Zero-Trust Cloud Deployment via Metadata-Derived Key Encryption
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
In cloud computing, secrets such as private information and keys are inadequately protected during deployment, as actors with administrative privileges may misuse their access, leading to exposure of confidential data, even in zero-trust environments.
Innovation Solution
A zero-trust cloud deployment method is implemented by creating a vault that locks down virtual machines and encrypts secrets using keys derived from unique and immutable deployment metadata, preventing access from outside the virtual machine, even for users with administrative privileges.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If secrets are stored in cloud virtual machines with administrative access, then cloud deployment flexibility and scalability are improved, but security of secrets deteriorates due to potential misuse by administrative users
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts secrets from the virtual machine file system and stores them in a separate secure location (e.g., HSM, secure enclave). The virtual machine only receives encrypted references to these secrets, not the secrets themselves. This separation ensures that even if the VM is compromised or cloned, the actual secrets remain protected outside the VM instance.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent performs preliminary encryption of secrets using deployment-specific keys before the virtual machine is even deployed. The encryption keys are derived from immutable deployment metadata (such as cloud provider credentials, account IDs, and deployment timestamps) that are unique to each deployment instance. This preliminary action ensures that secrets are protected from the moment of deployment creation, preventing any potential misuse by administrative users.
2Ease of operation
If administrative users have access to deployed virtual machines, then operational capabilities are improved, but risk of unauthorized access and cloning attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic key derivation where encryption keys are generated based on unique deployment metadata that changes with each deployment instance. This means that even if administrative users have access to one deployed VM, they cannot access secrets from other deployments because each deployment has its own unique key derived from its specific metadata. This dynamic approach maintains operational capabilities while preventing unauthorized access across different deployment instances.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies different security measures to different parts of the system. Secrets are encrypted with deployment-specific keys that are only valid within that particular deployment context. Administrative users can perform operations within their authorized VM instances, but the security properties (encryption keys) are locally specific to each deployment, preventing lateral movement or cloning attacks.
3Reliability
If secrets are encrypted with deployment-specific keys, then security against cloning attacks is improved, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service key derivation where the encryption keys are automatically generated from immutable deployment metadata that is already present in the cloud environment. The system uses existing cloud provider credentials, account IDs, and deployment timestamps to derive keys without requiring manual key generation or management. This automated approach reduces key management complexity while maintaining strong protection against cloning attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses a universal key derivation function that can work with multiple types of deployment metadata (cloud provider credentials, account IDs, deployment timestamps, resource identifiers). This single derivation mechanism serves multiple purposes: generating encryption keys, verifying deployment authenticity, and preventing cloning. By making the key management system multi-functional, the patent reduces overall complexity despite the enhanced security requirements.
Data Source
AI summary
Techniques for zero-trust cloud deployment are described herein. In accordance with various embodiments, a device including a processor and a non-transitory memory derives a key from deployment metadata of a virtual machine, where the deployment metadata change with each deployment of the virtual machine. The device then encrypts secrets using the key to bind the key to the virtual machine. The device further deploys the virtual machine in a cloud using the deployment metadata, including loading the encrypted secrets to the deployed virtual machine in the cloud.