Satellite group secure communication method, device and equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention relates to a secure communication method and device for a satellite group, equipment and a storage medium, which are used for safely and efficiently generating and distributing a group key so as to ensure secure communication between satellite groups based on the group key. The method comprises the following steps: a group management node initializes parameters of a dynamic accumulator, broadcasts a group key generation message to a group member node, and receives a group key response message returned by the group member node; after the verification of the group key response message is passed, updating a dynamic accumulator parameter, calculating a group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculating a dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter and the group key dynamic key; and sending the corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value and the group key dynamic key to each group member node, so that each group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of satellite communication technology, and in particular to a secure communication method, device, equipment and storage medium for a satellite cluster. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of satellite communication technology, the dual-layer satellite network of geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and medium Earth Orbit (MEO) occupies an important position in the global communication system. It is not only widely used in high-tech fields such as military, aerospace and navigation, but also plays a vital role in civil fields such as global Internet access, distance education, and medical services. The dual-layer satellite network can provide wide coverage, high bandwidth and low latency communication services, making it an important part of current and future communication technology.

[0003] However, how to ensure secure communication between satellite clusters in a dual-layer satellite network is a problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present application provides a satellite cluster security communication method, apparatus, device and storage medium for ensuring the communication security between satellite clusters in a double-layer satellite network.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication method for a satellite cluster, which is applied to a group management node in the satellite cluster, including:

[0006] Initializing dynamic accumulator parameters, generating a group key generation message including a generated verification value, and broadcasting the group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group;

[0007] Receiving a group key response message including a response verification value returned by each group member node, wherein the group key response message is sent after the generated verification value is verified;

[0008] After verifying the response verification value returned by the at least one group member node, updating the dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculating the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculating the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter;

[0009] For each group member node, a group key distribution message is sent to the group member node, wherein the group key distribution message includes the dynamic accumulator verification value of the group member node and the group key dynamic key, so that the group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value.

[0010] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication method for a satellite cluster, which is applied to a group member node in the satellite cluster, including:

[0011] Receiving a group key generation message broadcasted by a group management node in the satellite group; wherein the group key generation message includes a generated verification value;

[0012] After the generated verification value is verified, a response verification value is generated, and a group key response message including the response verification value is returned to the group management node, so that the group management node verifies the response verification value;

[0013] receiving a group key distribution message including a dynamic accumulator verification value and a group key dynamic key returned by the group management node, verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, and extracting the group key based on the group key dynamic key;

[0014] Among them, the dynamic accumulator verification value is calculated by the group management node according to the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, the updated dynamic accumulator parameter is updated by the initialized dynamic accumulator parameter, and the group key dynamic key is calculated according to the group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter.

[0015] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication device for a satellite cluster, which is arranged in a group management node in the satellite cluster, including:

[0016] a broadcast module, configured to initialize a dynamic accumulator parameter, generate a group key generation message including a generated verification value, and broadcast the group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group;

[0017] A response receiving module, used to receive a group key response message including a response verification value returned by each group member node, wherein the group key response message is sent after the generated verification value is verified;

[0018] a group key calculation module, configured to update the dynamic accumulator parameter after verifying the response verification value returned by the at least one group member node, and calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculate the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter;

[0019] The group key distribution module is used to send a group key distribution message to each group member node, wherein the group key distribution message includes a dynamic accumulator verification value of the group member node and the group key dynamic key, so that the group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value.

[0020] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication device of a satellite cluster, which is arranged in a group member node in the satellite cluster, and includes:

[0021] A message receiving module, configured to receive a group key generation message broadcasted by a group management node in the satellite group; wherein the group key generation message includes a generated verification value;

[0022] a response generation module, configured to generate a response verification value after the generated verification value is verified, and return a group key response message including the response verification value to the group management node, so that the group management node verifies the response verification value;

[0023] a group key extraction module, configured to receive a group key distribution message including a dynamic accumulator verification value and a group key dynamic key returned by the group management node, verify the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, and extract the group key based on the group key dynamic key;

[0024] Among them, the dynamic accumulator verification value is calculated by the group management node according to the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, the updated dynamic accumulator parameter is updated by the initialized dynamic accumulator parameter, and the group key dynamic key is calculated according to the group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter.

[0025] In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a communication device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the processor executes any method described in the first aspect or any step of the method described in the first aspect.

[0026] In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which includes a computer program. When the computer program is run on a communication device, the computer program is used to enable the communication device to execute any method described in the first aspect or any step of the method described in the first aspect.

[0027] This application has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0028] In an embodiment of the present application, in order to enable secure communication between satellite groups, a group management node generates a group key and distributes it to group member nodes. Before generating the group key, a dynamic accumulator parameter is first initialized, and a group key generation message containing a generated verification value is broadcast to each group member node, so that each group member node verifies the generated verification value and returns a group key response message containing a response verification value; after the group management node verifies the response verification value returned by each group member node, the dynamic accumulator parameter is updated, and the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node is calculated based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and the group key dynamic key is calculated based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and the corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value and group key dynamic key are sent to each group member node, so that each group member node verifies the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value and extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key; a secure and efficient group key generation and distribution process can be implemented through the dynamic accumulator, thereby ensuring secure communication between satellite groups based on the group key.

[0029] Other features and advantages of the present application will be described in the following description, and partly become apparent from the description, or be understood by practicing the present application. The purpose and other advantages of the present application can be realized and obtained by the structures specifically pointed out in the written description, claims, and drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0031] Figure 1 A scene diagram of a satellite communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0032] Figure 2 A satellite registration flow chart provided for an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] Figure 3 A ground device registration flow chart provided for an embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Figure 4 A GEO and MEO satellite cluster scene diagram provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0035] Figure 5 A flowchart of a secure communication method for a satellite cluster provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0036] Figure 6 A ground equipment access authentication flow chart provided for an embodiment of the present application;

[0037] Figure 7 An inter-satellite handover authentication flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0038] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of a secure communication device for a satellite cluster provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0039] Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of the structure of another satellite group security communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0040] Fig.10 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the technical solution of the present application, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments recorded in the application documents, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the technical solution of the present application.

[0042] The following is an introduction to some concepts involved in the embodiments of the present application.

[0043] GEO satellites: GEO satellites are fixed in an orbit about 35,786 kilometers above the Earth's equator, remaining stationary relative to the Earth's surface. This position enables the satellite to continuously cover the same area of ​​the Earth and is widely used in communications, broadcasting and meteorological observations.

[0044] MEO satellite: MEO satellite refers to a satellite in medium Earth orbit, which has an orbit altitude between 2,000 km and 35,786 km and is commonly used in global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as GPS.

[0045] Dynamic Accumulator: Dynamic Accumulator is a cryptographic tool for efficiently managing and verifying membership of large datasets without exposing information about individual members. It supports efficient add and remove operations while providing cryptographic proof of member existence.

[0046] Key synchronization: Key synchronization refers to the process of ensuring that all participating nodes in a satellite network share and use the correct encryption keys at a given time. This process is critical to maintaining communication security and data confidentiality within the network.

[0047] Authentication: Authentication is a security mechanism that verifies the identities of both parties in communication, ensuring that both the sender and receiver of data are the expected legitimate users. Authentication is particularly important in satellite networks to prevent unauthorized access and data leakage.

[0048] Satellite node: A satellite node refers to a single satellite unit that constitutes a satellite communication network. In the embodiment of the present application, these satellite nodes can be satellites in geostationary orbit or medium earth orbit, involving data transmission and authentication interaction.

[0049] Session key: A temporary key used to encrypt all information exchanged during a session. Session keys are generated at the beginning of a session and discarded at the end of the session to ensure confidentiality of communications and data integrity.

[0050] Intersatellite Link: A communication link that connects two or more satellite nodes for data transmission. Intersatellite links allow satellites to communicate with each other in orbit, supporting real-time exchange of data and are critical to the efficiency and coverage of satellite networks.

[0051] Secure Channel: A communications path protected by encryption and other security measures to safely transmit data in a network environment that may be subject to eavesdropping or interference.

[0052] In order to facilitate understanding of the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application, the background technology related to the embodiments of the present application is first introduced here.

[0053] With the rapid development of satellite communication technology, the dual-layer satellite network of geostationary orbit GEO and medium earth orbit MEO occupies an important position in the global communication system. It is not only widely used in high-tech fields such as military, aerospace and navigation, but also plays a vital role in civil fields such as global Internet access, distance education, and medical services. The dual-layer satellite network can provide wide coverage, high bandwidth and low latency communication services, making it an important part of current and future communication technology.

[0054] However, double-layer satellite networks face many challenges in practical applications, especially in terms of security. Double-layer satellite networks face various security threats, such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, and impersonation attacks. How to ensure secure communication between satellite clusters in double-layer satellite networks is a problem that needs to be solved.

[0055] In view of this, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication method, apparatus, device and storage medium for a satellite cluster. The group management node in the satellite cluster implements a secure and efficient group key generation and distribution process through a dynamic accumulator. The group member nodes can obtain the group key distributed by the group management node, and based on the group key, secure communication between satellite clusters can be ensured.

[0056] Afterwards, the group management node can also periodically verify the legitimacy of the group member nodes and update the group key. In addition, the group member nodes in the satellite group can perform inter-satellite authentication based on the group key to further ensure secure communication between satellite groups.

[0057] In addition, the embodiments of the present application can also implement security authentication of ground equipment when the ground equipment accesses a group member node, and perform inter-satellite switching authentication when the ground equipment or the group member node moves, thereby ensuring the continuity and security of the ground equipment accessing a new group member node.

[0058] The preferred embodiments of the present application are described below in conjunction with the drawings in the specification. It should be understood that the preferred embodiments described herein are only used to illustrate and explain the present application, and are not used to limit the present application. In addition, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application may be combined with each other if there is no conflict.

[0059] The satellite communication system according to the embodiment of the present application is introduced below.

[0060] like Figure 1 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of a satellite communication system of an embodiment of the present application, which includes a GEO satellite node, a MEO satellite node and a ground network. The ground network includes a network control center (NCC), a base station and ground equipment (i.e., a user), etc. The network control center is used to manage and monitor the operation of the entire satellite communication system. The GEO satellite node and multiple MEO satellite nodes within the coverage of its communication signal can constitute a satellite cluster. The GEO satellite node serves as a group management node of the satellite cluster, and the MEO satellite node serves as a group member node of the satellite cluster. The MEO satellite nodes in the satellite cluster communicate with each other through inter-satellite links. The ground equipment can access the MEO satellite node and communicate with the MEO satellite node through the satellite-to-ground link. Attackers may attack the MEO satellite node through the attack link, so it is necessary to ensure secure communication between satellite clusters.

[0061] The embodiments of the present application involve four scenarios: group key generation and distribution, inter-satellite authentication, ground equipment access authentication, and inter-satellite handover authentication. The detailed description of each scenario is as follows:

[0062] 1. Group key generation and distribution scenario: involving GEO satellite nodes and MEO satellite nodes. GEO satellite nodes serve as group management nodes and are responsible for generating and distributing group keys to MEO satellite nodes.

[0063] 2. Inter-satellite authentication scenario: mainly involves mutual authentication between MEO satellite nodes.

[0064] 3. Ground equipment access authentication scenario: involving ground equipment, MEO satellite nodes and network control center NCC. Ground equipment accesses the satellite network through MEO satellite nodes and performs two-way authentication and key negotiation with NCC.

[0065] 4. Inter-satellite handover authentication scenario: involves ground equipment, currently connected MEO satellite nodes, and MEO satellite nodes that need to be newly connected in the future. When the ground equipment moves to the best coverage of the new MEO satellite node, inter-satellite handover authentication is required to ensure the continuity of communication services.

[0066] The embodiments of the present application involve the following mechanisms:

[0067] 1. Initialization mechanism: NCC, as the trusted center, generates the public parameters, system master private key and master public key of the satellite communication system.

