Anti-ransomware system and method using sinkholes at electronic devices
By generating recursive sinking hole directories and monitoring the file list of ransomware, delaying its encryption process, identifying and rectifying ransomware, the problem of difficulty in detecting and preventing ransomware in the existing technology is solved, and the efficiency of ransomware detection and elimination is improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201980025840.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2018-02-23
- Filing Date
- 2019-02-19
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-02-19
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively detect and eliminate ransomware, especially as the privacy and decentralized nature of the Bitcoin payment system makes ransomware difficult to detect and prevent.
The sinkhole generator is used to generate a recursive sinkhole directory, and the ransomware file list generation time is extended, the ransomware threat indication is monitored and identified, and the ransomware is remediated by using the cleaner.
Effectively delay the infection and encryption process of ransomware, providing additional time for detection and removal, improving the detection and elimination of ransomware, and preventing the files of computing devices from being encrypted.
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Figure CN112106047B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates generally to electronic security, and more particularly to an anti-ransomware method and apparatus using a sinkhole at an electronic device. Background Art
[0002] Malicious programs or software, also known as malware, have emerged in many new forms and have continued to increase in capability in recent years. Software tools exist to detect and eliminate these threats, as well as to mitigate or repair any damage they cause to end-user computing devices. Some forms of malware may delete files from a computing device and / or render files inaccessible without the end-user's knowledge or consent.
[0003] Malware can be any program that performs harmful or potentially harmful activities on a computer, typically without the user's knowledge and / or consent. Malware includes, but is not limited to, viruses, Trojan horses, backdoors, keyloggers, rootkits, ransomware, remote access tools, worms, and exploits. Malware can perform a variety of functions, such as modifying a user's personal files or eavesdropping on a user's activities. Ransomware is an example form of malware in which a user's data is made inaccessible via deletion or modification (e.g., via encryption or corruption) and a ransom is demanded (e.g., until a fee is paid to return the data).
[0004] An asymmetric ransomware prototype was designed to demonstrate how cryptography can be used to launch extortion-based attacks that result in inaccessibility and information leakage. Public key cryptography can also be used in computer attacks, and the use of multiple keys in asymmetric public key cryptography allows ransomware to encrypt items on a system using a public key while never exposing the private key, thereby keeping the private key secret. For ransomware, using public key encryption while keeping the private key secret is critical for "mangling" data files without exposing information that can be used by someone to figure out how to undo the encryption.
[0005] The incidence of ransomware has increased with the advent of Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a digital asset and payment system that provides decentralized digital currency and anonymity in commercial transactions. The decentralized and anonymous nature of Bitcoin makes Bitcoin very attractive to ransomware developers as a payment method for ransomware schemes. Ransomware developers have begun incorporating Bitcoin transactions into their ransomware.
[0006] For example, there is no central bank or authority for the Bitcoin currency, and therefore, any such authority cannot manipulate the value of Bitcoin. In addition, people who conduct Bitcoin transactions have a great deal of privacy. The Bitcoin network is pseudonymous, and there is no easy way to link a Bitcoin account address to a real-world identity. Bitcoin currency can be sent across borders, and transactions are not location-specific. In addition, basic Bitcoin transactions are irreversible. Once a transfer has been made, a third party cannot force a refund (as with a credit card). Recently, new and unique ransomware binaries have proliferated due to the easier participation in the ransomware process through Bitcoin payments and the greater difficulty in detecting ransomware binaries. For example, with ransomware-as-a-service, members do not need to have specific programming or other technical skills, but have the willingness to spread ransomware (e.g., through email botnets that are easy for non-programmers to set up, etc.).
[0007] Encouraged by a lucrative business model and the possibility of revenue sharing, ransomware authors make it difficult to detect ransomware binaries using traditional antivirus software. Highly polymorphic code and code obfuscation / encryption techniques make ransomware difficult to detect by signature-based scanners. In addition, due to very high parallel processing capabilities, the ransomware process takes very little time to infect the target system, making it even more difficult for behavioral (e.g., machine learning-based) antivirus scanners to detect. Summary of the invention
[0008] The present disclosure provides a malware scanner for scanning computer files, the malware scanner comprising: a sinkhole generator, the sinkhole generator generating a sinkhole directory; a storage device, the storage device being adapted to store computer files and the sinkhole directory, wherein the sinkhole directory is recursively expanded when the computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory, so as to occupy the computer file by extending the time period spent for executing the file list of the sinkhole directory; an analyzer, the analyzer monitoring the execution of the computer file when the computer file is executing the file list of the sinkhole directory, so as to try to identify a threat indication associated with the computer file, and when the analyzer identifies the threat indication, the analyzer classifies the computer file as ransomware; and a cleaner, the cleaner remediating the ransomware.
[0009] The present disclosure also provides at least one machine-readable storage medium, which contains instructions that, when executed, cause at least one processor to at least: generate a sinkhole directory, which is recursively expanded when a file index of the sinkhole directory is executed to extend the time period that a computer file spends executing the file index of the sinkhole directory; in response to the presence of a threat indication associated with the execution of the computer file, identify the computer file as ransomware; and remediate the ransomware.
[0010] The present disclosure also provides a method for remediating ransomware on an electronic device, the method comprising the following steps: generating a sinkhole directory by executing instructions using at least one processor, the sinkhole directory being recursively expanded when a computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory, so as to delay the computer file by extending a time period for executing the file list; monitoring the execution of the computer file when the computer file is executing the file list of the sinkhole directory by executing instructions using the at least one processor, so as to attempt to identify a threat indication associated with the computer file; classifying the computer file as ransomware in response to the identification of the threat indication by executing instructions using the at least one processor; and remediating the ransomware by executing instructions using the at least one processor.
[0011] The present disclosure also provides an apparatus for remediating ransomware, the apparatus comprising: a unit for generating a canary file and a recursive connection in a sinkhole directory, the recursive connection pointing back to the sinkhole directory, the recursive connection causing the sinkhole directory to be recursively extended when a computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory, so as to extend a time period spent on executing the file list of the sinkhole directory; a unit for identifying a computer file as ransomware when the computer file is executing the file list of the sinkhole directory based on a threat indication; and a unit for remediating the ransomware. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0012] Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating an example use environment including an electronic message sent to an electronic device.
[0013] Figure 2 Illustrated Figure 1 An example implementation of an electronic device.
[0014] Figure 3 Illustrated Figure 2 An example implementation of a processor for an example electronic device.
[0015] Figure 4 Illustrated Figure 3 An example implementation of a malware scanner for .
[0016] Figure 5 , Figure 7 as well as Figure 8 is a flowchart representing example machine readable instructions that may be executed to implement Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 An example processor is provided to process incoming files and protect against malware (such as ransomware) at the electronic device.
[0017] Figure 6 An example recursive sinkhole directory listing is shown.
[0018] Fig. 9 is constructed to execute Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 Instructions to achieve Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 A block diagram of an example processor platform for a processor.
