An anonymous vehicle announcement method based on editable blockchain

By using temporary trap door revocable chameleon hashing scheme and editable threshold ring signature scheme in VANET, the problem of sending false information by malicious vehicles is solved, the anonymity and credibility of the announcement is achieved, and the system is enhanced. Strong and road safety.

CN118870348BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-26GUIZHOU UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411331612.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-24
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2044-09-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network (VANET), malicious vehicles may send false information, resulting in unreliability in data management and storage, and the edge node resources are limited, making it difficult to store the entire blockchain, and the existing technology is difficult to effectively solve this problem.

Method used

Using the chameleon hashing scheme ETRCH based on temporary trap door revocable and the editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS, an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on editable blockchain is constructed to realize the anonymity, threshold authentication and rapid correction mechanism of announcement messages. Ensure the immutability and durability of information.

Benefits of technology

Through anonymity and threshold authentication mechanisms, the credibility and security of announcements are improved, user privacy is protected, the system's self-correction ability and robustness is enhanced, the frequency of traffic congestion and accidents is reduced, and road safety is improved .

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain, which adopts a temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hashing scheme (ETRCH) and an editable threshold ring signature scheme (RTRS). It includes: in the parameter setting stage, the trust entity TA generates and distributes public parameters and creates public-private key pairs for users. In the announcement initiation stage, the accident discovery vehicle generates an accident description and selects threshold ring signature members, and the regulator generates temporary trapdoor parameters and invites members to join. In the joining verification stage, the witness responds and expresses his willingness to join. In the announcement release and verification stage, the RSU combined response generates an announcement-aggregation data packet, which is broadcast to the blockchain and verified by the verifier V. In the announcement rewriting stage, the regulator or members are allowed to collaborate to rewrite the forged message. This method not only enhances the security and authenticity of the data, but also improves the transparency and reliability of the announcement system through blockchain technology.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of intelligent transportation systems, and in particular to an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain. Background Art

[0002] Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a type of Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) used to accurately disseminate information about traffic events, such as traffic jams and accident reports, in a short time, thereby reducing the frequency of traffic congestion and accidents.

[0003] VANET is a special regional network that supports dynamic, random, multi-hop topology applications in the field of transportation. It is a special type of mobile ad hoc network (MANET). Some scholars believe that truly pure general-purpose MANET does not exist in the real world, while special mobile ad hoc networks with practical application backgrounds such as VANET, MESH network, opportunistic network and wireless sensor network (WSN) have achieved great success.

[0004] Compared with general-purpose self-organizing networks, the topological structure of nodes in VANET changes quickly. The rapid mobility of vehicles determines the frequent changes in the topological structure in the vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, which greatly shortens the lifetime of the communication link between two vehicle nodes. The usual solution is to extend the lifetime of the link by increasing the transmission power, but the increase in transmission power and communication distance reduces the network throughput. The rapidly changing topological structure makes it difficult to establish an accurate list of neighbor nodes, and it becomes unrealistic for each node to obtain and maintain the global topological structure of the entire network. Therefore, the protocol based on the network topology structure is not suitable for vehicle-mounted self-organizing networks.

[0005] The network architecture of VANET is mainly divided into two parts: one is the communication between vehicles, namely vehicle-to-vehicle communication (IVC) or vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V); the other is the communication between vehicles and fixed facilities (i.e. roadside nodes), namely road-to-vehicle communication (RVC) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I). The vehicle is equipped with an on-board unit (OBU), through which the vehicle communicates with the outside world. Fixed facilities mainly refer to the roadside unit (RSU) set up at the edge of the road. The on-board unit mainly includes positioning module, vehicle status parameter acquisition module, vehicle-road communication module, workshop communication module, and input and output devices.

[0006] However, due to the characteristics of VANET's open environment, there are cases where malicious vehicles send false information. The immutability and transparency of blockchain make the data management and storage of VANET more trustworthy, but at the same time, there is a risk of being abused by malicious vehicles to spread false or even dangerous data, which can cause damage to vehicles and drivers. On the other hand, with the increase of large amounts of IoT data, the limited resources of edge nodes make it difficult to store the entire blockchain. Summary of the invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to provide an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art.