[0068] 2. Registration mechanism: including satellite registration and ground equipment registration, making satellite nodes and ground equipment legal nodes of the satellite communication system.

[0069] 3. Group key generation and distribution mechanism: The GEO satellite node generates and distributes the group key to each MEO satellite node within its communication range. The group key generation and distribution mechanism is designed to ensure secure communication between the GEO and MEO satellite groups.

[0070] 4. Inter-satellite authentication mechanism: realize mutual authentication between MEO satellite nodes to ensure secure communication in dynamic environments.

[0071] 5. Group key update mechanism: periodically verify the legitimacy of MEO satellite nodes and update the group key.

[0072] 6. Ground equipment access authentication mechanism: realize two-way authentication and key negotiation between ground equipment and connected MEO satellite nodes.

[0073] 7. Inter-satellite handover authentication mechanism: When ground equipment or satellite nodes move, ensure the continuity and security of ground equipment accessing new satellite nodes.

[0074] Before introducing the secure communication method for a satellite cluster according to an embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned initialization mechanism and registration mechanism are first introduced.

[0075] 1. The initialization mechanism is performed by the network control center NCC:

[0076] 1) Select a secure group and bilinear map. NCC selects a secure N-order additive cyclic group G1 and an N-order multiplicative cyclic group G2, and determines a bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2. This step ensures that the mathematical infrastructure used by the system is sufficiently secure.

[0077] 2) Determine the generator. NCC determines the generator P of the additive cyclic group G1. The generator P is used to generate keys and parameters in the subsequent process.

[0078] 3) Select the security function. NCC selects the following security functions:

[0079] Hash function H(·): used to generate and verify message digests.

[0080] Key generation function KDF(·): used to derive key material.

[0081] Physical Unclonable Function (PUF): used to generate hardware-based unique response values ​​to enhance system security.

[0082] 4) Generate a master private key and a master public key. NCC randomly selects a master private key sk ncc ∈[1,N-1], and calculate the system's master public key pk ncc =[sk ncc ]P.

[0083] 5) Release system public parameters. NCC securely stores the system master private key sk ncc The system public parameters pubparam are published to the satellite communication system. The pubparam content includes: the additive cyclic group G1, the multiplicative cyclic group G2, the generator P, the hash function H(·), the key generation function KDF(·), the physical unclonable function PUF(·), the master public key pk ncc .

[0084] 2. Registration mechanism. The registration mechanism of the embodiment of the present application is divided into a satellite registration mechanism and a user registration mechanism, which ensures that all nodes can undergo security authentication before joining the system, thereby becoming legal nodes of the system. All registration requests and response messages are transmitted in a secure channel.

[0085] 1) Satellite registration mechanism. Figure 2 As shown, taking the registration of GEO satellite node G0 as an example, the registration process of MEO satellite node is the same as that of GEO satellite node.

[0086] a. Generate satellite PUF challenge code: Before satellite registration, NCC randomly generates a PUF challenge code c for all satellite nodes sat .

[0087] b. Satellite registration request: GEO satellite node G0 sends a satellite registration request {ID G,0}, where ID {G,0} Identifier of GEO satellite G0.

[0088] After receiving the satellite registration request, NCC first searches the satellite database to confirm whether the satellite is unregistered. When G0 is unregistered, NCC sends a satellite PUF challenge c to GEO satellite node G0. sat .

[0089] c. Calculate the PUF response value: GEO satellite node G0 calculates the satellite PUF response value p G,0 =PUF(c sat ) and return it to the NCC.

[0090] After receiving the PUF response value, NCC randomly selects a random parameter s G,0 ∈[1,N-1], N is the number of elements in the above N-order additive cyclic group G1, calculate the public key k G,0 =[s G,0 ]P and identification information hash value d G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,c sat ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,ET G,0 ), calculate the private key sk G,0 =sk ncc +d G,0 s G,0 NCC sends a GEO satellite authentication message {pk G,0 ,sk G,0 ,ET G,0}, and store GEO satellite registration information {ID G,0 ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,sk G,0 ,ET G,0}, where ET G,0 It is the expiration timestamp of the legal identity of GEO satellite G0 in the system.

[0091] d. Verify and store: GEO satellite node G0 receives the GEO satellite authentication message {pk G,0 ,sk G,0 ,ET G,0}, calculate the timestamp verification hash value d' G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,c sat ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,ET G,0 ), and verify that the following equation holds:

[0092]

[0093] If the above equation holds true, the GEO satellite node G0 confirms the received pk G,0 and sk G,0 is correct, and thus safely stores {c sat ,pk G,0 ,sk G,0 ,ET G,0 Otherwise, the GEO satellite node G0 sends a satellite registration failure message to the NCC and then re-executes the registration steps.

[0094] e. Registration completed: After the satellite registration is completed, the NCC will send the identification information of each satellite node and the PUF response value [ID G,0 :p G,0 ,ID M,0 :p M,0 ,ID M,1 :p M,1 ,ID M,2 :p M,2 ,…] are transmitted to each satellite node through a secure channel.

[0095] It should be noted that, in addition to the GEO satellite node G0, other GEO satellite nodes can also register with the NCC, and the registration process is similar to the registration process of the above-mentioned GEO satellite node G0, which will not be repeated here.

[0096] 2) Ground equipment registration mechanism. Figure 3 As shown, the registration of ground device u0 is taken as an example.

[0097] First, the ground device registers the request. The ground device u0 sends a ground registration request {ID U,0}, where ID U,0 Indicates the unique identification information of u0.

[0098] Secondly, authentication keys and pseudonyms are assigned. After receiving the user registration request, the NCC first searches the user database to confirm whether the user u0 is an unregistered satellite network user. When it is confirmed that u0 is not registered, the NCC performs the following operations:

[0099] Randomly select an authentication key sk U , 0, assign multiple IDs to u0 that match the real identity U ,0 irrelevant pseudonym set Returns a ground registration response message containing the following information:

[0100] {sk U,0 ,pubparam,PIDs,c sat ,[ID G,i :p G,i ],[ID M,i:p M,i ]}

[0101] Among them, pubparam is the system public parameters, including G1, G2, P, H (·), KDF (·), PUF (·), pk ncc ;c sat is the satellite PUF challenge code randomly generated by NCC; [ID G,i :p G,i ] contains the identification information of the GEO satellite node and the corresponding PUF response value set; [ID M,i :p M,i ] contains the identification information of the MEO satellite node and the corresponding PUF response value set.

[0102] Finally, the registration response is stored. After receiving the registration response, the ground device u0 stores the registration response securely for use in subsequent authentication processes.

[0103] The following is a detailed introduction to the secure communication method for a satellite cluster in an embodiment of the present application.

[0104] like Figure 4 As shown, the satellite cluster consists of GEO satellite nodes and MEO satellite nodes within its communication range. The GEO satellite nodes are cluster management nodes, and the MEO satellite nodes are cluster member nodes.

[0105] First, the embodiment of the present application provides a timing interaction diagram of a secure communication method for a satellite group, which is applied to a group management node and a group member node in a satellite group, and involves a group key generation and distribution process, such as Figure 5 As shown, the secure communication method of the satellite group includes the following S51-S59:

[0106] S51. The group management node initializes dynamic accumulator parameters and generates a group key generation message including a generated verification value.

[0107] The initialized dynamic accumulator parameter may be the management private key of the group management node. For example, the group management node takes the GEO satellite node G0 as an example and initializes a dynamic accumulator parameter ACC G,0 =sk G,0 ,sk G,0 It is the private key of G0, that is, the management private key.

[0108] In an optional implementation, the group key generation message further includes a broadcast parameter. When calculating the verification value, the group management node may calculate the broadcast parameter based on a bilinear mapping generator, and calculate a PUF response value based on a preset physically unclonable function (PUF) challenge code; then, calculate a first derived function value based on the PUF response value and the broadcast parameter, and calculate the verification value based on the management private key and the first derived function value.

[0109] Specifically, taking the GEO satellite node G0 as an example, the GEO satellite node G0 randomly selects a random parameter r G,0 ∈[1,N-1], and calculate:

[0110] Broadcast parameter R G,0 =[r G,0 ]P;

[0111] PUF response value p' G,0 =PUF(C cat );

[0112] The first derivative function value gkd G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,R G,0 ,p' G,0 ,T1);

[0113] Generate verification value gka G,0 =sk G,0 +gkd G,0 ·r G,0 ;

[0114] Among them, T1 is the sending timestamp.

[0115] S52: The group management node broadcasts a group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group.

[0116] The group management node may broadcast a group key generation message to at least one group member node within the coverage of its communication signal. For example, the group key generation message is represented as: G,0 ,R G,0 ,pk G,0 ,gka G,0 ,T1,ET G,0}, where ET G,0 It is the timestamp of the legal identity expiration of GEO satellite G0.

[0117] S53: The group member node receives the group key generation message broadcast by the group management node, and generates a response verification value after verifying the generated verification value.

[0118] Optionally, the group key generation message includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group management node; before verifying the generation verification value returned by the group management node, the freshness of the group key generation message can also be verified based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key generation message and the legal identity expiration timestamp.

[0119] For example, taking the group member node as MEO satellite node M0, after receiving the group key generation message, MEO satellite M0 verifies the freshness and validity of the timestamp: |T1-T'1|<ΔT and ET G,0 >T'1, where T'1 is the receiving timestamp, △T is the maximum tolerance time, ET G,0 It is the timestamp of the legal identity expiration of GEO satellite G0.

[0120] After verifying the freshness of the group key generation message, the group member nodes can verify the legitimacy and integrity of the group key generation message. The verification process of the group key generation message is introduced below.

[0121] In some embodiments, the group key generation message further includes broadcast parameters and management public keys, and the broadcast parameters and management public keys are both calculated based on bilinear mapping generators; when verifying the generated verification value, the group member node may perform the following steps A1-A2:

[0122] A1. Calculate a response parameter based on the management public key and the registration PUF response value of the group management node, and calculate a third derived function value based on the broadcast parameter and the registration PUF response value;

[0123] Among them, based on the management public key pk G,0 , the registered PUF response value p of the group management node G,0 , PUF challenge code c of group member node sat , identification information ID G,0 And the legal identity expiration timestamp ET G,0 Calculate the response parameter d' G,0 , for example, d' G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,c sat ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,ET G,0 ).

[0124] Based on the broadcast parameter R G,0 , the registered PUF response value p of the group management node G,0 , identification information ID G,0 And send timestamp T1 to calculate the third derivative function value gkd' G,0 , for example, gkd' G,0 =H(IDG,0 ,R G,0 ,p G,0 ,T1).

[0125] A2. Using the bilinear mapping rule, based on the master public key of the satellite group, the response parameter and the third derived function value, the generated verification value returned by the group management node is verified; wherein the master public key is calculated based on the bilinear mapping generator.

[0126] Optionally, step A2 includes the following steps:

[0127] Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the management public key based on the response parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter based on the third derivative function value;

[0128] The bilinear mapping result of the generated verification value returned by the group management node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the management public key, and the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter.

[0129] Among them, the above response parameter d' G,0 , the third derivative function value gkd' G,0 For example, the master public key pk ncc The bilinear mapping result is e(pk ncc ,P), the bilinear mapping result of managing public keys is The bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameters is The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value is e([gka G,0 ]P,P), verify whether the following equation holds:

[0130]

[0131] If the above equation holds true, it means that the generated verification value has passed the verification.

[0132] After the group member node verifies the generated verification value, it can generate a response verification value and send a group key response message including the response verification value to the group management node.

[0133] In an optional implementation, the group member node generates a response verification value, which may include the following steps:

[0134] Calculate response parameters based on the bilinear mapping generator, calculate PUF response value based on the preset PUF challenge code, and calculate key negotiation parameters based on the broadcast parameters and the bilinear mapping generator;

[0135] Calculating a fourth derived function value based on the response parameter, the PUF response value, and the key negotiation parameter;

[0136] A response verification value is calculated based on the member private key and the fourth derivation function value.

