the certificate authority to perform verification on a simplified representation rather than processing all key materials, reducing computational complexity while maintaining authentication completeness.
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication process is segmented into distinct steps: key hashing by the user, hash value submission, and verification by the certificate authority. This segmentation separates the computationally intensive hashing operation from the verification operation, allowing each party to perform only their designated task and reducing overall system complexity.
Data Source
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AI summary
Disclosed are methods and systems for identity authentication, and a computing device and a storage medium. The method of identity authentication at the user is provided to prove to the certificate authority that a key is owned by a user. The method can comprise selecting a certain number of keys from a set of keys of the user, obtaining a hash value of a correspondence between each key in the certain number of keys and a user identifier of the user respectively, and transmitting the obtained hash values to the certificate authority, and after receiving from the certificate authority a notification regarding a first subset of hash values, sending keys corresponding to the first subset of hash values as a first subset of keys to the certificate authority. The first subset of hash values can be selected by the certificate authority from the obtained hash values. Zero knowledge proof can be achieved with the technical solution of the disclosure.