[0008] Based on the first main aspect of the present invention, an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain is provided, including constructing an editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS based on a temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hash scheme ETRCH, which is used for anonymous announcement signing in VANET to achieve threshold authentication of announcement messages;

[0009] Furthermore, the anonymous vehicle announcement method includes at least one of the following steps or a combination thereof:

[0010] System parameter setting phase: Set up a trusted entity TA to generate public parameters and distribute them to all vehicle user nodes and roadside units RSUs, and generate public-private key pairs for users in the system;

[0011] Announcement initiation phase: After discovering an accident, one of the vehicle user nodes generates an accident description message, selects the member public key list L of the threshold ring signature, selects a part of the public parameters, and forwards the request data packet RQP to the regulator R. The regulator R generates a temporary trapdoor parameter and sends the RQP and temporary trapdoor parameter to the members in the ring signature, inviting them to join the announcement;

[0012] Join verification announcement phase: After receiving RQP, the witness W is willing to join the announcement and forwards a response data packet RPP to RSU, which contains information on whether it agrees with the message;

[0013] Announcement release and verification phase: RSU generates an announcement-aggregation data packet AGP by combining RPP, broadcasts AGP as a block transaction to the blockchain, packages it into a generated block, and synchronizes it to the blockchain; any user who receives AGP chooses to become a verifier V to verify the validity of AGP;

[0014] Announcement rewrite phase: If a member in the ring signature finds that the announcement message on the blockchain is forged, the regulator or a threshold number of threshold ring signature members collaborate to complete the rewrite operation.

[0015] In the above scheme, the request packet (RQP) is the packet sent by the initiator to the verifier and the regulator. RQP contains traffic message reports , ring signature , the purpose of which is to have witnesses sign the announcement.

[0016] A response packet (RPP) is a packet sent by a witness to a verifier. If the witness confirms that the received announcement is correct, an RPP is generated and sent to the verifier. The RPP consists of two parts: a) a message report and b) the witness's signature on the message.

[0017] An Announcement-Aggregation Packet (AGP) is a packet generated by an RSU by combining received RPPs and broadcasting it to other entity RSUs in the system. An AGP contains an announcement and a threshold ring signature of the announcement. .

[0018] In the above scheme, by using ETRCH and RTRS, the method ensures the anonymity of vehicle announcements. This means that vehicle users can publish announcements of accidents or other important traffic events without revealing their identities, thereby protecting the privacy of users. Using the threshold authentication mechanism implemented by RTRS, an announcement is considered valid only when a certain number of members agree. This increases the difficulty of malicious announcements being published on the blockchain and improves the credibility of the announcements.

[0019] Moreover, the ETRCH solution supports editing and revoking published announcements, which provides regulators with additional control capabilities. If the announcement information is found to be inaccurate or potentially harmful, regulators can make corrections or deletions in a timely manner. In addition, by quickly and accurately disseminating information about accidents and other traffic incidents, the method helps reduce traffic congestion and improve road safety. The rapid verification and release mechanism of announcements enables vehicle users to respond to changes in traffic conditions in a timely manner.

[0020] In the above scheme, the announcement information is recorded on the blockchain to ensure the immutability and durability of the announcement. This immutability provides a strong guarantee for the announcement information, so that any attempt to tamper with the announcement will be recorded and tracked. The announcement rewrite phase allows collaboration between regulators and threshold ring signature members, providing a flexible mechanism to respond to emergencies or correction of erroneous information. This mechanism not only enhances the system's self-correction ability, but also improves the robustness of the entire system.

[0021] Therefore, this method provides an effective information dissemination and authentication mechanism for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), which is an important advancement in the field of intelligent transportation systems and helps to achieve intelligent communication and coordination between vehicles.

