Secure communications in Passive Entry Passive Start (PEPS) systems

By using data reordering engine, cyclic redundancy verification module and advanced encryption standard encryption in the vehicle access system, combined with OOB pairing and near-field communication, the problem of insufficient security of Bluetooth low-power systems in vehicle access is solved, and the problem of insufficient security of Bluetooth low-power systems in vehicle access is realized. The secure data exchange between the vehicle and the portable communication device is enhanced, and the system's anti-attack capability is enhanced.

CN112384918BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05STRATTEC SECURITY CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN201980030453.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2019-05-08
Filing Date
2019-05-09
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2039-05-09

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Bluetooth-based low-power vehicle access systems are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, passive eavesdropping attacks, brute-force cracking attacks and relay attacks, resulting in insufficient security of vehicle data exchange.

Method used

Adopting a BLE-based security system, utilizing a data reordering engine, cyclic redundancy verification module and advanced encryption standard encryption, combined with OOB pairing and near-field communication, provides a multi-level security mechanism to ensure data between the vehicle and the portable communication device. Exchange security.

Benefits of technology

It effectively improves the security of the vehicle access system, prevents illegal intrusions and data leakage, and ensures users' safe and reliable access and control of the vehicle.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A system and method for secure communication between a vehicle and a portable communication device is disclosed. A system includes a vehicle access system included in a vehicle. The vehicle access system is configured to wirelessly receive a reordered message from the portable communication device, de-reorder the reordered message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein de-reordering the reordered message at a bit level includes swapping a bit at a first index position within the reordered message with a bit at a second index position within the reordered message, and initiating a vehicle operation based on the message.
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Description

[0001] Related Applications

[0002] This application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62 / 669,256, filed on May 9, 2018, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] Embodiments provided herein relate to a security mechanism for pairing Bluetooth modules, thereby enabling secure exchange of user-specific data between Bluetooth modules, and in particular, to addressing various Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)-based security attacks. Summary of the invention

[0004] Vehicle-based access systems have undergone many changes in technology over the years. Early vehicles relied primarily on mechanical locks and keys to ensure secure access to the interior of the vehicle. Later, keyless entry systems were introduced, which in some embodiments include a keypad mounted on the vehicle door and provide access to the vehicle after the user enters a password. More recently, remote keyless entry systems using handheld transmitters have been introduced. These handheld transmitters allow users to remotely lock and unlock the vehicle and typically operate over radio waves at approximately 300MHz to 450MHz.

[0005] The remote keyless entry (RKE) system has been further improved by introducing the passive entry passive start (PEPS) system. In these systems, the user does not need to manually operate a portable communication device to lock and unlock the vehicle, but only needs to carry the device (e.g., a key fob) with him. In particular, the user is only required to enter the vicinity of the vehicle (usually within 1 to 2 meters), and then exchange data between the key fob and the vehicle before unlocking the vehicle. The PEPS system usually operates on a radio frequency of 300MHz to 450MHz. However, the PEPS system can also operate at a radio frequency of 2.4GHz using Bluetooth or BLE technology, where the member device or slave device carried by the user communicates with the master device or host device in the vehicle through a BLE protocol based on 2.4GHz. As used herein, "Bluetooth" refers to a near-field wireless technology for exchanging data between devices over a short distance using short-wavelength ultra-high frequency (UFH) radio waves in the industrial, scientific and medical radio bands (from 2.400GHz to 2.485GHz).

[0006] For example, in some PEPS systems, when a user carrying a member device (key fob) is detected in a defined vicinity of the vehicle, a receiver installed in the vehicle (in the host device) is connected to the member device via the BLE protocol. The connection process may include authentication through a key exchange between the host device and the member device. The process of key exchange and verification is sometimes referred to as "pairing". In response to successful pairing, encrypted and secure data is exchanged between the host device and the member device, which allows control of various vehicle operations, such as unlocking the vehicle's doors to provide the user with access to the vehicle. PEPS systems with BLE communications operating at 2.4 GHz replace traditional systems operating at 300 MHz to 450 MHz, allowing smartphones or other portable communication devices to be used as keys for vehicles. For example, smartphones are typically equipped with Bluetooth technology and are widely used as a wireless medium for connecting to Bluetooth-enabled devices. Therefore, these systems allow users to interact with and access vehicles using smartphones instead of carrying separate traditional dedicated devices (such as key fobs). However, in some embodiments, a traditional key fob may also be upgraded with Bluetooth technology and thus may act as a primary device for communicating with the PEPS system, or in some embodiments, as a backup device for a user's primary device (e.g., a user's smartphone) in the event of damage or theft.

[0007] Thereafter, securing the pairing process of the vehicle and the portable communication device and the subsequent data exchange between the vehicle and the portable communication device represents a challenging and important security function associated with the BLE PEPS system. In particular, Bluetooth-based systems may be subject to various security attacks. These attacks include man-in-the-middle attacks, passive eavesdropping attacks, brute force attacks, replay attacks, and relay attacks.

