Robot Weapon Safety via Dual Communication Links

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing remotely controlled mobile robots equipped with weapons pose safety concerns due to the risk of unintended firing, malfunctions, and loss of communication links, which have hindered their deployment in military contexts.

Innovation Solution

A dual communication link system is implemented, where one link connects the operator control unit to the robot and another directly to the weapon interrupt module, ensuring the weapon is safely disengaged if the operator intends to stop it or if either communication link degrades, using a stop switch and a kill switch to prevent accidental firing and malfunctions.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Device complexity

If a single communication link is used to control the weapon, then the system complexity is reduced, but the safety and reliability of weapon control deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication link structureVSAvoidweapon control safety
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The communication link is segmented into two independent channels: a primary control link for normal operation and a secondary safety link for weapon interruption. This segmentation allows the system to maintain safety through redundancy while managing complexity by separating control functions into distinct, specialized pathways.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A weapon interrupt module is introduced as an intermediary component that receives commands from both communication links. This mediator independently verifies control signals and can override weapon activation, providing an additional safety layer without requiring complete system redesign.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If the weapon control system is made more robust with multiple safety mechanisms, then the safety improves, but the device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveweapon safetyVSAvoidcontrol system structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements preliminary safety actions by requiring the weapon safety to be disengaged through specific control sequences before the weapon can be activated. This preliminary action ensures that safety protocols are established before operational modes are engaged, preventing accidental firing while maintaining a streamlined control structure.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The control system dynamics are configured so that the safety mechanism is always active by default and can only be disabled through deliberate, multi-step control actions. The system dynamically adjusts its state based on control inputs, maintaining safety constraints while allowing operational flexibility when properly authorized.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

3Object-affected harmful factors

If the operator control unit is positioned farther from the robot, then the operator safety improves, but the communication link reliability deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperator exposure to hostile situationVSAvoidcommunication link stability
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The weapon interrupt module serves as a local intermediary on the robot platform that can receive and process safety commands independently of the operator's distance. This allows the operator to maintain safe separation while the intermediary ensures reliable weapon control through local signal processing and verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the communication parameter architecture by implementing two different communication protocols: one for primary control and another for safety-critical interrupt signals. This parameter differentiation ensures that safety commands maintain high reliability even when operator distance affects general communication quality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS7974736B2Robot deployed weapon system and safing method
Publication Date: 2011.07.05 FOSTER MILLER INC
  • US7974736B2 patent drawing
  • US7974736B2 patent drawing
  • US7974736B2 patent drawing

AI summary

This subject invention features a robot deployed weapon system. A remotely controlled mobile robot has a weapon mounted to the robot. There is a firing circuit for the weapon and a weapon interrupt module on board the robot. An operator control unit is for remotely operating the robot and the weapon. The operating control unit preferably includes a stop switch. Also, a separate operator module is in communication with the weapon interrupt module. Preferably, the operator module includes a kill switch. There are two communication links. The first communication link is between the operator control unit and the robot. This communication link is configured to safe the weapon if the stop switch is activated and/or the first communication link degrades. The second communication link is between the operator module and the weapon interrupt module. The communication link is configured to safe the weapon if the kill switch is activated and/or the second communication link degrades.