Self-Powered Tamper Detection for Secure Program Memory

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing tamper detection systems for electronic circuitry lack a reliable, self-sustaining mechanism to detect unauthorized access and respond by disrupting program data without external power sources, posing risks to sensitive information and national security.

Innovation Solution

A self-powering tamper detection system architecture that includes a long-life power source, a tamper detector actuating a mechanical switch, a tamper controller, and program memory, which produces a disruption of stored data upon unauthorized access, while allowing authorized maintenance through a tamper unlock signal.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a tamper detection system uses external power sources and complex architecture, then the detection capability and response mechanism can be more sophisticated, but the system becomes less reliable and more vulnerable to power dependency and failure

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesystem reliabilityVSAvoidsystem architecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The tamper detection system is designed to be self-powered through energy harvesting from the tamper event itself. The mechanical energy of attempted tampering is converted into electrical energy to power the detection and response mechanisms, eliminating dependency on external power sources and enhancing system reliability while maintaining simplicity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The system architecture transitions from static power-dependent design to dynamic energy harvesting. The system activates only when tamper energy is harvested, creating a dynamic response that adapts to the presence or absence of tamper events, thereby improving reliability without requiring complex continuous power management

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

2Reliability

If the system responds to all tamper events by disrupting program data, then security is maximized, but authorized maintenance and legitimate access are blocked

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidmaintenance accessibility
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system incorporates feedback mechanisms that distinguish between authorized and unauthorized tamper events. The response action is conditioned on the nature of the detected event, allowing the system to maintain security while permitting authorized maintenance through differentiated response based on event characterization feedback

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

Different response qualities are applied to different types of tamper events. Authorized maintenance events receive a permissive response allowing access, while unauthorized tamper events trigger data disruption. This localized quality control enables both security and maintenance accessibility

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Duration of action of stationary object

If the power source has long lifetime to ensure continuous protection, then the system can operate indefinitely without replacement, but the power source size and cost increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepower source lifetimeVSAvoidpower source mass
Core Design Contradiction:
Duration of action of stationary objectVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of continuous power consumption, the system operates periodically only when tamper events occur. Energy is harvested on-demand during tamper attempts, converting mechanical energy to electrical energy only when needed, thereby eliminating the need for large-capacity long-life power sources while maintaining indefinite operational capability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Solution Approach 2:

The system serves itself by harvesting energy from tamper events to power its own detection and response operations. This self-powered approach eliminates dependency on external power sources of any capacity, achieving indefinite operation without requiring large or expensive power sources

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

Ensures the integrity of sensitive data by providing a reliable, long-term power source for tamper detection and response, preventing unauthorized access while allowing authorized maintenance without data disruption.

Implementation Method 1

In a particular embodiment, tamper detection transducer 14 can be a piezoelectric transducer, which transforms a pressure force from tampering into an electrical signal to represent tampering.

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectPiezoelectric effect: Piezoelectric Effect

Implementation Method 2

In another particular embodiment, tamper detection transducer 14 can be an optical transmitter and optical receiver that convert electrical energy into optical energy, and optical energy into electrical energy, respectively.

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectLight emission and detection: Light Emitting Diode

Data Source

PatentUS10977391B2Tamper detection and response deactivation technique
Publication Date: 2021.04.13 HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND CORP
  • US10977391B2 patent drawing
  • US10977391B2 patent drawing
  • US10977391B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A self-powering tamper detection system architecture includes a power source, a tamper detector configured to mechanically actuate a tamper switch when a tamper event occurs, a tamper switch electrically connected to the power source and mechanically connected to the tamper detector, a tamper unlock system configured to provide a tamper unlock signal when an authorized maintenance condition exists, a tamper controller configured to produce a tamper response when the tamper event is identified, and to not produce the tamper response when the tamper unlock signal is provided, and program memory configured to store program data. The tamper response produces a disruption of the program data.