[0137] Here, we also take the group member node as MEO satellite node M0 as an example. MEO satellite node M0 randomly selects a random parameter r M,0 ∈[1,N-1], and calculate:

[0138] Response parameter R M,0 =[r M,0 ]P;

[0139] PUF response value p' M,0 =PUF(c sat );

[0140] Key negotiation parameters

[0141] Fourth derivative function value

[0142] Response verification value gka M,0 =sk M,0 +gkd M,0 r G,0 .

[0143] Among them, T2 is the sending timestamp, sk M,0 It is the private key of MEO satellite node M0, that is, the member private key.

[0144] S54: The group member node sends a group key response message including a response verification value to the group management node.

[0145] Specifically, the group key response message may also include identification information of group member nodes, response parameters, member public keys, sending timestamps, legal identity expiration timestamps, etc. For example, the group key response message may be expressed as:

[0146] {ID M,0 ,R M,0 ,pk M,0 ,gka M,0 ,T2,ET M,0}

[0147] Among them, E.T. M,0 It is the expiration timestamp of the legal identity of MEO satellite M0.

[0148] S55. The group management node receives the group key response message including the response verification value returned by each group member node, and verifies the response verification value.

[0149] Optionally, the group key response message also includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group member node. Before verifying the response verification value returned by each group member node, the group management node can also verify the freshness of the group key response message based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key response message and the legal identity expiration timestamp.

[0150] For example, taking the group management node as GEO satellite node G0, after receiving the group key response message, GEO satellite node G0 verifies the freshness and validity of the timestamp: |T2-T'2|<△T and ET M,0 Is it greater than T'2, where T'2 is the receiving timestamp, △T is the maximum tolerance time, ET M,0 It is the timestamp of the legal identity expiration of GEO satellite G0.

[0151] In an optional implementation, the group key response message further includes a response parameter and a member public key, both of which are calculated based on a bilinear map generator; when the group management node verifies the response verification value returned by at least one group member node, the group management node performs the following steps B1-B3 for each group member node:

[0152] B1. Calculate the verification parameter based on the member public key returned by the group member node and the registered PUF response value of the group member node.

[0153] The verification parameter is calculated based on the member public key of the group member node, the registered PUF response value, the PUF challenge code, the identification information and the legal identity expiration timestamp. For example, taking the group member node as the MEO satellite node M0 as an example, the verification parameter is: d' M,0 =H(ID M,0 ,c sat ,p M,0 ,pk M,0 ,ET M,0 ).

[0154] B2. Calculate the key negotiation parameter based on the response parameter returned by the group member node, and calculate the second derived function value based on the key negotiation parameter, the response parameter and the registered PUF response value.

[0155] For example, for MEO satellite node M0 and GEO satellite node G0, based on the response parameter R M,0 , bilinear map generator P and random parameter r G,0 , calculate the key negotiation parameters of M0 For example,

[0156] Next, based on the identification information ID of the group member node M,0 , key negotiation parameters Response parameter R M,0 , register PUF response value p M,0 And send timestamp T2, calculate the second derivative function value gkd' M,0 ,For example,

[0157] B3. Using the bilinear mapping rule, based on the satellite group's master public key, verification parameter and the second derived function value, the response verification value returned by the group member node is verified.

[0158] Optionally, step B3 includes:

[0159] Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the member public key based on the verification parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter based on the second derivative function value;

[0160] The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value returned by the group member node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the member public key and the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter.

[0161] Here, we also take the group member node as MEO satellite node M0 as an example, and the verification parameter is d' M,0 , the response parameter is R M,0 , the second derivative function value is gkd' M,0 , master public key pk ncc The bilinear mapping result is e(pk ncc ,P), the bilinear mapping result of the member public key is The bilinear mapping result of the response parameter is The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value is e([gka M,0 ]P,P), verify whether the following equation holds:

[0162]

[0163] If the above equation holds true, it means that the response verification value has been verified successfully.

[0164] S56. After the verification is passed, the group management node updates the dynamic accumulator parameters, and calculates the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameters, and calculates the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameters and the group key dynamic key.

[0165] In an optional implementation, the group management node updates the dynamic accumulator parameter, including the following steps:

[0166] For each group member node, a corresponding dynamic accumulator derived value is calculated based on the identification information of the group member node;

[0167] A dynamic accumulator parameter is updated based on a dynamic accumulator derived value of at least one group member node.

[0168] It is assumed that the group management node is the GEO satellite node G0 and the group member nodes include the MEO satellite node M0 and the MEO satellite node M1. For the MEO satellite node M0, the GEO satellite node G0 is based on its own identification information ID G,0 、M0 identification information ID M,0 and the group key expiration timestamp ET gk , calculate the dynamic accumulator derived value of M0 For example, Similarly, the dynamic accumulator derived value of MEO satellite node M1 is

[0169] Next, update the dynamic accumulator parameter ACC i ,For example, Among them, r G,0 It is a random parameter selected by the group management node in the above embodiment.

[0170] Afterwards, based on the identification information ID of the GEO satellite node G0 (group management node) G,0 、ID of MEO satellite node M0 M,0 and key negotiation parameters MEO satellite node M1 ID M,1 and key negotiation parameters Send timestamp T3 and calculate group key gk G，0 ,For example,

[0171] Based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter ACC i , GEO satellite node G0 identification information ID G,O , group key gk G,0 and send timestamp T3, calculate the group key dynamic key For example,

[0172] Finally, for the MEO satellite node M0, based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter ACC i , the key negotiation parameter of M0 calculated in the above embodiment Group Key Dynamic Key And send timestamp T3, calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of M0 For example,

[0173] Similarly, the dynamic accumulator verification value of M1 in, It is the key negotiation parameter of M1.

[0174] S57. The group management node sends a group key distribution message to each group member node, which includes the dynamic accumulator verification value of the group member node and the group key dynamic key.

[0175] For example, the GEO satellite node G0 sends a group key distribution message to the MEO satellite node M0:

[0176] Send a group key distribution message to MEO satellite node M1: At the same time, the GEO satellite node G0 notifies the NCC of the group members GMs = {ID M,0 ,ID M,1}.

[0177] S58. The group member node receives the group key distribution message, and after verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value therein, extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key.

[0178] For example, taking the group member node as MEO satellite node M0, after receiving the group key distribution message, MEO satellite M0 verifies the freshness and validity of the timestamp: |T3-T'3|<△T and ET gk Is it greater than T'3, △T is the maximum tolerance time, ET gk The group key expiration timestamp.

[0179] After verifying the freshness of the group key generation message, the group member node may verify the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value in the group key generation message.

[0180] In an optional implementation, the group member node verifies the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, including the following steps C1-C3:

[0181] C1. Calculate the dynamic accumulator verification parameter based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, key negotiation parameter and group key dynamic key.

[0182] Among them, the group member node takes MEO satellite node M0 as an example. M0 verifies the value based on the dynamic accumulator Calculated key negotiation parameters Group Key Dynamic Key And the sending timestamp T3, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' of M0 is calculated by the following formula i :

[0183]

[0184] C2. For each group member node in the satellite group, a dynamic accumulator derived value is calculated based on the identification information of the group member node and the identification information of the group management node;

[0185] Exemplarily, the MEO satellite node M0 calculates its own dynamic accumulator derived value For example At the same time, M0 calculates the dynamic accumulator derived value of MEO satellite node M1 For example Among them, E.T. gk The group key expiration timestamp.

[0186] C3. Using the bilinear mapping rule, the dynamic accumulator verification parameters are verified based on the master public key, management public key, broadcast parameters and dynamic accumulator derived value of each group member node of the satellite group.

[0187] Optionally, step C3 includes:

[0188] Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the management public key based on the response parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter for each group member node based on the dynamic accumulator derived value of the group member node;

[0189] The bilinear mapping result of the dynamic accumulator verification parameter is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the management public key and the bilinear mapping results of the broadcast parameters.

[0190] Here, we also take the group member node as MEO satellite node M0 as an example. The satellite group also includes MEO satellite node M1. The response parameter calculated by M0 is d' G,0 , the dynamic accumulator derived value of M0 is The dynamic accumulator derived value of M1 is Master public key pk ncc The bilinear mapping result is e(pk ncc ,P), the bilinear mapping result of managing public keys is Broadcast parameter R G,0 The bilinear mapping result is and Dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i The bilinear mapping result is e([ACC' i ]P,P).

[0191] MEO satellite node M0 verifies whether the following equation holds true:

[0192]

[0193] If the above equation holds true, it means that the dynamic accumulator verification parameter verification is successful.

[0194] Optionally, when the group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key, it may specifically perform a preset operation on the group key dynamic key and a dynamic accumulator verification parameter to obtain the group key.

[0195] For example, MEO satellite node M0 is based on the group key dynamic key Dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i , the identification information of the GEO satellite node G0 and the above-mentioned sending timestamp T3, and the group key gk is extracted by the following formula G,0 :

[0196]

[0197] In the above embodiment of the present application, the group management node and each group member node within its communication range complete the generation and distribution process of the group key, the group management node and each group member node achieve mutual trust and build a group key for the double-layer satellite network.

[0198] In some embodiments, in order to ensure that the group member nodes within the communication range of the group management node are always legitimate nodes, the group management node periodically detects the group member nodes in the satellite group, detects whether they are still within the communication range, and determines whether there are new group member nodes joining the satellite group. When the group member nodes in the satellite group change, the group management node can update the group key. The change of the group member nodes in the satellite group includes at least one of the following situations: the joined group member node leaves the satellite group, and the new group member node joins the satellite group.

[0199] At this point, the group management node can perform the following steps D1-D2:

[0200] D1. When a group member node in the satellite group changes, the dynamic accumulator parameters are updated, and a new group key dynamic key is calculated based on the generated new group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameters, and a new dynamic accumulator verification value of each current group member node is calculated based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameters and the new group key dynamic key.

[0201] D2. For each current group member node, the new dynamic accumulator verification value and the new group key dynamic key of the group member node are sent to the group member node, so that the group member node extracts a new group key based on the new dynamic accumulator verification value and the new group key dynamic key.

[0202] In an optional implementation, when a group member node is added to the satellite group, the group management node may further perform the following operations before re-updating the dynamic accumulator parameters:

[0203] Sending a new group key generation message to the newly added group member node; wherein the new group key generation message includes a newly generated verification value;

[0204] Receive a new group key response message returned by the newly added group member node, the new group key response message includes a new response verification value, and the new group key response message is sent after the newly generated verification value is verified;

[0205] Verify the new response verification value returned by the newly added group member node.

[0206] Assume that the satellite cluster includes GEO satellite node G0, MEO satellite node M0 and MEO satellite node M1. When M0 leaves the satellite cluster and MEO satellite node M3 joins the satellite cluster, the group key update process is as follows:

[0207] 1. GEO satellite node G0 verifies the legitimacy of the newly added MEO satellite node M3.

[0208] GEO satellite node G0 generates a new group key generation message to MEO satellite node M3 under its communication signal coverage, and first initializes a dynamic accumulator parameter ACC G,0 =sk G,0 .

[0209] Randomly select a random parameter r G,0 ∈[1,N-1], calculate the temporary public key R G,0 = r G,0 ]P (similar to the broadcast parameters in the above embodiment) and PUF response value p' G,0 =PUF(c sat );

[0210] Calculate the fifth derivative function value and newly generated verification value T6 is the sending timestamp, ET G,0 It is the timestamp of the legal identity expiration of GEO satellite G0.

[0211] The GEO satellite node G0 sends the following new group key generation message to the MEO satellite node M3 within its coverage area:

[0212] 2. MEO satellite node M3 verifies the validity of the new group key generation message.

