A fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index

By generating plaintext inverted indexes and encrypting them in ORAM dense database index, the problem of inefficient database query in the existing technology is solved, and quick connection query under multi-keyword query conditions is realized, which improves retrieval efficiency and guarantees Check privacy.

CN114625768BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03CHANGSHA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210249142.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-03-14
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2042-03-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is inefficient when performing fast search and connection query of encrypted data in a huge database, and cannot meet the multi-keyword query conditions, resulting in extremely low query efficiency.

Method used

The ORAM-based dense database indexing method is adopted, and by generating plain text inverted indexes and encrypting them using an inadvertent random access machine, a dense index is constructed, stored on a cloud server, and a multi-keyword connection query is realized, using ORAM. Read and ORAM.write interfaces are used for querying.

Benefits of technology

On the premise of ensuring the privacy of query without leakage, quick connection query of text file data is realized, query efficiency is improved, and strong security and privacy protection capabilities and efficient retrieval capabilities are provided.

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Abstract

The fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index disclosed in the present application includes the following steps: S1, generating an inverted index; S2, constructing a secret index: using an oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB, the encryption method is recorded as Enc(DB), and obtaining secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2; S3, outsourcing secret indexes: storing the constructed secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2 to a public cloud server, and the private parts of ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored on the user side; S4, oblivious connection query: according to a query condition containing two or more keywords, quickly obtain a match from a remote index, obtain the data file corresponding to the query condition, and output the query result. The technical solution involved in the present invention can perform a fast connection query on text file data under the premise of ensuring that the query privacy is not leaked, and has a high query efficiency.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security processing technology, and more specifically, to a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the Internet, the amount of information has exploded, the query of data files has become more and more complicated, and the privacy of information query cannot be guaranteed. How to accurately perform encrypted file search in a huge database is one of the research directions in the field of data processing technology.

[0003] At present, in order to solve the problem of users' fast search for encrypted data stored in cloud servers, the existing technology usually adopts Searchable Encryption (SE) or Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) plus inverted index technology to encrypt and retrieve data. SE technology usually leaks search features (Search Pattern) and access features (Access Pattern) to achieve efficient query, and its security is not strong enough; while ORAM is a technology that protects search features and access features. It provides a fast and secure read and write interface for private array data. It is an encapsulation of the interaction protocol between users and the cloud. ORAM.read(k) indicates that the user accidentally reads the key value k and the result is v. ORAM.write(k,v) indicates that the user accidentally writes the (k,v) tuple to ORAM. After each read or write, ORAM continuously changes the data storage location and re-encrypts the accessed data to protect the location and data information of each access, reducing the possibility of attackers using leaked information to infer the real data. The oblivious random access machine is usually not fully optimized for the secret database. For example, if a user needs to perform a join query on a secret database table, if the oblivious random access machine is simply used to store data, the data query process is likely to traverse the entire database table, which is inefficient. In addition, the existing ORAM solutions only provide single-keyword queries, which do not meet the operations that require multiple query conditions to be met at the same time in actual application scenarios, resulting in extremely low query efficiency.

[0004] Therefore, how to provide a fast connection query method based on ORAM confidential database index, which can quickly connect and query text file data while ensuring query privacy and has high query efficiency, has become a technical problem that needs to be urgently solved by technical personnel in this field. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present application provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM confidential database index, which can perform fast connection query on text file data while ensuring query privacy without leakage, and has high query efficiency.

[0006] The present application provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index, comprising the following steps: S1, given a set of text files F, each of which is a set of keywords, and each file corresponds to a unique identifier; assuming that w is a keyword, and W is a set of all keywords available for query; DB(w) represents the set of all document identifiers matching the keyword w, which means that the corresponding documents contain the keyword w; then a plaintext inverted index is generated for all files, denoted as DB, which can quickly obtain an output set DB(w) according to any input keyword w;

[0007] S2. Construct a secret index: Use an oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB. The encryption method is recorded as Enc(DB) to obtain secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2.

[0008] S3, outsourcing secret index: the constructed secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored in the public cloud server, and the private parts of ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored on the user side;

[0009] S4, casual join query: perform a u-dimensional join query (w1∧w2∧…∧w u ),u≥2, quickly obtain the set of file identifiers that match this u-dimensional join query from the remote index, and the query method is recorded as Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), the result set is DB(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), denoted as R.

