Transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset

By filling the whitelist and graylist of the target node, a private transaction is created to resolve double-spending conflicts, and the connection to neighboring nodes is disconnected. This solves the problems of high time cost and uncontrollability in existing cryptocurrency node connection occupation methods, and achieves low-cost and controllable cryptocurrency transaction traceability.

CN120087966BActive Publication Date: 2026-06-19SICHUAN POLICE COLLEGE +1

Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
SICHUAN POLICE COLLEGE
Filing Date
2025-01-20
Publication Date
2026-06-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing methods for securing cryptocurrency node connections are time-consuming, uncontrollable, and have uncertain results, making it difficult to achieve effective transaction traceability.

Method used

By filling the whitelist and graylist of the target node, a privacy transaction that conflicts with the double-spending transaction is created. The transaction is injected into the transaction pool using the RPC service and sent. The neighbor node connection is disconnected, thereby occupying the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node and identifying the originating transaction.

Benefits of technology

It achieves cryptocurrency transaction traceability with low time cost, controllable process, and certain results, and can trigger the selection process of outgoing connection at any time, with repeatability.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset. The method includes: filling a whitelist and a graylist of target nodes; creating a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other through double-spending transactions; injecting the first privacy transaction into the target node's transaction pool and sending the second privacy transaction to other nodes for forwarding; after the target node receives the second privacy transaction and determines that it conflicts with the first privacy transaction through double-spending, disconnecting the connection of the neighboring node that sent the second privacy transaction to it, thus occupying the incoming connection; then, the target node selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, thus occupying the outgoing connection; based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, the originating transaction of the target node is identified. Applying this invention can achieve cryptocurrency transaction tracing with low time cost, controllable process, and certain results.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset. Background Technology

[0002] Cryptocurrency systems, based on blockchain technology and peer-to-peer networks, are characterized by decentralized transactions, strong anonymity, and decentralization, making transactions difficult to trace and regulate. Current research on network-layer transactions for cryptocurrency traceability and regulation primarily focuses on technologies for tracing cryptocurrency transactions at the network layer.

[0003] Network layer transaction tracing technology refers to the technology of identifying the originating node of a transaction in a cryptocurrency network by analyzing network traffic.

[0004] Connection capture (also known as eclipse attack) is a technique that allows complete control over the incoming and outgoing connections of a target node, serving as the basis for transaction tracing. By capturing all incoming and outgoing connections of a target node, all inbound and outbound traffic can be monitored, allowing analysis of the node's originating and forwarding transactions, thus enabling transaction tracing at the network layer.

[0005] One current method for capturing connections to cryptocurrency nodes involves actively sending ADDR messages to the target node and establishing connections with it. This process continuously populates the target node's node list, captures incoming connections, and waits for the target node to actively establish connections with the controlled nodes in its list, ultimately achieving complete capture of all connections to the target node.

[0006] In practical applications, the inventors of this invention have found that existing connection occupation methods usually rely on the restart of the target node to trigger the selection process of outgoing connections. Therefore, existing connection occupation methods have problems such as high time cost, uncontrollable process, uncertain effect, and difficulty in maintaining the occupation state of the connection. As a result, transaction tracing methods based on connection occupation are difficult to apply to real-world scenarios. Summary of the Invention

[0007] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to propose a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset, which can achieve cryptocurrency transaction tracing with low time cost, controllable process and certain effect.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset, comprising:

[0009] Populate the whitelist and graylist of the target node;

[0010] Create a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other in a double-spending transaction;

[0011] The first privacy transaction is injected into the transaction pool of the target node by calling the RPC service of the target node, and the second privacy transaction is sent to other nodes for forwarding.

[0012] After the target node receives the second privacy transaction and determines that there is a double-spending conflict between the second privacy transaction and the first privacy transaction, it disconnects the connection of the neighboring node that sent the second privacy transaction to it, thereby occupying the incoming connection of the target node.

[0013] The target node then selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, thereby occupying the outgoing connection of the target node.

[0014] Based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, the originating transaction of the target node is identified.

[0015] Preferably, the method for filling the node list of the gray list of the target node is as follows:

[0016] Establish an incoming connection with the target node and respond to the target node's time synchronization request; and

[0017] Add the IP address of the invalid node to the response, thereby filling the graylist of the target node with the IP address of the invalid node.