[0022] As a further preferred solution, the chameleon hashing scheme ETRCH with revocable temporary trapdoors sets up multiple regulators, each of which can set multiple temporary trapdoors and allow k of n edge nodes to collaborate to rewrite data on the blockchain to solve the storage limitation problem; when a malicious regulator is found to abuse editing authority, k of the n regulators can collaborate to update the temporary trapdoor to revoke the malicious regulator's editing authority.

[0023] As a further preferred solution, the construction of the editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS includes one or a combination of the following steps:

[0024] The initialization step RTRS.Setup sets the system security parameters and generates the necessary bilinear groups and cryptographic hash functions, providing a basis for subsequent key generation and signing operations; the key generation step RTRS.KeyGen generates a pair of public and private keys for each user participating in the system, and generates a chameleon hash key for the regulator; the signing step RTRS.Sign allows users to sign messages with their private keys to generate ring signatures, while using chameleon hash values ​​to ensure the anonymity and unforgeability of messages; the signing step RTRS.JoinSign allows new users to join existing ring signatures to expand the scope of participants in the signature; the verification step RTRS.Verify allows any user to verify the validity of the ring signature to ensure that the signature is generated by a legitimate user; when a false or harmful announcement message is detected, the rewrite step RTRS.Redact allows the regulator or a group of users to collaborate to rewrite the message; the update step RTRS.Update allows the regulator to update the information in the ring signature or the key of the participant.

[0025] As a further preferred solution, the initialization step RTRS.Setup further includes:

[0026] Input the system security parameter λ to generate the bilinear group generator , select the generator is a subgroup of which the cyclic order is q;

[0027] set up and ;set up and represents a cryptographic hash function;

[0028] Execute ETRCH.CHInit (λ) to generate the parameters required to calculate the Chameleon hash , output system common parameters output parameters ;

[0029] Among them, execute ETRCH.CHInit (λ) to generate the parameters required to calculate the Chameleon hash include:

[0030] Input the system security parameter λ, select a large prime number q, and let G,G T are two q-order multiplicative cyclic groups, with g as the generator; let and represents a cryptographic hash function; set the symmetric bilinear map to e:G×G→G T ;

[0031] Set the number of regulators to n, k to be the threshold of the secret sharing scheme; output the public parameter param ETRCH = (G,G T ,e,q,g,H,H1,n,k).

[0032] As a further preferred solution, the key generation step RTRS.KeyGen further comprises:

[0033] Input system public parameters, user i selects a random s i ∈Z N , then calculate the initial public / private key pair ;

[0034] The regulator executes ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key ;

[0035] Wherein, the execution of ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key )include:

[0036] For each regulator R i Generate long-term public key PK and long-term private key SK;

[0037] Calculate R for each regulator i Unique identifier ID i The hash value h i ;

[0038] For each regulator R i Choose a temporary trapdoor etd i , and calculate the associated hash key hk i .

[0039] As a further preferred solution, the signing step RTRS.Sign further includes:

[0040] Initiator IDp execution Generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 ;

[0041] calculate ;

[0042] Choose a random number r p ∈Z N calculate ;

[0043] For each user i∈L, calculate C i and π i , generate a ring signature σ d,n ;

[0044] Wherein, the execution Generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 include:

[0045] Enter the hash key After the message M0, entity P i Check an equation: whether it is established;

[0046] Then P i Pick a random number , calculate random values , calculate the chameleon hash of message M0 , the algorithm removes the hash key from the hash key list HK , and output the tuple .

[0047] As a further preferred solution, the verification step RTRS.Verify further comprises:

[0048] The entity executes ETRCH.Verify(CH0) to verify the validity of the Chameleon hash tuple CH0; calculation ;

[0049] For i=1,...,n, check the equation whether it is established;

[0050] calculate And check the equation whether it is established;

[0051] The entity executes ETRCH.Verify(CH0) to verify the validity of the chameleon hash tuple CH0, including:

[0052] Check an equation = whether it is established;

[0053] Recalculate the Chameleon hash value Chash0' using known parameters;

[0054] Compare the recalculated hash value Chash0' with the original hash value CHash0 to see if they are consistent.