[0213] MEO satellite node M3 verifies the freshness of T6 in the new group key generation message and the expiration timestamp ET G,0 Calculate the new response parameter d' G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,c sat ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,ET G,0 );

[0214] Calculate the sixth derivative function value

[0215] Verify the equation whether it is established;

[0216] If the equation holds true, M3 verifies the legitimacy of the GEO satellite node G0 and the integrity of the new group key generation message.

[0217] 3. MEO satellite node M3 generates a new group key response message.

[0218] Randomly select a random parameter r M,3 ∈[1,N-1], calculate the new response parameter R M,3 =[r M,3 ]P;

[0219] Calculate the PUF response value p' M,3 =PUF(c sat );

[0220] Calculate key negotiation parameters

[0221] Calculate the seventh derivative function value

[0222] Calculate the new response verification value gka M,3 =sk M,3 +gkd M,3 r G,3 , where T7 is the sending timestamp;

[0223] MEO satellite node M3 sends a new group key response message to GEO satellite node G0: {ID M,3 ,R M,3 ,pk M,3 ,gkd M,3 ,T7,ET M,3}.

[0224] 4. GEO satellite node G0 verifies the new group key response message.

[0225] GEO satellite node G0 verifies the freshness of T7 and the legal identity of MEO satellite node M3, and the expiration timestamp ETM,3 effectiveness.

[0226] Calculate the verification parameter d' of MEO satellite node M3 M,3 =H(ID M,3 ,c sat ,p M,3 ,pk M,3 ,ET M,3 );

[0227] Calculate key negotiation parameters

[0228] verify whether it is established;

[0229] If the verification is successful, the GEO satellite node G0 confirms: 1) the M3 satellite is a legitimate MEO satellite node; 2) the new group key response message {ID M,3 ,R M,3 ,pk M,3 ,gkd M,3 ,T7,ET M,3} is complete; 3) G0 calculates the key negotiation parameters Key negotiation parameters calculated with M3 is consistent and correct.

[0230] 5. The GEO satellite node G0 re-updates the dynamic accumulator parameters, calculates the new group key and distributes it.

[0231] Calculates the dynamic accumulator derived value of M3

[0232] Calculates the dynamic accumulator derived value of M1

[0233] Update accumulator

[0234] Calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of M3

[0235] Calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of M1

[0236] Calculate new group key

[0237] Calculate new group key dynamic key

[0238] GEO satellite node G0 sends a new group key distribution message to MEO satellite nodes M1 and M3 within its communication range:

[0239]

[0240] At the same time, notify the NCC of the GMs in the group new ={ID M,1 ,ID M,3}.

[0241] 6. The MEO satellite node verifies the validity of the new group key distribution message.

[0242] Take the verification of MEO satellite GEO satellite node M3 as an example. M3 first verifies the freshness and expiration timestamp of T7. effectiveness.

[0243] Calculate dynamic accumulator validation parameters

[0244] Calculates the new dynamic accumulator derived value for M1

[0245] Calculates the dynamic accumulator derived value of M3

[0246] Verify that the following equation holds:

[0247]

[0248] If the equation holds true, the MEO satellite node M3 confirms the new group key distribution message Complete, authentic, untampered, and key negotiation parameters Negotiate correctly.

[0249] 7. The MEO satellite node extracts the new group key.

[0250] Take the extraction of the new group key by MEO satellite GEO satellite node M3 as an example. M3 calculates the new group key using the following formula:

[0251]

[0252] Through the above steps, GEO satellite node G0 completes the group key update of MEO satellite nodes within its communication range. The newly added MEO satellite node M3 successfully becomes a legitimate node in the satellite group through a series of verification and key negotiation steps, and shares the new group key with GEO satellite node G0 and other MEO satellite nodes.

[0253] In the embodiment of the present application, after extracting the group key, each group member node in the satellite group can perform mutual authentication based on the group key to prevent unauthorized group member nodes from joining the satellite group, thereby ensuring the overall security and reliability of the satellite group. The following takes the MEO satellite node M0 and the MEO satellite node M1 in the satellite group as an example to introduce the authentication process between the group member nodes in the embodiment of the present application.

[0254] In some embodiments, a group member node in a satellite group may initiate an authentication request to other group member nodes to perform mutual authentication, specifically including the following steps E1-E4:

[0255] E1. The group member node calculates the authentication parameter based on the random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and encrypts the authentication parameter based on the group key to obtain the encrypted authentication parameter.

[0256] Among them, taking the example of MEO satellite node M0 initiating an authentication request to MEO satellite node M1, M0 randomly selects a random parameter isr M,0 ∈[1,N-1], based on the random parameter isr M,0 , dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the first intermediate parameter DISR M,0 ,For example,

[0257] And, based on the random parameter isr M,0 , its own dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the first authentication data isd M,0 , for example, isd M,0 =H(ID M,0 ,ACC' i ,gk G,0 ,isr M,0 ,T4), where T4 is the sending timestamp.

[0258] The first intermediate parameter DISR M,0 , first authentication data isd M,0 and send timestamp T4 as authentication parameter, based on group key gk G,0 The authentication parameters are encrypted.

[0259] MEO satellite node M0 sends an inter-satellite authentication message to MEO satellite node M1 in, It means that the group key gk G,0 Encryption is performed.

[0260] E2. The group member node sends an inter-satellite authentication message including the encrypted authentication parameters to other group member nodes in the satellite group, so that the other group member nodes decrypt and verify the encrypted authentication parameters.

[0261] Taking the other group member node as MEO satellite node M1 as an example, after receiving the inter-satellite authentication message, M1 verifies the inter-satellite authentication message, which specifically includes the following verification process:

[0262] 1. M1 decrypts the encrypted authentication parameter based on the group key to obtain the decrypted authentication parameter, for example, in, It means that the group key gk G,0 Decrypt.

[0263] 2. M1 performs verification based on the decryption authentication parameters, as follows:

[0264] Based on the decryption intermediate parameter DISR' in the decryption authentication parameter M,0 , its own dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the decryption random parameter isr' M,0 ,For example,

[0265] After checking the freshness of T'4, M1 verifies the parameter ACC' based on its own dynamic accumulator i , decrypt random parameter isr' M,0 and group key gk G,0 , verify whether the following equation holds: isd' M,0 =isd M,0 =H(ID M,0 ,ACC' i ,gk G,0 ,isr' M,0 ,T'4).

[0266] If the above equation holds true, M1 confirms that M0 is a node within the satellite cluster and the inter-satellite authentication message is complete, valid and has not been tampered with.

[0267] 3. M1 generates and sends an inter-satellite authentication response message, as follows:

[0268] M1 randomly selects a random parameter isr M,1 ∈[1,N-1], based on the random parameter isr M,1 , its own dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the second intermediate parameter DISR M,0 ,For example,

[0269] And, based on the random parameter isr M,1 , decrypt random parameter isr' M,0 , its own dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the second authentication data isdM,1 , for example, isd M,1 =H(ID M,0 ,ID M,1 ,ACC' i ,gk G,0 ,isr' M,0 ,isr M,1 ,T'4,T5), where T5 is the sending timestamp.

[0270] M1 sends an intersatellite authentication response message to M0

[0271] E3. The group member node receives the inter-satellite authentication response message containing the encrypted response parameter returned by other group member nodes, decrypts the encrypted response parameter based on the group key, and obtains the decrypted response parameter.

[0272] E4. The group member node verifies the decryption response parameter based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and confirms that other group member nodes have passed the authentication after the verification is successful.

[0273] In the above steps E3-E4, the group member node is the MEO satellite node M0, and M0 receives the inter-satellite authentication response message from M1: After that, the intersatellite authentication response message is verified, which specifically includes the following verification process:

[0274] 1. M0 decrypts the encrypted response parameter based on the group key to obtain the decrypted response parameter in, It means that the group key gk G,0 Decrypt.

[0275] 2. M0 performs verification based on the decryption response parameters, as follows:

[0276] Based on the decryption intermediate parameter DISR' in the decryption response parameter M,1 , its own dynamic accumulator verification parameter ACC' i and group key gk G,0 , calculate the decryption random parameter isr' M,1 ,For example,

[0277] After verifying the freshness of timestamp T'5, M0 verifies parameter ACC' based on its own dynamic accumulator i , decrypt random parameter isr' M,1 , the random parameter isr selected by itself M,0 and group key gk G,0 , verify whether the following equation holds: isd' M,1 =H(IDM,0 ,ID M,1 ,ACC′ i ,gk G,0 ,isr M,0 ,isr′ M,1 ,T4,T′5).

[0278] If the above equation holds true, M1 confirms that the inter-satellite authentication response message is complete and has not been tampered with, and that the MEO satellite node M0 is a legitimate group member node in the satellite group.

[0279] Through the above steps, MEO satellite nodes M0 and M1 have successfully achieved mutual authentication. After the authentication is completed, these satellite nodes can use the group key to perform secure encrypted communication and data integrity verification. Through this inter-satellite authentication mechanism, not only can a trust relationship be quickly established between satellite nodes within the satellite group, but it can also ensure the security and reliability of data transmission and prevent unauthorized satellite nodes from joining the network.

[0280] In some embodiments, a group member node in a satellite group can not only initiate an authentication request to other group member nodes, but also receive authentication requests initiated by other group member nodes and perform mutual authentication, specifically including the following steps F1-F4:

[0281] F1. A group member node receives an inter-satellite authentication message containing encrypted authentication parameters sent by other group member nodes in the satellite group, decrypts the encrypted authentication parameters based on the group key, and verifies the obtained decrypted authentication parameters;

[0282] F2. After the verification is passed, the group member node confirms that other group member nodes have passed the authentication, calculates the response parameter based on the random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and encrypts the response parameter based on the group key to obtain the encrypted response parameter;

[0283] F3. The group member node returns an inter-satellite authentication response message including the encrypted response parameters to other group member nodes, so that other group member nodes decrypt and verify the encrypted response parameters.

[0284] The specific implementation process of the above steps F1-F4 is similar to the specific implementation process of E1-E4 in the above embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0285] Through the above steps, mutual authentication can be successfully achieved between group member nodes. After the authentication is completed, these satellite nodes can use the group key for secure encrypted communication and data integrity verification. Through this inter-satellite authentication mechanism, not only can a trust relationship be quickly established between nodes in the group, but it can also ensure the security and reliability of data transmission and prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network.

[0286] It should be noted that the group management node and the group member nodes in the satellite group can also perform mutual authentication based on the group key. The authentication process is similar to the mutual authentication process between the group member nodes and will not be repeated here.

[0287] In an embodiment of the present application, in a two-layer satellite network environment where the group management node and the group member nodes are located, in order to ensure that the ground equipment in the satellite communication system can securely access the satellite group and realize identity authentication and key negotiation during the access process, it is necessary to implement a strict ground access authentication mechanism. The design of this mechanism must not only ensure the authenticity of the identities of the communicating parties, but also ensure the security of the key negotiation process to prevent any potential malicious attacks or unauthorized access.

[0288] To this end, the present application embodiment proposes a multi-level, multi-stage ground device access authentication process to cope with the complex and changeable satellite communication environment. The following takes the current group member nodes in the satellite group including MEO satellite node M1 and MEO satellite node M3 as an example to introduce the ground device access authentication process in detail.

[0289] In some embodiments, when a ground device requests access to a group member node, the group member node may perform the following steps G1-G4:

[0290] G1. The group member node receives the access authentication request including the access authentication parameters sent by the ground device, and calculates the intermediate authentication parameters based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameters and the access authentication parameters.

[0291] Among them, taking the group member node as MEO satellite node M1 as an example, the process of the ground device generating an access authentication request is as follows:

[0292] 1. Pseudonym selection and generation negotiation parameters. The ground device u0 randomly selects an unused pseudonym And a negotiation parameter rk U,0 .

