Efficient trusted communication system and method
By transmitting certificates between the access device and the communication device to establish a secure channel, the problem of time-consuming authentication and sensitive data exposure in the prior art is solved, and efficient and secure communication authentication and data transmission are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411370763.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2018-10-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
AI Technical Summary
In the prior art, the authentication process between the access device and the communication device is time-consuming and may expose sensitive data, affecting communication efficiency and security.
By transmitting resource provider certificates and access device certificates between access devices and communication devices, a secure channel is established and data is transmitted or received using the channel to avoid plain text exposure of sensitive data.
Efficient and secure authentication between the access device and the communication device is realized, reducing the time of the authentication process, and improving the confidentiality and integrity of data transmission.
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Figure CN119071082A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] This application is a divisional application for the PCT international application number PCT / US2018 / 057973, the international application date of October 29, 2018, the application number 201880099142.4 entering the Chinese national phase, and entitled “Efficient and Reliable Communication System and Method”.
[0002] Cross-reference to related applications
[0003] none. Background Art
[0004] The access device and the communication device may interact with each other. Typically, the communication device verifies the authenticity of the access device before transmitting encrypted sensitive data to the access device. For example, the communication device may generate and send an authentication request message to the access device, and receive and process an authentication response message from the access device. Similarly, the communication device may receive and process an authentication request message from the access device, and generate and send an authentication response message to the access device.
[0005] Authenticating the access device and the communication device to each other can be a time consuming task.
[0006] Embodiments of the present invention address these and other problems. Summary of the invention
[0007] One embodiment of the present invention includes a method, comprising: transmitting a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate from an access device to a communication device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to the communication device or receiving data from the communication device using the secure channel.
[0008] Another embodiment of the present invention includes an access device, the access device comprising: a processor; a memory device; and a computer-readable medium coupled to the processor, the computer-readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to implement a method, the method comprising: transmitting a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate to a communication device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to or receiving data from the communication device using the secure channel.
[0009] Another embodiment of the present invention includes a method, comprising: receiving, by a communication device, a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate from an access device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to or receiving data from the access device using the secure channel.
[0010] Another embodiment of the present invention includes a communication device, comprising: a processor; a memory device; and a computer-readable medium coupled to the processor, the computer-readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to implement a method, the method comprising: receiving a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate from an access device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to or receiving data from the access device using the secure channel.
[0011] Another embodiment of the present invention includes a method, comprising: transmitting a certificate request value by a resource provider computer to a certificate authority computer; receiving a resource provider certificate from the certificate authority computer by the resource provider computer; creating an access device certificate by the resource provider computer; and transmitting the access device certificate and the resource provider certificate by the resource provider computer to an access device.
[0012] Another embodiment of the present invention includes a resource provider computer, the resource provider computer comprising: a processor; a memory device; and a computer-readable medium coupled to the processor, the computer-readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to implement a method, the method comprising: transmitting a certificate request value to a certificate authority computer; receiving a resource provider certificate from the certificate authority computer; creating an access device certificate; and transmitting the access device certificate and the resource provider certificate to an access device.
[0013] These and other embodiments of the invention are described in further detail below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0014] Figure 1 A block diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0015] Figure 2 A block diagram illustrating a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0016] Figure 3 A block diagram illustrating an access device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0017] Figure 4 A block diagram illustrating an authorization computer according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0018] Figure 5 A flow chart illustrating a resource provider certificate and key pair generation process according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0019] Figure 6 A flow chart illustrating an access device certificate and key pair generation process according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0020] Fig. 7A A flow chart illustrating a secure interaction process between a communication device and an access device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0021] Figure 7B A flow chart illustrating a secure interaction process between a communication device and an access device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.
[0022] Figure 7C A flow chart illustrating a secure interaction process between a communication device and an access device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0023] Before discussing the embodiments of the present invention, some terms will be described.
[0024] A "user" may include an individual. In some embodiments, a user may be associated with one or more personal accounts and / or communication devices. In some embodiments, a user may also be referred to as a cardholder, account holder, or consumer.
[0025] A "communication device" may include any suitable electronic device that can be operated by a user, which may also provide remote communication capabilities with a network. A "mobile communication device" may be an example of a "communication device" that can be easily transferred. Examples of remote communication capabilities include using a mobile phone (wireless) network, a wireless data network (e.g., 3G, 4G or similar network), Wi-Fi, Wi-Max, Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), or any other communication medium that can provide access to a network such as the Internet or a private network. Examples of mobile communication devices include mobile phones (e.g., cellular phones), personal digital assistants (PDAs), tablet computers, netbooks, laptop computers, personal music players, handheld dedicated readers, etc. Other examples of mobile communication devices include wearable devices, such as smart watches, fitness bracelets, ankle rings, rings, earrings, etc., and cars with remote communication capabilities. In some embodiments, the mobile communication device may act as a payment device (e.g., the mobile communication device may store and be able to transmit payment credentials for transactions).
[0026] A "payment device" may include any suitable device that can be used to conduct a financial transaction, such as providing payment credentials to a merchant. A payment device may be a software object, a hardware object, or a physical object. As an example of a physical object, a payment device may include a substrate (e.g., a paper or plastic card), and information printed, embossed, encoded, or otherwise included at or near the surface of the object. A hardware object may involve a circuit system (e.g., a permanent voltage value), while a software object may involve non-permanent data stored on the device. A payment device may be associated with a value, such as a monetary value, a discount, or store credit, and a payment device may be associated with an entity, such as a bank, a merchant, a payment processing network, or a user. Suitable payment devices may be handheld and compact, such that they can fit into a user's wallet and / or pocket (e.g., pocket-sized). Example payment devices may include smart cards, magnetic stripe cards, key chain devices (e.g., Speedpass available from Exxon-Mobil Corporation), and other devices. TM ) etc. Other examples of payment devices include payment cards, smart media, transponders, etc. If the payment device is in the form of a debit card, credit card or smart card, the payment device may also optionally have features such as a magnetic stripe. Such devices may operate in contact or contactless mode.
[0027] "Access data" may include account information, or any other suitable type of data that may be used to access resources such as data, goods, services, etc. The access data may be specifically associated with a user or a group of users, and may be in any suitable form.
[0028] "Account information" may include any information associated with a user account. Such information may be directly related to an account, or may be derived from information related to an account. Examples of account information may include an account identifier, a username, a password, user information (e.g., name, age, email address, shipping address, etc.). In some cases, account information may also be referred to as payment account information, card account information, etc., and may be associated with a payment device (e.g., a payment card). For example, account information may include a PAN (primary account number or "account number"), a username, an expiration date, a CVV (card verification value), a dCVV (dynamic card verification value), a CVV2 (card verification value 2), a CVC3 (card verification code 3) card verification value, etc. CVV2 is generally understood to be a static verification value associated with a payment device. The CVV2 value is generally visible to the user (e.g., user), while the CVV and dCVV values are generally embedded in a memory or authorization request message and are not easily known to the user (but they are known to the issuer and payment processor).
[0029] A "credential" can be any suitable information that serves as reliable evidence of value, ownership, identity, or authority. A credential can be a string of numbers, letters, or any other suitable characters, as well as any object or document that can be used for verification. Examples of credentials include value certificates, identification cards, authentication documents, access cards, passwords, and other login information.