[0055] As a further preferred solution, the rewriting step RTRS.Redact further comprises:

[0056] Entity P i Run RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n ) Check validity;

[0057] P i implement Output new Chameleon hash tuple CH1 = ;

[0058] Finally, the new signature σ is output ' d,n =(CH1,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] );

[0059] Among them, P i implement include:

[0060] Input Chameleon hash tuple CH0, temporary trapdoor parameters and new message M1;

[0061] Calculate a new hash value ;

[0062] Output the new Chameleon hash tuple CH1.

[0063] Based on the second main aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed, the aforementioned anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain is implemented.

[0064] Based on the third main aspect of the present invention, a hardware device for anonymous vehicle announcement is provided, including a data storage device, a processor, and a computer program stored in the data storage device and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the aforementioned anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain when executing the program.

[0065] Advantages and beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0066] The present invention proposes a novel temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hashing scheme (ETRCH), which supports decentralized management and forced revocation of editing permissions. The ETRCH scheme sets multiple regulators, each of which can set multiple temporary trapdoors and allow k of n edge nodes to collaborate to rewrite data on the blockchain to solve the storage limitation problem. When it is found that a malicious regulator abuses editing permissions, k of the n regulators can collaborate to update the temporary trapdoor to revoke the editing permissions of the malicious regulator. Based on ERTCH, the present invention constructs an editable threshold ring signature scheme (RTRS) for anonymous announcement signing in VANET to achieve threshold authentication of announcement messages. And use ETRCH and RTRS to construct an anonymous announcement scheme based on an editable blockchain for VANET. When a regulator finds a false or harmful announcement message, the content can be quickly rewritten.

[0067] Therefore, compared with the prior art, the present invention significantly improves the information security and reliability in the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) by introducing an anonymous vehicle announcement method based on an editable blockchain. By using the temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hashing scheme (ETRCH) and the editable threshold ring signature scheme (RTRS), the method ensures the anonymity of vehicle users when publishing announcements, while enhancing the authenticity and credibility of the announcements through a threshold authentication mechanism. This method not only protects the privacy of users, but also effectively prevents the spread of false information by ensuring that only verified information can be broadcast and recorded.

[0068] In addition, the announcement rewrite and revocation mechanism of the present invention provides regulators and authorized members with the necessary tools to quickly respond to and correct erroneous or malicious announcements on the blockchain. The flexibility and responsiveness of this mechanism is an important advancement in intelligent traffic management systems, allowing the system to remain efficient and accurate in the face of ever-changing traffic environments and potential safety threats.

[0069] Finally, by embedding the announcement information into the blockchain, the invention ensures the credibility and transparency of the information, providing a reliable source of information for vehicle users. This high degree of reliability and transparency is essential to improving road safety, reducing accidents and congestion, and optimizing traffic flow. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0070] Figure 1 The system composition in one embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0071] Figure 2 The interactive process of the anonymous vehicle announcement method in one embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0072] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below so that the purpose, features and advantages of the present invention can be more clearly understood. It should be understood that the following embodiments are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, but are only intended to illustrate the essential spirit of the technical solution of the present invention.

[0073] In the following description, certain specific details are set forth for the purpose of illustrating the various disclosed embodiments to provide a thorough understanding of the various disclosed embodiments. However, those skilled in the relevant art will recognize that the embodiments may be practiced without one or more of these specific details. In other cases, well-known devices, structures, and techniques associated with the present application may not be shown or described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the description of the embodiments.

[0074] References throughout the specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" indicate that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Thus, the appearances of "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" in various places throughout the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any manner in one or more embodiments.

[0075] Example

[0076] like Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, in this embodiment, it includes constructing a temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hash scheme ETRCH, constructing an editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS and an anonymous vehicle announcement method.

[0077] 1.ETRCH construction method

[0078] ETRCH.CHInit (λ) → param ETRCH : Input the system security parameter λ, select a large prime number q, and let G,G T are two q-order multiplicative cyclic groups, with g as the generator. Let and represents a cryptographic hash function. Set the symmetric bilinear map to e:G×G→G T . Set the number of supervisors to n, k is the threshold of the secret sharing scheme. Output public parameter param ETRCH = (G,G T ,e,q,g,H,H1,n,k).