[0293] 2. Generate a temporary identity. Calculate the temporary identity Among them, sk U,0 is the private key of the ground device, and T8 is the sending timestamp.

[0294] 3. Generate negotiation parameter difference value.

[0295] 4. Generate user data verification value. Calculate user data verification value

[0296] 5. Access authentication request is sent. The ground device u0 sends an access authentication request to the MEO satellite node M1 Access authentication parameters include pseudonym Temporary Identity TID U,0 , random parameter difference value drk U,0 , user data verification value ud U,0 .

[0297] After receiving the above access authentication request, M1 performs the following operations:

[0298] 1. M1 verifies the freshness of the timestamp. After receiving the access authentication request, M1 first checks the freshness of the timestamp T8.

[0299] 2. M1 generates intermediate data. Calculate intermediate data

[0300] 3. M1 calculates the intermediate authentication parameter. Intermediate authentication parameter a M,1 =ACC i +md M,1 r M,1 , where T9 is the sending timestamp.

[0301] 4. M1 sends an intermediate authentication request. Finally, M1 sends an intermediate authentication request to the network control center NCC.

[0302] G2. The group member node sends an intermediate authentication request including access authentication parameters and intermediate authentication parameters to the network control center of the satellite group, so that the network control center verifies the access authentication parameters and the intermediate authentication parameters.

[0303] The network control center NCC verifies the access authentication parameters and the intermediate authentication parameters, specifically including the following steps:

[0304] 1. NCC checks the freshness of timestamps. After receiving the intermediate authentication request, NCC first checks the freshness of timestamps T8 and T9.

[0305] 2. NCC verifies whether the following equation holds:

[0306]

[0307] in:

[0308] d' G,0 is the GEO satellite verification value, d' G,0 =H(ID G,0 ,c sat ,p G,0 ,pk G,0 ,ET G,0 );

[0309] is the GEO-MEO key derived value corresponding to M1,

[0310] is the GEO-MEO key derived value corresponding to M3,

[0311] M1 Verification Data

[0312] When the above equation is established, the NCC confirms that the MEO satellite node M1 is a legal satellite node and a valid node in the GEO satellite node G0 group.

[0313] 3. NCC retrieves the private key for ground equipment authentication. NCC retrieves the user database based on the access authentication parameters to obtain the private key sk for ground equipment authentication. U,0 , and perform the following calculations:

[0314] Restore the identification information ID' of the ground equipment U,0 ,

[0315] Restore the negotiated parameters rk' of the ground equipment U,0 ,

[0316] Verify ground equipment data, verify equations Is it true? If the equation is true, the NCC confirms that the ground equipment u0 is a legitimate user in the satellite communication system.

[0317] 4. NCC generates security information and performs the following calculations:

[0318] Calculate the user authentication code uac of the ground equipment U,0 ,

[0319] Calculate the message authentication code umac of the ground equipment U,0 , umac U,0 =H(ID M,1 ,uac U,0 ,T 10 ).

[0320] Calculate the authentication encryption value DUMAC U,0 ,

[0321] Calculate the encrypted value of the negotiation parameter ddrk U,0 ,

[0322] Calculate the asymmetric key derived value und of the ground device U,0 ,

[0323] NCC sends an authentication response message to M1. For example, the authentication response message is: {DUMAC U,0 ,und U,0 ,ddrk U,0 ,T 10}, where T 10 Sending timestamp.

[0324] G3. The group member node receives the authentication response message returned by the network control center after the verification is successful. The authentication response message contains the key authentication parameters of the ground device.

[0325] The key authentication parameter includes the asymmetric key derived value und of the ground device. U,0 , Authentication encryption value DUMAC U,0 and negotiate parameter encryption value ddrk U,0 .

[0326] After receiving the authentication response message sent by the network control center, the group member node verifies the key authentication parameters in the authentication response message, including:

[0327] Decrypt the authentication encrypted value to obtain the user authentication code, and decrypt the negotiation parameter encrypted value to obtain the negotiation parameter;

[0328] The user authentication code and negotiated parameters are verified based on an asymmetric key-derived value.

[0329] Here, we also take the group member node as the above-mentioned MEO satellite node M1 as an example, M1 receives the authentication response message {DUMAC U,0 ,und U,0 ,T 10}, first check the timestamp T 10 The freshness of , and then the following calculation is performed:

[0330] 1. Restore the message authentication code umac' of the ground equipment U,0 , Among them, r M,1 Random parameters chosen for M1.

[0331] 2. Restore the negotiation parameters rk' of the ground equipment U,0 ,

[0332] 3. Verify user authentication data of ground equipment.

[0333] Verify the equation If true, M1 confirms the legitimacy of the NCC and the ground equipment u0 and that the authentication response message has not been tampered with in the open channel.

[0334] G4. After the group member node verifies the key authentication parameters, it sends a session key negotiation message to the ground device. The session key negotiation message includes session key negotiation parameters, so that the ground device verifies the session key negotiation parameters and calculates the session key based on the session key negotiation parameters after the verification is passed.

[0335] Optionally, session key negotiation parameters are obtained in the following ways:

[0336] Calculating a session key value based on the negotiation parameters, calculating an authentication response value based on the session key value and the user authentication code, and calculating a key negotiation difference value based on the user authentication code and the negotiation parameters;

[0337] The authentication response value and the key negotiation difference value are used as session key negotiation parameters.

[0338] Here, the group member node is taken as the above-mentioned MEO satellite node M1 as an example. When generating the session key negotiation parameter, M1 randomly selects a session key negotiation parameter rk M,1 , and perform the following calculations:

[0339] 1. Generate a session key value, Among them, T 11 Sending timestamp.

[0340] 2. Generate the key negotiation differential value drk M,1 , as follows:

[0341]

[0342] 3. Generate an authentication response value for ground device u0

[0343] Afterwards, M1 sends a session key negotiation message to u0

[0344] After receiving the session key negotiation message, the ground device u0 verifies the session key negotiation message and negotiates the key, which specifically includes the following process:

[0345] 1. Check the timestamp freshness. u0 receives the session key negotiation message After that, check the timestamp T 11 The freshness.

[0346] 2. Restore user authentication code uac' U,0 ,

[0347] 3. Restore the message authentication code umac' U,0 ,umac' U,0 =H(IDM,1 ,uac' U,0 ,T 10 ).

[0348] 4. Restore the negotiation parameter rk' M,1 , as follows:

[0349]

[0350] 5. Restore the session key value The details are as follows:

[0351]

[0352] 6. Verify the authentication response value The details are as follows:

[0353]

[0354] Verify the equation If the equation is true, the ground device u0 confirms the legitimacy of the MEO satellite M1 and the session key The correctness of the authentication and the integrity of the message, otherwise the ground device u0 terminates the access authentication process.

[0355] like Figure 6 As shown, in the above embodiment of the present application, taking the ground device u0 accessing the MEO satellite node M1 as an example, when the ground device u0 attempts to access the MEO satellite node M1, it first generates initial authentication information by randomly selecting an unused pseudonym and session key negotiation parameters. Then, the ground device u0 sends an access authentication request to the MEO satellite node M1, which includes the user's temporary identity and related key information. After receiving the access authentication request, the MEO satellite node M1 sends authentication information to the network control center NCC through a series of key verifications and parameter calculations, so that the NCC can further verify the legitimacy of the user's identity. The NCC generates the necessary authentication messages and authentication data by verifying the information in the request, and returns these data to the MEO satellite node, finally completing the user access authentication process.

[0356] In an embodiment of the present application, in a two-layer satellite network environment where the group management node and the group member nodes are located, the mobility of the ground equipment and the group member nodes will cause changes in signal coverage. When the position change of the ground equipment u0 or the currently connected MEO satellite M1 makes communication unfeasible, in order to ensure the continuity and security of the ground equipment communication, inter-satellite switching authentication must be implemented. The main purpose of the inter-satellite switching authentication mechanism is to ensure that the ground equipment can safely switch between different satellite nodes when the ground equipment moves or the satellite signal weakens, and to prevent unauthorized ground equipment from accessing the network using the switching process. The triggering conditions for inter-satellite switching include but are not limited to: 1) the current satellite signal strength is lower than the set threshold; 2) the ground equipment enters the optimal coverage area of ​​another satellite.

[0357] The inter-satellite switching process is introduced in detail below.

[0358] In some embodiments, after the ground device accesses the group member node, the group member node can generate a first switching authentication credential for the ground device based on the group key, and send the first switching authentication credential to the ground device through the session key, so that the ground device can switch to other group member nodes based on the first switching authentication credential when the inter-satellite switching authentication conditions are met.

[0359] Specifically, after the ground device u0 accesses the MEO satellite node M1, M1 generates a first handover authentication credential for u0 based on the group key. The first handover authentication credential is sent to u0 through the secure channel established during the access authentication phase. where gk G,0 The group key constructed under GEO satellite G0, Switch the authentication certificate to cert M,1 The expiration timestamp of the .

[0360] When the ground device u0 accesses the MEO satellite node M1 and the inter-satellite handover triggering condition is met, the ground device u0 can switch the authentication certificate cert based on the first handover authentication certificate. M,1 Switch to other MEO satellite nodes. The inter-satellite switching process is introduced in the following embodiment.

[0361] 1. Generation and sending of intersatellite handover request. When the ground device u0 triggers the intersatellite handover authentication condition, u0 randomly selects an unused pseudonym And a switch negotiation parameter Calculate the switch verification value Handover key negotiation value after disturbance And send an intersatellite handover request to the newly connected MEO satellite node M3 through the intersatellite link

[0362] 2. Verification of inter-satellite handover request and generation of response. After receiving the inter-satellite handover request, the MEO satellite node M3 first checks the timestamp T 12 The freshness of the extracted handover authentication credential is then calculated Extracted handover negotiation parameters Extracted handover verification value And verify the equation hreq' U,0 =hreq U,0 When the equation is true, the MEO satellite node M3 confirms the legitimacy of the ground device u0, and the intersatellite handover request is fresh and complete.

[0363] Next, M3 randomly selects a negotiation parameter rk M,3 , calculate the switching key parameters after M3 disturbance Handover session key between ground equipment u0 and M3

[0364] Switching response value Where T 13 Finally, M3 sends a handover response message {drk M,3 ,hres M,3 ,T 13}.

[0365] 3. Verification and key negotiation of intersatellite handover response. When the ground equipment u0 receives the handover response message {drk M,3 ,hres M,3 ,T 13}, first check the timestamp T 13 freshness, and then calculate the negotiation parameters of the extracted M3 The handover session key negotiated between u0 and M3

[0366] Response verification value

[0367] Verify the equation hres M,3 =hres' M,3 If the equation is true, the ground device u0 verifies that the MEO satellite node M3 is a legitimate node and the new session key Correct, intersatellite handover response is complete.

[0368] In the above embodiments of the present application, Figure 7As shown in the figure, take the ground device u0 switching from the currently connected MEO satellite M1 to the newly connected MEO satellite node M3 as an example. After the ground device completes the initial access authentication, the MEO satellite M1 uses the group key gk G,0 Generate intersatellite handover authentication credentials for ground equipment u0 And send it to the ground device u0 through the established secure channel. When the ground device u0 meets the switching conditions, a new authentication request hreq is generated. U,0 and key negotiation parameters The request is sent to the newly connected satellite node M3 via the intersatellite link. After receiving the request, MEO satellite M3 first verifies the timestamp T 12 The freshness of the received authentication information hreq is calculated and verified U,0 If the verification is successful, M3 randomly selects the key negotiation parameter M3 and generates the session key. The authentication response M3 is then sent to the ground device u0 through a secure channel.

[0369] The intersatellite handover authentication mechanism of the embodiment of the present application effectively addresses the communication interruption problem caused by the mobility of ground equipment and satellite nodes by introducing a dynamic key negotiation and authentication process. The mechanism combines group key-based authentication credentials, pseudonym mechanism, dynamic timestamp and two-way authentication protocol to ensure that ground equipment can safely and reliably switch access points and maintain secure communications in a dual-layer satellite network environment.