[0030] "Payment credentials" may include any suitable information associated with an account (e.g., a payment account and / or payment device associated with the account). Such information may be directly related to the account, or may be derived from information associated with the account. Examples of account information may include PAN (primary account number or "account number"), username, expiration date, and verification values such as CVV, dCVV, CVV2, dCVV2, and CVC3 values.
[0031] A "token" may be a replacement value for a credential. A token may be a string of numbers, letters, or any other suitable characters. Examples of tokens include payment tokens, access tokens, personal identification tokens, etc.
[0032] A "payment token" may include a payment account identifier that replaces an account identifier such as a primary account number (PAN). For example, a payment token may include a series of alphanumeric characters that can be used as a replacement for an original account identifier. For example, the token "4900 00000000 0001" can be used to replace the PAN "4147 0900 0000 1234". In some embodiments, the payment token may be "format-retained" and may have a numerical format consistent with account identifiers used in existing transaction processing networks (e.g., the ISO 8583 financial transaction message format). In some embodiments, a payment token may be used in place of a PAN to initiate, authorize, settle, or resolve a payment transaction, or to represent an original credential in other systems where the original credential would normally be provided. In some embodiments, a payment token may be generated such that recovery of the original PAN or other account identifier may not be computationally possible from the token value. In addition, in some embodiments, the token format may be configured to allow an entity receiving the token to identify it as a token and to recognize the entity that issued the token.
[0033] A "resource provider" may be an entity that can provide resources such as goods, services, information, and / or access. Examples of resource providers include merchants, data providers, transportation agencies, government entities, venue and residential operators, etc. A resource provider may operate a resource provider computer. A "merchant" may generally be an entity that participates in a transaction and can sell goods or services or provide access to goods or services.
[0034] An "acquirer" may generally be a commercial entity (e.g., a commercial bank) that has a commercial relationship with a particular merchant or other entity. Some entities may perform the functions of both an issuer and an acquirer. Some embodiments may encompass such a single entity, an issuer-acquirer. An acquirer may operate an acquirer computer, which may also be generally referred to as a "transmitting computer."
[0035] An "authorized entity" may be an entity that authorizes a request. Examples of authorized entities may be an issuer, a government agency, a document repository, an access administrator, etc.
[0036] An "issuer" may generally include a commercial entity (e.g., a bank) that maintains a user account. An issuer may also issue a consumer payment credential stored on a user device such as a cell phone, smart card, tablet computer, or laptop computer.
[0037] "Access device" can be any suitable device that provides access to a remote system. The access device can also be used to communicate with a merchant computer, a transaction processing computer, an authentication computer, or any other suitable system. The access device can generally be located at any suitable location, such as at the merchant's location. The access device can take any suitable form. Some examples of access devices include POS or point of sale devices (e.g., POS terminals), entrance and / or exit gates of transportation systems, cellular phones, PDAs, personal computers (PCs), tablet PCs, handheld dedicated readers, set-top boxes, electronic cash registers (ECRs), automated teller machines (ATMs), virtual cash registers (VCRs), self-service machines, security systems, access systems, etc. The access device can use any suitable contact or contactless operation mode to send or receive data from a mobile communication device or a payment device or data associated with a mobile communication device or a payment device. In some embodiments where the access device may include a POS terminal, any suitable POS terminal may be used and it may include a reader, a processor, and a computer-readable medium. The reader may include any suitable contact or contactless operation mode. For example, an exemplary card reader may include a radio frequency (RF) antenna, an optical scanner, a barcode reader, or a magnetic stripe reader to interact with a payment device and / or a mobile device. In some embodiments, a cell phone, tablet, or other dedicated wireless device used as a POS terminal may be referred to as a mobile point of sale or "mPOS" terminal. In some embodiments, one or more access devices may be associated with a resource provider computer.
[0038] An "authorization request message" may be an electronic message requesting authorization for a transaction. In some embodiments, the authorization request message is sent to a transaction processing computer and / or the issuer of a payment card to request authorization for a transaction. The authorization request message according to some embodiments may comply with ISO8583, which is a standard for systems for exchanging electronic transaction information associated with payments made by a user using a payment device or payment account. The authorization request message may include an issuer account identifier that may be associated with the payment device or payment account. The authorization request message may also include additional data elements corresponding to "identification information", including, by way of example only: service code, CVV (card verification value), dCVV (dynamic card verification value), PAN (primary account number or "account number"), payment token, user name, expiration date, etc. The authorization request message may also include "transaction information", such as any information associated with the current transaction, such as transaction amount, merchant identifier, merchant location, acquirer bank identification number (BIN), card acceptor ID, information identifying the items purchased, etc., as well as any other information that may be used to determine whether to identify and / or authorize the transaction.
[0039] An "authorization response message" may be a message in response to an authorization request. In some cases, the authorization response message may be an electronic message reply to the authorization request message generated by the issuing financial institution or a transaction processing computer. By way of example only, the authorization response message may include one or more of the following status indicators: approved - the transaction was approved; rejected - the transaction was not approved; or call center - the response is pending and the merchant must call a toll-free authorization phone number for more information. The authorization response message may also include an authorization code, which may be a code that the credit card issuing bank returns to the merchant's access device (e.g., POS device) in response to the authorization request message in an electronic message (directly or through a transaction processing computer) indicating that the transaction is approved. The code may serve as proof of authorization.
[0040] A "server computer" may include a powerful computer or cluster of computers. For example, a server computer may be a large mainframe, a cluster of small computers, or a group of servers that work as a unit. In one example, a server computer may be a database server coupled to a network server. A server computer may include one or more computing devices and may use any of a variety of computing structures, arrangements, and compilations to service requests from one or more client computers.
[0041] "Memory" may be any suitable device or devices that can store electronic data. Suitable memory may include non-transitory computer-readable media that stores instructions that can be executed by a processor to implement the desired method. Examples of memory may include one or more memory chips, disk drives, etc. Such memory may operate using any suitable electrical, optical, and / or magnetic operating modes.
[0042] A "processor" may include a device that processes something. In some embodiments, a processor may include any suitable one or more data computing devices. A processor may include one or more microprocessors that work together to achieve the desired functions. A processor may include a CPU that includes at least one high-speed data processor that is sufficient to execute program components for executing user and / or system generated requests. The CPU may be a microprocessor such as AMD's Athlon, Duron, and / or Opteron; IBM and / or Motorola's PowerPC; IBM and Sony's Cell processor; Intel's Celeron, Itanium, Pentium, Xeon, and / or XScale; and / or similar processors.
[0043] A "secure element" may include a secure element. In some embodiments, a "secure element" may include a component that can securely perform a function. A secure element may be a memory that securely stores data so that access to it is protected. An example of a "secure element" is a trusted execution environment (TEE), which is a secure area of a processor. Another example of a secure element is a universal integrated circuit card (UICC), which is a secure smart card. Another example of a secure element is an embedded secure element, an embedded hardware component in a larger mechanical or electrical system. Another example of a secure element is a hardware security module (HSM), which is a physical computing device that can protect and manage cryptographic keys used for authentication and provide cryptographic processing functions.
[0044] An "interaction" may be a mutual action or influence. Examples of interactions may include transactions, such as payment transactions, data access transactions, and secure location access transactions.
