Zero-Trust Telemetry Encryption With Trust-Chain Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Inability to configure and transmit telemetry securely in a zero-trust computing environment leads to inadequate access control, as existing systems fail to adapt telemetry collection and encryption based on hardware location and trust chain validation, resulting in stale or inadequate data for continuous validation of access to protected resources.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a system where Information Handling Systems (IHS) generate telemetry, encrypt it using a symmetric fleet key, and transmit it securely within a zero-trust environment, with adaptive telemetry collection and transmission managed by a policy decision point and an adaptive telemetry orchestrator, ensuring telemetry is encrypted and adjusted based on hardware trust chain validation.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing systems collect and transmit telemetry data without adaptive encryption based on hardware location and trust chain validation, then the system operation is simple and straightforward, but the security and access control are inadequate
Solution Approach 1:
The system dynamically adapts telemetry collection and encryption based on hardware location and trust chain validation status. The policy decision point adjusts encryption requirements and telemetry parameters in real-time based on the current trust state of the IHS, transforming a static system into one that responds to changing security conditions.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes encryption parameters (such as encryption type, key management, and data transformation) based on the validated trust chain and hardware location. When trust is established, more secure encryption methods are applied; when trust is insufficient, telemetry collection or transmission is restricted, thereby resolving the security-complexity contradiction.
2Reliability
If telemetry is collected and transmitted without adaptive adjustment based on hardware trust chain validation, then the data transmission is continuous and uninterrupted, but the data becomes stale or inadequate for continuous validation
Solution Approach 1:
The policy decision point receives telemetry data and validates it against the trust chain status, then provides feedback by adjusting future telemetry collection parameters. This closed-loop feedback mechanism ensures that only relevant and current telemetry data is collected and transmitted, improving data quality while avoiding unnecessary transmissions that would reduce efficiency.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of continuously collecting and transmitting all telemetry data, the system performs partial action by selectively collecting only the necessary telemetry parameters based on current trust validation requirements. This reduces unnecessary data transmission while ensuring adequate data quality for security validation purposes.
3Reliability
If the system implements adaptive telemetry collection and encryption based on trust chain validation, then access control and security are improved, but the device complexity and implementation difficulty increase
Solution Approach 1:
The policy decision point acts as an intermediary between the IHS and the telemetry management system. It receives telemetry data, validates it against trust chain information, and makes access control decisions based on the validation results. This intermediary approach simplifies the overall system architecture by centralizing the complex validation logic in a dedicated component rather than distributing it throughout the entire system.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods that operate an Information Handling System (IHS) support secure telemetry for use in a zero-trust environment. Upon being initialized, the IHS retrieves a factory-provisioned resource locator of a service that provides the location of a policy decision point of the zero-trust environment. The IHS establishes an encrypted session with the policy decision point that is located using the factory-provisioned resource locator. Via the encrypted session, the IHS receives a symmetric key from the policy decision point, where the key may be fleet-wide key for encryption of a customer's telemetry. Telemetry that is generated by the sensors is identified when ready for transmission and encrypted using the symmetric key received from the policy decision point. The customer's encrypted telemetry can then be securely transmitted.