[0019] These drawings are not to scale. Wherever possible, the same reference numbers are used throughout the drawings and accompanying written description to refer to the same or like parts. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0020] In the following detailed description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings, which form a part of the detailed description, and wherein, by way of illustration, specific examples that can be put into practice are shown. These examples are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice this theme, and it is to be understood that other examples may be utilized and logical changes, mechanical changes, electrical changes, and other changes may be made without departing from the scope of the subject matter of the present disclosure. Therefore, the following detailed description is provided to describe the example implementations, and should not be viewed as limiting the scope of the subject matter described in the present disclosure. Certain features from the different aspects described below may be combined to form new aspects of the subject matter discussed below.
[0021] When introducing elements of various embodiments of the present disclosure, the articles "a," "an," "the," and "said" are intended to mean that there are one or more elements. The terms "comprising," "including," and "having" are intended to be inclusive and mean that there may be additional elements in addition to the listed elements.
[0022] As used herein, the terms "system," "unit," "module," "engine," and the like may include hardware and / or software systems that operate to perform one or more functions. For example, a module, unit, or system may include a computer processor, controller, and / or other logic-based device that performs operations based on instructions stored on a tangible and non-transitory computer-readable storage medium (such as a computer memory). Alternatively, a module, unit, engine, or system may include a hard-wired device that performs operations based on hard-wired device logic. The various modules, units, engines, and / or systems shown in the accompanying drawings may represent hardware that operates based on software or hard-wired instructions, software that directs hardware to perform operations, or a combination of the two.
[0023] There are various malware protection tools to protect computing devices from the threat of malware. Traditionally, malware protection tools attempt to combat malware using techniques including monitoring downloaded files and comparing the downloaded files to known malware signatures (also known as definitions), monitoring system processes that modify critical system files, monitoring new files for a specified period of time to ensure that their behavior is not suspicious, and many other techniques. In some examples, after the malware protection tool technology identifies malware on a computing device, the malware protection tool can eliminate the malware (e.g., by terminating the malware and deleting the malware's file data, etc.), or isolate the malware (e.g., moving and encrypting malware files to lock the malware and prevent the malware from accessing files or being accessed by other programs, etc.). Although these techniques are sufficient to address many malware threats, in some examples, undetected, advanced, or highly complex threats evade detection or intervention by the tool.
[0024] The ransomware may be sent to a computing device via an email attachment, website compromise, or the like. Once on the device, the ransomware communicates with an encryption key server. The ransomware then searches for user and / or other non-operating system files (e.g., .jpg, .bmp, .pdf, .docx, .xlsx, etc.). For example, a list of files may begin with information from a user profile folder. For example, the ransomware encrypts files by encrypting and renaming user and / or other non-operating system files. The ransomware then hacks into these files and may lock the computing device, for example, persisting after the device and its operating system are restarted.
[0025] In some examples, a sinkhole may be implemented on a computer to thwart ransomware executing or attempting to execute on that computer. The process of sinkholing involves redirecting program execution, data traffic, etc. from its original destination to a destination specified by the sinkhole owner. A sinkhole (also known as a black hole) is an altered destination (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) address, code segment, data set, file location, etc.) provided by a system (e.g., by antivirus software, computer security processor, etc.) to redirect or "shift" malicious code from its intended destination to a fake destination that will not damage or otherwise affect the operation of the system.
[0026] In some examples, a ransomware file arrives at a computing device (e.g., a smartphone, tablet, laptop, desktop computer, server, etc.), such as via a phishing email, a hacked website, other infected documents, etc. The ransomware process begins executing on the computing device and obtains an encryption key from a command and control server. The computing device is configured with a sinkhole triggered by an incoming file (e.g., an incoming file containing a ransomware program, etc.) to transfer and occupy the ransomware process while processing a list of files (e.g., .docx, .pdf, .jpg, .xlsx, etc.) through a recursive bait directory (which forms a sinkhole). The list of files of the ransomware process in the sinkhole creates sufficient threat indicators (IOCs) for the behavior tracking software executing on the computing device to identify the ransomware. The behavior tracking process can then isolate, delete, and / or otherwise disable the ransomware and prevent the ransomware process from encrypting files on the computing device. As a result, the computing device remains uninfected.
[0027] IOCs for ransomware may include actions, commands, and / or other processes, such as generating a unique computer identifier, retrieving an external IP address, injecting into a clean process (such as explorer.exe, svchost.exe), and the like. For example, IOCs may include ensuring "reboot survival" by installing a ransomware program that runs when a computer device boots up (e.g., through a service portal, scheduled tasks, autorun key values, etc.). IOCs may include disabling volume shadow copies, startup repair, operating system error recovery, and the like. IOCs may include stopping operating system security centers, update services, error reporting, antivirus software, file delivery (e.g., Background Intelligent Delivery Service (BITS)), and the like.
[0028] In some examples, sinkholes serve as a mechanism for an operating system (e.g., Microsoft Windows TM OS、AppleiOS TMThe recursive file system (e.g., New Technology File System (NTFS), File Allocation Table (FAT) file system, High Performance File System (HPFS), etc.) established by the Windows TM In Windows Vista, an NTFS junction point is a symbolic link to a directory that acts as an alias for that directory. TM Operating systems, for example, Microsoft has included an NTFS connection from C:\Documents and Settings to C:\Users to support legacy software. User profile folders can also include NTFS connections.
[0029] A hard link is a file name, usually in a directory entry, that points to or links to a target data file. In contrast, a soft link (also called a shortcut) links to a target file indirectly, either through a hard link to the target file or another location that can directly access the file. If a hard link is deleted, but another hard link to the target data file exists, the target data file is still accessible and the original file can be restored. Hard links are protected by many operating systems (e.g., and later versions of operating system, etc.) and file systems (e.g., NFTS, etc.).
[0030] Reparse points provide another way to create links. If a file or directory has a reparse point attached, the system will invoke a file system filter, as indicated by the reparse point tag associated with the reparse point. The filter can implement any method of accessing the actual data. For example, Hierarchical Storage Management (HSM) can be used with reparse points to access the data.
[0031] In order to open and encrypt files for ransom, the ransomware requires a list of files. Some ransomware samples use recursive file system mount points that utilize fake or "dumb" canary files to occupy the ransomware process while the malware detection process monitors to detect and kill the ransomware process. Testing of multiple samples showed that the ransomware was unaware of the fact that the NTSF junction folder is a reparse point, let alone a recursive point.
[0032] In one example of ransomware detection, thirty-two (32) instances of the same file were provided as canaries or decoys in a recursive directory. The ransomware encrypted the file 32 times. In some examples, adding another recursive mount point created an exponential increase in instances of the file. Creating an NTFS connection to the root of the volume exposes all available files to the ransomware, including the canary file with the recursive mount point. The processing of these files by the ransomware delays the encryption of files by the ransomware and can enable a malware scanner to identify and remediate the ransomware from the computing device before the ransomware is able to infect the computing device and / or files on the computing device. Thus, the sinkhole provides a good IOC when the malware scanner is running and provides a delay period to occupy the ransomware.
[0033] Thus, a sinkhole can be created on demand at the endpoint before a behavioral malware scanner is triggered to track file activity, and can be cleared once scanning and processing are complete. Sinkholes can also be implemented system-wide as a persistent mechanism to "catch" ransomware processes and enable additional time and activity for ransomware detection and remediation.