[0008] Therefore, the systems and methods described herein provide a secure BLE-based PEPS system that utilizes Bluetooth technology to address security deficiencies, thereby providing users with secure and reliable access and control of their vehicles. In some embodiments, conventional automotive frequency bands are replaced by industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) band frequencies. This not only supports access to the vehicle using a key fob, but also supports access using other handheld devices such as smart phones and wearable devices. In various embodiments, methods that use the ISM band and use BLE as a wireless communication protocol to ensure the security of PEPS functions in the vehicle are utilized to perform various functions, including pairing, binding, user commands such as lock and unlock commands, etc. In addition, since the use of handheld communication devices with BLE communication capabilities (e.g., in key fobs and smart phones) can cause security threats, the embodiments described herein address such threats. In particular, the embodiments described herein provide security systems and methods that are strategically designed to consider various possible methods of violating the BLE communication protocol at different levels of the data stream to provide wirelessly exchanged user information and data. In some cases, the system and method provide various modules implemented in the application layer, such as a data reordering engine, a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) module, and an advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption, which can be provided separately from the security mechanisms provided by the protocol stack. Other security mechanisms provided by the BLE protocol stack, such as out-of-band (OOB) pairing (e.g., using near field communication (NFC)) and encryption (e.g., AES counter (CCM) with CBC-MAC) in the link layer (LL) can also be provided.

[0009] For example, embodiments disclosed herein provide a hands-free method for authorizing a user to securely access a vehicle. In some embodiments, the systems and methods described herein include an ultra-high frequency (UHF)-enabled module. The module communicates via an ultra-high frequency (UHF)-based communication protocol to understand each other and serve PEPS system functions such as positioning and secure data exchange. A secure method of learning and authenticating and performing data exchange between a host device and a member device provides secure access to the vehicle and prevents intruders from illegally authorizing access to the vehicle.

[0010] In particular, some embodiments provide a system for secure communication between a vehicle and a portable communication device. The system includes a vehicle access system included in a vehicle. The vehicle access system is configured to wirelessly receive a reordered message from the portable communication device, de-reorder the reordered message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein de-reordering the reordered message at a bit level includes swapping a bit at a first index position within the reordered message with a bit at a second index position within the reordered message, and initiating a vehicle operation based on the message.

[0011] Other embodiments provide a method for securely communicating between a vehicle and a portable communication device. The method includes: wirelessly receiving a reordered message from the portable communication device using a vehicle access system included in the vehicle; de-reordering the reordered message at a bit level using the vehicle access system to obtain a message, wherein de-reordering the reordered message at a bit level includes swapping a bit at a first index position within the reordered message with a bit at a second index position within the reordered message, and initiating a vehicle operation based on the message using the vehicle access system.

[0012] Another embodiment provides a vehicle access system installed in a vehicle. The vehicle access system includes a wireless near-field communication transceiver and an electronic processor. The wireless near-field communication transceiver is configured to: wirelessly receive a reordered message from a portable communication device; de-reorder the reordered message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein the de-reordering of the reordered message at a bit level includes swapping a bit at a first index position within the reordered message with a bit at a second index position within the reordered message; and provide the message to the electronic processor. The electronic processor is configured to initiate a vehicle operation based on the message.

[0013] Other aspects of the various embodiments provided herein will become apparent by consideration of the detailed description and accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0014] The accompanying drawings and the following detailed description are incorporated into and form a part of the specification, and are used to further illustrate embodiments of the concepts of the invention claimed, and to explain the various principles and advantages of these embodiments. In each individual view, the same reference numerals refer to the same or functionally similar elements.

[0015] Figure 1 A vehicle providing passive entry passive start (PEPS) functionality is shown according to some embodiments.

[0016] Figure 2 According to some embodiments Figure 1 A block diagram of a PEPS system included in a vehicle.

[0017] Figure 3 According to some embodiments Figure 2 The PEPS system includes a transceiver.

[0018] Figure 4 According to some embodiments Figure 2 The Vehicle Access System (VAS) included in the PEPS system.

[0019] Figure 5 shows a device configured to communicate with Figure 4Portable communication device for VAS communications.

[0020] Figure 6 According to some embodiments, Figure 4 VAS and Figure 5 between portable communication devices.

[0021] Figure 7 The flow of the OOB pairing mechanism provided by the core BLE protocol stack according to some embodiments is shown.

[0022] Figure 8 A flow is shown for securing application data and commands on the transmit leg of a PEPS system according to some embodiments.

[0023] Fig. 9 A method of generating an 8-byte random number and dividing the random number into 16-byte random numbers according to some embodiments is shown.

[0024] Fig.10 and Fig.11 A method of shuffling message bytes using a 16-byte random number according to some embodiments is shown.

[0025] Fig.12 A flow is shown for securing application data and commands on the receiving leg of a PEPS system according to some embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] One or more embodiments are described and illustrated in the following description and accompanying drawings. These embodiments are not limited to the specific details provided herein and may be modified in various ways. In addition, there may be other embodiments not described herein. In addition, the functions described herein as being performed by a component may be performed by multiple components in a distributed manner. Similarly, the functions performed by multiple components may be merged and performed by a single component. Similarly, the components described as performing specific functions may also perform additional functions not described herein. For example, a device or structure that is "configured" in a certain manner is configured at least in this manner, but may also be configured in an unlisted manner.