[0045] The term "public / private key pair" may include a pair of associated cryptographic keys generated by an entity. The public key may be used for functions such as encrypting a message to be sent to an entity, or for verifying a digital signature that should be made by an entity. On the other hand, the private key may be used for functions such as decrypting a received message or applying a digital signature. The public key may be authorized by a subject called a certificate authority (CA), which may store the public key in a database and distribute it to any other entity that requests it. The private key may be kept in a secure storage medium and will generally be known only to the entity. However, the cryptographic system described herein may have a key recovery mechanism for recovering lost keys and avoiding data loss. The public and private keys may be in any suitable format, including formats based on Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
[0046] An "elliptic curve cryptography point" or "ECC point" may include a point along an elliptic curve. An ECC point may include any point on an elliptic curve suitable for use in elliptic curve cryptography.
[0047] A "digital signature" may include a type of electronic signature. A digital signature may encrypt a file with a digital code that may be difficult to copy. In some embodiments, a "digital signature" may refer to the result of applying an algorithm based on a public / private key pair that allows a signer to demonstrate and a verifier to verify the authenticity and integrity of a file. The signer works with the help of a private key and the verifier works with the help of a public key. This process proves the authenticity of the sender, the integrity of the signed file, and the so-called principle of non-repudiation, which does not allow for the denial of what has been signed. A certificate or other data that includes a signer's digital signature is said to be "signed" by the signer.
[0048] A "certificate" or "digital certificate" may include an electronic file and / or a data file. In some embodiments, a digital certificate may use a digital signature to bind a public key to data associated with the identity. A digital certificate may be used to prove ownership of a public key. A certificate may include one or more data fields, such as the legal name of the identity, the serial number of the certificate, the start and end dates of validity of the certificate, permissions associated with the certificate, etc. The certificate may include a "start valid" date indicating the first date the certificate is valid, and an "end valid" date indicating the last date the certificate is valid. The certificate may also include a hash of the data included in the data field in the certificate. Unless otherwise specified, each certificate is signed by a certificate authority.
[0049] A "certificate authority" (CA) may include an entity that issues digital certificates. A CA may prove its identity using a CA certificate, which includes the CA's public key. A CA certificate may be signed with another CA's private key, or may be signed with the same CA's private key. The latter is referred to as a self-signed certificate. A CA may maintain a database of all certificates issued by the CA, and may also maintain a list of revoked certificates. A CA may be operated by an entity, such as a processing network entity, an issuer, an acquirer, etc.
[0050] A "cryptographic nonce" or "random number" may include any number. In some embodiments, a nonce may be any number, string, bit sequence, or other data value intended for use in association with a single communication session. In some cases, a cryptographic nonce may be generated randomly or pseudo-randomly. Typically, a cryptographic nonce is of sufficient length that the likelihood of multiple independent generation of the same nonce value is not significant.
[0051] A "blinded key", such as a "blind public key", may include a key whose original value has been obfuscated or otherwise modified. In some embodiments, a blind key may be blinded by combining its original value with another data element, such as a cryptographic random number. For example, in elliptic curve cryptography, a public key may be multiplied by a random number to generate a "blind public key". Similarly, a private key may be multiplied by a random number to generate a "blind private key". In this context, the cryptographic random number may be referred to as a blinding factor.
[0052] A "temporary key pair" may include a temporary public key and a temporary private key. In some embodiments, a temporary key pair may be generated for use in a single communication session and / or transaction. The temporary key pair may be in any suitable format, such as ECC or RSA. Typically, the temporary key pair may be deleted once the interaction or communication session has ended.
[0053] A "static key pair" may include a static public key and a static private key. In some embodiments, a static key pair may be maintained for a period of time. Typically, but not necessarily, a static private key may be securely stored in, for example, a hardware security module (HSM) or a secure element (SE). Typically, but not necessarily, a static public key may be bound to an identity using a digital certificate. The static key pair may be in any suitable format, such as ECC or RSA.
[0054] A "shared secret" may include any data value or other information known only to an authorized party in a secure communication. A shared secret may be generated from any appropriate data in any appropriate manner. For example, a Diffie-Hellman-based algorithm (such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)) may be used to generate a shared secret from a private key and a public key. In some cases, a shared secret may be used to generate a session key. In some embodiments, additional values and / or data may be used with the public and private keys to generate a session key. For example, additional values may include blinding factors, unpredictable numbers, etc.
[0055] "Session keys" may include cryptographic keys used in a session. In some embodiments, session keys may be used to encrypt or decrypt data to be securely transmitted. In some cases, session keys may be generated from a shared secret known to both the sending entity and the receiving entity. For example, session keys may be derived using a key derivation function and a shared secret. Session keys may be used to protect data included in a request or response message. In some embodiments, a session key may be part of a symmetric key pair.
[0056] A "key derivation function" (KDF) may include a function capable of deriving a key. In some embodiments, a key derivation function is capable of deriving one or more secret keys from a secret value. For example, a key derivation function may derive a session key from various inputs, such as, but not limited to, a random value, an unpredictable number, a public key, and / or a private key. A keyed cryptographic hash function is an example of a pseudo-random function used for key derivation.
[0057] Embodiments of the present invention allow for an efficient method for authenticated communications. For example, a communication device and an access device can mutually authenticate when exchanging messages including sensitive data without exposing any sensitive data in plain text.
[0058] Embodiments of the present invention allow authentication without the terminal (i.e., access device) being explicitly authenticated. Specifically, methods according to embodiments of the present invention use techniques whereby the terminal can provide certificates to the communication device, and the communication device can use these certificates to establish a secure channel to the terminal. In some embodiments, when the terminal's certificate is authenticated by the same certificate authority that authenticated the communication device's certificate, a method for extracting a public key from the certificate can allow the terminal to establish a secure channel with the terminal of the communication device.
[0059] Once the secure channel is established, any data transmitted from the terminal to the communication device or from the communication device to the terminal may be considered authenticated as originating from a trusted entity.
[0060] Embodiments of the present invention may allow for ECQV certificates, see (M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)", Certicom Research, 2013), which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes. ECQV may enable compact certificates, thus enabling the necessary data to be transmitted from the terminal to the communication device within existing protocols. In addition, less communication device processing is required compared to using alternative signature schemes such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-DSA) or EC-Schnorr (e.g., ECQV uses 1×ECC point multiplication for each certificate, while the listed alternatives use 2×ECC point multiplication for each certificate).
[0061] Embodiments of the present invention allow an access device to send a static representation of its public key in a certificate to a communication device, rather than determining a new temporary public key for each interaction with the communication device. Embodiments of the present invention may allow an access device to provide a temporary value, such as a random value s, to a communication device, as described in further detail herein. The random value S may be used by the communication device as an input to derive a session key that may be used to securely communicate with the access device. The use of the random value S and the access device (static) public key included in the certificate may allow randomness between sessions and / or communications without the need to use a new temporary access device public key for each session and / or communication. The processing impact of the random value S is negligible.
[0062] In other words, instead of using the temporary public key from the access device for its session key derivation, the communication device can extract the static resource provider public key and the static access device public key from the received ECQV certificate. The communication device can then use the access device public key and the random value S in the session key derivation.
[0063] In some embodiments, the session key established by the access device can only be derived by an access device that has an access device public key and an access device certificate from the same root certificate authority as the communication device. Therefore, the access device may not be explicitly authenticated, and instead the communication device may encrypt data that can only be successfully decrypted by the authentic access device. This may provide confidentiality (including privacy protection) and integrity. In some embodiments, this may further prevent the Processing Option Data Object List (PDOL) data from the access device from being manipulated (e.g., if the access device indicates to the communication device that cardholder authentication is required, a malicious party cannot manipulate the indication).