[0018] Preferably, at least 20 incoming connections are established with the target node; and

[0019] Each established incoming connection sends the IP addresses of 250 invalid nodes to the target node in response to a time synchronization request.

[0020] Preferably, the method for filling the node list of the whitelist of the target node is as follows:

[0021] By frequently establishing incoming connections with the target node through a large number of controlled nodes; and

[0022] After responding to the Ping request from the target node, the connection is disconnected to populate the IP address of the controlled node into the whitelist of the target node.

[0023] Preferably, the process of filling the whitelist of the target node is completed within 1 minute.

[0024] Preferably, the target node selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, specifically including:

[0025] The target node selects a controlled node from the whitelist of nodes to reset the connection.

[0026] Furthermore, the process of the target node selecting a new node from the node list to reset the connection also includes:

[0027] The target node selects a node from the gray list, determines that the node is invalid, and then selects a controlled node from the white list to reset the connection.

[0028] Preferably, the step of identifying the originating transaction of the target node based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node specifically includes:

[0029] After securing the incoming and outgoing connections to the target node, all incoming and outgoing transaction data of the target node are monitored.

[0030] If a transaction is found to originate solely from the target node, then this transaction is identified as the originating transaction of the target node.

[0031] The present invention also provides a computer device, the computer device including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset described above.

[0032] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that can be executed by at least one processor to cause the at least one processor to perform the steps of the transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset described above.

[0033] In this invention, the whitelist and graylist of the target node are populated; a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other in a double-spending transaction are created; the first privacy transaction is injected into the target node's transaction pool by calling the target node's RPC service, and the second privacy transaction is sent to other nodes for forwarding; after the target node receives the second privacy transaction and determines that there is a double-spending transaction conflict between the second privacy transaction and the first privacy transaction, the connection of the neighboring node that sent the second privacy transaction to it is disconnected, thereby occupying the incoming connection of the target node; then the target node selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, thereby occupying the outgoing connection of the target node; based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, the originating transaction of the target node is identified. Compared with the existing transaction tracing method that relies on node restart to trigger the outgoing connection selection process, the transaction tracing method of this invention based on privacy transaction connection reset effectively realizes the control of the target node's connection, can trigger the outgoing connection selection process at any time, and has repeatability, without relying on node restart to trigger the outgoing connection selection process, thereby achieving cryptocurrency transaction tracing with low time cost, controllable process, and certain effect. Attached Figure Description

[0034] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0035] Figure 1 A flowchart of a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the process of filling a gray list of target nodes according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the process of filling a target node whitelist according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating a connection reset method based on privacy transactions provided in this embodiment of the invention;

[0039] Figure 5 A schematic diagram illustrating the connection reset success rate in an experiment based on a privacy transaction-based connection reset attempt, provided as an embodiment of the present invention.

[0040] Figure 6This is a schematic diagram illustrating the time span of a single connection reset attempt in an experiment based on a privacy transaction, provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0041] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a computer device hardware structure provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0042] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments and accompanying drawings.

[0043] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, the technical or scientific terms used in the embodiments of this invention should have the ordinary meaning understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this disclosure pertains. The terms "first," "second," and similar terms used in this disclosure do not indicate any order, quantity, or importance, but are merely used to distinguish different components. Terms such as "comprising" or "including" mean that the element or object preceding the word encompasses the elements or objects listed following the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects. Terms such as "connected" or "linked" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but can include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. Terms such as "upper," "lower," "left," and "right" are used only to indicate relative positional relationships; when the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may also change accordingly.

[0044] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0045] This invention proposes a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset, the specific process of which is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0046] Step S101: Populate the graylist of nodes for the target node;

[0047] Specifically, each node in the network typically maintains two lists of nodes: a whitelist and a graylist. The whitelist contains verified nodes that can accept connections, while the graylist contains nodes whose connectivity has not been checked. The graylist contains nodes shared by other nodes that have not had their connectivity checked by the current node; that is, when a node is added to the graylist, the node does not check its connectivity (ability to accept incoming connections).

[0048] In this step, a large number of invalid node records are used to fill the gray list of the target node, creating conditions for occupying the outgoing connection of the target node; these invalid nodes can be artificially constructed non-real nodes; the records of invalid nodes can be composed of random IP addresses and ports, and do not correspond to real nodes in the network.