[0079] ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) → : Input common parameter param ETRCH , generate hash keys for n supervisors , each supervisor performs the following operations:

[0080] n supervisors execute (n,k)-DKG and share a long-term public key PK=g SK ∈G, the long-term private key is , each supervisor R i The long-term secret share is For each regulator R i Set a unique identifier ID i ,calculate .

[0081] Each R i Randomly select a constant value etd i ∈Z q As a temporary trapdoor, calculate and , let the hash key be .

[0082] Finally the algorithm outputs a list of hash keys .

[0083] :Enter hash key and message M0, entity (editorial board member) P i Execute the following to generate the Chameleon hash tuple of M0:

[0084] P i Check the equation Is it true? If not, terminate and output .

[0085] P i Pick a random number , calculate the random value r0= , calculate the chameleon hash of message M0 As shown below:

[0086]

[0087] The algorithm removes a hash key from the hash key list HK , and output the tuple .

[0088] ETRCH.Verify(CH0) → Status: When inputted with Chameleon hash tuple CH0, the algorithm outputs the current status of CH0 as follows.

[0089] First check the equation = If not, terminate and output Status=0.

[0090] Then, recalculate the Chameleon hash using the known parameters .if , then the output is Status = 0, otherwise the output is Status = 1.

[0091] ETRCH.EtdShare (hk a ,L) → ( ) : Enter the hash key and a list L of n public keys, the supervisor generates temporary trapdoor parameters as follows:

[0092] Temporary trapdoor etd a Holder of R a Choose a (k-1) degree polynomial ,in, is the random coefficient, f(0) = a0 = etd a .

[0093] R a Randomly select n different integers , encrypt using the public key in L (t i ,f(t i )) and send the results to the recipients respectively.

[0094] : Input Chameleon hash tuple CH0, temporary trapdoor parameters , new message M1, entity P i ∈L will calculate the collision of CH0 in the following way:

[0095] P i calculate ,calculate And send η i To other entities P j (j∈{1,...,k}\{i}).

[0096] P i Receive (η1,...,η i−1 ,η i+1 ,...,η k ), calculate And output adaptive randomness .

[0097] Finally, the algorithm outputs the new Chameleon hash tuple .

[0098] ETRCH.ForgeVerify (CH0,CH1) → Status: Input Chameleon Hash tuples CH0,CH1, the algorithm verifies that these two tuples are valid Chameleon Hash collisions.

[0099] Check the equation If it is not true, terminate and output Flag = False.

[0100] Check the equation = If it is not true, the algorithm outputs Flag = 0, otherwise it outputs Flag = 1.

[0101] : Enter a new hash key = ∈ HK, Chameleon hash tuple CH0 and trapdoor parameter = , regulator R i (i ∈ {1,...,k}) is performed as follows:

[0102] R i Calculate η i ← , send η i To other supervisors R i ,i ∈ {1,...,k}\{j}.

[0103] R i Receive (η1,...,η i−1 ,η i+1 ,...,η k ), calculate ← , = .

[0104] Finally, the algorithm outputs the adaptive randomness r1= and the new Chameleon hash tuple .

[0105] 2.RTRS construction method

[0106] RTRS.Setup(λ) → param RTRS : Input the system security parameter λ and generate the bilinear group generator (N = pq, , , ̂), select the generator , is a subgroup of its cyclic order q. Set and .set up and → Z N Represents a cryptographic hash function.

[0107] Execute ETRCH.CHInit (λ) to generate the parameters required to calculate the Chameleon hash , output system common parameters output parameters .

[0108] RTRS.KeyGen(param RTRS ) → : Input system public parameters, user i selects a random s i ∈Z N , and then calculate the initial public / private key pair (pk i ,sk i )= The regulator executes ETRCH.KeyGen(param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key .