[0027] In addition, some embodiments described herein may include one or more electronic processors configured to perform the described functions by executing instructions stored in a non-transitory computer-readable medium. It should be understood that some embodiments may include one or more general or special processors (or "processing devices"), such as microprocessors, digital signal processors, custom processors, and field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and unique stored program instructions (including both software and firmware), which control one or more processors to implement some, most, or all of the methods and / or devices described herein in combination with certain non-processor circuits. Alternatively, some or all functions may be implemented by a state machine without stored program instructions, or in one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), where each function or some combination of some of the functions is implemented as custom logic. Of course, a combination of the two methods may be used. In particular, the systems and methods described herein and related functions, including passive entry passive start (PEPS) functions, may be implemented via hardware, software, firmware, system-on-chip technology, or a combination thereof.

[0028] Similarly, the embodiments described herein may be implemented as a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions executable by one or more electronic processors to perform the described functions. As used in this application, "non-transitory computer-readable medium" includes all computer-readable media, but does not include transient propagating signals. Thus, non-transitory computer-readable media may include, for example, ROM (read-only memory), RAM (random access memory), register memory, processor cache, or any combination thereof.

[0029] In addition, the words and terms used herein are for descriptive purposes and should not be considered limiting. For example, the use of "including," "comprising," "having," and variations thereof herein is meant to encompass the items listed thereafter and their equivalents and other items. The terms "connected" and "coupled" are used broadly and encompass both direct connections and couplings and indirect connections and couplings. Furthermore, "connected" and "coupled" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections or couplings, but may include direct or indirect electrical connections or couplings.

[0030] As described above, in a passive entry passive start (PEPS) system, a user carries a portable communication device that acts as a transceiver for communicating with a vehicle. In response to the portable communication device entering the vicinity of the vehicle, the portable communication device is paired and bound to a receiver included in the vehicle, such as in accordance with the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol. After pairing and binding, commands can be sent to and received by a controller of a vehicle access system (VAS) included in the vehicle. In many embodiments, pairing is the first part of the BLE communication process, and data exchange is the second part of the BLE communication. In the process provided by the BLE protocol stack, stakeholders in BLE communication know each other and share link layer (LL) encryption keys for LL encryption and decryption. Binding is also a process provided by the protocol stack in which stakeholders in the BLE connection store each other's information. The encryption key from the first pairing process is stored in a corresponding non-volatile memory to avoid the pairing process when reconnecting. Binding is a process in which devices list each other as trusted devices and bind each time after the first pairing.

[0031] Although PEPS systems improve the user experience as described above, PEPS systems (especially PEPS systems using the BLE protocol) may attract the attention of hackers and thieves who will look for loopholes and gaps in the security features provided by the core BLE protocol stack. For example, Bluetooth as a technology is vulnerable to attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, passive eavesdropping attacks, brute force attacks, replay attacks, and relay attacks. In a MITM BLE attack, the attacker passively eavesdrops on the communications between stakeholders in a BLE connection and sniffs the data exchanged between them. The embodiments described herein ensure the security of the pairing process and data communications, thereby improving the security of user data against various BLE-based attacks.

[0032] Figure 1 A vehicle 102 is shown that provides passive entry passive start (PEPS) functionality according to some embodiments. Figure 1 As shown in FIG. 1 , the vehicle 102 includes a vehicle access system (VAS) 150 and one or more transceivers. In some embodiments, as shown in FIG. Figure 1As shown in FIG. 1 , vehicle 102 includes transceivers 110, 120, 130, and 140 positioned within vehicle 102 (e.g., placed at four corners of the interior of vehicle 102) and optionally one or more transceivers 160, 170, 180, and 190 positioned on an exterior surface of vehicle 102 (e.g., placed at four exterior locations on vehicle 102). As used herein, an "exterior surface" includes a location outside of a vehicle body or passenger compartment, which may be exterior or interior to a component of vehicle 102. For example, in some embodiments, one or more of the transceivers (such as transceivers 160, 170, 180, or 190) are positioned within a rearview mirror of vehicle 102, a bumper or fender of vehicle 102, or the like, such positioning positions the transceivers exterior to the vehicle body or passenger compartment. Figure 1 The configuration of transceivers shown in represents one example configuration. In other embodiments, fewer or additional transceivers may be used in various configurations, including using a single transceiver.

[0033] The VAS 150 and transceiver communicate with a portable communication device 104, such as a smart phone 104A, a key fob 104B, etc. For example, although not described herein, the transceiver communicates with the portable communication device to perform location services to determine the location of the portable communication device 104 relative to the vehicle 102. The VAS 150 communicates with the portable communication device 104 to perform pairing, binding, and data exchange as described herein.

[0034] The VAS 150 and the transceiver form a PEPS system. For example, Figure 2 2 is a block diagram of a PEPS system 200 included in a vehicle 102 according to some embodiments. In addition to the VAS 150 and the transceiver, the PEPS system 200 includes a body control module (BCM) 204, an electronic control unit 206, and a memory 208. The BCM 204, the electronic control unit 206, and the VAS 150 are coupled to a vehicle bus 220. Figure 2 As shown in , the transceiver is also communicatively coupled to the VAS 150 (eg, via a wired connection, a wireless connection, or a combination thereof).