[0049] Specifically, the inventors of this invention discovered that peer nodes include node records in the Handshake / TimedSync responses of the target node; therefore, responding to the target node's Handshake / TimedSync request is the only way to populate the target node's graylist. Furthermore, the inventors also considered that the target node only sends Handshake requests to the peer node when establishing an outgoing connection, infrequently and at unpredictable timing; however, TimedSync requests are initiated every minute, targeting all incoming and outgoing connections. Therefore, in this invention, by establishing an incoming connection with the target node and responding to the target node's TimedSync request, adding invalid node records (i.e., the IP addresses of invalid nodes) to the response, the invalid node records (IP addresses of invalid nodes) are populated into the target node's graylist node list. The entire process is as follows: Figure 2 As shown.

[0050] Furthermore, the inventors of this invention also considered that, since a response can contain up to 250 invalid node IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, and the default maximum size of the graylist node list is 5000, it is possible to completely fill all positions in the graylist node list of the target node by establishing more than 20 incoming connections with the target node, and each established incoming connection will send the IP addresses of 250 invalid nodes to the target node when responding to the Timed Sync request.

[0051] Since the gray list is populated using a first-in-first-out (FIFO) management method, the timing of responding to Timed Sync requests needs to be considered. Responses carrying invalid node records should be processed after responses from uncontrolled nodes whenever possible to minimize the number of other non-invalid node records during the gray list population process. This can be achieved by adding a sending delay to the TimedSync response.

[0052] Additionally, under normal circumstances, peer nodes maintain a "shared node" history for each connection. For uncontrolled peer connections to the target node, the longer the connection lasts, the fewer node records the uncontrolled peer will carry in its Timed Sync response. This is beneficial for greylisting, as fewer node records in the uncontrolled node's response have a smaller impact on greylisting effectiveness.

[0053] Step S102: Populate the whitelist of nodes for the target node;

[0054] In this step, the whitelist of the target node is populated with the IP addresses of a large number of controlled nodes to create conditions for taking over the outgoing connection of the target node.

[0055] Specifically, according to the whitelist management mechanism, there are three ways to add node records to the target node's whitelist: (1) In the outgoing connection selection phase, directly attempt to establish an outgoing connection with nodes in the gray list; (2) Periodically call gray_peerlist_housekeeping() to filter nodes in the gray list into the whitelist; (3) Establish an incoming connection with the target node and add the node IP to the target node's whitelist. Of these three methods, only the third method is controllable. Therefore, the technical solution of this invention fills the target node's whitelist by establishing an incoming connection with the target node.

[0056] During node whitelist management, the only chance for an incoming connection to be added to the whitelist and have its last_seen timestamp (the timestamp of the most recent confirmation of connectability) updated to the latest version is if the IP address corresponding to that incoming connection does not exist in the whitelist before the connection is established. Therefore, an IP address can only be added to the whitelist via an incoming connection if it does not already exist in the whitelist.

[0057] If you have a sufficient number of controlled nodes (greater than or equal to the maximum capacity of the target node's whitelist), then by manipulating these numerous controlled nodes to frequently establish incoming connections with the target node and respond to the target node's Ping (heartbeat) requests (the transaction process of Ping messages is as follows...), you can achieve this. Figure 3 (As shown), the connection is then disconnected. This process effectively fills the whitelist of the target node with the IP address of the controlled node, and the newly added controlled node in the whitelist has the most recent last_seen time, thus increasing its competitiveness in outgoing connection selection. Here, "controlled node" refers to a node completely controlled by supervisors, who have complete control over all of the node's behavior and runtime information.

[0058] If the number of controlled nodes is large, then during the filling process, if the last_seen time of other nodes in the whitelist is not updated in time, the controlled node records that continuously establish incoming connections with the target node can replace all the benign node records in the whitelist node list, thereby achieving complete filling of the whitelist.

[0059] Furthermore, the inventors of this invention considered that since the target node synchronizes with all its connections every 1 minute, the last_seen time of the target node's outgoing connections in the whitelist will be updated when the timed synchronization is completed. Therefore, the process of completely filling the whitelist should be completed within 1 minute as much as possible; otherwise, the outgoing connection records of the target node will affect the filling effect of the whitelist.

[0060] By filling gray and white lists, it is possible to occupy all positions in the target node's node list. Since the target node typically only selects from the gray and white lists when establishing outgoing connections, after occupying the node list, by triggering the target node's outgoing connection selection process, the target node can actively establish connections with the controlled nodes in the node list, thereby achieving occupation of the target node's outgoing connections.