[0109] RTRS.Sign( M0,L,hk a ) → ( ,σ d,n ) : Input message M0, list of n public keys L = {pk1,...,pk n} and hash key . Define a label f ​​for each user i , if user i is a participating signer, then f i =1, otherwise, f i =0, the RTRS signature of message M0 is calculated as follows:

[0110] Initiator ID p implement Generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 , then calculate . ID p Then choose a random number r p ∈Z N calculate .

[0111] For each user i∈L, the initiator selects a random value x i ∈Z N , using the public key pk in L i Encryption x i The encryption result is . Originator calculation , where C = , C= , where x= ,d=1.

[0112] The initiator outputs the ring signature σ d,n =(CH0,S1,S2,{C i ,π i} i∈[n] ) and send it to the supervisor ID a .

[0113] Supervisor ID a First run RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n ) to check validity, then run Generate ETD a The secret share (t i ,f(t i )) and use the public key pk in L i Encryption i ,f(t i )), the encryption result is , and send it to ID p .

[0114] ID p Encryption parameters , and ring signature σ d,n , broadcast to RSU and other vehicle nodes.

[0115] RTRS.JoinSign(σ d,n ,(pk d+1 ,sk d+1 ))→σ d+1,n : Input ring signature σ d,n = (S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ) and the new signer's public / private key pair (pk d+1 ,sk d+1 )=( , ), output d+1-out-of-n threshold ring signature σ d+1,n A user in the non-signer set participates in the generation of the ring signature, assuming that his or her identity is d+1.

[0116] New Signer P d+1 Execute CHGen to generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 , then calculate .Pd+1 Choose a random r d+1 ∈Z N And calculate S 1d+1 = ,S 2d+1 = , and calculate .

[0117] New signer d+1 calculation , then, use Replace (C d+1 ,π d+1 )∈ {C i ,π i} i∈[n] .

[0118] The output d+1-out-of-n threshold ring signature is .

[0119] RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n ) → Status: Input member public key list L = {pk1,...,pk n} and ring signature σ d,n = (CH0,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ).

[0120] The entity executes ETRCH.Verify(CH0) to verify the validity of the Chameleon hash tuple CH0, and then calculates .

[0121] For i=1,...,n, check the equation Is it true?

[0122] If they are all true, then calculate C = And check the following equation:

[0123] Is it true? If the equality is true, the signature is valid.

[0124] : Input ring signature σ d,n = (CH0,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ), trapdoor parameter , a list L of n public keys and a new message M1.

[0125] Entity P i First run RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n) Check validity. If the output is 0, return and terminate; otherwise, do the following:

[0126] P i Execute ETRCH.Forge (CH0, ,M1,L) outputs the new chameleon hash tuple CH1 = .

[0127] Finally, the new signature σ is output ' d,n =(CH1,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ).

[0128] RTRS.Update(hk b ,σ d,n , ) →σ′ d,n : Enter new hash key , trapdoor parameter = ( , ) and ring signature σ d,n = (CH0,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ), regulator R i (i ∈ {1,...,t}) executes the following to output a new ring signature σ′ d,n :

[0129] Threshold number of regulators to collaborate on enforcement Outputs a new Chameleon hash tuple .

[0130] Threshold number of regulators to collaborate on enforcement Generate ETD b The secret share (ti, f(ti)) and the trapdoor parameter = ( , ) .

[0131] Finally, the new signature σ′ is output d,n =(CH′0,S1,S2,{C i ,v i} i∈[n] ).

[0132] 3. Anonymous vehicle announcement method based on editable blockchain

[0133] Step 1: System parameter setting stage

[0134] The trusted entity TA executes RTRS.Setup(λ) to generate the system common parameters param RTRS = and . The regulator R executes ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key , the long-term public key is PK =g SK ∈ G, the long-term private key is SK∈ The vehicle user executes RTRS.KeyGen(param RTRS ), generate your own public and private key pair (pk i ,sk i ) = ( , ),s i ∈ R Z N .