[0035] In some embodiments, the BCM 204 is responsible for monitoring and controlling various electronic accessories associated with the vehicle 102. The BCM 204 can control load drivers and actuate relays, which in turn perform actions in the vehicle 102, such as controlling the central locking system of the vehicle 102 (e.g., locking or unlocking one or more doors included in the vehicle 102 (or other lockable components of the vehicle 102)). In some embodiments, the BCM 204 is also configured to control power windows, power mirrors, air conditioning equipment, overhead lights, anti-theft control systems associated with the vehicle 102, and the like. In order to perform this control, the BCM 204 communicates with other onboard computers and systems included in the vehicle 102 via the vehicle bus 220. The vehicle bus 220 or other component interconnection allows communication between components of the PEPS system 200. The vehicle bus 220 can be, for example, one or more buses or other wired or wireless connections known in the art. The vehicle bus 220 can have additional elements, which are omitted herein for simplicity, such as controllers, buffers (e.g., caches), drivers, repeaters, and receivers or other similar components to support communication. The vehicle bus 220 operates according to one or more addressing schemes, data communication or connection protocols, etc. to support appropriate communications between the aforementioned components.

[0036] The electronic control unit 206 is an embedded system that controls one or more systems or subsystems (e.g., electrical systems or subsystems) included in the vehicle 102, such as the engine and other components of the vehicle. In some embodiments, the vehicle 102 is a hybrid or electric vehicle. Therefore, in these embodiments, the electronic control unit 206 can be configured to control the motor or other powertrain components of the vehicle 102.

[0037] Although in Figure 2 In the embodiment shown in , the electronic control unit 206 is shown as part of the PEPS system 200, but in other embodiments, the electronic control unit 206 may be separate from the PEPS system 200, and in this configuration, the electronic control unit 206 may or may not communicate with the PEPS system 200. For example, in some embodiments, vehicle start or engine start is controlled by the BCM 204, so authorization from the PEPS system 200 is provided to the BCM 204. However, the vehicle 102 may include additional supporting components (e.g., an electric steering control unit) that provide signals to the BCM 204 (which may be used for authentication or other purposes). Therefore, in these configurations, the PEPS system 200 may communicate with the ECU 206 (or other ECUs) indirectly. As shown in FIG. Figure 2 As shown in FIG. 2 , the ECU 206 communicates with the BCM 204 via a vehicle bus 220 (which other components of the PEPS system 200 may also use to communicate).

[0038] Figure 3 1 is a block diagram of one of the transceivers (for illustrative purposes, transceiver 110) included in vehicle 102 according to some embodiments. According to some embodiments, transceiver 110 is shown to include a BLE module for providing various PEPS functions. For example, Figure 3 The transceiver 110 shown in FIG. 1 includes: a BLE transceiver or module 620 having an integrated circuit, such as a BLE system on chip (SoC) 612; and an antenna 614. The antenna 614 is configured to receive Bluetooth signals from the portable communication device 104 that is attempting to access the PEPS function of the vehicle 102. The antenna 614 can be an omnidirectional antenna. It should be understood that providing Figure 3 The transceiver 110 shown in FIG. 1 is an example configuration of such a transceiver, and the transceiver included in the vehicle 102 may include a transceiver such as a Figure 3 , or more of the components shown in different configurations or forms, while still providing the functionality described herein performed by the transceiver. Additionally, in some embodiments, different transceivers included in the vehicle 102 may have different configurations or forms while still providing the functionality described herein. In other words, when the vehicle 102 includes multiple transceivers, in some embodiments, not all of the transceivers may be identical. As described above, the transceiver may be used to determine the location of the portable communication device to determine whether the VAS 150 should attempt to pair and bind with the device as described herein.

[0039] Figure 4 is a block diagram of a VAS 150 according to some embodiments. Figure 4 In the illustrated embodiment of , the VAS 150 includes: a radio frequency (RF) circuit 702 coupled to an antenna 704, an integrated circuit (such as, BLE SoC 706) coupled to an antenna 708, and an electronic processor 710 within a housing 720. The BLE SoC 706 and the antenna 708 form a BLE transceiver or module. In some embodiments, the BLE transceiver (BLE SoC 706) performs, among other things, pairing, bonding, and secure data exchanges described herein with respect to the VAS 150 related to PEPS functionality. The BLE SoC 706 can transmit data exchanges received as part of the secure data exchange to the electronic processor 710 for further processing, such as activating one or more vehicle operations.

[0040] The electronic processor 710 is communicatively coupled to the RF circuit 702 and the BLE SoC 706. The electronic processor 710 may include at least one processor or microprocessor that interprets and executes a set of instructions stored in a non-transitory memory (e.g., memory 208) included in the VAS 150 or separate from the VAS 150. For example, the electronic processor 710 may be configured to execute one or more software programs to perform a set of functions. The memory storing these one or more software programs may include volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM)), non-volatile memory elements (e.g., read-only memory (ROM)), and combinations thereof. The memory may have a distributed architecture in which various components are remote from each other but can be accessed by the electronic processor 710. It should be understood that providing Figure 4 The VAS 150 shown in FIG. 1 is an exemplary configuration of the VAS 150, and in some embodiments, the VAS 150 may include Figure 4 Fewer or more components than shown in different configurations or forms may be used while still providing the functions performed by VAS 150 as described herein.

[0041] Figure 5 is a block diagram of a portable communication device 104 according to some embodiments. Figure 5 As shown in FIG. 1 , in some embodiments, the portable communication device 104 includes: a BLE SoC 802 coupled to an antenna 804, a near field communication (NFC) chip 806 coupled to an antenna 808, and a memory 810 controlled by an electronic processor 812 within a housing 820. As described above with respect to the BLE SoC 706, the BLE SoC 802 performs, among other things, the pairing, bonding, and secure data exchange described herein with respect to the portable communication device 104 related to PEPS functionality.