[0061] Step S103: Reset the connection based on privacy transactions to achieve the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node;

[0062] The privacy-based transaction-based node connection reset method in this step enables control over the target node's connections. By quickly disconnecting all other connections to the target node, the number of outgoing connections to the target node drops drastically, triggering the node's outgoing connection selection process to choose a controlled node from the node list for connection.

[0063] Specifically, the node connection reset method based on privacy transactions proposed in this invention utilizes the propagation characteristics of privacy transactions and the node connection management mechanism. A privacy transaction refers to a secret transaction sent to a node, typically generated by a user calling the node's open RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service. By calling the target node's open RPC service, the user sends the generated cryptocurrency transaction to the target node. Upon receiving the transaction, the target node does not forward it but retains it only in its own transaction pool until it is packaged and added to the blockchain. Using privacy transactions, we can create double-spending conflicts between the target node and its neighboring nodes.

[0064] Since double-spending conflicts are one cause of disconnections between nodes, if a node receives a double-spending transaction from a neighboring node, the node will disconnect from that neighboring node. Therefore, the connection of a target node can be reset by creating a double-spending conflict between the target node and its neighboring nodes.

[0065] Based on the above analysis, the specific process for resetting the connection based on privacy transactions in this step is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, it includes the following sub-steps:

[0066] Sub-step S401: Create a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other as double-spending transactions;

[0067] In this sub-step, using the same UTXO (Unspent Transaction Output), two privacy transactions, tx1 and tx2, are created that conflict with each other as double-spending transactions.

[0068] Sub-step S402: Inject the first privacy transaction into the transaction pool of the target node;

[0069] In this sub-step, the first privacy transaction is injected into the transaction pool of the target node by calling the RPC service of the target node.

[0070] Sub-step S403: Send the second privacy transaction to other nodes for forwarding;

[0071] In this sub-step, the second privacy transaction is sent to other nodes besides the target node, and these other nodes then propagate the second privacy transaction across the network: each node that receives the second privacy transaction, other than the target node, will broadcast the second privacy transaction to all its neighboring nodes, thereby achieving the purpose of propagating the second privacy transaction across the network.

[0072] Sub-step S404: The neighboring nodes of the target node forward the received second privacy transaction to the target node;

[0073] Specifically, since tx1 is kept in the target node's transaction pool and not forwarded, tx2 can be successfully propagated in the network. The target node's neighboring nodes can also successfully receive tx2 and will naturally forward tx2 to the target node.

[0074] In this sub-step, when a neighboring node of the target node (e.g., node A) receives the second privacy transaction, the node will forward the second privacy transaction to all its neighboring nodes, including the target node.

[0075] Sub-step S405: The target node disconnects from the neighboring node, thus occupying the incoming connection to the target node;

[0076] Specifically, since the target node already has transaction tx1 that has a double-spending conflict with tx2, according to the cryptocurrency transaction management mechanism, the first-acquired transaction tx1 will be retained, and the target node will actively disconnect from the neighboring nodes that sent it the double-spending transaction, thereby resetting the target node's connection.

[0077] In this sub-step, after the target node receives a second privacy transaction sent by one of its neighboring nodes, it determines that the second privacy transaction has a double-spending conflict with the first privacy transaction in the transaction pool, and then disconnects from the neighboring node.

[0078] As the target node continuously receives second privacy transactions from its neighboring nodes and disconnects from each of them, it achieves the capture of the incoming connections to the target node.

[0079] Sub-step S406: The target node selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, thereby occupying the outgoing connection of the target node;

[0080] In this sub-step, as the number of connections to the target node decreases sharply, the target node will begin a new outgoing connection selection process: the target node selects a controlled node from the whitelist of nodes to reset the connection; or, the target node selects a node from the graylist of nodes, determines that the node is invalid, and then selects a controlled node from the whitelist of nodes to reset the connection.

[0081] Through the above process, as the number of connections to the target node decreases sharply, the target node will begin a new outgoing connection selection process, thereby connecting to the controlled nodes pre-injected in the node list, and ultimately achieving complete control over the outgoing connections of the target node.

[0082] As for incoming connections, by continuously resetting the connection, it is possible to disconnect existing and newly added uncontrolled nodes' incoming connections, thereby maintaining complete control over the target node's connection.