[0010] Further, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, in step S2, the steps of the encryption method Enc(DB) are as follows:

[0011] Assume that ORAM is an oblivious random access machine, which is an encapsulation of the interaction protocol between the user and the cloud; ORAM.read(k) represents that the user inadvertently reads the key value k, and the result obtained is v;

[0012] ORAM.write(k,v) is used to represent the inadvertent writing of a (k,v) tuple into ORAM. Then, two inadvertent random access machines ORAM are given, assuming that they are sets with empty initial states, and the initialization method is used to generate secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2.

[0013] Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the step of using the initialization method to generate a secret state index method includes:

[0014] S21. Initialize ORAM1: For each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm:

[0015] {ORAM1.write(w||1,id1||s),ORAM1.write(w||2,id2),…,ORAM1.write(w||s,id s )} is initialized; where s is the number of elements in the set DB(w), DB(w)={id1,id2,…,id s}, the symbol x||y means concatenating two strings x and y into one string; the value of s is saved to the first data block, that is, ORAM1.write(w||1,id1||s);

[0016] S22, initialize ORAM2: for each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm respectively:

[0017] {ORAM2.write(w||id1,1),ORAM2.write(w||id2,1),…,ORAM2.write(w||id s ,1)} for initialization.

[0018] Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the constructing of a confidential index includes: constructing a file identification confidential index and constructing a keyword status confidential index.

[0019] Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the query method Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ) are as follows:

[0020] S41. Get the smallest set of query results among all keywords, assuming it is DB(w1), that is,

[0021] The symbol min indicates the minimum value, and the symbol |DB(w)| indicates the number of elements in the set DB(w);

[0022] S42, assuming s = |DB(w1)|, call the oblivious access interface 1 in sequence:

[0023] ORAM1.read(w1||1), ORAM1.read(w1||2),…,ORAM1.read(w1||s) to query and obtain the result set DB(w1), where the length s is obtained in the first data block;

[0024] S43, then obtain a set of candidate file identifiers DB(w1); assume DB(w1) = {id1, id2, ..., id s} and then initialize an empty set R;

[0025] For identifier id1, call the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence:

[0026] ORAM2.read(w2||id1),ORAM2.read(w3||id1),…,ORAM2.read(w u ||id1) to query; add id1 to the result set R according to the returned result;

[0027] For identifier id2, call the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence:

[0028] ORAM2.read(w2||id2),ORAM2.read(w3||id2),…,ORAM2.read(w u ||id2) to query; add id2 to the result set R according to the returned result;

[0029] Repeat the above process until all file identifiers {id1, id2, ..., id s} is judged and the final result set R is obtained.

[0030] Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the specific rule for adding id1 to the result set R according to the returned result is:

[0031] If the result set returned by any of the reads is an empty set, then id1 does not belong to the final result set and this file identifier is discarded; if the result sets returned by all of the reads are not empty sets, then id1 is added to the result set R.

[0032] Furthermore, in a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the specific rule for adding id2 to the result set R according to the returned result is:

[0033] If the result set returned by any of the reads is an empty set, then id2 does not belong to the final result set and this file identifier is discarded; if the result sets returned by all of the reads are not empty sets, then id2 is added to the result set R.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index, which includes the following steps: S1, given a set of text files F, each of which is a set of keywords, and each file corresponds to a unique identifier; assuming that w is a keyword, W is the set of all searchable keywords; DB(w) is the set of all document identifiers matching keyword w, which means that the corresponding documents contain keyword w; then a plaintext inverted index is generated for all files, denoted as DB, which can quickly obtain the output set DB(w) based on any input keyword w; S2, build secret index: use oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB, the encryption method is denoted as Enc(DB), and obtain secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2; S3, outsource secret index: store the constructed secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2 to the public cloud server, and the private parts of ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored on the user end; S4, oblivious join query: execute a u-dimensional join query (w1∧w2∧…∧w u ),u≥2, quickly obtain the set of file identifiers that match this u-dimensional join query from the remote index, and the query method is recorded as Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), the result set is DB(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), denoted as R. The present invention provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index. Compared with the prior art, the present method can perform fast connection query on text file data under the premise of ensuring query privacy without leakage, and has high query efficiency.