[0034] Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating an example use environment 100 including an electronic message 105 (eg, an email, a text message, a web link, a downloaded file, etc.) sent to an electronic device 110. Figure 1 In the illustrated example, message 105 includes malware 115 that is delivered to electronic device 110 . Figure 1 The electronic device 110 of the illustrated example is a desktop computer. However, in addition or alternatively, any other type of electronic device, such as a laptop computer, a smartphone, a tablet computer, a smart watch, other computing devices, etc., may be used.
[0035] In some examples, a file including malware may be sent to the electronic device 110 (e.g., from a web server and / or file server via a web browser, from another electronic device via a mail server, etc.). As used herein, a file may include information and / or data to be transferred for storage, relaying, and / or execution at the electronic device 110. For example, a file may include instructions, image data, user identification information, etc. to be executed by the electronic device 110. In some examples, this data transfer is performed without the user's knowledge. For example, a storage device (e.g., a USB thumb drive, etc.) may be inserted into the electronic device 110, and / or the electronic device 110 may be connected to a network that automatically triggers (e.g., without sounding an alarm and / or requesting user permission, etc.) the transfer of files (e.g., malware, etc.) to the electronic device 110.
[0036] Figure 2An example implementation of the electronic device 110 is illustrated. As mentioned above, the example electronic device 110 can be implemented by a variety of electronic / computing devices, such as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a smartphone, a mobile device accessory, etc. Figure 1 In the illustrated example, the electronic device 110 is a desktop computer. The example electronic device 110 includes a storage unit 205 , a display 210 , a processor 215 , and an interface 220 . For example, the example electronic device 110 receives the malware 115 via the interface 220 .
[0037] Figure 2 The example storage unit 205 of the illustrated example is implemented by any memory, storage device, and / or storage disk for storing data, such as flash memory, magnetic media, optical media, etc. Moreover, the data stored in the example storage unit 205 can be in any data format, such as binary data, comma delimited data, tab delimited data, structured query language (SQL) structure, etc. Although in the illustrated example, the example storage unit 205 is illustrated as a single component, the example storage unit 205 and / or any other data storage components described herein can be implemented by any number and / or type of memory. Figure 2 In the illustrated example, the example storage unit 205 may store any type of data for use by the electronic device 110 , including, for example, data files, operating system files, configuration files, executable files, and the like.
[0038] Figure 1 The example display 210 of the illustrated example is implemented by any display device capable of presenting information from the electronic device 110. In some examples, the display device 210 is a graphical display. However, in addition or alternatively, any other type of display may be used, such as, for example, a light emitting diode (LED), an organic light emitting diode (OLED), a liquid crystal display, a cathode ray tube display (CRT), a touch screen, a tactile output device, etc.
[0039] The example processor 215 executes instructions at the electronic device 110 to, for example, implement an operating system, execute applications, store data, etc. The example processor 215 is hardware and may be implemented by one or more analog or digital circuits, logic circuits, programmable processors, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), and / or field programmable logic devices (FPLDs), etc.
[0040] Figure 2The example interface 220 of the illustrated example is an Ethernet or Wi-Fi interface, and / or may also be implemented as a USB interface, etc. However, in addition or alternatively, any other past, present, and / or future interface type may be used. Furthermore, in some examples, the interface may be implemented via a wireless interface, such as Bluetooth. TM Interface, Near Field Communication (NFC) interface, etc. In the examples disclosed herein, interface 220 enables electronic device 110 to communicate with one or more external devices, systems, etc.
[0041] Figure 3 Illustrated Figure 1 and / or Figure 2 An example implementation of the processor 215 of the example electronic device 110. Figure 3 The example processor 215 includes: an operating system 305, a file system 310, a malware scanner 315, and an alarm controller 320.
[0042] For example, the example operating system 305 is system software for managing the hardware and software resources of the electronic device 110. The example operating system 305 is utilized by the file system 310 and / or applications executed on the example electronic device 110. The example file system 310 organizes and controls how data is stored and retrieved on the electronic device 110. For example, the file system 310 can be implemented as part of the operating system 305 and / or separate from the operating system 305. The example file system 310 provides space in a memory (e.g., the example storage 205, etc.) for files to be organized for storage, retrieval, etc.
[0043] The example malware scanner 315 performs scans of the electronic device 110, such as detecting ransomware, etc., that attempts to intrude into the electronic device 110 (e.g., by encrypting files, modifying the file system 310, etc.). In some examples, the malware scanner 315 looks for indicators of compromise (IOCs) to identify ransomware and / or other malware 115 that is running and / or attempting to run to adversely affect the electronic device 110. For example, the malware scanner 315 looks for IOCs, including programs and / or other computer processes that attempt to: generate a unique computer identifier; retrieve an external IP address; inject themselves into known clean applications and / or operating system processes; modify device startup services / tasks; modify / disable / stop operating system error recovery, background processes, updates, error reporting, antivirus scanning, file delivery, etc.
[0044] In some examples, the malware scanner 315 dynamically (e.g., after a file transfer, a file request, an application execution, other triggers, etc.) and / or before ongoing system operations (e.g., at startup, setup, etc.) generates a sinkhole pointing to and / or otherwise forming a directory that includes a recursive list of artificial files in the file system 310 to occupy the execution of ransomware and / or other malware processes executing on the electronic device 110. For example, when a ransomware process attempts to index files in the file system 310, in response to a ransomware application query, the sinkhole creates a recursive directory structure including linked files recursively indexed by the ransomware process, thereby occupying the processing power and available bandwidth of the ransomware process. That is, the ransomware is tricked into interpreting the sinkhole as a large file directory. In turn, the ransomware attempts to traverse the recursive directory structure and encrypt its files. Since ransomware requires a file list to open and encrypt files, a sinkhole including a recursive directory mount point utilizes a canary file (e.g., a fake or decoy file, folder, etc.) to occupy the ransomware process while the malware scanner 315, for example, attempts to detect and kill the ransomware process.
[0045] In the examples disclosed herein, ransomware and / or malware scans implemented by the malware scanner 315 may be performed based on malware signatures and / or other malware detection information (e.g., stored in the storage unit 205, etc.). As used herein, malware is any data that can be used to interfere with the operation of a device. In some examples, the malware may be malicious and intended to leak user information (e.g., social security information, usernames, passwords, personal information, etc.). In other examples, the malware may be ransomware and intended to lock and / or otherwise remove access to files until a fee is paid. As used herein, malware signatures include any information that can be used to detect malware, such as, for example, data patterns known to be malicious, uniform resource locators (URLs) known to be malicious, computing actions known to be taken to encrypt or invade file access, etc. In some examples, malware signatures and / or other malware detection information stored in the storage unit 205 may be updated, for example, by communicating with an external server via the interface 220 of the electronic device 110. Using the results of the scan, the example malware scanner 315 can determine whether the electronic device 110 is “clean” and can trigger further actions with respect to the electronic device 110 , detected malware, and the like.