[0042] The memory 810 stores identification data associated with the portable communication device 104, which is used to wirelessly authenticate the portable communication device 104 using the PEPS function associated with the vehicle 102. The identification data is transmitted using at least one of the antenna 804 associated with the BLE SoC 802 and the antenna 808 associated with the NFC chip 806. In some embodiments, the memory 810 also stores encryption keys or other mechanisms for encrypting data transmitted to the vehicle 102. The memory 810 (or a separate memory included in the portable communication device 104) may also store an operating system, such as iOS provided by Apple Inc. or Android provided by Google LLC. It should be understood that providing Figure 5The portable communication device 104 shown in FIG. 1 is an example configuration of such a device, and the portable communication device 104 may include Figure 5 104, while still providing the functions described herein performed by the portable communication device 104. It should be understood that in some embodiments, the portable communication device 104 and the VAS 150 communicate using ultra-high frequency (UHF) communications, such as Figure 6 as shown in .

[0043] As described above, the first part in the BLE protocol is pairing, where the stakeholders (host device and member device) in the BLE connection learn about each other. Pairing is usually initiated by the host device (e.g., VAS 150) by sending a pairing request to the member device (e.g., portable communication device 104) that the host device is willing to communicate with. In response to the member device accepting the pairing request, the member device sends a response back to the host device, thereby indicating that the host device can start the pairing process. After the pairing process is initiated, the host device and the member device will learn about each other's characteristics, such as MAC address, BLE version, etc. In addition, during the same process, the host device and the member device share encryption key information for encrypting the communication link between the devices. After exchanging the encryption key information, the pairing process terminates, and the host device sends a binding request to the member device according to the preference of the host device, the member device, or the two devices to be bound. In response to the member device accepting the binding request, the member device saves the pairing information to the corresponding memory. This allows the member device to bind with the host device every time it reconnects without having to repeat the pairing process.

[0044] The BLE core stack provides three pairing methods, namely, Just Works pairing, MITM pairing, and out-of-band (OOB) pairing. Just Works is a relatively simple form of pairing and generally provides the lowest level of security. MITM pairing generally provides a higher level of security than Just Works pairing by introducing a pairing code (passkey) for authenticating the pairing process. The pairing code protects the device from hackers or intruders sniffing the information exchanged during pairing, which may lead to hacking the system using the information learned. OOB pairing is generally the safest pairing method provided by the core BLE protocol stack. OOB pairing occurs in different frequency bands, and in some embodiments, it is performed through a wireless communication protocol different from BLE itself, typically operating in the ISM band of 2.4GHz to 2.4835GHz. By exchanging pairing information on another protocol, the OOB pairing method provides improved security from passive eavesdroppers during the pairing process. The embodiments described herein are described and illustrated as using OOB pairing, and in particular using the OOB pairing method provided by the BLE core stack. It should be understood that the embodiments described herein are not limited to the OOB pairing method, and other methods may be used regardless of the examples provided herein.

[0045] For example, Figure 7 The OOB pairing process according to some embodiments is shown. The BLE protocol stack provides OOB pairing for pairing, and therefore, for any band selected for operation, a fixed protocol and exchange number are followed (except Bluetooth). In some embodiments, the NFC protocol, which usually operates at a frequency of 13.56MHz, is used as an auxiliary band for the OOB pairing mechanism to share pairing information and encryption keys. However, it should be understood that other protocols may also be used. In some embodiments, after the phase 1 feature exchange, the pairing process enters the phase 2 authentication. During phase 2, key generation and exchange are performed, where the connection link is encrypted using a key to prevent attacks such as MITM. In some embodiments, elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public key pairing is used as a phase 2 authentication between the VAS 150 and the portable communication device 104, where each device generates its own ECDH public-private key pair. The public-private key pair contains a private key and a public key, and the phase 2 pairing is authorized by the private key and the public key.

[0046] After completing the pairing process and the bonding process as described herein, the security of the data transmitted between the host device and the member device can be ensured. The transmitted data can be any type of data including information, commands, etc. from any one of the devices (any one of the BLE SoCs). Figure 8FIG. 2 shows a process for ensuring the security of application data and commands on the sending side or sending segment of the PEPS system 200 according to some embodiments. In particular, Figure 8 The application layer of the transmission segment for transmitting data from one device (e.g., portable communication device 104 in the exemplary case) to a paired and bonded device (e.g., VAS 150 in the exemplary case) is shown. Figure 8 As shown in , the application layer includes, among other things, a data reordering / de-reordering engine 902 and a random number generator 904. The application layer also includes an encryption / decryption engine 906, such as an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter (CCM) with a CBC-MAC encryption engine, for encryption and decryption. In some embodiments, the application layer also includes a cyclic redundancy code (CRC) module 908 for generating a CRC for each message sent to maintain integrity and authenticity.

[0047] Thus, to send a message from the portable communication device 104 to the paired VAS 150 (including, for example, a command to unlock the doors of the vehicle 102, start the engine of the vehicle 102, etc.), the CRC module 908 generates a CRC that is appended to the message along with the device identifier (to form a data array). The message is then passed to the data shuffling / deshuffling engine 902, where the bits or bytes within the message are randomly shuffled. To randomly shuffle the message, an input may be fed from the random number generator 904.