[0370] In some embodiments, the MEO satellite node M1 may also receive an inter-satellite handover request from other ground equipment u1, that is, other ground equipment u1 may be switched to the MEO satellite node M1. The MEO satellite node M1 may specifically perform the following steps H1-H4:

[0371] H1. Receive an inter-satellite handover request including a handover verification parameter sent by other ground equipment; the handover verification parameter is calculated by other ground equipment based on a second handover authentication credential generated by other group member nodes that have been connected.

[0372] The handover verification parameter includes a first handover verification value and a handover key negotiation value. The calculation process of the first handover verification value is similar to the above-mentioned handover request verification value hreq U,0 The calculation process of the switching key negotiation value is similar to the above-mentioned switching key negotiation value after disturbance. The calculation process of the second switching authentication credential is similar to the calculation process of the first switching authentication credential cert M,1 The calculation process of is similar. For example, the other group member node to which the other ground device u1 has accessed may be the MEO satellite node M3.

[0373] H2. Calculate the third handover authentication credentials corresponding to other group member nodes based on the group key, and verify the handover verification parameters based on the third handover authentication credentials.

[0374] The calculation process of the third switching authentication credential is the same as the above-extracted switching authentication credential cert' M,1 The calculation process is similar.

[0375] Optionally, verifying the handover verification parameter based on the third handover authentication credential includes:

[0376] The switching negotiation parameter is calculated based on the third switching authentication credential and the switching key negotiation value, and the second switching verification value is calculated based on the third switching authentication credential and the switching negotiation parameter; if the second switching verification value is consistent with the first switching verification value, it is determined that the switching verification parameter verification is passed.

[0377] The calculation process of the handover negotiation parameters is similar to the handover negotiation parameters extracted above. The calculation process of the second handover verification value is similar to the calculation process of the extracted handover verification value hreq' U,0 The calculation process is similar.

[0378] H3. After the verification is passed, a switching key parameter is calculated based on the third switching authentication credential, a switching session key is generated, and a switching response value is calculated based on the switching session key and the third switching authentication credential.

[0379] The calculation process of the switching key parameter is the same as the above switching key parameter drk M,3 The calculation process of the switching session key is similar to the above switching session key. The calculation process of the switching response value is similar to that of the switching response value hres. M,3 The calculation process is similar.

[0380] H4. Send the switching response message including the switching key parameter and the switching response value to other ground devices, so that other ground devices can verify the switching key parameter and the switching response value and obtain the switching session key.

[0381] The inter-satellite switching process between the above-mentioned MEO satellite node M1 and other ground equipment is similar to the inter-satellite switching process between the MEO satellite node M3 and the ground equipment u0 in the above-mentioned embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0382] The secure communication method for a satellite cluster of an embodiment of the present application can achieve efficient identity authentication and key negotiation between satellite nodes at different levels, and between satellite nodes and ground equipment. It is particularly suitable for a two-layer satellite network with complex node relationships, and can significantly improve the security and authentication efficiency of the network.

[0383] In the group key generation and distribution mechanism, a dynamic accumulator-based technology is used to ensure that the group key can be dynamically updated when satellite nodes change (such as new nodes joining or existing nodes leaving). This technology solves the security risks existing in the traditional static key management mechanism and provides a solution that can respond to changes in network topology in real time.

[0384] By introducing the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) as the core of node authentication, the uniqueness and security of satellite nodes are further enhanced. The unpredictability and uniqueness of PUF make the responses of the same device different at different times and in different environments, thus effectively preventing identity forgery and replay attacks.

[0385] In response to the authentication requirements between MEO satellite nodes, the present application embodiment proposes a distributed authentication mechanism based on intersatellite links. This mechanism allows satellites to directly authenticate each other and ensures the security of subsequent communications through the session keys generated through negotiation, avoiding the bottleneck and single point failure problems of traditional centralized authentication systems.

[0386] When ground devices move in a dual-layer satellite network, the present application embodiment proposes an inter-satellite handover authentication mechanism based on dynamic key update. This mechanism can ensure the continuity and security of the authentication process when the user switches to a new MEO satellite node, thereby ensuring a seamless communication experience for ground devices between different coverage areas.

[0387] In summary, the embodiments of the present application can solve various authentication and key management problems existing in the existing two-layer satellite network, and realize efficient and secure authentication and key synchronization. Specifically, the embodiments of the present application include the following advantages:

[0388] 1. Improve multi-scenario authentication efficiency:

[0389] An efficient authentication mechanism is designed for various authentication scenarios in dual-layer satellite networks, including group key generation and distribution, inter-satellite authentication, ground equipment access authentication, and inter-satellite handover authentication.

[0390] Dynamic accumulator technology is used to achieve efficient group key generation and distribution process. Through the characteristics of dynamic accumulator, the calculation and communication overhead are reduced and the authentication efficiency is improved.

[0391] 2. Realize secure authentication and key management in dynamic environments:

[0392] Solve the authentication and key management issues of satellites and user nodes in a dynamic environment, especially in the case of frequent switching of MEO satellite nodes, to ensure the continuity and security of the authentication process.

[0393] Through physical unclonable functions and bilinear mapping technology, the system's anti-attack capability is enhanced, the integrity and freshness of authentication messages are ensured, and the level of security authentication and key management in dynamic environments is improved.

[0394] 3. Adapt to resource-constrained satellite node environment:

[0395] Aiming at the limited computing and storage resources of satellite nodes, a low-overhead and high-efficiency authentication and key management method is designed to enable it to operate efficiently in a resource-constrained environment.

[0396] A low resource consumption solution is provided to ensure efficient authentication and key synchronization under limited hardware conditions, thereby improving the applicability of the system.

[0397] 4. Enhance the system's anti-attack capabilities:

[0398] In response to various security threats faced by satellite networks, such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks and impersonation attacks, an authentication mechanism with strong anti-attack capabilities is designed.

[0399] By introducing PUF and bilinear mapping technology, the integrity and freshness of the authentication message are guaranteed, the reliability and security of the authentication process and key synchronization are ensured, and the overall security of the system is enhanced.

[0400] 5. Improve the overall security and reliability of the system:

[0401] Through a multi-scenario dynamic authentication mechanism, the continuity and security of communications are ensured during ground equipment access, inter-satellite authentication, group key update and inter-satellite switching.

[0402] Design a complete authentication and key management system, including initialization mechanism, registration mechanism, group key generation and distribution mechanism, inter-satellite authentication mechanism, group key update mechanism, ground equipment access authentication mechanism and inter-satellite switching authentication mechanism to provide comprehensive security protection.

[0403] 6. Ensure efficient operation of satellite networks:

[0404] In a dynamic satellite network environment, maintain seamless connection between users and satellite nodes to ensure the continuity and stability of communication services.

[0405] Through effective authentication and key management methods, satellite service interruption time can be reduced and the overall network performance and user experience can be improved.

[0406] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present application provides a satellite cluster security communication device 800, which is arranged in a cluster management node in the satellite cluster, such as Figure 8 As shown, the device comprises:

[0407] The broadcast module 801 is used to initialize the dynamic accumulator parameters, generate a group key generation message including a generated verification value, and broadcast the group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group;

[0408] A response receiving module 802 is used to receive a group key response message including a response verification value returned by each group member node, wherein the group key response message is sent after the generated verification value is verified;

[0409] The group key calculation module 803 is used to update the dynamic accumulator parameter after verifying the response verification value returned by at least one group member node, and calculate the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter and the group key dynamic key;

[0410] The group key distribution module 804 is used to send a group key distribution message to each group member node, where the group key distribution message includes a corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value and the group key dynamic key, so that each group member node can extract the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value.

[0411] In an optional implementation, the group key generation message further includes a broadcast parameter, and when calculating and generating the verification value, the broadcast module is specifically used to:

[0412] Calculate broadcast parameters based on bilinear mapping generators, and calculate PUF response values ​​based on a preset physical unclonable function PUF challenge code;

[0413] Calculating a first derivative function value based on the PUF response value and the broadcast parameter;

[0414] A verification value is generated by calculation based on the management private key and the first derivative function value.

[0415] In an optional implementation, the group key response message further includes a response parameter and a member public key, and the response parameter and the member public key are both calculated based on a bilinear mapping generator;

[0416] The device also includes a first verification module, which is used to perform the following operations for each group member node:

[0417] Calculate the verification parameter based on the member public key returned by the group member node and the registered PUF response value of the group member node;

[0418] Calculate the key negotiation parameter based on the response parameter returned by the group member node, and calculate the second derived function value based on the key negotiation parameter, the response parameter and the registered PUF response value;

[0419] The bilinear mapping rule is used to verify the response verification value returned by the group member node based on the master public key, verification parameter and second derived function value of the satellite group; wherein the master public key is calculated based on the bilinear mapping generator.

[0420] In an optional implementation, the first verification module is specifically used to:

[0421] Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the member public key based on the verification parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter based on the second derivative function value;

[0422] The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value returned by the group member node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the member public key and the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter.

[0423] In an optional implementation, when updating the dynamic accumulator parameters, the group key calculation module is specifically used to:

[0424] For each group member node, a corresponding dynamic accumulator derived value is calculated based on the identification information of the group member node;

[0425] A dynamic accumulator parameter is updated based on a dynamic accumulator derived value of at least one group member node.

[0426] In an optional implementation, the group key response message also includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group member node;

[0427] The device also includes a second verification module, which is used to:

[0428] Based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key reply message and the legal identity expiration timestamp, the freshness of the group key reply message is verified.

[0429] In an optional implementation, the device further includes an updating module, configured to:

[0430] When a group member node in the satellite group changes, the dynamic accumulator parameters are updated again, and a new group key dynamic key is calculated based on the generated new group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameters, and a new dynamic accumulator verification value of each current group member node is calculated based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameters and the new group key dynamic key;

[0431] For each current group member node, the new dynamic accumulator verification value and the new group key dynamic key of the group member node are sent to the group member node, so that the group member node extracts a new group key based on the new dynamic accumulator verification value and the new group key dynamic key.

[0432] In an optional implementation, the device further includes a third verification module, configured to:

[0433] When a new group member node is added to the satellite group, a new group key generation message is sent to the new group member node; wherein the new group key generation message includes a newly generated verification value;

[0434] Receive a new group key response message returned by the newly added group member node, the new group key response message includes a new response verification value, and the new group key response message is sent after the newly generated verification value is verified;

[0435] Verify the new response verification value returned by the newly added group member node.

[0436] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present application provides a satellite cluster security communication device 900, which is arranged in a group member node in the satellite cluster, such as Fig. 9 As shown, the device comprises:

[0437] The message receiving module 901 is used to receive a group key generation message broadcasted by a group management node in a satellite group; wherein the group key generation message includes a generated verification value;

[0438] A response generation module 902 is used to generate a response verification value after the generated verification value is verified, and return a group key response message including the response verification value to the group management node, so that the group management node verifies the response verification value;

[0439] The group key extraction module 903 is used to receive a group key distribution message including a dynamic accumulator verification value and a group key dynamic key returned by the group management node, verify the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, and extract the group key based on the group key dynamic key;

[0440] The dynamic accumulator verification value is calculated by the group management node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameters, the updated dynamic accumulator parameters are updated from the initialized dynamic accumulator parameters, and the group key dynamic key is calculated based on the group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameters.

[0441] In an optional implementation, the group key generation message further includes a broadcast parameter and a management public key, and the broadcast parameter and the management public key are both calculated based on a bilinear mapping generator;

[0442] The device also includes a fourth verification module, which is used to:

[0443] Calculating a response parameter based on the management public key and the registration PUF response value of the group management node, and calculating a third derived function value based on the broadcast parameter and the registration PUF response value;

[0444] The generated verification value returned by the group management node is verified by using the bilinear mapping rule based on the master public key of the satellite group, the response parameter and the third derived function value; wherein the master public key is calculated based on the bilinear mapping generator.