[0046] The example alarm controller 320 enables presentation of an alarm via the example electronic device 110. In some examples, the alarm controller 320 causes the alarm message to be displayed via the display 210 of the example electronic device 110. For example, the example alarm can be displayed by displaying a notification message, a pop-up window, etc. For example, if the electronic device 110 is implemented using a desktop computer, a pop-up window can be displayed via the display 210 to notify the user that ransomware is attempting to execute on the electronic device 110. In some examples, the alarm controller 320 receives a response via an alarm presented to the user (e.g., via the electronic device 110, etc.). Such a response can be used, for example, to determine how to handle a file in which malware is detected (e.g., accept the file, delete the file, terminate the connection, take no action, etc.).
[0047] Figure 4 An example implementation of malware scanner 315 is illustrated. Figure 4 The example malware scanner 315 includes: a command interface 405, an analyzer 410, a file manager 415, a sinkhole generator 420, and a cleaner 425.
[0048] like Figure 4 As shown in the example of , command interface 405 monitors interactions with operating system 305 and file system 310 (e.g., incoming commands, application and / or other process executions, etc.) to receive input that helps analyzer 410 determine IOCs. Example analyzer 410 works with file manager 415 to route commands and / or other application / process executions to sinkholes created in file system 310 by sinkhole generator 420. As a process (e.g., ransomware and / or other malware process) runs on a sinkhole, analyzer 410, for example, looks for IOCs to classify the process as ransomware.
[0049] For example, the ransomware 115 arrives at the electronic device 110 via an email attachment, a hacked website visit, etc. Once in an active state, the ransomware 115 communicates with a command and control server (such as an encryption key server, etc.). The ransomware process 115 then searches the file system 310 of the electronic device 110 (e.g., starting with a user profile folder, etc.) to locate a certain type of file, such as user / non-operating system files including images (e.g., .jpg, .gif, etc.), text documents (e.g., .doc, .docx, etc.), spreadsheets (e.g., .xls, .xlsx, etc.), fixed layout electronic files (e.g., .pdf, etc.). The ransomware 115 then attempts to encrypt the identified files by renaming, encrypting, and renaming the files. Through renaming and encryption, the ransomware 115 locks the system 110 by hiding the files and making them inaccessible. The ransomware 115 persists after a reboot, a restart, etc.
[0050] In some examples, while the analyzer 410 is monitoring operations to detect ransomware and / or other malware, the sinkhole formed by the sinkhole generator 420 engages the ransomware process 115 on the electronic device 110 to recursively list files (e.g., bait or canary files, etc.). The ransomware 115 generates IOCs via its interaction with the sinkhole and creates sufficient IOCs for behavioral tracking to be detected by the analyzer 410. Once the analyzer 410 identifies the ransomware 115, the cleaner 425, for example, can quarantine, delete, and / or otherwise remove the ransomware 115 before the ransomware process 115 encrypts files and infects the electronic device 110. If the process is not a ransomware process, the harmless process will not attempt to generate the same file list as the ransomware process, nor will it be delayed in the sinkhole like the ransomware process. That is, because the ransomware process seeks to fully identify the file list to identify the files to target, the ransomware process is trapped in a recursive sinkhole seeking a comprehensive file list. Other processes are not interested in such a comprehensive list of files and can avoid getting stuck in a sinkhole loop.
[0051] For example, when the operating system 305 is Microsoft Windows TM When the ransomware process 115 searches the file system 310 for a file that is not in the file system 310, the ransomware 115 attempts to retrieve a list of files from the file system 310. The file manager 415 routes the ransomware process 115 to a sinkhole, where the ransomware process 115 searches to identify files. The sinkhole is located and / or formed by the sinkhole generator 420 in a connection point folder that can link to other folders (e.g., C:\user, C:\Documents, etc.). In some examples, the folders are indexed in alphabetical order and / or other priority order. For example, when the ransomware process 115 performs a search, the ransomware 115 first locates folders marked with non-alphanumeric punctuation (e.g., "!", "$", etc.). For example, a folder marked as "c:\test\!" may include a canary file document "testdocument.docx" and a folder that points back to "C:\test\!" ” folder. As the ransomware 115 processes items in the C:\test\! folder, the ransomware 115, for example, continually loops back to the same C:\test\! folder. Some ransomware processes 115 may be stuck in a sinkhole loop indefinitely. Other ransomware processes 115 iterate multiple times (e.g., 32 times, 50 times, 100 times, etc.) within a certain period of time (e.g., 10 minutes, 12 minutes, 15 minutes, etc.) before evaluating the sinkhole. As the ransomware 115 iterates, the ransomware 115 repeatedly encrypts files, thereby generating IOCs for the analyzer 410 to detect.
[0052] Thus, the connection points in the sinkhole trigger iterations to spawn additional connections and canary files for the ransomware 115 to search, analyze, and encrypt. The analyzer 410 detects the activity of the ransomware 115, and the analyzer 410 can trigger the cleaner 425 to remediate (e.g., quarantine, delete, etc.) the ransomware 115 before it can infect actual useful files of the file system 310 of the electronic device 110. Thus, the sinkhole occupies the ransomware by causing it to waste time on the sinkhole files in the recursive sinkhole directory. During this wasted time, the process has time to search for and evaluate the ransomware process.
[0053] In contrast, current ransomware detection methods do not include sinkholes, and damage has already been done to the electronic device 110 and its files when the ransomware is detected. Once detected, further damage can be stopped, but the damage already done cannot be repaired. Therefore, certain examples provide technical improvements to the operation of the operating system 305 and file system 310, as well as the ability of the malware scanner 315 to detect and remediate ransomware 115 before the electronic device 110 and its files are damaged.
[0054] In some examples, sinkhole generator 420 may implement a sinkhole as a recursive junction point (e.g., NTFS junction, etc.) in operating system 305. A junction point is a symbolic link to a directory that acts as an alias for the directory. Reparse points provide another way to create a link to a directory in file system 310. For example, if a file or directory has a reparse point attached, operating system 305 and / or file system 310 invokes a file system filter indicated by a reparse point tag associated with the reparse point. The file system filter may implement a method of accessing the associated data. Ransomware 115 does not know that the folder in the sinkhole is a reparse point, let alone a recursive point.
[0055] Although you can link reparse points to directories using the reparse point mechanism (e.g., links are called junctions), you cannot link files except by writing a custom file system filter driver. If the referenced directory is moved or deleted, the junction will not point anywhere. However, because the junction can be a soft link, the junction is not limited to objects residing in the same storage location (e.g., on the same drive, etc.). Instead, the junction can point to a directory in a different location (e.g., on a different drive, or even to the drive itself, etc.). However, junctions are not allowed to point to mapped network objects.
[0056] In some examples, Microsoft Windows TMFile path lengths are limited (e.g., "MAX_PATH") to prevent infinitely long recursive paths. In the Windows application programming interface (API), the maximum length of a path, MAX_PATH, is defined as 260 characters. Therefore, the maximum path on drive X is "X:\some 256-character path string". <nul>Additionally, to prevent buffer overflows and "infinite" loops on local drives, Command Prompt and Windows Explorer close when the directory depth reaches 32 or the path name exceeds 256 characters, whichever comes first. TM Stop the recursion.