[0035] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0036] 1. Using the random access to confidential database indexing technology, it has strong security and privacy protection capabilities, and has no risk of search feature leakage and access feature leakage;

[0037] 2. It can realize fast connection query and can search multiple data files according to the query conditions of multiple keywords, which effectively reduces the search time and improves the search efficiency. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0039] Figure 1A flowchart of the steps of a fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 A flowchart of the steps of generating a secret state index using an initialization method provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3 The query method Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ) step flow chart. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0043] It should be noted that when an element is referred to as being "fixed on" or "set on" another element, it can be directly on the other element or indirectly set on the other element; when an element is referred to as being "connected to" another element, it can be directly connected to the other element or indirectly connected to the other element.

[0044] It should be understood that the terms "length", "width", "up", "down", "front", "back", "first", "second", "vertical", "horizontal", "top", "bottom", "inside", "outside", etc., indicating the orientation or position relationship, are based on the orientation or position relationship shown in the drawings, and are only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.

[0045] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of this application, "multiple" and "several" mean two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.

[0046] It should be noted that the structures, proportions, sizes, etc. illustrated in the drawings of this specification are only used to match the contents disclosed in the specification for people familiar with this technology to understand and read, and are not used to limit the conditions under which this application can be implemented. Therefore, they have no substantive technical significance. Any structural modification, change in proportional relationship or adjustment of size should still fall within the scope of the technical content disclosed in this application without affecting the effects and purposes that can be achieved by this application.

[0047] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, the present invention provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index, including the following steps: S1, given a set of text files F, each of which is a set of keywords, and each file corresponds to a unique identifier; assuming that w is a keyword, W is a set of all searchable keywords; DB(w) is recorded as a set of all document identifiers matching the keyword w, which means that the corresponding documents contain the keyword w; then a plaintext inverted index is generated for all files, denoted as DB, which can quickly obtain an output set DB(w) according to any input keyword w; S2, constructing a secret index: using an oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB, the encryption method is denoted as Enc(DB), and obtaining secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2; S3, outsourcing secret indexes: storing the constructed secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2 to a public cloud server, and the private parts of ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored on the user end; S4, oblivious connection query: executing a u-dimensional connection query (w1∧w2∧…∧w u ),u≥2, quickly obtain the set of file identifiers that match this u-dimensional join query from the remote index, and the query method is recorded as Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), the result set is DB(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), denoted as R. The present invention provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index, which can perform fast connection query on file data and improve retrieval query efficiency under the premise of ensuring query security and no leakage.

[0048] The present invention provides a fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0049] S1. Assume a set of text files F, each of which is a set of keywords, and each file corresponds to a unique identifier; assume w is a keyword, and W is the set of all searchable keywords; DB(w) is the set of all document identifiers matching keyword w, which means that the corresponding documents contain keyword w; then generate a plaintext inverted index for all files, denoted as DB, which can quickly obtain the output set DB(w) based on any input keyword w;

[0050] Here is an example of the specific operation of the inverted index: For example, given a set of data files f1, f2, ..., f i , whose file identifiers are id1, id2, ..., id i , file f1 contains three of the keywords {w1, w2, w3}, and file f2 contains two of the keywords {w1, w2}; an inverted index is established for the two data files f1 and f2, corresponding to the set of all keywords W = {w1, w2, w3}, the file identification set DB(w1) corresponding to keyword w1 = {id1, id2}, the file set DB(w2) corresponding to keyword w2 = {id1, id2}, and the file set DB(w3) corresponding to keyword w3 = {id1}.

[0051] S2. Construct a secret index: Use an oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB. The encryption method is denoted as Enc(DB) to obtain secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2.

[0052] Specifically, in an embodiment of the present invention, the steps of the encryption method Enc(DB) are as follows:

[0053] Assume that ORAM is an oblivious random access machine, which is an encapsulation of the interaction protocol between the user and the cloud; ORAM.read(k) represents that the user inadvertently reads the key value k, and the result obtained is v;

[0054] ORAM.write(k,v) is used to represent the inadvertent writing of a (k,v) tuple into ORAM. Then, two inadvertent random access machines ORAM are given, assuming that they are sets with empty initial states, and the initialization method is used to generate secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2.