[0135] Step 2: Announcement launch phase

[0136] Vehicle User ID p As the initiator, generate the accident description information msg according to the specific situation and submit a transaction tx to include msg. p Choosing a hash key , Ring signature member list L, ID p implement Generate ring signature σ 1,n and encryption parameters . ID p Send L,σ 1,n To the supervisor. Trapdoor key etd a Holder of R IDa implement Generate ETD a The secret share (t i ,f(t i )) and use the public key pk in L i Encryption i ,f(t i )), the encryption result is , and send it to ID p IDp will encrypt the parameters , and ring signature σ d,n Broadcast to RSU and other vehicle nodes.

[0137] Step 3: Join the verification announcement phase

[0138] If a member in the member public key list L wants to join the announcement, assuming that the member's identity is d+1 and the current ring signature is σ d,n . ID d+1 Execute RTRS.JoinSign(σ d,n ,(pk d+1 ,sk d+1 ))Generate parameters (S 1i ,S 2i )and And send it to RSU. RSU receives (S 1i ,S 2i )and Post-calculation , 2 = ,use Replace (C d+1 ,π d+1 )∈ {C i ,π i} i∈[n] Finally, the output d+1-out-of-n threshold ring signature is .

[0139] Step 4: Announcement and verification phase

[0140] Once the number of users joining the announcement reaches the threshold, the threshold ring signature σ is generated d,n ,d≥k. RSU will initiate a transaction, and the miners in the blockchain will pack the transaction into the block. v When receiving AGP, execute RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n ) to verify the validity of the ring signature.

[0141] Step 5: Announcement rewriting phase

[0142] If a false announcement message is found, the k members in the ring signature can cooperate to execute RTRS.Redact(σ d,n , ,L,msg′) to rewrite the announcement message. The supervisor grants the editing permission to the ring members in the signature, which can improve the efficiency of rewriting. In addition, the supervisors are not necessarily fully trusted. K of the n supervisors can collaborate to perform Revoking a temporary trapdoor means revoking the editing privileges of the original temporary trapdoor owner and selecting a new temporary trapdoor.

[0143] The matters not described in detail in the present invention are all known technologies to those skilled in the art.