[0057] Thus, some examples create a folder (referred to as "C:\Test\!" for purposes of illustration only) and generate a document within that folder (e.g., a canary file referred to as "C:\Test\!\TestDocument.docx" for purposes of illustration only). Then, for example, a connection named "$" is created and points to the C:\Test folder. With this configuration, the ransomware 115 sees 32 instances of the same file, which it has encrypted 32 times. Adding another recursive mount point to the folder creates an exponential increase in instances of the file. Creating an NTFS connection pointing to the root of the volume exposes all available files in the ransomware 115's folder. Such a folder structure allows the sinkhole to delay file encryption by the ransomware 115.
[0058] In one example, the link / connection can be created and managed by the sinkhole generator 420 using the command line utility Mklink (e.g., using the system ("mklink / JC:\\$C:\\") to create a connection pointing to C:\$, etc.). The connection can also be removed (e.g., using the system ("rmdir / S / QC:\\$" to delete the connection at C:\$, etc.). Using an API associated with the operating system 305 (e.g., Microsoft Windows TM API, etc.), you can manage the links / junctions. First, if the directory does not exist, you can create the directory (e.g., using CreateDirectory(szJunction, NULL), etc.). If the directory exists, it must be empty because a reparse point cannot be associated with a non-empty directory. You can get a directory handle to open the directory for reading and writing (e.g., using HANDLE hDir = OpenDirectory(szJunction, TRUE), etc.). Then, create a reparse point and associate it with the directory.
[0059] For example, sinkhole generator 420 may create a reparse point as follows:
[0060] / / Please note that buf and ReparseBuffer occupy the same space
[0061] BYTE buf[sizeof(REPARSE_MOUNTPOINT_DATA_BUFFER)+
[0062] MAX_PATH * sizeof(WCHAR)];
[0063] REPARSE_MOUNTPOINT_DATA_BUFFER& ReparseBuffer =
[0064] (REPARSE_MOUNTPOINT_DATA_BUFFER&)buf;
[0065] / / Prepare reparse point data
[0066] memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
[0067] ReparseBuffer.ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT;
[0068] int len = ::MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, szTarget, -1,
[0069] ReparseBuffer.ReparseTarget, MAX_PATH);
[0070] ReparseBuffer.ReparseTargetMaximumLength = (len--) * sizeof(WCHAR);
[0071] ReparseBuffer.ReparseTargetLength = len * sizeof(WCHAR);
[0072] ReparseBuffer.ReparseDataLength = ReparseBuffer.ReparseTargetLength + 12;
[0073] / / Attach reparse point
[0074] DWORD dwRet;
[0075] ::DeviceIoControl(hDir, FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, &ReparseBuffer,
[0076] ReparseBuffer.ReparseDataLength + REPARSE_MOUNTPOINT_HE
[0077] ADER_SIZE,NULL,0,&dwRet,NULL);
[0078] In the example, szTarget contains the path, which is prefixed with the "unresolved" prefix "\??\" and ends with a backslash character, for example "\??\C:\Some Dir\" and so on.
[0079] As the ransomware process 115 attempts to navigate the recursive sinkhole, the analyzer 410 monitors application and system behavior for IOCs. Because encryption is delayed by the sinkhole, the analyzer 410 applies heuristics, machine learning, and / or other behavioral security applications, for example, to the monitored activities and / or other events generated by the ransomware 115. However, while the analyzer 410 is processing the behavior of the ransomware 115 in the sinkhole, the file system 310 remains uninfected by the ransomware 115 as the ransomware 115 processes the file list from the sinkhole.
[0080] In some examples, multiple sinkholes can be combined, nested, positioned adjacent to each other, etc. to further delay the ransomware 115. For example, with one sinkhole, the WANNACRY ransomware was delayed by approximately 12 minutes, while with two sinkholes, the delay was over 30 minutes. For example, the analyzer 410 detected and the cleaner 425 remediated the WANNACRY ransomware after 2 to 3 minutes. Other ransomware families (such as CRYPTOLOCKER, LOCKY, etc.) are unable to infect the electronic device 110 using a sinkhole that includes a canary file.
[0081] Although in Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 exemplified in Figure 1 The exemplary implementation of the exemplary electronic device 110 of the embodiment of the present invention may be combined, divided, rearranged, omitted, eliminated and / or implemented in any other manner. Figures 2 to 4 In addition, the example storage 205, the example display 210, the example processor 215, the example interface 220, the example operating system 305, the example file system 310, the example malware scanner 315, the example alert controller 320, the example command interface 405, the example analyzer 410, the example file manager 415, the example sinkhole generator 420, the example cleaner 425 and / or more generally Figures 1 to 4 The example electronic device 110 may be implemented by hardware, software, firmware and / or any combination of hardware, software and / or firmware. Thus, for example, the example storage 205, the example display 210, the example processor 215, the example interface 220, the example operating system 305, the example file system 310, the example malware scanner 315, the example alarm controller 320, the example command interface 405, the example analyzer 410, the example file manager 415, the example sinkhole generator 420, the example cleaner 425 and / or more generally Figures 1 to 4 Any of the example electronic devices 110 of can be implemented by one or more analog or digital circuits, logic circuits, programmable processors, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), and / or field programmable logic devices (FPLDs). When any of the apparatus or system claims of the present patent is understood to cover pure software and / or firmware implementations, the example storage unit 205, the example display 210, the example processor 215, the example interface 220, the example operating system 305, the example file system 310, the example malware scanner 315, the example alarm controller 320, the example command interface 405, the example analyzer 410, the example file manager 415, the example sinkhole generator 420, the example cleaner 425, and / or more generally Figures 1 to 4 At least one of the example electronic devices 110 of is thus explicitly defined as comprising: a non-transitory computer-readable storage device or storage disk containing software and / or firmware, such as a memory, a digital versatile disk (DVD), a compact disk (CD), a Blu-ray disk, etc. Further, Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 The example electronic device 110 is not Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 Elements, processes and / or devices other than or in place of the illustrated elements, processes and / or devices Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 The illustrated elements, processes and / or devices may also include one or more other elements, processes and / or devices, and / or may include more than one of any or all of the illustrated elements, processes and devices. As used herein, the phrase "in communication" (including variations thereof) encompasses direct communication and / or indirect communication through one or more intermediate components, and does not require direct physical (e.g., wired) communication and / or continuous communication, but additionally includes selective communication at periodic intervals, scheduled intervals, non-periodic intervals and / or one-time events.
[0082] exist Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 The following table shows a representative method for implementing Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 Flowchart of example machine readable instructions for an example processor 215. In these examples, the machine readable instructions include a flow chart ... Fig. 9 The program may be embodied in software stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium such as a CD-ROM, floppy disk, hard drive, digital versatile disk (DVD), Blu-ray disk, or memory associated with the processor 912, but the entire program and / or portions thereof may alternatively be executed by other devices other than the processor 912, and / or embodied in firmware or dedicated hardware. In addition, although reference is made to Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 , but many other methods of implementing the example processor 215 may alternatively be used. For example, the order of execution of the blocks may be changed, and / or some of the blocks may be changed, eliminated, or combined. Additionally or alternatively, any or all of the blocks may be implemented by one or more hardware circuits (e.g., discrete and / or integrated analog and / or digital circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), comparators, operational amplifiers (op-amps), logic circuits, etc.) configured to perform corresponding operations without executing software or firmware.