[0445] In an optional implementation, the fourth verification module is specifically used to:

[0446] Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the management public key based on the response parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter based on the third derivative function value;

[0447] The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value returned by the group member node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the management public key, and the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter.

[0448] In an optional implementation, the group key generation message also includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group management node;

[0449] The device also includes a fifth verification module, which is used to:

[0450] The freshness of the group key generation message is verified based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key generation message, and the legal identity expiration timestamp.

[0451] In an optional implementation, the group key response message further includes a response parameter, and when generating a response verification value, the response generation module is specifically used to:

[0452] Calculate response parameters based on the bilinear mapping generator, calculate PUF response value based on the preset PUF challenge code, and calculate key negotiation parameters based on the broadcast parameters and the bilinear mapping generator;

[0453] Calculating a fourth derived function value based on the response parameter, the PUF response value, and the key negotiation parameter;

[0454] A response verification value is calculated based on the member private key and the fourth derivation function value.

[0455] In an optional implementation, when verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, the group key extraction module is specifically used to:

[0456] Calculating a dynamic accumulator verification parameter based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, the key negotiation parameter, and the group key dynamic key;

[0457] For each group member node in the satellite group, a dynamic accumulator derived value is calculated based on the identification information of the group member node and the identification information of the group management node;

[0458] The dynamic accumulator verification parameters are verified based on the master public key, management public key, broadcast parameters and dynamic accumulator derived value of each group member node of the satellite group using the bilinear mapping rule.

[0459] In an optional implementation, when extracting the group key based on the group key dynamic key, the group key extraction module is specifically used to:

[0460] Perform preset operations on the group key dynamic key and the dynamic accumulator verification parameter to obtain the group key.

[0461] In an optional implementation, the device further includes a first inter-satellite authentication module, configured to:

[0462] Calculating an authentication parameter based on the random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and encrypting the authentication parameter based on the group key to obtain an encrypted authentication parameter;

[0463] Sending an inter-satellite authentication message containing the encrypted authentication parameters to other group member nodes in the satellite group, so that the other group member nodes decrypt and verify the encrypted authentication parameters;

[0464] Receive the inter-satellite authentication response message containing the encrypted response parameter returned by other group member nodes, decrypt the encrypted response parameter based on the group key, and obtain the decrypted response parameter;

[0465] The decryption response parameters are verified based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameters and the group key, and after the verification is passed, it is confirmed that other group member nodes have passed the authentication.

[0466] In an optional implementation, the apparatus further includes a second inter-satellite authentication module, configured to:

[0467] Receiving an inter-satellite authentication message containing an encrypted authentication parameter sent by other group member nodes in the satellite group, decrypting the encrypted authentication parameter based on the group key, and verifying the obtained decrypted authentication parameter;

[0468] After the verification is passed, it is confirmed that other group member nodes have passed the authentication, and the response parameter is calculated based on the random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and the response parameter is encrypted based on the group key to obtain the encrypted response parameter;

[0469] An inter-satellite authentication response message including the encrypted response parameters is returned to other group member nodes so that other group member nodes can decrypt and verify the encrypted response parameters.

[0470] In an optional implementation, the device further includes a ground access authentication module, which is used to:

[0471] receiving an access authentication request including access authentication parameters sent by the ground device, and calculating intermediate authentication parameters based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameters and the access authentication parameters;

[0472] Sending an intermediate authentication request including the access authentication parameter and the intermediate authentication parameter to a network control center of the satellite cluster so that the network control center verifies the access authentication parameter and the intermediate authentication parameter;

[0473] Receive an authentication response message returned by the network control center after verification, the authentication response message including the key authentication parameters of the ground device;

[0474] After the key authentication parameters are verified, a session key negotiation message is sent to the ground device, and the session key negotiation message includes session key negotiation parameters, so that the ground device verifies the session key negotiation parameters and calculates the session key based on the session key negotiation parameters after the verification is passed.

[0475] In an optional embodiment, the key authentication parameter includes an asymmetric key derived value of the ground device, an authentication encrypted value, and a negotiation parameter encrypted value;

[0476] When verifying the key authentication parameters, the ground access authentication module is specifically used to:

[0477] Decrypt the authentication encrypted value to obtain the user authentication code, and decrypt the negotiation parameter encrypted value to obtain the negotiation parameter;

[0478] The user authentication code and negotiated parameters are verified based on an asymmetric key-derived value.

[0479] In an optional implementation, the device further includes a parameter calculation module, configured to calculate the session key negotiation parameters in the following manner:

[0480] Calculating a session key value based on the negotiation parameters, calculating an authentication response value based on the session key value and the user authentication code, and calculating a key negotiation difference value based on the user authentication code and the negotiation parameters;

[0481] The authentication response value and the key negotiation difference value are used as session key negotiation parameters.

[0482] In an optional implementation, the device further includes a switching credential sending module, configured to:

[0483] A first switching authentication credential for the ground device is generated based on the group key, and the first switching authentication credential is sent to the ground device through the session key, so that the ground device switches to other group member nodes based on the first switching authentication credential when the inter-satellite switching authentication condition is met.

[0484] In an optional implementation, the method further includes an inter-satellite switching module, configured to:

[0485] Receiving an inter-satellite handover request including a handover verification parameter sent by other ground equipment; the handover verification parameter is calculated by other ground equipment based on a second handover authentication credential generated by other group member nodes that have been connected;

[0486] Calculating a third handover authentication credential corresponding to other group member nodes based on the group key, and verifying the handover verification parameter based on the third handover authentication credential;

[0487] After the verification is passed, a handover key parameter is calculated based on the third handover authentication credential, a handover session key is generated, and a handover response value is calculated based on the handover session key and the third handover authentication credential;

[0488] The handover response message including the handover key parameter and the handover response value is sent to other ground devices, so that other ground devices can obtain the handover session key after verifying the handover key parameter and the handover response value.

[0489] In an optional implementation, the handover verification parameter includes a first handover verification value and a handover key negotiation value;

[0490] When verifying the handover verification parameter based on the third handover authentication credential, the inter-satellite handover module is specifically used for:

[0491] Calculating a handover negotiation parameter based on the third handover authentication credential and the handover key negotiation value, and calculating a second handover verification value based on the third handover authentication credential and the handover negotiation parameter;

[0492] If the second handover verification value is consistent with the first handover verification value, it is determined that the handover verification parameter verification is passed.

[0493] For the convenience of description, the above parts are divided into modules (or units) according to their functions and described separately. Of course, when implementing this application, the functions of each module (or unit) can be implemented in the same or multiple software or hardware.

[0494] After introducing the secure communication method and apparatus for a satellite cluster according to an exemplary embodiment of the present application, next, a communication device according to another exemplary embodiment of the present application is introduced.

[0495] Based on the same inventive concept as the above method embodiment, a communication device is also provided in the embodiment of the present application. In this embodiment, the structure of the communication device can be as follows: Fig.10 As shown, it includes a memory 1001 , a communication module 1003 and one or more processors 1002 .

[0496] The memory 1001 is used to store computer programs executed by the processor 1002. The memory 1001 may mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system and programs required for running the instant messaging function, etc.; the data storage area may store various instant messaging information and operation instruction sets, etc.

[0497] The memory 1001 may be a volatile memory, such as a random-access memory (RAM); the memory 1001 may also be a non-volatile memory, such as a read-only memory, a flash memory, a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD); or the memory 1001 may be any other medium that can be used to carry or store a desired computer program in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto. The memory 1001 may be a combination of the above memories.

[0498] The processor 1002 may include one or more central processing units (CPU) or a digital processing unit, etc. The processor 1002 is used to implement the above-mentioned secure communication method of the satellite group when calling the computer program stored in the memory 1001.

[0499] The communication module 1003 is used to communicate with other communication devices.

[0500] The specific connection medium between the memory 1001, the communication module 1003 and the processor 1002 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application. Fig.10 In the embodiment, the memory 1001 and the processor 1002 are connected via a bus 1004. The bus 1004 is connected to the processor 1002 via a bus 1004. Fig.10 The connections between the other components are only for illustration and are not intended to be limiting. The bus 1004 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of description, Fig.10 The diagram shows that only one thick line is used, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or only one type of bus.

[0501] The embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed on a communication device, the computer program is used to enable the communication device to execute the secure communication method for the satellite cluster of the above embodiment, such as Figure 5 shown.

[0502] The computer-readable storage medium in the above embodiments can be any available medium or data storage device that can be accessed by the processor in the device, including but not limited to magnetic storage such as floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes, magneto-optical disks (MO), etc., optical storage such as CDs, DVDs, BDs, HVDs, etc., and semiconductor storage such as ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, non-volatile memory (NAND FLASH), solid-state drives (SSDs), etc.

[0503] In some possible implementations, various aspects of the method for scheduling attack traffic provided in the embodiments of the present application may also be implemented in the form of a program product, which includes a computer program. When the program product is run on a communication device, the computer program is used to enable the communication device to execute the steps of the secure communication method for a satellite cluster according to various exemplary embodiments of the present application described above in this specification. For example, the communication device may execute the following steps: Figure 5 Follow the steps shown in .

[0504] The program product may use any combination of one or more readable media. The readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. The readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device or device, or any combination of the above. More specific examples of readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above.

[0505] The program product of the embodiment of the present application may adopt a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM) and include a computer program, and can be run on a communication device. However, the program product of the present application is not limited to this. In this document, a readable storage medium may be any tangible medium containing or storing a program, which can be used by or in combination with a command execution system, device or device.

[0506] A readable signal medium may include a data signal propagated in baseband or as part of a carrier wave, wherein a readable computer program is carried. Such propagated data signals may take a variety of forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A readable signal medium may also be any readable medium other than a readable storage medium, which may send, propagate, or transmit a program for use by or in conjunction with a command execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0507] The computer program embodied on the readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wireline, optical fiber cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0508] The computer program for performing the operations of the present application may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" or similar programming languages. The computer program may be executed entirely on the user communication device, partially on the user communication device, as a separate software package, partially on the user communication device and partially on the remote communication device, or entirely on the remote communication device or server. In the case of a remote communication device, the remote communication device may be connected to the user communication device through any type of network including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external communication device (e.g., using an Internet service provider to connect through the Internet).

[0509] It should be noted that, although several units or subunits of the device are mentioned in the above detailed description, this division is merely exemplary and not mandatory. In fact, according to the embodiments of the present application, the features and functions of two or more units described above can be embodied in one unit. Conversely, the features and functions of one unit described above can be further divided into multiple units to be embodied.

[0510] In addition, although the operations of the method of the present application are described in a specific order in the drawings, this does not require or imply that the operations must be performed in this specific order, or that all the operations shown must be performed to achieve the desired results. Additionally or alternatively, some steps may be omitted, multiple steps may be combined into one step, and / or one step may be decomposed into multiple steps.

[0511] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that contain a computer-usable computer program.

[0512] Although the preferred embodiments of the present application have been described, those skilled in the art may make additional changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications falling within the scope of the present application.