[0055] Specifically, in an embodiment of the present invention, Figure 2 As shown, the method of generating a secret state index using the initialization method includes:

[0056] S21. Initialize ORAM1: For each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm:

[0057] {ORAM1.write(w||1,id1||s),ORAM1.write(w||2,id2),…,ORAM1.write(w||s,id s )} is initialized; where s is the number of elements in the set DB(w), DB(w)={id1,id2,…,id s}, the symbol x||y means concatenating two strings x and y into one string;

[0058] The size s of the result set is saved, and the value of s is saved in the first data block, that is, ORAM1.write(w||1,id1||s);

[0059] S22, initialize ORAM2: for each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm respectively:

[0060] {ORAM2.write(w||id1,1),ORAM2.write(w||id2,1),…,ORAM2.write(w||id s ,1)} for initialization; where s is the number of elements in the set DB(w);

[0061] In the initialization process, since both ORAM1 and ORAM2 are completed on a trusted user side, there is no need to perform a traditional ORAM shuffling operation.

[0062] S3, outsourcing secret index: the constructed secret indexes ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored in the public cloud server, and the private parts of ORAM1 and ORAM2 are stored on the user side;

[0063] The private part includes a secret key and unencrypted data.

[0064] S4, casual join query: perform a u-dimensional join query (w1∧w2∧…∧w u ),u≥2, quickly obtain the set of file identifiers that match this u-dimensional join query from the remote index, and the query method is recorded as Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), the result set is DB(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ), denoted as R.

[0065] Specifically, in the embodiments of the present invention, as shown in the attached Figure 3 As shown, the query method Search(w1∧w2∧…∧w u ) are as follows:

[0066] S41. Get the smallest set of query results among all keywords, assuming it is DB(w1), that is, The symbol min indicates the minimum value, and the symbol |DB(w)| indicates the number of elements in the set DB(w);

[0067] In order to improve query efficiency, users can estimate the smallest query result set among all keywords based on experience, assuming it is DB(w1);

[0068] S42. For convenience, assuming s=|DB(w1)|, the user calls the oblivious access interface 1 in sequence:

[0069] ORAM1.read(w1||1), ORAM1.read(w1||2),…,ORAM1.read(w1||s), and obtain the result set DB(w1), where the length s is available in the first data block;

[0070] S43. The user obtains a set of candidate file identifiers DB(w1). Let us assume that DB(w1)={id1,id2,…,id s}, the user initializes an empty set R, and for the identifier id1, the user calls the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence:

[0071] ORAM2.read(w2||id1),ORAM2.read(w3||id1),…,ORAM2.read(w u ||id1) to query;

[0072] If the result set returned by any of the reads is an empty set, then id1 does not belong to the final result set and the file identifier is discarded; if the result sets returned by all of the reads are not empty sets, then id1 is added to the result set R;

[0073] For identifier id2, the user calls the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence:

[0074] ORAM2.read(w2||id2),ORAM2.read(w3||id2),…,ORAM2.read(w u ||id2) to query;

[0075] If the result set returned by any of the reads is an empty set, then id2 does not belong to the final result set and the file identifier is discarded; if the result sets returned by all of the reads are not empty sets, then id2 is added to the result set R;

[0076] Repeat the above process until all file identifiers {id1, id2, ..., id s} is judged and the final result set R is obtained.

[0077] As described above, the fast connection query method based on ORAM secret database index involved in the embodiment of the present invention generates an inverted index through steps, constructs an inverted index for the data file, and provides a prerequisite for fast connection query; secondly, by performing file identification encryption processing and keyword status encryption processing on the constructed inverted index respectively, the method has a strong privacy protection capability, without the risk of search feature leakage and access feature leakage; and, provides an index channel for multiple keyword query conditions, retrieves data files according to the query conditions of multiple keywords, can realize fast connection and accurate query, effectively reduces the retrieval time, and improves the retrieval efficiency. Compared with the prior art, this method can perform fast connection query on text file data under the premise of ensuring that the query privacy is not leaked, and has high query efficiency.