[0083] As mentioned above, Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 The example processing of can be implemented using coded instructions (e.g., computer and / or machine readable instructions) stored on a non-transitory computer and / or machine readable medium (such as a hard drive, flash memory, read-only memory, compact disk, digital versatile disk, cache memory, random access memory, and / or any other storage device or storage disk in which information is stored for any duration (e.g., for an extended period of time, permanently, for a brief instance, for temporary buffering and / or for caching of information). As used herein, the term non-transitory computer readable medium is expressly defined to include any type of computer readable storage device and / or storage disk, and excludes propagating signals and excludes transmission media. "Including and comprising" (and all forms and tenses thereof) are used herein as open-ended terms. Therefore, whenever a claim lists any content followed by any form of "include or comprise" (e.g., comprises, includes, comprising, including, etc.), it is to be understood that additional elements, terms, etc. may be present without falling outside the scope of the corresponding claim. As used herein, when the phrase "at least" is used as a transitional term in a claim preamble, it is open-ended, just as the terms "comprising and including" are open-ended.
[0084] Figure 5 is a flowchart representing example machine readable instructions that may be executed to implement Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 An example processor 115 is provided to process incoming files and protect against malware (such as ransomware) at the electronic device 110. Figure 5 The example procedure 500 begins when the example malware scanner 315 detects that a file and / or other communication 105 has been received at the interface 220 of the electronic device 110 .
[0085] At block 502, the file system 310 is configured using a sinkhole. For example, the sinkhole generator 420 modifies the file system 310 to create a sinkhole as a recursive junction point (e.g., an NTFS junction, etc.) that links to a directory (e.g., a "sinkhole directory") in the file system 310 of the electronic device 110. Thus, a sinkhole folder or directory having one or more canary files, such as a "sinkhole directory," may be generated using a junction or recursive mount point. Figure 6 600. A sinkhole is established using one or more connection points so that the ransomware 115 recursively generates files based on the initial contents of the sinkhole. Such a folder structure can delay the encryption of files by the ransomware 115.
[0086] At box 504, the malware scanner 315 monitors and remediates malware in incoming files. For example, when the ransomware process 115 attempts to navigate a recursive sinkhole, the analyzer 410 of the malware scanner 315 monitors application and system behavior for IOCs that suggest the presence of ransomware and / or other malware. Because encryption is delayed by the sinkhole, the analyzer 410, for example, applies heuristics, machine learning, and / or other behavioral security applications to the monitored activities and / or other events generated by the ransomware 115. However, while the analyzer 410 is processing the behavior of the ransomware 115 in the sinkhole, the file system 310 remains uninfected by the ransomware 115 as the ransomware 115 processes the file list from the sinkhole.
[0087] At block 506, normal system operation is facilitated. That is, after the incoming file and / or the process triggered by the incoming file is being monitored and (if warranted) processed for malware remediation, or while the incoming file and / or the process triggered by the incoming file is being monitored and (if warranted) processed for malware remediation, system operation is facilitated by the operating system 305, the file system 310, etc. For example, after the incoming file has been identified as allowed and / or after the incoming file has been quarantined and / or deleted, the malware scanner 315, the operating system 305, and the file system 310 facilitate normal system operation (e.g., execution of applications, storage of data, modification of data, transmission of data, etc.). In some examples, while the malware scanner 315 is observing the behavior of the file (e.g., the ransomware process 115 associated with the incoming file, etc.), the operating system 305 and the file system 310 continue normal system operation. The malware scanner 315 then waits for another incoming file, link, etc. to be processed.
[0088] Figure 7 is a flowchart representing example machine readable instructions that may be executed to configure Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 The example processor 115 of the present invention can monitor and remediate malware in incoming files and / or other data communications (e.g., Figure 5 At block 702, the analyzer 410 analyzes the incoming file to assess whether the analyzer 410 can recognize the file (e.g., as known ransomware and / or other malware, a legitimate file, etc.).
[0089] For example, scanning may be performed by the analyzer 410 of the example malware scanner 315 based on malware signatures and / or other malware detection information stored in the example storage 205. Malware signatures and / or other malware detection information stored in the storage 205 may be updated, for example, by communicating with an external server via the interface 220.
[0090] When a file is identified, at block 704, the identified file is evaluated to determine whether the file is malware. If the identified file is known not to be malware, then at block 706, execution of the file and / or execution related to the file is allowed. However, if the identified file is known to be malware, then at block 708, the malware is remediated. For example, the file may be blocked, quarantined, deleted, moved, etc., to eliminate ransomware and / or keep the ransomware file away from available content at the electronic device 110.
[0091] If the analyzer 410 does not identify the file, then at block 710, a malware scan is performed. For example, the analyzer 410 of the malware scanner 315 looks for known virus / malware signature information, comparisons to definition files, and / or other file features used to identify the file. At block 712, after the malware scan, the file is analyzed again to determine whether the analyzer 410 was able to identify the file based on the results of the scan. For example, after the analyzer 410 processes the file, the analyzer 410 determines whether it was able to identify the file based on similarities to known malware signatures, verified malware features, etc. If the file can be identified, control passes to block 704 to evaluate whether the identified file is malware.
[0092] However, if the analyzer 410 is unable to identify the file, then at block 714, the unidentified file is allowed to begin execution relative to the sinkhole. At block 716, the execution of processes associated with the file is monitored to determine whether the file is malware. For example, the analyzer 410 monitors IOCs of the file's process execution as the file's process navigates a sinkhole and / or other area of the file system 310, operating system 305, etc.
[0093] At box 718, the analyzer 410 evaluates the monitored information to determine whether the analyzer 410 detects any IOCs (such as specific file access, resource usage, file system read / write, directory processing, etc.) to quantify and / or characterize the behavior of the file. Evidence of IOCs can indicate that the file is malware such as ransomware. If the IOCs indicate the presence of ransomware and / or other malware, control is transferred to box 720 to remediate the malware (e.g., quarantine, deletion, etc. by the cleaner 425, etc.). If no IOCs are detected and / or the IOCs are insufficient to assess whether the file is malware, monitoring continues at box 716 unless, at box 722, it is determined that the file process execution has completed.
[0094] In some examples, when malware is detected, an alarm is triggered, and the example alarm controller 320 notifies another system (e.g., an external server), a user, an operator, an administrator, etc. via the display 210, the interface 220, etc. For example, the alarm controller 320 may also generate a notification indicating whether the identified malware (e.g., ransomware, etc.) has been successfully remediated (e.g., quarantined, deleted, etc.).
[0095] Figure 8 is a flowchart representing example machine readable instructions that may be executed to configure Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 The example processor 115 monitors the file process execution (e.g., Figure 7 At block 802, the interaction between the monitored process and the sinkhole directory generated by the sinkhole is monitored. For example, the process executed to generate the sinkhole directory listing is monitored and evaluated. At block 804, the interaction with the canary file in the sinkhole directory is monitored. For example, the interaction with the canary file and / or the decoy file in the sinkhole can help promote the recursion of the monitored process in the directory listing.