[0083] Step S104: Based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, realize the traceability of cryptocurrency transactions of the target node.

[0084] In this step, based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, the originating transactions of the target node are identified, thereby realizing the traceability of cryptocurrency transactions of the target node.

[0085] Specifically, after securing the incoming and outgoing connections to the target node, all incoming and outgoing transaction data of the target node can be monitored.

[0086] By analyzing the transaction traffic at the cryptocurrency network layer, if a transaction is found to have originated from the target node but was not previously sent to the target node, it indicates that this transaction is the originating transaction of the target node, thus enabling the traceability of cryptocurrency transactions at the target node.

[0087] Because all connections to the target node are controlled, it is possible to analyze and identify the originating transactions of the target node and decide whether to intercept them. For regulators, if the originating transactions of the target node are illegal, they can be intercepted, enabling refined supervision.

[0088] Based on the aforementioned connection reset method using privacy transactions, an experiment was conducted on the target node involving 40 connection reset attempts based on privacy transactions. Figure 5 As shown, 35 (87.5%) connection reset attempts successfully reset all target connections, achieving an average connection reset rate of 99.55%. More importantly, even if a single attempt failed to reset all connections, those connections that were not reset were reset in subsequent attempts.

[0089] The time span of each attempt, and the results are as follows Figure 6 As shown, due to the randomness of transaction propagation in the network, the time it takes for a double-spend tx2 to reach the target node through benign peers is uncertain, thus the completion time of a connection reset attack fluctuates within a certain range. The results show that the average completion time of a connection reset attempt based on privacy transactions is 39.94 seconds, with 38 attempts (95%) taking less than 2 minutes. This means that connection reset attempts can quickly reset the target node's connection in most cases.

[0090] In this invention, the whitelist and graylist of the target node are populated; a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other in a double-spending transaction are created; the first privacy transaction is injected into the target node's transaction pool by calling the target node's RPC service, and the second privacy transaction is sent to other nodes for forwarding; after the target node receives the second privacy transaction and determines that there is a double-spending transaction conflict between the second privacy transaction and the first privacy transaction, the connection of the neighboring node that sent the second privacy transaction to it is disconnected, thereby occupying the incoming connection of the target node; then the target node selects a new node from the node list to reset the connection, thereby occupying the outgoing connection of the target node; based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, the originating transaction of the target node is identified. Compared with the existing transaction tracing method that relies on node restart to trigger the outgoing connection selection process, the transaction tracing method of this invention based on privacy transaction connection reset effectively realizes the control of the target node's connection, can trigger the outgoing connection selection process at any time, and has repeatability, without relying on node restart to trigger the outgoing connection selection process, thereby achieving cryptocurrency transaction tracing with low time cost, controllable process, and certain effect.

[0091] Figure 7 This illustration schematically depicts the hardware architecture of a computer device 1300 for a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset according to an embodiment of this application. In this embodiment, the computer device 1300 is a device capable of automatically performing numerical calculations and / or information processing according to pre-set or stored instructions. For example, it may be a smartphone, tablet computer, laptop computer, desktop computer, rack server, blade server, tower server, or cabinet server (including standalone servers or server clusters composed of multiple servers), etc. Figure 7 As shown, the computer device 1300 includes, but is not limited to, at least: a memory 1310, a processor 1320, and a network interface 1330 that can communicate with each other via a system bus. Wherein:

[0092] The memory 1310 includes at least one type of computer-readable storage medium, including flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory (e.g., SD or DX memory), random access memory (RAM), static random access memory (SRAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), magnetic memory, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc. In some embodiments, the memory 1310 may be an internal storage module of the computer device 1300, such as the hard disk or memory of the computer device 1300. In other embodiments, the memory 1310 may also be an external storage device of the computer device 1300, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, etc. Of course, the memory 1310 may also include both the internal storage module and the external storage device of the computer device 1300. In this embodiment, the memory 1310 is typically used to store the operating system and various application software installed on the computer device 1300, such as the program code for a transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset. In addition, the memory 1310 can also be used to temporarily store various types of data that have been output or will be output.

[0093] In some embodiments, processor 1320 may be a central processing unit (CPU), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor, or other data processing chip. Processor 1320 is typically used to control the overall operation of computer device 1300, such as performing control and processing related to data interaction or communication with computer device 1300. In this embodiment, processor 1320 is used to run program code stored in memory 1310 or process data.

