Zero Trust Endpoint Architecture Using Formally Verified Microkernel
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional virtualization systems lack effective isolation of identity, confidentiality, and permissions in endpoint devices, leading to vulnerabilities in zero trust environments, where critical information can be subverted due to incomplete isolation across devices.
Innovation Solution
A computing device architecture that includes formally verified microkernels, virtual machine monitors, and a confidence level determination engine to enforce zero trust policies by isolating critical components and managing access based on identity information and system actions, ensuring that only authorized actions are permitted.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If conventional virtualization systems are used to run multiple operating systems on a single host, then resource utilization and productivity are improved, but security isolation and reliability deteriorate due to lack of effective isolation of identity, confidentiality, and permissions
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the virtualization architecture into distinct isolation layers: a formally verified microkernel at the core, multiple virtual machine monitors (VMMs) as intermediate layers, and guest operating systems at the outer layer. Each layer operates in its own address space with controlled access, enabling simultaneous resource sharing while maintaining security boundaries. The microkernel provides fundamental isolation, while individual VMMs provide VM-specific isolation, resolving the contradiction between resource utilization and security isolation.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces formally verified VMMs as intermediary components between the microkernel and guest operating systems. These VMMs act as mediators that manage resource access, enforce isolation policies, and provide confidence level determination for system actions. The VMMs translate guest OS requests into microkernel operations while maintaining security boundaries, enabling productive multi-OS operation without compromising security isolation.
2Adaptability or versatility
If a software abstraction layer is introduced between hardware and operating systems to enable virtualization, then adaptability and versatility are improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The abstraction layer is segmented into modular components: the microkernel provides basic virtualization functions, while individual VMMs provide VM-specific management. This segmentation allows the system to achieve high adaptability through configurable VMM instances while managing complexity through clear separation of concerns. Each VMM is independently verified and manages specific VMs, preventing complexity from compounding across the entire system.
Solution Approach 2:
The microkernel is designed as a universal base layer that provides core virtualization functions applicable to multiple VMs and guest operating systems. By consolidating common functionality in the microkernel and allowing VMMs to specialize for specific VM requirements, the system achieves versatility without proportionally increasing overall complexity. The formally verified components provide universal security guarantees across different virtualization scenarios.
3Measurement precision
If virtual machine introspection is used to observe hardware states and events, then measurement precision and detection capability are improved, but loss of information increases due to potential subversion of critical information in untrusted environments
Solution Approach 1:
The VMM acts as an intermediary between the untrusted guest OS and the trusted observation point. It provides controlled access to hardware state information through virtual machine introspection while filtering and validating data before exposing it to management systems. The formally verified VMM ensures that observation capabilities are provided without allowing guest OS subversion of critical information, resolving the contradiction between detection precision and information protection.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses disposable virtual machine instances for observation and monitoring purposes. Temporary VMs can be created specifically for introspection tasks, gather necessary information, and then terminated. This approach provides precise measurement capabilities when needed while minimizing the risk of information subversion, as the observation environment does not persist long enough to be compromised by guest OS attacks.
Data Source
AI summary
A computing device includes a virtualized system including: a set of one or more virtual machines (VMs) that execute one or more guest operating systems, a set of one or more virtual machine monitors (VMMs) corresponding to the set of one or more VMs respectively: a formally verified microkernel to abstract hardware resources of the computing device, an isolated environment that is addressable only from the formally verified microkernel, the isolated environment including: a policy manager that manages a set of one or more policies for the virtualized system including installing the set of policies to a policy enforcement point, where the set of policies includes one or more zero trust policies, a confidence level determination engine that calculates a confidence level for a system or user action based at least on inputs including identity information, and provides the calculated confidence level to the policy manager. The policy enforcement point enforces the set of policies.