TPMS Sensor Authentication Using ECU Signature Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMS) face security challenges due to the risk of unauthorized wireless communications, which can lead to compromised vehicle control and safety.

Innovation Solution

The implementation of methods and systems for TPMS sensor authentication, where an electronic control unit (ECU) uses key values to generate and compare signature values within radio frequency (RF) transmissions to verify the authenticity of TPMS sensors.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If wireless communication is implemented in TPMS for automated tire pressure monitoring, then productivity and ease of operation are improved, but security vulnerabilities and reliability are worsened due to unauthorized access risks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveautomated tire pressure monitoringVSAvoidsecurity against unauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary authentication of the sensor before accepting tire pressure data. The ECU verifies the sensor's identity using cryptographic authentication mechanisms in advance, ensuring that only authorized sensors can communicate tire pressure information, thus preventing unauthorized access before it can compromise system reliability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces cryptographic authentication mechanisms as an intermediary layer between the TPMS sensor and the ECU. This intermediary verification process uses digital signatures and public key infrastructure to mediate the communication, ensuring that wireless data transmission is secure while maintaining automated monitoring functionality

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If cryptographic authentication is implemented in TPMS to enhance security, then reliability is improved, but device complexity increases due to additional authentication components

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity authenticationVSAvoidauthentication system structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication system is segmented into distinct functional components: the sensor unit with its private key, the ECU with public key storage, and the cryptographic verification module. This segmentation allows each component to perform its specific authentication function independently, making the complex security system more manageable and maintainable while ensuring reliable authentication

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The cryptographic authentication mechanism is designed to be universal, using standard public key infrastructure that can be implemented across different TPMS systems. The authentication protocol serves multiple functions including identity verification, data integrity checking, and secure key exchange, reducing the need for multiple separate security mechanisms and thereby managing complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentUS12317082B2Tire pressure monitoring system sensor authentication
Publication Date: 2025.05.27 SENSATA TECHNOLOGIES INC
  • US12317082B2 patent drawing
  • US12317082B2 patent drawing
  • US12317082B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods, apparatus, systems, and computer program products for tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) sensor authentication are disclosed. In a particular embodiment, an electronic control unit (ECU) of a vehicle receives a first radio frequency (RF) transmission that includes TPMS data and a first signature value. In this particular embodiment, the ECU uses a key value to generate a second signature value and determines whether the second signature value corresponds with the first signature value. In this example embodiment, the ECU uses a determination of whether the second signature value corresponds with the first signature value to determine whether the first RF transmission is from a particular TPMS sensor authenticated to the key value.