[0144] The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the present invention and the advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention to be protected. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An anonymous vehicle announcement method based on editable blockchain, characterized in that: Including building an editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS based on the temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hash scheme ETRCH, which is used for anonymous announcement signing in VANET to achieve threshold authentication of announcement messages; Furthermore, the anonymous vehicle announcement method includes at least one of the following steps or a combination thereof: System parameter setting phase: Set up a trusted entity TA to generate public parameters and distribute them to all vehicle user nodes and roadside units RSUs, and generate public-private key pairs for users in the system; Announcement initiation phase: After discovering an accident, one of the vehicle user nodes generates an accident description message, selects the member public key list L of the threshold ring signature, selects a part of the public parameters, and forwards the request data packet RQP to the regulator R. The regulator R generates a temporary trapdoor parameter and sends RQP and the temporary trapdoor parameter to the members in the ring signature, inviting them to join the announcement; Join verification announcement phase: After receiving RQP, the witness W is willing to join the announcement and forwards a response data packet RPP to the RSU, which contains information on whether it agrees with the message; Announcement release and verification phase: RSU generates an announcement-aggregation data packet AGP by combining RPP, broadcasts AGP as a block transaction to the blockchain, packages it into a generated block, and synchronizes it to the blockchain; any user who receives AGP chooses to become a verifier V to verify the validity of AGP; Announcement rewrite phase: If a member in the ring signature finds that the announcement message on the blockchain is forged, the regulator or a threshold number of threshold ring signature members collaborate to complete the rewrite operation; The temporary trapdoor revocable chameleon hashing scheme ETRCH sets multiple regulators, each of which can set multiple temporary trapdoors and allow n of the k edge nodes to collaborate to rewrite the data on the blockchain to solve the storage limitation problem; When a malicious supervisor is found to have abused editing privileges, n of the k supervisors can collaborate to update a temporary trapdoor to revoke the malicious supervisor's editing privileges; The construction of the editable threshold ring signature scheme RTRS includes one or a combination of the following steps: The initialization step RTRS.Setup sets the system security parameters and generates the necessary bilinear groups and cryptographic hash functions, providing a basis for subsequent key generation and signature operations. Generate a pair of public and private keys for each user participating in the system through the key generation step RTRS.KeyGen, and generate a chameleon hash key for the regulator; The signing step RTRS.Sign allows users to sign messages with their private keys to generate ring signatures, while using chameleon hash values ​​to ensure the anonymity and unforgeability of messages; the joining step RTRS.JoinSign allows new users to join existing ring signatures, expanding the scope of participants in the signature; The verification step RTRS.Verify allows any user to verify the validity of the ring signature to ensure that the signature is generated by a legitimate user; when a false or harmful announcement message is detected, the rewrite step RTRS.Redact allows a regulator or a group of users to collaborate to rewrite the message; The update step RTRS.Update allows the regulator to update the information in the ring signature or the key of the participant; The initialization step RTRS.Setup further comprises: Input the system security parameter λ to generate the bilinear group generator , select the generator , is a subgroup of which the cyclic order is q; set up and ;set up and represents a cryptographic hash function; Execute ETRCH.CHInit (λ) to generate the parameters required to calculate the Chameleon hash , output system common parameters output parameters ; Among them, execute ETRCH.CHInit (λ) to generate the parameters required to calculate the Chameleon hash include: Input the system security parameter λ, select a large prime number q, and let G,G T are two q-order multiplicative cyclic groups, with g as the generator; let and represents a cryptographic hash function; set the symmetric bilinear map to e:G×G→G T ; Set the number of regulators to n, k to be the threshold of the secret sharing scheme; output the public parameter param ETRCH = (G,G T ,e,q,g,H,H1,n,k); The key generation step RTRS.KeyGen further comprises: Input system public parameters, user i selects a random s i ∈Z N , then calculate the initial public / private key pair ; The regulator executes ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key ; Wherein, the execution of ETRCH.KeyGen (param ETRCH ) Generate Chameleon hash key include: For each regulator R i Generate long-term public key PK and long-term private key SK; Calculate R for each regulator i Unique identifier ID i The hash value h i ; For each regulator R i Choose a temporary trapdoor etd i , and calculate the associated hash key hk i ; The signing step RTRS.Sign further comprises: Initiator IDp execution Generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 ; calculate ; Choose a random number r p ∈Z N calculate ; For each user i∈L, calculate C i and π i , generate a ring signature σ d,n ; Wherein, the execution Generate the Chameleon hash value of message M0 include: Enter the hash key After the message M0, entity P i Check an equation: whether it is established; Then P i Pick a random number , calculate random values , calculate the chameleon hash of message M0 , the algorithm removes the hash key from the hash key list HK , and output the tuple ; The verification step RTRS.Verify further comprises: The entity executes ETRCH.Verify(CH0) to verify the validity of the Chameleon hash tuple CH0; calculation ; For i=1,...,n, check the equation whether it is established; calculate And check the equation whether it is established; The entity executes ETRCH.Verify(CH0) to verify the validity of the chameleon hash tuple CH0, including: Check an equation whether it is established; Recalculate the Chameleon hash value Chash0' using known parameters; Compare the recalculated hash value Chash0' with the original hash value CHash0 to see if they are consistent; The rewriting step RTRS.Redact further comprises: Entity P i Run RTRS.Verify(L,σ d,n ) Check validity; P i implement Output new Chameleon hash tuple CH1 = ; Finally, output the new signature ; Among them, P i implement include: Input Chameleon hash tuple CH0, temporary trapdoor parameters and new message M1; Calculate a new hash value ; Output the new Chameleon hash tuple CH1.

2. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed, the anonymous vehicle announcement method based on the editable blockchain as described in claim 1 is implemented.

3. A hardware device for anonymous vehicle announcement, comprising a data storage device, a processor, and a computer program stored in the data storage device and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the program, the anonymous vehicle announcement method based on the editable blockchain as described in claim 1 is implemented.