TLS Authentication Handshake Using a Three-Stage Identity Loop
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing RSA-based cryptography is vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, compromising secure communications, and lacks robust user authentication mechanisms to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Innovation Solution
The Secure Authentication and Identity Loop (SAIL) protocol employs a three-stage asymmetric cryptographic communication scheme using public and private keys for secure user authentication and key exchange, ensuring verified peer-to-peer communications through multiple rounds of encrypted content transmission and digital signature verification.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If RSA-based cryptography with single peer-to-peer transmission is used for user authentication, then the authentication process is simple and fast, but the system is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and compromised by quantum computing advancements
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication protocol is segmented into three distinct peer-to-peer transmissions instead of a single transmission. Each transmission serves a specific purpose: establishing cryptographic parameters, exchanging authentication data, and confirming session keys. This segmentation allows each step to be independently verified for authenticity, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks while maintaining manageable complexity through clear protocol structure
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries in the form of verified session keys and authentication tokens that mediate between the client and server. These intermediaries serve as trusted carriers of authentication information, allowing the system to achieve higher reliability without directly increasing protocol complexity, as the intermediaries encapsulate complex verification logic
2Measurement precision
If traditional SSL/TLS certificate verification is used, then the authentication process is straightforward, but it fails to conduct analysis of secured communication results to precisely confirm communications are occurring with the targeted destination
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs preliminary cryptographic parameter establishment and authentication data exchange in the first two transmissions before the actual data communication begins. This preliminary action includes verifying digital signatures and establishing session keys upfront, allowing the system to achieve precise destination verification without adding significant time to the overall communication process, as the verification is integrated into the initial handshake
3Reliability
If quantum computing advancements are considered, then RSA-based cryptography becomes vulnerable, but implementing more secure cryptographic schemes increases system complexity
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs parameter changes by using multiple different cryptographic parameters across the three transmissions rather than relying on a single cryptographic operation. Each transmission uses different cryptographic primitives and key types, creating a layered security approach that is more resistant to quantum computing attacks. This parameter diversification achieves higher security without requiring a complete overhaul to a single complex quantum-resistant algorithm
Data Source
AI summary
A computerized method supporting SSL-based or TLS-based communications with multiple cryptographically protected transmissions is described. Responsive to a first transmission including a first content encrypted with a public key of an intended recipient and a first digital signature for use in detect tampering to the first content, a second transmission is received. The second transmission includes a combined result including the first content and a second content, which is encrypted with a public key of the sender. Recovery of the first content verifies to the sender that the second transmission originated from the intended recipient. Thereafter, a third transmission is sent. The third transmission has data including at least the second content, being the remaining data after extraction of the first content from the combined result, which is encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient and a third digital signature for use in verifying non-tampering of the data.