[0064] Figure 1A block diagram of a system 100 including several components according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The system 100 includes a communication device 102, an access device 104, a resource provider computer 106, a certificate authority 108, a transmission computer 110, a processing network 112, and an authorization computer 114. The communication device 102 can be in operative communication with the access device 104. The resource provider computer 106 can be in operative communication with the access device 104, the certificate authority 108, and the transmission computer 110. The transmission computer 110 can be in operative communication with the processing network 112, and the processing network can be in operative communication with the authorization computer 114. Figure 1 This is intended to illustrate example arrangements of components according to some embodiments of the invention and is not intended to be limiting.
[0065] Figure 1 The entities, providers, networks, and devices described in the may communicate with each other via any suitable means including a communication network. Messages and other communications between entities, providers, networks, and devices may be in encrypted or unencrypted form. The communication network may be any one and / or combination of the following: direct interconnection; the Internet; a local area network (LAN); a metropolitan area network (MAN); an operating task as a node on the Internet (OMNI); a secure custom connection; a wide area network (WAN); a wireless network (e.g., using protocols such as, but not limited to, wireless application protocol (WAP), I-mode, etc.); etc. Messages between devices and computers may be transmitted using secure communication protocols, such as, but not limited to, file transfer protocol (FTP); hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP); secure hypertext transfer protocol (HTTPS), secure socket layer (SSL), transport layer security (TLS), etc.
[0066] The user may use the communication device 102 to interact at a resource provider (e.g., a merchant). The interaction may be a payment transaction (e.g., for purchasing goods or services), an access interaction (e.g., for accessing a transportation system), or any other suitable interaction. The communication device 102 may interact with an access device 104 at a resource provider location, which operates a resource provider computer 106. For example, the user may tap the communication device 102 against a near field communication (NFC) reader in the access device 104. Alternatively, the user may indicate payment account information to the resource provider electronically, such as in an online transaction. In some cases, the communication device 102 may transmit an account identifier, such as a primary account number or a payment token, to the access device 104.
[0067] The resource provider computer 106 can be in operative communication with one or more access devices. For example, a resource provider of the resource provider computer 106 can operate a location that includes and / or operates multiple access devices. The resource provider computer 106 can provide an access device public key certificate and an access device key pair for each of the access devices in communication with the resource provider computer 106.
[0068] The certificate authority 108 may include one or more server computers. The certificate authority 108 can issue certificates to entities such as resource providers, issuers, communication devices, etc. The certificate authority 108 can generate CA key pairs. The certificate authority 108 can also generate resource provider public key certificates. In some embodiments, the certificate authority 108 can be in operative communication with the processing network 112 and / or can be operatively coupled to the communication network, and can generate certificates on behalf of the processing network 112.
[0069] The transmission computer 110 may be located (in an operational sense) between the resource provider computer 106 and the processing network 112. The transmission computer 110 may be operated by an entity such as an acquirer. The acquirer may maintain accounts with any merchant (e.g., an airline) with which a user may wish to interact. The transmission computer 110 may be configured to route messages between any suitable number of resource provider computers and any suitable number of processing networks. In some embodiments, the transmission computer 110 may store and / or utilize suitable routing tables.
[0070] The processing network 112 may route or switch messages between a plurality of transmission computers including the transmission computer 110 and a plurality of authorization entity computers including the authorization computer 114. In some embodiments, the processing network 112 may be a network computer. The network computer may be configured to provide authorization services and clearing and settlement services for payment transactions. The network computer may include data processing subsystems, networks, and operations to support and deliver authorization services, exception file services, and clearing and settlement services. Exemplary payment processing networks may include VisaNet TM For example, VisaNet TM Payment processing networks such as VisaNet can process credit card transactions, debit card transactions and other types of commercial transactions. TMSpecifically include the Visa Integrated Payment (VIP) system that processes authorization requests and the Base II system that performs clearing and settlement services. Moreover, the payment processing network may include a server computer and may use any appropriate wired or wireless telecommunications network, including the Internet. In some embodiments, the network computer may forward the authorization request received from the transmission computer to the authorization entity computer via a communication channel. The network computer may further forward the authorization response message received from the authorization entity computer to the transmission computer.
[0071] Authorization computer 114 may be configured to authorize any suitable request, including access to data, access to a location, approval of an interaction, and / or approval of a payment. In some embodiments, authorization computer 114 may be operated by an account issuer. Typically, an issuer is an entity (e.g., a bank) that issues and maintains a user's account. An account may be a credit, debit, prepaid, or any other type of account.
[0072] Figure 2 A block diagram of a communication device 200 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The exemplary communication device 200 may include a processor 202. The processor 202 may be coupled to a secure memory 204, an antenna 206, a contactless element 208, and a computer-readable medium 212, the computer-readable medium including a key determination module 212A, an encryption module 212B, and an application module 212C.
[0073] The secure memory 204 may securely store encrypted access data, key identifiers, public keys, and / or any other relevant data. The secure memory 204 may be in the form of a secure element, a hardware security module, or any other suitable form of secure data storage.
[0074] Antenna 206 may be a long range antenna that allows communication device 200 to communicate with a remote computer via a network, such as a cellular network.
[0075] The contactless element 208 may include a short-range antenna and one or more computer chips. The contactless element 208 may allow the communication device 200 to communicate with an access device via a short-range communication mode such as NFC, Bluetooth, or WiFi.
[0076] The computer-readable medium 212 may include code that can be executed by the processor 202 to implement a method, the method comprising: receiving, by a communication device, a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate from an access device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to or receiving data from the access device using the secure channel.
[0077] The key determination module 212A may include any program, software or other code suitable for performing operations related to determining an encryption key using data in a certificate. The key determination module 212A may use the data in the certificate to determine the encryption key in any suitable manner described herein. In some embodiments, the key determination module 212A may be configured to use data in a resource provider public key certificate and a certificate authority public key to determine the resource provider public key. The key determination module 212A may also be configured to use data in an access device certificate and a resource provider public key to determine the access device public key.
[0078] The encryption module 212B may include any program, software or other code suitable for performing operations related to encryption and / or decryption. For example, the encryption module 212B may be configured to generate a shared secret, such as using a key protocol such as Diffie-Hellman, as described herein. The encryption module 212B may be further configured to derive a session key from a shared secret, such as using a key derivation function (KDF). In some embodiments, the encryption module 212B may be configured to store one or more static keys, such as a static communication device private key and / or a static communication device public key. In some embodiments, the encryption module 212B may be implemented using any combination of software (e.g., host card emulation or HCE) and hardware (e.g., hardware security module or HSM). As described herein, a session key may be used to encrypt data (e.g., access data) to send to an access device. The session key may also be used to decrypt data received from an access device. The access device may only be able to decrypt data when the access device is credible, thereby implicitly authenticating the access device.
[0079] The application module 212C may include any program, software, or other code suitable for running one or more applications. For example, the application module 212C may include a payment application that can be used to conduct payment transactions. In some embodiments, the payment application may be configured to allow a user to select goods and services to purchase, obtain security credentials (e.g., cryptographic keys) from the issuer of the payment account, and / or initiate or perform a payment transaction (e.g., using security credentials). It is to be understood that the components described herein are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be limiting. In various embodiments, more or fewer components than those listed herein may be provided.
[0080] Figure 3 A block diagram of an access device 300 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The exemplary access device 300 may include a processor 302, an output element 304, an input element 306, a computer-readable medium 308, a device reader 310, a secure memory 312, and a network interface 314. The computer-readable medium 308 may include a device interaction module 308A, an encryption module 308B, and an authorization module 308C.