[0078] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but rather to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index, It is characterized in that The following steps are involved: S1. Given a set of text files F, each of which is a set of keywords, each file corresponds to a unique identifier; assuming that w is a keyword, and W is the set of all searchable keywords; DB(w) is the set of all document identifiers matching keyword w, which means that the corresponding documents contain keyword w; then a plaintext inverted index is generated for all files, denoted as DB, which can quickly obtain the output set DB(w) based on any input keyword w; S2. Construct a secret index: Use an oblivious random access machine to encrypt the plaintext inverted index DB. The encryption method is recorded as Enc(DB) to obtain the secret index ORAM 1 and ORAM 2 ; The steps of the encryption method Enc(DB) are as follows: Assume that ORAM is an oblivious random access machine, which is an encapsulation of the interaction protocol between the user and the cloud; ORAM.read(k) represents that the user inadvertently reads the key value k, and the result obtained is v; ORAM.write(k,v) is used to represent writing (k,v) tuples into ORAM inadvertently. Then two ORAMs are given, assuming that they are initially empty sets, and the initialization method is used to generate the dense index ORAM. 1 and ORAM 2 ; The step of using the initialization method to generate a secret state index comprises: S21, Initialize ORAM 1 : For each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm separately: {ORAM 1 .write(w||1,id 1 ||s),ORAM 1 .write(w||2,id 2 ),L,ORAM 1 .write(w||s,id s )} for initialization; where s is the number of elements in the set DB(w), DB(w)={id 1 ,id 2 ,L,id s }, the symbol x||y means concatenating two strings x and y into one string; the value of s is saved in the first data block, which is ORAM 1 .write(w||1,id 1 ||s); S22, Initialize ORAM 2 : For each keyword w in W, call the following algorithm separately: {ORAM 2 .write(w||id 1 , 1), ORAM 2 .write(w||id 2 , 1), L, ORAM 2 .write(w||id s , 1)} is initialized; S3. Outsourcing the secret index: The completed secret index ORAM 1 and ORAM 2 Stored in public cloud servers, ORAM 1 and ORAM 2 The private part of is stored on the user side; S4, casual join query: perform a u-dimensional join query (w 1 ∧w 2 ∧L∧w u ),u≥2, quickly obtain the set of file identifiers matching this u-dimensional join query from the remote index, and the query method is recorded as Search(w 1 ∧w 2 ∧L∧w u ), the result set is DB(w 1 ∧w 2 ∧L∧w u ), denoted as R.

2. The fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The constructing of the secret index includes: constructing a file identification secret index and constructing a keyword status secret index.

3. The fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The query method Search(w 1 ∧w 2 ∧L∧w u ) are as follows: S41. Get the smallest set of query result sets among all keywords, assuming it is DB(w 1 ), that is DB(w 1 )|=min w∈{w1,w2,L,wu} {DB(w 1 ),L,DB(w u )}; The symbol min indicates the minimum value, and the symbol |DB(w)| indicates the number of elements in the set DB(w); S42, assuming s = | DB (w 1 )|, call the inadvertent access interface 1 in sequence: ORAM 1 .read(w 1 ||1), ORAM 1 .read(w 1 ||2),L,ORAM 1 .read(w 1 ||s) to query and get the result set DB(w 1 ), where the length s is obtained in the first data block; S43, then obtain a set of candidate file identifiers DB (w 1 ); Assume DB(w 1 )={id 1 ,id 2 ,L,id s } and then initialize an empty set R; For identifier id 1 , call the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence: ORAM 2 .read(w 2 ||id 1 ),ORAM 2 .read(w 3 ||id 1 ),L,ORAM 2 .read(w u ||id 1 ) to query; according to the returned result, id 1 Add to the result set R; For identifier id 2 , call the oblivious access interface 2 in sequence: ORAM 2 .read(w 2 ||id 2 ),ORAM 2 .read(w 3 ||id 2 ),L,ORAM 2 .read(w u ||id 2 ) to query; according to the returned result, id 2 Add to the result set R; Repeat the above process until all file identifiers {id 1 ,id 2 ,L,id s } is judged and the final result set R is obtained.

4. The fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index according to claim 3, It is characterized in that According to the returned result, id 1 The specific rules added to the result set R are: If the result set returned by one of the reads is an empty set, then id 1 It does not belong to the final result set, so the file identifier is discarded; if all the result sets returned by the reads are not empty, then id 1 Add to the result set R.

5. The fast connection query method based on ORAM encrypted database index according to claim 3, It is characterized in that According to the returned result, id 2 The specific rules added to the result set R are: If the result set returned by one of the reads is an empty set, then id 2 It does not belong to the final result set, so the file identifier is discarded; if all the result sets returned by the reads are not empty, then id 2 is added to the result set R.