[0048] For example, in some embodiments, the data shuffle / deshuffle engine 902 obtains 8 bytes of input from the random number generator 904 . Fig. 9 A sample 8-byte random number is shown by way of example in FIG. The random number is converted to a 16-byte input by dividing each byte of the 8-byte random number into two nibbles (e.g., a lower nibble and an upper nibble) and then promoting them to bytes. Thus, Fig. 9 As shown in , a 16-byte random number is derived from an 8-byte random number. Fig. 9 , B1 is the least significant byte (LSB), and B16 is the most significant byte (MSB). The 16-byte random number is fed byte by byte (e.g., from LSB to MSB) to the data reordering / deordering engine 902 to reorder two bits or two bytes of data (included in the data array formed by the message with attachment) at a time, such as Fig.10 and Fig.11 As shown in . It should be understood that random numbers of different lengths can be used to provide different amounts of rearrangement or to interpret messages of various lengths. In addition, in some embodiments, random numbers of appropriate lengths can be generated without the need for division and promotion as described herein.

[0049] For example, to perform the reordering, in some embodiments, the individual bits at the index defined by the feed byte from the 16-byte random number are swapped with the individual bits at the then-highest index of the data array, which in some embodiments includes the message, device identifier, and CRC. Fig.10 As shown in , when the LSB of the random number (B1) is fed to the rearrangement / de-rearrangement engine, the bit at the B1 index will be rearranged (exchanged) with the number at the current highest index of the data array (B16). The current highest index of the data array is decremented by each rearrangement iteration (each byte of the 16-byte random number), and the process continues until all elements (bits) of the data array are rearranged. After the rearrangement is completed, the 8-byte random number (also referred to as "roll" in this article) initially generated is attached to the rearranged data number array for de-rearrangement on the receiving side of the system. It should be understood that the bytes of the random number are provided as an example of rearranging the bits. In other embodiments, different parts or subsets of the random number are used to perform bit rearrangement, including using more than one byte. In addition, in some embodiments, a part or subset of the random number can also be further processed (e.g., multiplied, added or subtracted with a value, etc.) to generate an index in the data array for performing the rearrangement as described herein.

[0050] The results of the data reordering / deshortordering engine 902 vary each time even when the same message is fed at different instances. Thus, the data reordering / deshortordering engine 902 improves the security of the transmitted data against passive eavesdropping attacks that attempt to understand and decode the data (to understand the mechanisms of the specified PEPS system). In addition, because more exchanges are performed in this embodiment, reordering at the individual bit level (compared to the byte level) can provide further security.

[0051] After the message with the device identifier and corresponding CRC is reordered, the reordered information is passed to the encryption / decryption engine 906. The encryption / decryption engine 906 can use dedicated encryption hardware and dynamic memory to encrypt the input information. By using a dedicated encryption / decryption engine 906 in the PEPS system 200, the speed of encryption and decryption is increased, the processing load on the hardware performing encryption and decryption is reduced, or a combination thereof. In some embodiments, the encryption / decryption engine 906 also receives as input an encryption key and an initialization vector (IV), which is used to encrypt the input plaintext information. For example, the 13-byte IV includes a 4-byte randomly generated synchronization byte and a 9-byte counter that increments each time the module sends or receives a message to maintain synchronization. These randomly generated 4-byte numbers or "sync bytes" can be shared as part of the message for decryption on the receiving side of the system. The counter value can also be shared periodically to verify counter synchronization.

[0052] like Figure 8 As shown in , after the encryption / decryption engine 906 encrypts the reordered message (including the reordered plaintext information), the encrypted message can be passed to the BLE protocol stack layer. The BLE protocol stack layer can encrypt the data again using the key shared during the pairing process (and the devices sharing the link can use the key), and can send the result. This double encryption (one at the application layer and one at the BLE protocol stack layer) provides higher security and makes it less likely for hackers to break the encryption through brute force.

[0053] Fig.12 The same or similar modules in the application layer of the receiving side or receiving section (e.g., VAS 150 in one example) of the PEPS system 200 as described above with respect to the transmitting section are shown, including a data reordering / deordering engine 902 and an encryption / decryption engine 906. In the transmitting section shown, the above modules respectively perform the functions of reordering and encrypting messages. In the receiving section, the same or similar modules respectively perform the functions of deordering and decrypting the transmitted data packets.

[0054] In particular, in response to receiving the transmitted data packet in the receiving segment, the data packet is passed to the BLE protocol stack layer. The BLE protocol stack layer uses the encryption information shared during the pairing process to decrypt the message. The decrypted message is then passed to the application layer. In the application layer, the packet is first passed to the encryption / decryption engine 906 to further decrypt the encrypted packet using the IV and encryption key as input. The further decrypted message can then be passed to the data reordering / de-reordering engine 902 for de-reordering. The data reordering / de-reordering engine 902 takes the 8-byte volume (appended to the message during the reordering process in the encryption segment as described above) as a parameter and generates a 16-byte random number as described above. The generated 16-byte random number is fed in reverse order (e.g., from MSB to LSB) to de-reorder the message using the above-mentioned reordering algorithm. After de-reordering the data, the message packet is destroyed to extract the original message and the CRC generated for it, and then both can be stored in a buffer. The original message may also be passed to a CRC module 908 included in the application layer of the transmission segment, where the CRC module 908 compares the generated CRC (based on the extracted message) with the CRC stored in the buffer to verify the authenticity of the message. In response to determining that the message is authentic (based on the CRC), the message packet is authorized as valid data and the command may be executed. For example, the command may be an unlock or lock command for one or more doors of the vehicle 102.