[0081] The one or more output elements 304 may include any suitable device that can output data. Examples of output elements 304 may include display screens, speakers, and data transmission devices.
[0082] The one or more input elements 306 may include any suitable device capable of inputting data into the access device 300. Examples of input devices include buttons, touch screens, touch pads, microphones, and the like.
[0083] Device reader 310 may include any suitable device capable of reading data from a communication device such as an access card (e.g., a credit card). Device reader 310 includes an antenna, electrical contacts, etc., and may read data on a memory chip or magnetic stripe on a portable device such as a card.
[0084] The computer-readable medium 308 may include code that can be executed by the processor 302 to implement a method, the method comprising: transmitting a resource provider certificate and an access device certificate from an access device to a communication device; establishing a secure channel between the access device and the communication device using data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate; and transmitting data to or receiving data from the communication device using the secure channel.
[0085] The device interaction module 308A may include computer code executable by the processor 302 to allow the access device 300 to communicate with an external device, such as a communication device.
[0086] The encryption module 308B may include any program, software or other code suitable for performing operations related to encryption and / or decryption. For example, the encryption module 308B may be configured to generate a shared secret, such as using a key protocol such as Diffie-Hellman, as described herein. The encryption module 308B may be further configured to derive a session key from a shared secret, such as using a key derivation function (KDF). In some embodiments, the encryption module 308B may be configured to store one or more static keys, such as a static access device private key and / or a static access device public key. In some embodiments, the encryption module 308B may be implemented using any combination of software (e.g., host card emulation or HCE) and hardware (e.g., hardware security module or HSM). The session key as described herein can be used to encrypt and / or decrypt data.
[0087] The authorization module 308C may include computer code executable by the processor 302 to generate and transmit an authorization request message and receive an authorization response message from an authorization computer.
[0088] The secure memory 312 may securely store encrypted access data, key identifiers, public keys, and any other relevant data. The secure memory 312 may be in the form of a secure element, a hardware security module, or any other suitable form of secure data storage.
[0089] The network interface 314 may include an interface that may allow the access device 300 to communicate with an external computer. The network interface 314 may enable the access device 300 to transmit data to and from another device (e.g., a resource provider computer, a communication device, etc.). Some examples of the network interface 314 may include a modem, a physical network interface (e.g., an Ethernet card or other network interface card (NIC)), a virtual network interface, a communication port, a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) slot and card, etc. The wireless protocols enabled by the network interface 314 may include Wi-Fi. TM .
[0090] Data transmitted via the network interface 314 may be in the form of signals, which may be electrical, electromagnetic, optical, or any other signals (collectively referred to as "electronic signals" or "electronic messages") capable of being received by an external communication interface. These electronic messages, which may include data or instructions, may be provided between the network interface 314 and other devices via a communication path or channel. As described above, any suitable communication path or channel may be used, such as wire or cable, optical fiber, a telephone line, a cellular link, a radio frequency (RF) link, a WAN or LAN network, the Internet, or any other suitable medium.
[0091] Figure 4 A block diagram of an authorization computer 400 according to some embodiments of the present invention is shown. The exemplary authorization computer 400 may include a processor 402, an output element 404, an input element 406, a computer readable medium 408, a secure memory 412, and a network interface 414. The computer readable medium 408 may include an interaction processing module 408A and a verification module 408B.
[0092] The one or more output elements 404 may include any suitable device that can output data. The output element 404 may be similar to the output element 304 described above. The one or more input elements 406 may be similar to the input element 306 described above.
[0093] The computer readable medium 408 may include code executable by the processor 402. The computer readable medium 408 may contain any number of applications, modules, and code.
[0094] The interaction processing module 408A may include code executable by the processor 402 to process access data, such as transaction data. Such processing may include performing fraud analysis and determining whether the authorization request message should be approved or denied.
[0095] The secure memory 412 may securely store encrypted access data, key identifiers, public keys, and any other relevant data. The secure memory 412 may be similar to the secure memory 312 described above. The network interface 414 may include an interface that may allow the authorized computer 400 to communicate with an external computer. The network interface 414 may be similar to the network interface 314 described above.
[0096] Figure 5 A flow chart of a method for generating a resource provider key and a certificate according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 5 The method described in the will be described in the context of a resource provider computer communicating with a certificate authority to generate a resource provider key pair and a resource provider public key certificate. However, it should be understood that the present invention is applicable to other situations (e.g., a server computer requests a certificate, etc.). Although the steps are shown in a particular order, it should be understood that embodiments of the present invention may include methods with steps performed in a different order. In addition, steps may be omitted or added and these steps may still be within embodiments of the present invention.
[0097] Figure 5 The method described in can use the Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificate scheme over a second-generation secure channel, see (M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)", Certicom Research, 2013). Note that the ECQV certificate scheme as described in this article saves 64 bytes compared to other certificate schemes.
[0098] In step 510, the certificate authority 502 may generate a certificate authority ECC key pair, also referred to as a CA key pair. The CA key pair may include a certificate authority private key dca and a certificate authority public key Pca. The certificate authority 502 may generate the CA key pair at any suitable time before step 520, and may be performed independently of other devices such as the resource provider computer 504. The certificate authority 502 may store the CA key pair in a secure memory or other suitable database.
[0099] For example, the certificate authority 502 may determine the private key using any suitable method known to those skilled in the art. The certificate authority 502 may determine the certificate authority public key Pca based on the certificate authority private key dca and the generator point G. The generator point G may be a generator point of the P-256 elliptic curve, as described in [“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013.], however, it should be understood that other generator points may be used. The certificate authority 502 may calculate Pca=dca.G. The “dot” symbol (i.e., “.”) may represent ECC point multiplication. Elliptic curve point multiplication may include the operation of repeatedly adding points to itself along an elliptic curve. In some embodiments, elliptic curve point multiplication may be referred to as elliptic curve scalar multiplication and may be written in the Hessian form of an elliptic curve.
[0100] In some embodiments, the certificate authority 502 may make the certificate authority public key Pca available to other computers. In some embodiments, after step 510 and before step 560, the resource provider computer 504 may retrieve the certificate authority public key Pca from the certificate authority 502. For example, the resource provider computer 504 may transmit a request for the certificate authority public key Pca and / or the CA certificate to the certificate authority 502. The certificate authority 502 may respond by transmitting the certificate authority public key Pca and / or the CA certificate to the resource provider computer 504.
[0101] In step 520, the resource provider computer 504 can generate a certificate request value, also referred to as a resource provider certificate request value. The resource provider certificate request value may include an ECC point Rm and a merchant identifier Mid, also referred to as a resource provider identifier. The resource provider computer 504 can determine the first ECC point Rm based on a first random value km. The resource provider computer 504 can generate the first random value km in any suitable manner, for example, using a random number and / or a pseudo-random number generator to generate the first random value. The first random value km can have any suitable length, such as the order of an elliptic curve base point (i.e., 265 bits of curve P-256). The resource provider identifier Mid can be any suitable identifier. For example, the resource provider identifier Mid can be an alphanumeric string.
[0102] The resource provider computer 504 may determine a first ECC point Rm based on the first random value km and a generator point G. The generator point G may be a generator point of a P-256 elliptic curve, as described in [CFKerry, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013.], which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes. The generator point G may be the same generator point used by the certificate authority 502 at step 510. The first ECC point Rm may be determined, for example, by calculating Rm=km.G.