[0094] Network interface 1330 may include a wireless network interface or a wired network interface, which is typically used to establish a communication link between computer device 1300 and other computer devices. For example, network interface 1330 is used to connect computer device 1300 to an external terminal via a network, establishing a data transmission channel and communication link between computer device 1300 and the external terminal. The network may be an intranet, the Internet, Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), 4G network, 5G network, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other wireless or wired networks.

[0095] It should be pointed out that, Figure 7 Only a computer device with components 1310-1330 is shown; however, it should be understood that it is not required to implement all of the components shown, and more or fewer components may be implemented instead.

[0096] In this embodiment, the transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset stored in memory 1310 can also be divided into one or more program modules and executed by one or more processors (processor 1320 in this embodiment) to complete the embodiment of this application.

[0097] The computer-readable medium of this embodiment includes permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and information storage can be implemented by any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transfer medium that can be used to store information accessible by a computing device.

[0098] Those skilled in the art should understand that the discussion of any of the above embodiments is merely exemplary and is not intended to imply that the scope of this disclosure (including the claims) is limited to these examples; within the framework of this invention, the technical features of the above embodiments or different embodiments can also be combined, the steps can be implemented in any order, and there are many other variations of the different aspects of the invention as described above, which are not provided in the details for the sake of brevity.

[0099] Additionally, to simplify the description and discussion, and to avoid obscuring the invention, the well-known power / ground connections to integrated circuit (IC) chips and other components may or may not be shown in the provided drawings. Furthermore, the apparatus may be shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring the invention, and this also takes into account the fact that the details of implementation of these block diagram apparatuses are highly dependent on the platform on which the invention will be implemented (i.e., these details should be fully understood by those skilled in the art). While specific details (e.g., circuits) are set forth to describe exemplary embodiments of the invention, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced without these specific details or with variations thereof. Therefore, these descriptions should be considered illustrative rather than restrictive.

[0100] Although the invention has been described in conjunction with specific embodiments thereof, many substitutions, modifications, and variations of these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the foregoing description. For example, other memory architectures (e.g., dynamic RAM (DRAM)) may be used with the embodiments discussed.

[0101] The embodiments of this invention are intended to cover all such substitutions, modifications, and variations falling within the broad scope of the appended claims. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this invention should be included within the scope of protection of this invention.

Claims

1. A transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset, characterized in that, include: The whitelist and graylist of target nodes are populated; wherein, the whitelist of nodes stores verified node records that can be connected, while the graylist of nodes has not been verified for connectivity. Create a first privacy transaction and a second privacy transaction that conflict with each other in a double-spending transaction; The first privacy transaction is injected into the transaction pool of the target node by calling the RPC service of the target node, and the second privacy transaction is sent to other nodes for forwarding. After the target node receives the second privacy transaction and determines that there is a double-spending conflict between the second privacy transaction and the first privacy transaction, it disconnects the connection of the neighboring node that sent the second privacy transaction to it, thereby occupying the incoming connection of the target node. The target node then selects a controlled node from the whitelist of nodes to connect to; or, the target node selects a node from the graylist of nodes, determines that the node is invalid, and then selects a controlled node from the whitelist of nodes to connect to, thereby occupying the outgoing connection of the target node. Based on the occupation of the incoming and outgoing connections of the target node, all incoming and outgoing transaction data of the target node are monitored; If a transaction is found to have originated from the target node but was not previously sent to the target node, then the transaction is identified as the originating transaction of the target node.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method for filling the node list of the gray list of the target node is as follows: Establish an incoming connection with the target node and respond to the target node's time synchronization request; and Add the IP address of the invalid node to the response, thereby filling the graylist of the target node with the IP address of the invalid node.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, At least 20 incoming connections have been established with the target node; and Each established incoming connection sends the IP addresses of 250 invalid nodes to the target node in response to a time synchronization request.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method for populating the whitelist of the target node is as follows: An incoming connection is established between the controlled nodes and the target node by means of a number greater than or equal to the maximum capacity of the target node's whitelist. as well as After responding to the Ping request from the target node, the connection is disconnected to populate the IP address of the controlled node into the whitelist of the target node.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, The process of filling the whitelist of the target node is completed within 1 minute.

6. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

7. A computer readable storage medium characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that can be executed by at least one processor to cause the at least one processor to perform the steps of the transaction tracing method based on privacy transaction connection reset as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.