[0055] All the above-mentioned modules can be implemented on both sides of the BLE PEPS system 200 to address software attacks on the wireless communication protocol and improve data security against software attacks.

[0056] The ability to overcome relay attacks is an important goal of many wireless communication systems. Since the introduction of RKE systems in automobiles, relay attacks have become common in the automotive industry. To address relay attacks in the systems and methods disclosed herein, an accelerometer in the portable communication device 104 can be used with a time-of-flight (ToF) implementation to calculate the approximate distance of the portable communication device 104 from the VAS 150.

[0057] In some embodiments, the accelerometer is (constantly) active to track the movement of the portable communication device 104. When the portable communication device 104 is stationary and outside the BLE range of the VAS 150, the portable communication device 104 can enter a low power mode and advertising can be stopped. In response to the accelerometer present in the portable communication device 104 detecting motion again, the portable communication device can look for accelerometer data corresponding to the motion within a fixed time interval before the portable communication device 104 wakes up from its low power mode and starts advertising. This sleep and wake-up of the portable communication device 104 can improve the battery life of the device. In addition, the accelerometer data can be used as an input to grant vehicle access rights to the user. For example, when the user approaches the vehicle, the accelerometer data interprets the movement of the user and the portable communication device 104. When the user approaches the vehicle 102 (e.g., near the door) and suddenly stops or slows down, the changes in the accelerometer data are monitored and evaluated. This change in accelerometer data (e.g., from motion to stationary, or from one type of motion to another) is used as input to invoke ToF to calculate the approximate distance of the portable communication device from the VAS 150 and confirm its proximity to the vehicle to avoid relay attacks. This process reduces the likelihood of a relay attack on the PEPS system 200 at any given point in time and, therefore, enhances the security of the PEPS system 200.

[0058] Therefore, the systems and methods disclosed herein allow for the security of command / message frames to be ensured by reordering and de-reordering the field elements of the frame. In some embodiments, the reordering is accomplished using a randomly generated number input from a random number generator. In some embodiments, a random number for reordering the command / message (which can be reordered at the bit level or byte level) is attached to the message for de-reordering on the receiving side. Reordering and de-reordering can be implemented in the BLE application layer. However, in some embodiments, the VAS 150 and the portable communication device 104 are configured to reorder and de-reorder message frames as described herein.

[0059] The embodiments described herein also provide for ensuring the security of the reordered command / message frame by encrypting and decrypting in the application layer. In some embodiments, an encryption / decryption engine for data encryption and decryption is implemented in the application layer. In addition, in some embodiments, a counter value is regularly shared between the two ends to verify the synchronization of the encryption / decryption engine. Some embodiments may also use IV, which may include two parts: a randomly generated number and a rolling counter. In some embodiments, the randomly generated part (synchronization byte) of the IV is attached to the message frame for decryption on the receiving side. In addition, in some embodiments, both the VAS 150 and the portable communication device 104 in the communication are configured to encrypt and decrypt the data in the application layer.

[0060] Some embodiments described herein also use accelerometer data along with the BLE connection status to place the portable communication device into a low power operating mode. Additionally, in some embodiments, embodiments use accelerometer data to invoke ToF calculations for proximity measurements. For example, in some embodiments, accelerometer data is used with ToF measurements to grant access to the vehicle to help avoid relay attacks on the system.

[0061] In the foregoing description, specific embodiments have been described. However, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various modifications and changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention as set forth in the following claims. Therefore, the description and drawings should be regarded as illustrative rather than restrictive, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of the present teachings.

[0062] Each benefit, advantage, solution to problems, and any element that may make any benefit, advantage, or solution apparent should not be construed as a critical, required, or essential feature or element of any or all claims. The present invention is defined solely by the appended claims including any amendments made during the pendency of this application and all equivalents of those claims as issued.

[0063] The abstract of the present disclosure is provided to allow the reader to quickly determine the nature of the technical disclosure, and the present disclosure is submitted with the understanding that the present disclosure will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. In addition, in the aforementioned detailed description, it can be seen that various features are grouped together in various embodiments for the purpose of simplifying the present disclosure. This method of the present disclosure should not be interpreted as reflecting the following intention: the claimed embodiments require more features than the features explicitly recited in each claim item. Therefore, the following claims are incorporated into the detailed description with this, wherein each claim is independently a subject matter claimed separately.

[0064] Various features and advantages of some embodiments are set forth in the following claims.

Claims

1. A system for secure communication between a vehicle and a portable communication device, the system comprising: a vehicle access system included in the vehicle, wherein the vehicle access system is configured to wirelessly receive a reordered message and a random number from the portable communication device, the reordered message comprising a data array having a plurality of bits and the random number defining a first index position of one of the plurality of bits, de-arrange the re-arranged message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein de-arrange the re-arranged message at the bit level comprises swapping a bit at the first index position within the re-arranged message with a bit at a second index position within the re-arranged message, and Vehicle operation is initiated based on the message.

2. The system according to claim 1, further comprising: The portable communication device, wherein the portable communication device is configured to generating the random number, Based on the random number, rearranging the message at a bit level to generate the rearranged message, and The rearranged message and the random number are wirelessly transmitted to the vehicle access system.