[0103] The generation point G may be a public value that can be shared with other devices, such as the certificate authority 502. In some embodiments, the generation point G may be part of a standard used by the certificate authority 502, which may be known and / or received through other devices (e.g., a resource provider computer, a communication device, etc.). This step may be similar to generating an ECC public key, but the first ECC point Rm is not used as a public key. The first random value km may be retained by the resource provider computer 504 and not disclosed to the certificate authority 502.
[0104] At step 530, after generating the certificate request value including the merchant identifier Mid and the first ECC point Rm, the resource provider computer 504 may transmit the certificate request message to the certificate authority 502. The certificate request message may include the certificate request value. The resource provider computer 504 may transmit the certificate request message to the certificate authority 502 in any suitable manner as described herein.
[0105] In step 540, after receiving the certificate request message from the resource provider computer 504, the certificate authority 502 may generate a resource provider public key certificate, also referred to as a merchant public key certificate MCertificate. The certificate authority 502 may generate a resource provider public key certificate as described below and further described in detail in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 3.4, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0106] For example, generating a resource provider public key certificate may include the following. The certificate authority 502 may generate a second random value kca using any suitable method described herein. The second random value kca may have any suitable length, for example, 256 bits. For example, if a P-256 curve is used as described herein, each integer generated may be 256 bits. In addition, the x and y coordinates of the ECC point may also be 256 bits. The certificate authority 502 may then determine a second ECC point Pm. The certificate authority 502 may determine a second ECC point Pm based on the first ECC point Rm, the second random value kca, and the generated point G received in the certificate request message. The second ECC point Pm may be determined by calculating Pm=Rm+(kca.G).
[0107] The certificate authority 502 may then determine the resource provider public key certificate, i.e., MCertificate. The resource provider public key certificate MCertificate may include the second ECC point Pm and the resource provider identifier Mid. In some embodiments, the resource provider public key certificate MCertificate may include any other suitable data, such as the expiration date of the certificate, the effective date of the certificate, the serial number of the certificate, the subject, the issuer, etc.
[0108] After determining the resource provider public key certificate MCertificate, the certificate authority 502 may determine a first hash value em of the hash of the resource provider public key certificate MCertificate. The hash may be any suitable cryptographic hash function. For example, to determine the first hash value em, the certificate authority 502 may calculate em=hash(Mcertificate). For the P-256 curve, a hash algorithm with a 32-byte output may be used, for example, SHA256 is suitable. Hashing an integer modulus n is further described in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 2.3, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0109] The certificate authority 502 may also determine a private key derivation value rm. The private key derivation value rm may be a value that enables the resource provider computer 504 to determine the resource provider private key dmerch. The certificate authority 502 may determine the private key derivation value rm based on the first hash value em, the second random value kca, the certificate authority private key dca, and the order n of the elliptic curve. The order n of the elliptic curve may be a public value described in [CFKerry, Appendix D1.2.3 of "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013.]. For example, the certificate authority 502 may determine the private key derivation value rm by calculating rm=(em.kca+dca)(mod(n)), where mod is a modulus operator. In some embodiments, the order n of the elliptic curve may be a value included in the standard of the certificate authority 502. The resource provider computer 504 is capable of retrieving the value of the order n of the elliptic curve while retrieving the certificate authority public key Pca described above.
[0110] In step 550, after determining the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate and the private key derived value rm, the certificate authority 502 may send a certificate response message to the resource provider computer 504. The certificate response message may include the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate and the private key derived value rm.
[0111] In step 560, after receiving the certificate response message, the resource provider computer 504 may determine the resource provider ECC key pair. Determining the resource provider ECC key pair may include the following operations. The resource provider computer 504 may determine a first hash value em of a hash of the resource provider public key certificate rm. The hash function may be any suitable hash function as described herein. For example, to determine the first hash value em, the resource provider computer 504 may calculate em=hash (Mcertificate). In some embodiments, the hash function used by the resource provider computer 504 may be the same as the hash function used by the certificate authority 502, so the first hash value em may be the same as the value determined by both the resource provider computer 504 and the certificate authority 502.
[0112] Then, the resource provider computer 504 can determine the resource provider private key dmerch based on the first hash value em, the first random value km, the private key derivation value rm and the order n of the elliptic curve. For example, the resource provider computer 504 can determine the resource provider private key dmerch by calculating dmerch=(em.km+rm)(mod(n)). The resource provider computer 504 can also determine the resource provider public key Pmerch based on the first hash value em, the second ECC point Pm included in the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate and the certificate authority public key Pca. The elements of step 560 are further described in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 3.6, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0113] The resource provider computer 504 may store the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate in any suitable manner as described herein. In addition, the resource provider computer 504 may securely store the resource provider public key Pmerch and the resource provider private key dmerch.
[0114] Figure 6 A flow chart of a method for generating a key pair and a certificate for an access device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 6 The method described in the foregoing will be described in the context of a resource provider computer generating a certificate and a key pair for an access device. Although the steps are shown in a particular order, it should be understood that embodiments of the present invention may include methods having steps performed in a different order. In addition, steps may be omitted or added and still be within embodiments of the present invention.
[0115] exist Figure 6 In the example embodiment, the resource provider computer 504 can act as a sub-certificate issuing authority, which can generate access device public key certificates and access device key pairs. The resource provider computer 504 can generate access device public key certificates for one or more access devices. In some embodiments, the generated access device certificates can have an expiration date. When the expiration date comes, the corresponding access device can request a new certificate and key from the resource provider computer 504. In other embodiments, the resource provider computer 504 can store each generated certificate and key pair in a database, and can generate a new certificate and key pair when the key and certificate expire.
[0116] Prior to step 610, the resource provider computer 504 may generate and / or receive a certified ECC key pair, e.g. Figure 5The resource provider computer 504 can create a level 2 certificate for one or more access devices, such as access device 506, associated with the resource provider computer 504.
[0117] In step 610, the resource provider computer 504 may generate a random value kt and a first ECC point kt. The random value kt may be any suitable value and may be generated using a random number and / or pseudo-random number generator. The first ECC point kt may be generated, for example, by calculating Rt=kt.G, where the first ECC point Rt is determined based on the random value kt and the generated point G. The generated point G may be the same as Figure 5 The same generation point G as described in .
[0118] In this example, the resource provider computer 504 may generate the random value kt and the first ECC point Rt on behalf of the access device 506. However, it should be understood that in other embodiments, the access device 506 may generate the random value kt and the first ECC point Rt and then transmit the random value kt and the first ECC point Rt to the resource provider computer 504 in a certificate request message.
[0119] At step 620, the resource provider computer 504 may create an access device public key certificate, also referred to as a terminal public key certificate TCertificate, using ECQV techniques as described herein. For example, during step 620, the resource provider computer 504 may first generate a random value km'. Then, the resource provider computer 504 may determine a second ECC point Pt based on the first ECC point Rt, the random value km', and the generated point G. For example, the second ECC point Pt may be determined by calculating Pt = Rt + (km'.G).
[0120] The resource provider computer 504 may then determine the access device public key certificate, i.e., TCertificate. The access device public key certificate TCertificate may include the first ECC point Pt and the access device identifier Tid. In some embodiments, the access device public key certificate TCertificate may include any other suitable data, such as an expiration date of the TCertificate, a valid date of the TCertificate, etc. The access device identifier Tid may be any suitable identifier for identifying the access device 506. In some embodiments, the resource provider computer 504 may store a list of access device identifiers corresponding to access devices associated with and / or operated by a resource provider.