[0513] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present application fall within the scope of the claims of the present application and their equivalents, the present application is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A secure communication method for a satellite cluster, characterized in that: A group management node applied to the satellite group includes: Initializing dynamic accumulator parameters, generating a group key generation message including a generated verification value, and broadcasting the group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group; Receiving a group key response message including a response verification value returned by each group member node, wherein the group key response message is sent after the generated verification value is verified; After verifying the response verification value returned by the at least one group member node, updating the dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculating the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculating the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter and the group key dynamic key; A group key distribution message is sent to each group member node, wherein the group key distribution message includes a corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value and the group key dynamic key, so that each group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The group key generation message also includes a broadcast parameter, and the generated verification value is obtained in the following manner: Calculating the broadcast parameter based on a bilinear map generator, and calculating the PUF response value based on a preset physical unclonable function PUF challenge code; Calculating a first derivative function value based on the PUF response value and the broadcast parameter; The generated verification value is calculated based on the management private key and the first derivative function value.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The group key response message also includes a response parameter and a member public key, wherein the response parameter and the member public key are both calculated based on a bilinear mapping generator; Verifying the response verification value returned by the at least one group member node includes: For each swarm member node, perform the following operations: Calculate a verification parameter based on the member public key returned by the group member node and the registered PUF response value of the group member node; Calculating a key negotiation parameter based on the response parameter returned by the group member node, and calculating a second derived function value based on the key negotiation parameter, the response parameter and the registered PUF response value; The response verification value returned by the group member node is verified by using a bilinear mapping rule based on a master public key of the satellite group, the verification parameter and the fourth derived function value; wherein the master public key is calculated based on the bilinear mapping generator.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The using of a bilinear mapping rule to verify the response verification value returned by the group member node based on the master public key of the satellite group, the verification parameter and the fourth derived function value comprises: Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the member public key based on the verification parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter based on the second derivative function value; The bilinear mapping result of the response verification value returned by the group member node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the member public key and the bilinear mapping result of the response parameter.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The updating of the dynamic accumulator parameter comprises: For each group member node, calculating a corresponding dynamic accumulator derived value based on the identification information of the group member node; The dynamic accumulator parameter is updated based on the dynamic accumulator derived value of the at least one group member node.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The group key response message also includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group member node; Before verifying the response verification value returned by each group member node, it also includes: Based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key response message and the legal identity expiration timestamp, the freshness of the group key response message is verified.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The method further comprises: When a group member node in the satellite group changes, the dynamic accumulator parameter is updated again, and a new group key dynamic key is calculated based on the generated new group key and the re-updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and a new dynamic accumulator verification value of each current group member node is calculated based on the re-updated dynamic accumulator parameter and the new group key dynamic key; For each current group member node, the new dynamic accumulator verification value of the group member node and the new group key dynamic key are sent to the group member node, so that the group member node extracts the new group key based on the new dynamic accumulator verification value and the new group key dynamic key.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that When a group member node in the satellite group changes, before updating the dynamic accumulator parameter again, the method further includes: When a new group member node is added to the satellite group, a new group key generation message is sent to the new group member node; wherein the new group key generation message includes a newly generated verification value; Receiving a new group key response message returned by the newly added group member node, wherein the new group key response message includes a new response verification value, and the new group key response message is sent after the newly generated verification value is verified; The new response verification value returned by the newly added group member node is verified.

9. A secure communication method for a satellite cluster, characterized in that: Applicable to group member nodes in the satellite group, including: Receiving a group key generation message broadcasted by a group management node in the satellite group; wherein the group key generation message includes a generated verification value; After the generated verification value is verified, a response verification value is generated, and a group key response message including the response verification value is returned to the group management node, so that the group management node verifies the response verification value; receiving a group key distribution message including a dynamic accumulator verification value and a group key dynamic key returned by the group management node, verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, and extracting the group key based on the group key dynamic key; Among them, the dynamic accumulator verification value is calculated by the group management node according to the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, the updated dynamic accumulator parameter is updated by the initialized dynamic accumulator parameter, and the group key dynamic key is calculated according to the group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The group key generation message also includes broadcast parameters and management public keys, and the broadcast parameters and the management public keys are both calculated based on bilinear mapping generators; Verifying the generated verification value includes: calculating a response parameter based on the management public key and the registration PUF response value of the group management node, and calculating a third derived function value based on the broadcast parameter and the registration PUF response value; The generated verification value returned by the group management node is verified by using a bilinear mapping rule based on a master public key of the satellite group, the response parameter and the third derived function value; wherein the master public key is calculated based on the bilinear mapping generator.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The using of a bilinear mapping rule to verify the generated verification value returned by the group management node based on the master public key of the satellite group, the response parameter and the third derived function value comprises: Calculate the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, calculate the bilinear mapping result of the management public key based on the response parameter, and calculate the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter based on the third derived function value; The bilinear mapping result of the generated verification value returned by the group management node is compared and verified with the bilinear mapping result of the master public key, the bilinear mapping result of the management public key and the bilinear mapping result of the broadcast parameter.

12. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The group key generation message also includes a sending timestamp and a legal identity expiration timestamp of the group management node; Before verifying the generated verification value returned by the group management node, the method further includes: Based on the sending timestamp, the receiving timestamp of the group key generation message and the legal identity expiration timestamp, the freshness of the group key generation message is verified.

13. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The group key response message also includes a response parameter, and the generating of the response verification value includes: Calculating the response parameter based on a bilinear mapping generator, calculating a PUF response value based on a preset PUF challenge code, and calculating a key negotiation parameter based on the broadcast parameter and the bilinear mapping generator; Calculating a fourth derived function value based on the response parameter, the PUF response value and the key negotiation parameter; The response verification value is calculated based on the member private key and the fourth derivation function value.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that The verifying the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value includes: Calculating a dynamic accumulator verification parameter based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, the key negotiation parameter and the group key dynamic key; For each group member node in the satellite group, calculating a dynamic accumulator derived value based on identification information of the group member node and identification information of the group management node; The dynamic accumulator verification parameter is verified based on the master public key of the satellite group, the management public key, the broadcast parameter and the dynamic accumulator derived value of each group member node by using a bilinear mapping rule.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that The extracting the group key based on the group key dynamic key comprises: A preset operation is performed on the group key dynamic key and the dynamic accumulator verification parameter to obtain the group key.

16. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that After extracting the group key, the method further comprises: Calculating an authentication parameter based on a random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and encrypting the authentication parameter based on the group key to obtain an encrypted authentication parameter; Sending an inter-satellite authentication message including an encrypted authentication parameter to other group member nodes in the satellite group, so that the other group member nodes decrypt and verify the encrypted authentication parameter; receiving an inter-satellite authentication response message including an encrypted response parameter returned by the other group member nodes, and decrypting the encrypted response parameter based on the group key to obtain a decrypted response parameter; The decryption response parameter is verified based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and after the verification is successful, it is confirmed that the other group member nodes have passed the authentication.

17. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that After extracting the group key, the method further comprises: receiving an inter-satellite authentication message including an encrypted authentication parameter sent by other group member nodes in the satellite group, decrypting the encrypted authentication parameter based on the group key, and verifying the obtained decrypted authentication parameter; After the verification is passed, confirming that the other group member nodes have passed the authentication, calculating a response parameter based on a random parameter, the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the group key, and encrypting the response parameter based on the group key to obtain an encrypted response parameter; An inter-satellite authentication response message including the encrypted response parameter is returned to the other group member nodes, so that the other group member nodes decrypt and verify the encrypted response parameter.

18. The method according to any one of claims 14 to 17, characterized in that: The method further comprises: receiving an access authentication request including access authentication parameters sent by a ground device, and calculating an intermediate authentication parameter based on the dynamic accumulator verification parameter and the access authentication parameter; Sending an intermediate authentication request including the access authentication parameter and the intermediate authentication parameter to a network control center of the satellite cluster, so that the network control center verifies the access authentication parameter and the intermediate authentication parameter; Receiving an authentication response message returned by the network control center after verification, wherein the authentication response message includes a key authentication parameter of the ground device; After the key authentication parameters are verified, a session key negotiation message is sent to the ground device, wherein the session key negotiation message includes session key negotiation parameters, so that the ground device verifies the session key negotiation parameters and calculates the session key based on the session key negotiation parameters after the verification.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The key authentication parameter includes an asymmetric key derived value of the ground device, an authentication encryption value, and a negotiation parameter encryption value; Verifying the key authentication parameters includes: Decrypting the authentication encrypted value to obtain a user authentication code, and decrypting the negotiation parameter encrypted value to obtain a negotiation parameter; The user authentication code and the negotiation parameter are verified based on the asymmetric key derived value.

20. The method according to claim 19, characterized in that The session key negotiation parameters are obtained in the following manner: Calculating a session key value based on the negotiation parameters, calculating an authentication response value based on the session key value and the user authentication code, and calculating a key negotiation difference value based on the user authentication code and the negotiation parameters; The authentication response value and the key negotiation difference value are used as the session key negotiation parameters.

21. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The method further comprises: A first switching authentication credential for the ground device is generated based on the group key, and the first switching authentication credential is sent to the ground device through the session key, so that the ground device switches to other group member nodes based on the first switching authentication credential when the inter-satellite switching authentication condition is met.

22. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The method further comprises: Receiving an inter-satellite handover request including a handover verification parameter sent by other ground equipment; the handover verification parameter is calculated by the other ground equipment based on a second handover authentication credential generated by other group member nodes that have been connected; Calculating a third handover authentication credential corresponding to the other group member nodes based on the group key, and verifying the handover verification parameter based on the third handover authentication credential; After the verification is passed, a handover key parameter is calculated based on the third handover authentication credential, a handover session key is generated, and a handover response value is calculated based on the handover session key and the third handover authentication credential; A handover response message including the handover key parameter and the handover response value is sent to the other ground device, so that the other ground device verifies the handover key parameter and the handover response value to obtain the handover session key.

23. The method according to claim 22, characterized in that The handover verification parameter includes a first handover verification value and a handover key negotiation value; The verifying the handover verification parameter based on the third handover authentication credential includes: calculating a handover negotiation parameter based on the third handover authentication credential and the handover key negotiation value, and calculating a second handover verification value based on the third handover authentication credential and the handover negotiation parameter; If the second handover verification value is consistent with the first handover verification value, it is determined that the handover verification parameter verification is passed.

24. A secure communication device for a satellite cluster, characterized in that: The group management node is arranged in the satellite group, including: a broadcast module, configured to initialize a dynamic accumulator parameter, generate a group key generation message including a generated verification value, and broadcast the group key generation message to at least one group member node in the satellite group; A response receiving module, used to receive a group key response message including a response verification value returned by each group member node, wherein the group key response message is sent after the generated verification value is verified; a group key calculation module, configured to update the dynamic accumulator parameter after verifying the response verification value returned by the at least one group member node, and calculate the group key dynamic key based on the generated group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, and calculate the dynamic accumulator verification value of each group member node based on the updated dynamic accumulator parameter and the group key dynamic key; The group key distribution module is used to send a group key distribution message to each group member node, wherein the group key distribution message includes a corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value and the group key dynamic key, so that each group member node extracts the group key based on the group key dynamic key after verifying the group key distribution message based on the corresponding dynamic accumulator verification value.

25. A secure communication device for a satellite cluster, characterized in that: The satellite cluster is configured in a group member node, including: A message receiving module, configured to receive a group key generation message broadcasted by a group management node in the satellite group; wherein the group key generation message includes a generated verification value; a response generation module, configured to generate a response verification value after the generated verification value is verified, and return a group key response message including the response verification value to the group management node, so that the group management node verifies the response verification value; a group key extraction module, configured to receive a group key distribution message including a dynamic accumulator verification value and a group key dynamic key returned by the group management node, verify the group key distribution message based on the dynamic accumulator verification value, and extract the group key based on the group key dynamic key; Among them, the dynamic accumulator verification value is calculated by the group management node according to the updated dynamic accumulator parameter, the updated dynamic accumulator parameter is updated by the initialized dynamic accumulator parameter, and the group key dynamic key is calculated according to the group key and the updated dynamic accumulator parameter.

26. A communication device, characterized in that: It includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the processor executes the method described in any one of claims 1 to 8 or the steps of the method described in any one of claims 9 to 23.

27. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: It includes a computer program. When the computer program is run on a communication device, the computer program is used to enable the communication device to execute the method described in any one of claims 1 to 8 or the steps of the method described in any one of claims 9 to 23.

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