[0096] At block 806, iterations of the sinkhole directory list are monitored. For example, as a process (e.g., a ransomware process, etc.) explores a sinkhole directory and its canary files and continues to attempt to index them, the list contents of the sinkhole directory may be monitored (e.g., see Figure 6 At block 808, through the interaction between the monitored process and the sinkhole directory / canary file structure, the IOCs generated for the operating system 305, the file system 310, etc. are captured for further analysis by the analyzer 410, such as the malware scanner 315.
[0097] Fig. 9 is constructed to execute Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 Instructions to achieve Figure 1 , Figure 2 , Figure 3 and / or Figure 4 215 of the processor platform 900. The processor platform 900 can be, for example, a server, a personal computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device (e.g., a cellular phone, a smart phone, an iPad, etc.). TM tablet computer, etc.), a personal digital assistant (PDA), or any other type of electronic computing device.
[0098] The processor platform 900 of the illustrated example includes a processor 912. The processor 912 of the illustrated example is hardware. For example, the processor 912 can be implemented by one or more integrated circuits, logic circuits, microprocessors, or controllers from any desired series or manufacturing party. The hardware processor can be a semiconductor-based (e.g., silicon-based) device. In this example, the processor 912 implements the example operating system 305, the example file system 310, the example malware scanner 315, and / or the example alarm controller 320.
[0099] The processor 912 of the illustrated example includes a local memory 913 (e.g., a cache memory, etc.). The processor 912 of the illustrated example communicates with a main memory including a volatile memory 914 and a non-volatile memory 916 via a bus 918. The volatile memory 914 may be implemented by a synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), a dynamic random access memory (DRAM), a RAMBUS dynamic random access memory (RDRAM), and / or any other type of random access memory device. The non-volatile memory 916 may be implemented by a flash memory and / or any other desired type of memory device. Access to the main memory 914, 916 is controlled by a memory controller.
[0100] The processor platform 900 of the illustrated example also includes an interface circuit 920. The interface circuit 920 can be implemented by any type of interface standard, such as an Ethernet interface, a universal serial bus (USB), and / or a PCI expansion interface. For example, the example interface 920 can implement the example electronic device interface 220.
[0101] In the example shown, one or more input devices 922 are connected to the interface circuit 920. The input devices 922 permit a user to enter data and / or commands into the processor 912. The input devices may be implemented, for example, by an audio sensor, microphone, camera (still or video), keyboard, button, mouse, touch screen, trackpad, trackball, isopoint, and / or voice recognition system.
[0102] One or more output devices 924 are also connected to the interface circuit 920 of the illustrated example. The output device 924 can be implemented, for example, by a display device (e.g., a light emitting diode (LED), an organic light emitting diode (OLED), a liquid crystal display, a cathode ray tube display (CRT), a touch screen, a touch output device, a printer, and / or a speaker). The interface circuit 920 of the illustrated example thus typically includes a graphics driver card, a graphics driver chip, and / or a graphics driver processor.
[0103] The interface circuit 920 of the illustrated example also includes communication devices such as transmitters, receivers, transceivers, modems and / or network interface cards to facilitate the exchange of data with an external machine (e.g., any kind of computing device) via a network 926 (e.g., an Ethernet connection, a digital subscriber line (DSL), a telephone line, a coaxial cable, a cellular telephone system, etc.).
[0104] The processor platform 900 of the illustrated example also includes one or more mass storage devices 928 for storing software and / or data. Examples of such mass storage devices 928 include: floppy disk drives, hard disk drives, optical disk drives, Blu-ray disk drives, RAID systems, and digital versatile disk (DVD) drives. For example, Fig. 9 The example mass storage device 928 of the illustrated example implements the example storage 205 .
[0105] You can Figure 5 , Figure 7 and / or Figure 8 The coded instructions 932 are stored in the mass storage device 928, in the volatile memory 914, in the non-volatile memory 916, and / or on a removable tangible computer-readable storage medium such as a CD or DVD.
[0106] Based on the foregoing, it should be appreciated that example methods, apparatuses, and articles of manufacture have been disclosed that enable electronic devices (e.g., desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, smartphones, game controllers, etc.) to detect and remediate ransomware before it infects the device. Based on the collection and evaluation of multiple threat indicators, the disclosed examples are able to detect and remediate the ransomware even if the ransomware does not conform to a known profile or virus signature. Using sinkholes, the ransomware can be placed in an extended or infinite loop while the ransomware attempts to generate a comprehensive directory listing, while legitimate software will immediately exit the loop. Even advanced ransomware will process the sinkhole for several minutes (e.g., 10 minutes, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, increased due to nested sinkholes, etc.) before determining that the directory listing has a process in the loop. While the ransomware process from the incoming file is trapped in a recursive loop of the sinkhole, the ransomware's activities and access attempts, etc., can be monitored to identify the process and associated files as ransomware. Once the ransomware has been identified, it can be remediated before damage is caused to the electronic device or its files.
[0107] Example 1 includes a malware scanner that scans a computer file. The malware scanner of Example 1 includes a sinkhole generator that generates a sinkhole directory. The malware scanner of Example 1 includes a storage device that is suitable for storing a computer file and the sinkhole directory, wherein the sinkhole directory is recursively expanded when the computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory to occupy the computer file by extending the time period spent executing the file list of the sinkhole directory. The malware scanner of Example 1 also includes an analyzer that monitors the execution of the computer file while the computer file is executing the file list of the sinkhole directory to attempt to identify a threat indication associated with the computer file, and when the analyzer identifies a threat indication, the analyzer classifies the computer file as ransomware. The malware scanner of Example 1 also includes a cleaner that remediates the ransomware.
[0108] Example 2 includes the malware scanner of Example 1, wherein the cleaner interrupts the monitored execution when the computer file is identified as ransomware.
[0109] Example 3 includes the malware scanner of Example 1, wherein the threat indication comprises at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
[0110] Example 4 includes the malware scanner of Example 1, wherein the sinkhole generator generates the sinkhole directory in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
[0111] Example 5 includes the malware scanner of Example 1, wherein the sinkhole generator generates the sinkhole directory to include a canary file to be processed and to include a recursive link pointing back to the sinkhole directory.
[0112] Example 6 includes the malware scanner of example 5, wherein the recursive connection comprises a recursive file system mount point that recursively directs a process associated with the computer file to process the canary file.
[0113] Example 7 includes the malware scanner of Example 1, wherein the recursive connection includes a plurality of recursive file system mount points.
[0114] Example 8 includes at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium containing instructions that, when executed, cause at least one processor to at least generate a sinkhole directory, the sinkhole directory being recursively expanded when a file index of the sinkhole directory is executed to extend a period of time that a computer file spends executing the file index of the sinkhole directory. The instructions of Example 8, when executed, also cause at least one processor to at least identify the computer file as ransomware in response to the presence of a threat indication associated with the execution of the computer file. The instructions of Example 8, when executed, also cause at least one processor to at least remediate the ransomware.
[0115] Example 9 includes the at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 8, wherein the instructions, when executed, further cause at least one processor to remediate the ransomware by interrupting the monitored execution at least when the computer file is identified as ransomware.
[0116] Example 10 includes the at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 8, wherein the threat indication comprises at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
[0117] Example 11 includes the at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 8, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to generate the sinkhole directory in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
[0118] Example 12 includes the at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 8, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to: include a canary file and a recursive link in the sinkhole directory, the recursive link pointing back to the sinkhole directory.