[0121] At step 630, after creating the access device public key certificate TCertificate, the resource provider computer 504 may derive the access device key pair of the access device 506. For example, determining the access device key pair may include the following operations. The resource provider computer 504 may determine a first hash value et of a hash function performed on the access device public key certificate TCertificate. The hash function may be any suitable hash function as described herein. For example, to determine the first hash value et, the resource provider computer 504 may calculate et=hash(Tcertificate).
[0122] After determining the first hash value et, the resource provider computer 504 may generate a private key derived value et based on the first hash value et, the random value kt, the resource provider private key dmerch, and the order n of the elliptic curve. For example, the resource provider computer 504 may calculate rt=(et.kt+dmerch)(mod(n)), where mod is a modulus operator.
[0123] Then, the resource provider computer 504 may determine the access device private key dterm. The resource provider computer 504 may determine the access device private key dterm based on the first hash value et, the random value kt, the private key derived value kt, and the order n of the elliptic curve. For example, the resource provider computer 504 may determine the access device private key dterm by calculating dterm=(et.kt+rt)(mod(n)).
[0124] The resource provider computer 504 may also determine the access device public key Pterm based on the first hash value et, the second ECC point Pt and the resource provider public key Pmerch. The elements of step 630 are further described in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 3.6, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0125] In step 640, the resource provider computer 504 may transmit the access device public key certificate TCertificate, the access device public key Pterm, and the access device private key dterm to the access device 506. The resource provider computer 504 may have an access device management system that enables the resource provider computer 504 to transmit this data securely, for example, authenticated and with confidentiality and integrity. In some embodiments, the resource provider computer 504 may also transmit the resource provider public key certificate MCertificate to the access device 506.
[0126] In other embodiments, after the resource provider computer 504 determines the access device public key Pterm, the access device 506 may receive the access device public key Pterm from the resource provider computer 504 .
[0127] After step 640, the access device 506 may store the access device certificate TCertificate and the resource provider certificate MCertificate. The access device 506 may also store the access device private key dterm and the access device public key Pterm.
[0128] Furthermore, in some embodiments, the resource provider computer 504 may create more than one access device certificate for more than one access device. For example, the resource provider computer 504 may manage more than one access device and may create an access device certificate for each of the managed access devices.
[0129] Fig. 7A -C shows a flow chart of an interaction processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Fig. 7A The method described in -C will be described in the context of a communication device performing an interaction with an access device. Although the steps are shown in a particular order, it should be understood that embodiments of the present invention may include methods with steps performed in a different order. In addition, steps may be omitted or added and still be within embodiments of the present invention.
[0130] When communication device 508 is presented to access device 506 during an interaction, such as a transaction, Fig. 7A - The steps in C may occur. Some embodiments of the present invention may include a Quick Visa Smart Debit / Credit (qVSDC) protocol.
[0131] Before the access device 506 and the communication device 508 enter the communication range, an initial setup phase may be performed. The initial setup phase may include steps 700-702. After the initial setup phase, when the access device 506 and the communication device 508 enter the communication range, a processing phase may be performed. The processing phase may include steps 704-740.
[0132] In step 700, the access device 506 may be configured with a certificate (e.g., an ECQV certificate) for access device authentication. The certificate may include an access device public key certificate Tcertificate and a resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate, which may be received from the resource provider computer 504, such as Figure 6The access device 506 may also be configured with an access device key pair including an access device public key Pterm and an access device private key dterm. In some embodiments, the access device 506 may be configured with a CA public key certificate of the certificate authority 502. For example, the access device 506 may receive the CA public key certificate from the resource provider computer 504.
[0133] In step 702, the communication device 508 may be configured with a CA public key Pca. The communication device 508 may also be configured with a communication device public key / private key pair including a communication device public key Qc and a communication device private key dc. In some embodiments, the CA public key Pca, the communication device public key Qc, and / or the communication device private key dc may be stored on the communication device 508 during the manufacture of the communication device 508. In other embodiments, the CA public key Pca, the communication device public key Qc, and / or the communication device private key dc may be periodically provisioned to the communication device 508, such as once a day, once a week, twice a month, etc. In some embodiments, the communication device 508 may be further configured with a CA public key certificate of the certificate authority 502.
[0134] At step 704, after the initial setup phase and after the communication device 508 is detected (e.g., within communication range), the access device 506 may transmit a selection command to the communication device 508. The selection command may be a select proximity payment system environment (PPSE) command, which may be used to identify the payment environment supported by the access device 506 and the communication device 508. The PPSE command may also include information about which payment application(s) (e.g., a list of application identifiers (AIDs)) may be used on the communication device 508.
[0135] At step 706, upon receiving the select command from the access device 506, the communication device 508 may respond to the select command with a select response (i.e., an available application response). For example, the communication device 508 may include an application that may identify and process the request by identifying a payment environment identifier (e.g., a PPSE name) included in the request, and respond by sending an available application response back to the access device 506. The available application response may include a list of available AIDs, and may include a payment environment identifier (e.g., a PPSE name). In some embodiments, the available application response may be in the form of a select PPSE response, and may include PPSE file control information (FCI).
[0136] At step 708, after receiving the selection response (i.e., PPSEFCI), the access device 506 may transmit a select AID request to the communication device 508. The select AID request may request the communication device 508 to select a payment application. For example, when the access device 506 receives the available application response, the access device 506 may select a suitable application from the list of applications received in the available application response (e.g., by selecting an AID from the available AIDs received in the available application response). In some cases, the selected AID may be the highest priority AID available that is supported by the access device 506. The access device 506 may select the application selection with the selected AID to be sent to the application on the communication device 508 in the form of a select AID request.
[0137] At step 710, after receiving the select AID request from the access device 506, the communication device 508 may begin executing the application corresponding to the AID selected by the access device 506. For example, the selected AID may be an application, such as a payment application. The payment application may generate a blinding factor r, a temporary blind public key rQc, and an unpredictable number UNc. The blinding factor r may be a random value generated using one or more random number generators and / or one or more pseudo-random number generators. The blinding factor may be in any suitable range, such as in the range (0, 1) κ , where κ may be a security parameter that enables the generation of a suitable number of random bits (eg, 256 bits for curve P-256).
[0138] The communication device 508 may create a temporary blind public key rQc by blinding the communication device public key Qc with a blinding factor r. The communication device public key Qc may be blinded using ECC and / or RSA blinding techniques. In addition, as described herein, the unpredictable number UNc may be created in any suitable manner. For example, the unpredictable number UNc may be randomly generated. In some embodiments, the unpredictable number UNc may be the result of a process performed on the communication device 508.
[0139] At step 712, the communication device 508 may send a select AID response to the access device 506. In some embodiments, the select AID response may include an AID file control information (FCI) having the selected AID as a dedicated file name. The select AID response may include a list of transaction data identifiers for requesting appropriate data from the access device 506, and the list of transaction data identifiers may be in the form of a processing option data object list (PDOL). The transaction data requested by the application on the communication device 102 may include a terminal transaction qualifier (TTQ), an authorization amount, other amounts, a terminal country code, a terminal verification result, a transaction currency code, transaction data, a transaction type, and / or an unpredictable number. The select AID response may also include other data, such as FCI issuer discretionary data, an application identifier, and a language preference.