3. The system according to claim 2, wherein: The portable communication device is further configured to append an identifier of the portable communication device and a cyclic redundancy check code to the message before reordering the message.

4. The system according to claim 2, wherein: The portable communication device is further configured to encrypt the reordered message and the random number before sending the reordered message and the random number to the vehicle access system.

5. The system according to claim 4, wherein: The portable communication device is configured to encrypt the rearranged message and the random number by: performing a first encryption on the reordered message and the random number in a Bluetooth application layer using encryption information exchanged during a pairing process performed between the vehicle and the portable communication device, and A second encryption is performed on the reordered message and the random number in a Bluetooth stack layer using an encryption key and an initialization vector.

6. The system according to claim 1, wherein: The vehicle access system is configured to de-arrange the re-arranged message in a Bluetooth application layer.

7. The system according to claim 1, wherein: The vehicle access system is configured to swap a bit at the first index position within the reordered message with a bit at the second index position within the reordered message by: dividing each byte of the 8-byte random number appended to the reordered message into two parts, and lifting each of the two parts to bytes to generate a 16-byte random number, and For each byte of the 16-byte random number in a predetermined order, The bits of the message at the index position defined by the value of the byte are swapped with the bits of the message at the current highest index position, and the current highest index position is decremented.

8. The system according to claim 7, wherein: The predetermined order is opposite to an order used by the portable communication device to generate the reordered messages.

9. The system according to claim 1, wherein: The vehicle access system is further configured to decrypt the reordered message prior to de-reordering the reordered message.

10. The system according to claim 9, wherein: The vehicle access system is configured to decrypt the reordered message by: performing a first decryption of the reordered message in a Bluetooth stack layer using an encryption key and an initialization vector, and A second decryption is performed on the reordered message in a Bluetooth application layer using encryption information exchanged during a pairing process performed between the vehicle and the portable communication device.

11. A method for securely communicating between a vehicle and a portable communication device, the method comprising: wirelessly receiving, using a vehicle access system included in the vehicle, a rearranged message and a random number from the portable communication device, the rearranged message including a data array having a plurality of bits and the random number defining a first index position of one of the plurality of bits, utilizing the vehicle access system, de-rearranging the re-arranged message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein de-rearranging the re-arranged message at a bit level comprises swapping a bit at the first index position within the re-arranged message with a bit at a second index position within the re-arranged message; as well as Using the vehicle access system, a vehicle operation is initiated based on the message.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein: De-arranging the re-arranged message includes de-arranging the re-arranged message in a Bluetooth application layer.

13. The method according to claim 11, wherein: Swapping a bit at the first index position within the reordered message with a bit at the second index position within the reordered message comprises: dividing each byte of the 8-byte random number appended to the reordered message into two parts, and lifting each of the two parts to bytes to generate a 16-byte random number, and For each byte of the 16-byte random number in a predetermined order, The bits of the message at the index position defined by the value of the byte are swapped with the bits of the message at the current highest index position, and the current highest index position is decremented.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein: The predetermined order is opposite to an order used by the portable communication device to generate the reordered messages.

15. The method according to claim 11, further comprising: The reordered message is decrypted before de-arrangement of the reordered message.

16. The method according to claim 15, wherein: Decrypting the reordered message includes: performing a first decryption of the reordered message in a Bluetooth stack layer using an encryption key and an initialization vector, and A second decryption is performed on the reordered message in a Bluetooth application layer using encryption information exchanged during a pairing process performed between the vehicle and the portable communication device.

17. A vehicle access system installed in a vehicle, the vehicle access system comprising: Wireless communication transceiver; as well as Electronic processors, The wireless communication transceiver is configured to: wirelessly receiving a reordered message and a random number from a portable communication device, the reordered message comprising a data array having a plurality of bits and the random number defining a first index position of one of the plurality of bits, de-arrange the re-arranged message at a bit level to obtain a message, wherein de-arrange the re-arranged message at a bit level comprises swapping a bit at the first index position within the re-arranged message with a bit at a second index position within the re-arranged message, and providing the message to the electronic processor, The electronic processor is configured to initiate vehicle operation based on the message.

18. The vehicle access system of claim 17, wherein: The vehicle operation includes at least one selected from the group consisting of: an unlocking operation and a locking operation of a door of the vehicle.

19. The vehicle access system of claim 17, wherein: The wireless communication transceiver is configured to swap a bit at the first index position within the reordered message with a bit at the second index position within the reordered message by: dividing each byte of the 8-byte random number appended to the reordered message into two parts, and lifting each of the two parts to bytes to generate a 16-byte random number, and For each byte of the 16-byte random number in a predetermined order, swapping the bit of the message at the index position defined by the value of the byte with the bit of the message at the current highest index position and decrementing the current highest index position, Wherein, the predetermined order is opposite to the order used by the portable communication device to generate the reordered messages.

20. The vehicle access system of claim 17, wherein: The wireless communication transceiver is further configured to: decrypt the reordered message before de-arrangement of the reordered message, wherein the wireless communication transceiver is configured to decrypt the reordered message by: performing a first decryption of the reordered message in a Bluetooth stack layer using an encryption key and an initialization vector, and A second decryption is performed on the reordered message in a Bluetooth application layer using encryption information exchanged during a pairing process performed between the vehicle and the portable communication device.