[0119] Example 13 includes at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 12, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to include a recursive file system mount point in the recursive connection, the recursive file system mount point recursively directing a process associated with the file to process the canary file.
[0120] Example 14 includes the at least one non-transitory machine-readable medium of Example 13, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to: include a plurality of recursive file system mount points in the recursive connection.
[0121] Example 15 includes a method for remediating ransomware on an electronic device. The method of Example 15 includes the steps of generating a sinkhole directory by executing instructions using at least one processor, the sinkhole directory being recursively expanded when a computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory to delay the computer file by extending the time period for executing the file list. The method of Example 15 includes the steps of monitoring the execution of the computer file while the computer file is executing the file list of the sinkhole directory by executing instructions using the at least one processor to attempt to identify a threat indication associated with the computer file. The method of Example 15 includes the steps of classifying the computer file as ransomware in response to the identification of the threat indication by executing instructions using the at least one processor. The method of Example 15 includes the steps of remediating the ransomware by executing instructions using at least one processor.
[0122] Example 16 includes the method of Example 15, further comprising the step of interrupting execution of the file in response to identifying the file as ransomware.
[0123] Example 17 includes the method of Example 15, wherein the threat indication comprises at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
[0124] Example 18 includes the method of Example 15, wherein the step of generating the sinkhole directory is performed in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
[0125] Example 19 includes the method of Example 15, wherein the step of generating a sinkhole directory further comprises: generating a canary file and a recursive link in the sinkhole directory.
[0126] Example 20 includes the method of Example 19, wherein the recursive connection comprises a recursive file system mount point that recursively directs a process associated with the computer file to process the canary file.
[0127] Example 21 includes the method of Example 20, wherein the recursive connection includes multiple recursive file system mount points.
[0128] Example 22 includes an apparatus for remediating ransomware. The apparatus of Example 22 includes a unit for generating a canary file and a recursive link in a sinkhole directory, the recursive link pointing back to the sinkhole directory, the recursive link causing the sinkhole directory to be recursively expanded when a computer file executes a file listing of the sinkhole directory, thereby extending a time period spent executing the file listing of the sinkhole directory. The apparatus of Example 22 includes a unit for identifying a computer file as ransomware when the computer file is executing the file listing of the sinkhole directory based on a threat indication. The apparatus of Example 22 includes a unit for remediating the ransomware.
[0129] Although certain example methods, apparatus, and articles of manufacture are disclosed herein, the scope of coverage of this patent is not limited thereto. On the contrary, this patent covers all methods, apparatus, and articles of manufacture fairly falling within the scope of the claims of this patent.< / nul>
Claims
1. A malware scanner for scanning computer files, the malware scanner include: a sinkhole generator that generates a sinkhole directory that redirects program code from a first target to a second target; a storage device adapted to store a computer file and the sinkhole directory, wherein the sinkhole directory is recursively expanded when the computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory to occupy the computer file by extending a period of time spent to execute the file list of the sinkhole directory; an analyzer that monitors execution of the computer file while the computer file is executing the file listing of the sinkhole directory to attempt to identify a threat indicator associated with the computer file, and when the analyzer identifies the threat indicator, the analyzer classifies the computer file as ransomware; and A cleaner is used to eliminate the ransomware.
2. The malware scanner according to claim 1, in, The cleaner interrupts execution of the computer file when the computer file is identified as ransomware.
3. The malware scanner according to claim 1, in, The threat indication includes at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
4. The malware scanner according to claim 1, in, The sinkhole generator generates the sinkhole directory in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
5. The malware scanner according to claim 1, in, The sinkhole generator generates the sinkhole directory to include canary files to be processed and to include recursive links pointing back to the sinkhole directory.
6. The malware scanner according to claim 5, in, The recursive connection includes a recursive file system mount point that recursively directs a process associated with the computer file to process the canary file.
7. The malware scanner according to claim 6, in, The recursive connection includes a plurality of recursive file system mount points.
8. At least one machine-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed, cause at least one processor to at least: generating a sinkhole directory, the sinkhole directory being recursively expanded when a file index of the sinkhole directory is executed to extend a period of time that a computer file spends executing the file index of the sinkhole directory, the sinkhole directory redirecting program code from a first target to a second target; identifying the computer file as ransomware in response to the presence of a threat indicator associated with execution of the computer file; as well as Remediate said ransomware.
9. At least one machine-readable storage medium according to claim 8, in, The instructions, when executed, further cause the at least one processor to remediate the ransomware by interrupting execution of the computer file when the computer file is identified as ransomware.
10. The at least one machine-readable storage medium of claim 8, in, The threat indication includes at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
11. The at least one machine-readable storage medium of claim 8, in, The instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to generate the sinkhole directory in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
12. The at least one machine-readable storage medium of claim 8, in, The instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to include a canary file and a recursive link in the sinkhole directory, the recursive link pointing back to the sinkhole directory.
13. At least one machine-readable storage medium according to claim 12, in, The instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to include a recursive file system mount point in the recursive connection, the recursive file system mount point recursively directing a process associated with the computer file to process the canary file.
14. At least one machine-readable storage medium according to claim 13, in, The instructions, when executed, cause the at least one processor to include a plurality of recursive file system mount points in the recursive connection.
15. A method for remediating ransomware on an electronic device, the method The following steps are involved: generating a sinkhole directory by executing instructions with at least one processor, the sinkhole directory redirecting program code from a first destination to a second destination, the sinkhole directory recursively expanding when a computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory to delay the computer file by extending a time period for executing the file list; monitoring execution of the computer file while the computer file is executing the list of files of the sinkhole directory by executing instructions with the at least one processor to attempt to identify a threat indicator associated with the computer file; classifying the computer file as ransomware in response to identifying the threat indication by executing instructions with the at least one processor; as well as The ransomware is remediated by executing instructions using the at least one processor.
16. The method according to claim 15, further comprising: The following steps are involved: In response to identifying the computer file as ransomware, execution of the computer file is interrupted.
17. The method according to claim 15, in, The threat indication includes at least one of file access, resource usage, file system access, or directory processing.
18. The method according to claim 15, in, The step of generating a sinkhole directory is performed in at least one of the following ways: a) on demand or b) continuously.
19. The method according to claim 15, in, The step of generating a sinkhole directory also includes: generating a canary file and a recursive link in the sinkhole directory.
20. The method according to claim 19, in, The recursive connection includes a recursive file system mount point that recursively directs a process associated with the computer file to process the canary file.
21. The method according to claim 20, in, The recursive connection includes a plurality of recursive file system mount points.
22. A device for curing ransomware, the device include: A unit for generating a canary file and a recursive connection in a sinkhole directory, the sinkhole directory redirecting program code from a first target to a second target, the recursive connection pointing back to the sinkhole directory, the recursive connection causing the sinkhole directory to be recursively extended when a computer file executes a file list of the sinkhole directory to extend a period of time spent for executing the file list of the sinkhole directory; means for identifying the computer file as ransomware when the computer file is executing the file listing of the sinkhole directory based on the threat indication; as well as A unit to remediate said ransomware.
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