Battery Authentication via Public Key Cryptography
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing battery management systems face challenges in effectively authenticating and managing mobile batteries, particularly in shared systems, due to issues with leakage of identification information and the difficulty in preventing counterfeit products, especially when using common key cryptosystems, which are vulnerable to eavesdropping and repeat attacks.
Innovation Solution
The system employs a public key cryptosystem for authentication, utilizing authentication private and public keys issued by a key issuer, where the battery replacement machine encrypts a challenge code with the public key, and the mobile battery decrypts it using the private key, generating a response code that is verified by the battery replacement machine to confirm legitimacy, thereby enhancing security and preventing counterfeit detection.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If a common key cryptosystem is used for battery authentication, then the authentication process is simple and easy to implement, but the system becomes vulnerable to eavesdropping and repeat attacks, compromising security
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces the common key cryptosystem (mechanical/authentication system) with a public key cryptosystem. This substitution fundamentally changes the authentication mechanism from one using shared secrets to one using asymmetric cryptography, thereby eliminating vulnerability to eavesdropping and repeat attacks while maintaining operational simplicity through standardized cryptographic protocols
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the cryptographic parameters from symmetric key pairs to asymmetric key pairs (public and private keys). This parameter change in the authentication system enables the battery management system to resist eavesdropping and repeat attacks, as each battery has unique key pairs that cannot be derived from transmitted authentication data
2Ease of operation
If battery identification information is transmitted and stored, then authentication can be performed, but the identification information may leak, compromising system security
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the authentication capability from the battery identification information itself. Instead of transmitting and storing actual identification data that could leak, the system uses public key cryptography where only authentication results (authentication codes) are transmitted, not the underlying identification information. This separates the authentication function from the identification data
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces authentication codes as an intermediary between battery identification and system verification. The identification information never leaves the battery; instead, it remains secured within the battery's secure element, and only cryptographic authentication codes derived from it are transmitted to the battery management system for verification
3Reliability
If authentication keys are stored in batteries for verification, then legitimate batteries can be authenticated, but counterfeit batteries become harder to prevent without additional security measures
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies asymmetry through public and private key pairs. Each battery has a unique asymmetric key structure where the private key remains securely stored in the battery while the public key can be safely transmitted and stored in the battery management system. This asymmetric design inherently prevents counterfeit batteries from being created, as the private key cannot be derived from the public key or authentication codes
Solution Approach 2:
The patent performs preliminary authentication verification before allowing battery operations. The battery management system verifies authentication codes using stored public keys before permitting charging, discharging, or other battery operations. This preliminary security check prevents counterfeit batteries from accessing system resources without requiring complex physical security measures
Data Source
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AI summary
Provided is a confirmation method including: a step for transmitting first verification information to the to-be-confirmed apparatus; a step for generating third verification information by converting the first verification information based on second verification information; a step for receiving, from the to-be-confirmed apparatus, (i) fifth verification information generated by the to-be-confirmed apparatus by converting the first verification information based on fourth verification information satisfying a first mathematical relationship with the second verification information or (ii) sixth verification information derived by the to-be-confirmed apparatus from the first verification information and the fourth verification information or from the fifth verification information by using a second mathematical relationship to be satisfied by the third verification information and the fifth verification information when the to-be-confirmed apparatus is a legitimate apparatus; and a step for determining whether or not the to-be-confirmed apparatus is a legitimate apparatus, based on the third verification information and on the fifth verification information or the sixth verification information.