Virtual Trusted Computing Base for Secure Firmware Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current device security verification methods face challenges in effectively isolating internal software security components and detecting system security flaws, particularly in hardware-based trust computing bases, which are passive and difficult to modify, and struggle with code execution attacks like return-oriented programming (RoP).

Innovation Solution

A method and apparatus for device security verification using a virtual trust computing base, where a security memory loader verifies the validity of decryption keys, decrypts firmware, and checks its authentication and integrity using a secure memory loader, memory protection unit, and one-time programmable memory, with self-security verification and memory protection policies applied to ensure secure firmware execution.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If hardware-based trust computing base is used for security verification, then security isolation is improved, but adaptability and ease of modification deteriorate

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity isolationVSAvoidsecurity policy modification
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system divides security verification into two independent layers: a hardware-based trust computing base (TCM) for cryptographic operations and a software-based security policy management system for flexible control. This segmentation allows the hardware to provide reliable isolation while the software layer handles adaptability and policy modifications independently.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A software security policy management system acts as an intermediary between the hardware TCM and the device operations. This intermediary layer enables flexible security policy modifications without changing hardware, while the TCM provides the underlying cryptographic trust foundation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If manual security verification processing is used, then hardware operation security is improved, but responsiveness to security flaws deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvehardware operation securityVSAvoidsecurity flaw detection speed
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements automated feedback mechanisms where the security policy management system continuously monitors device operations and automatically responds to security events. When security flaws or violations are detected, the system automatically triggers verification processes and enforcement actions without manual intervention, improving both responsiveness and security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

3Productivity

If simple checksum verification is used for firmware integrity, then verification speed is improved, but detection capability against sophisticated attacks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveverification speedVSAvoidattack detection capability
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system transitions from simple checksum verification to cryptographic hash-based verification (e.g., SHA-256) for firmware integrity checking. This parameter change in the verification method provides strong detection capability against sophisticated attacks like return-oriented programming, while maintaining acceptable verification speeds through hardware acceleration and optimized algorithms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS10915633B2Method and apparatus for device security verification utilizing a virtual trusted computing base
Publication Date: 2021.02.09 ELECTRONICS & TELECOMM RES INST
  • US10915633B2 patent drawing
  • US10915633B2 patent drawing
  • US10915633B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method and an apparatus for device security verification utilizing a virtual trusted computing base are provided. The validity of a key for decryption is verified by a secure memory loader running on a processor of a device after booting of the device which is a computing device, and if the key is valid, encrypted firmware stored in a memory of the device is decrypted using the key to verify the confidentiality of the firmware. Then, the security memory loader verifies the authentication and integrity of the firmware by comparing a signature value generated for the decrypted firmware with an existing signature value.