[0140] The AID response may further include a request for a random value s, an access device public key certificate Tcertificate, and a resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate. For example, the request may be {s, Tcertificate, Mcertificate}. In addition, the file control information (FCI) may include a BF0C tag, and may include discretionary data, such as but not limited to an index Pca, a temporary blind public key rQc, and an unpredictable number UNc. The index Pca may be a certificate authority public key index, which may identify the public key of the certificate authority. In some embodiments, the access device 506 may evaluate the Pca index to determine whether the access device 506 and the communication device 508 are associated with the same certificate authority.
[0141] In some embodiments, the access device 506 may receive the communication device public key Qc. In other embodiments, the access device 506 may receive a temporary blind public key rQc, also referred to as a blind public key.
[0142] In step 714, in addition to the presence of the temporary blind public key rQc and the unpredictable number UNc, the presence of the request including {s, Tcertificate, Mcertificate} in the Select AID response can indicate to the access device 506 the processing capability of the communication device 508 to support terminal authentication. For example, the access device 506 can evaluate the Select AID response and determine whether the Select AID response includes the request {s, Tcertificate, Mcertificate}. The access device 506 can also determine whether the Select AID response includes the temporary blind public key rQc and the unpredictable number UNc.
[0143] If the access device 506 determines that it has received the request {s, Tcertificate, Mcertificate}, the temporary blind public key rQc, and the unpredictable number UNc, the access device 506 may generate a random value s in any suitable manner as described herein. The access device 506 may also use a key derivation function to derive the first session key. The input to the key derivation function may include the random value s, the access device private key dterm, the temporary blind public key rQc, and the unpredictable number UNc. The output of the key derivation function may be the first session key.
[0144] In other embodiments, the access device 506 may use the access device private key dterm and the communication device public key Qc to determine the first session key.
[0145] The derivation of the first session key can utilize the Diffie-Hellman technique. Diffie-Hellman is a way of generating a shared secret between two people in such a way that the secret cannot be seen or determined by observing the communication. The shared secret can then be used to determine an encryption key, in this case the first session key or the second session key. This is beneficial because an eavesdropper cannot determine the shared secret even if the messages between the access device and the communication device are recorded and later analyzed. For additional details on the Diffie-Hellman technique, see at least [Diffie, W. and Hellman, M. "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-22, 6 (November 1976), 644-654], which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes. In addition, the key derivation function can be any suitable key derivation function known to a person of ordinary skill in the art. For example, the key derivation function can be an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) based KDF, such as the HKDF described in [Krawczyk, Hugo "Password extraction and key derivation: The HKDF scheme", Cryptography Electronic Print Archive. International Cryptologic Research Association, (2010).], which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety for all purposes.
[0146] Reference Figure 7BIn step 716, after generating the first session key, the access device 506 may create a Get Processing Options (GPO) request including a random value s, an access device public key certificate Tcertificate, and a resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate. The GPO request may also include the access device transaction data requested by the communication device 508 in the Select AID response. In some embodiments, the GPO request may include the requested terminal transaction data in a Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL). In some embodiments, the terminal transaction data (e.g., a terminal transaction qualifier (TTQ)) may include a transaction type indicator indicating whether the access device 506 supports integrated chip-based transactions or magnetic stripe-based transactions. Therefore, the access device 506 may send the transaction type indicator in the terminal transaction data to indicate that the access device 506 supports integrated chip-based transactions. In some embodiments, the terminal transaction data (e.g., the terminal transaction qualifier TTQ)) may also include a consumer verification method (CVM) requirement indicator indicating whether the access device 506 needs a CVM and a CVM type indicator indicating the CVM type supported by the access device 506. Examples of CMs that may be supported by the access device 506 may include an online personal identification number (PIN), a signature, and / or a consumer device CVM (CDCVM) such as for a password on the communication device 508 .
[0147] In some embodiments, the access device 506 may transmit the resource provider certificate Mcertificate and the access device certificate Tcertificate to the communication device 508. A secure channel may then be established between the access device 506 and the communication device 508. For example, as described above, the access device 506 may determine a first session key, and as described in further detail below, the communication device 508 may determine a second session key. The first session key and the second session key may be the same and may be used to establish a secure channel between the access device 506 and the communication device 508.
[0148] The access device 506 may use the first session key to encrypt the transaction data in the GPO request. Encrypting the access device transaction data at this time can prevent indicators such as terminal transaction qualifiers from being maliciously manipulated, and the terminal transaction qualifiers are used by the access device 506 to indicate, for example, whether cardholder verification is required. After encrypting the data in the GPO request, the access device 506 may transmit the GPO request to the communication device 508. In some embodiments, the random value s, the access device public key certificate Tcertificate, and the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate may be transmitted as plaintext data. Therefore, the communication device 508 can access s, Tcertificate, and Mcertificate, and as described herein, the communication device 508 can be used to derive a second session key to decrypt the transaction data and / or other communications with the access device 506.
[0149] In step 718, after receiving the GPO request from the access device 506, the communication device 508 may determine whether the access device public key certificate Tcertificate and the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate are included in the GPO request. If the communication device 508 determines that the access device public key certificate Tcertificate and / or the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate are not included in the GPO request, the communication device 508 may terminate the communication with the access device 506, or in other embodiments, may resume processing applicable to access devices that do not support encrypted communication.
[0150] If the communication device 508 determines that both the access device public key certificate Tcertificate and the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate are included in the GPO request, the communication device 508 may determine to proceed to step 720 .
[0151] In step 720, the communication device 508 may use the data in the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate and use the CA public key Pca to determine the resource provider public key Pmerch. The data in the resource provider public key certificate may include the ECC point Pm. For example, in some embodiments, the determined resource provider public key Pmerch may include the following. The communication device 508 may decode the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate according to the certificate decoding method and rules to determine an octet string, which may be converted to a point using an octet string to elliptic curve point conversion. The communication device 508 may then determine the result of the hash of the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate. The communication device 508 may then determine the resource provider public key Pmerch using the result of the hash function, the point Pm, and the CA public key Pca. Additional details of determining the resource provider public key Pmerch are described in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC 4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 3.5, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0152] In some embodiments, the communication device 508 may extract data from the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate, such as the ECC point Pm. The communication device 508 may then determine a hash value em of a hash of the resource provider public key certificate Mcertificate, as described herein. The communication device 508 may then determine the resource provider public key Pmerch using the hash value em, the ECC point Pm, and the CA public key Pca, for example, by calculating Pmerch=(em.Pm)+Pca.
[0153] In step 722, after determining the resource provider public key Pmerch, the communication device 508 may use the data in the access device public key certificate Tcertificate and the resource provider public key Pmerch to determine the access device public key Pterm. The data in the access device public key certificate Tcertificate may include an ECC point Pt. For example, the communication device 508 may decode the access device public key certificate Tcertificate according to the certificate decoding method and rules to determine an octet string, which may be converted to a point using an octet string to elliptic curve point conversion. The communication device 508 may then determine the result of the hash of the access device public key certificate Tcertificate. The communication device 508 may then determine the access device public key Pterm using the result of the hash function, the point Pt, and the resource provider public key Pmerch. Additional details of the processing performed in this step are described in the following document: [M. Campagna "Standards for Efficient Cryptography, SEC4: Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV)" Section 3.5, Certicom Research, 2013].
[0154] In some embodiments, the communication device 508 may extract data from the access device public key certificate Tcertificate, such as the ECC point Pt. The communication device 508 may then determine a hash value et of a hash of the resource provider public key certificate Tcertificate, as described herein. The communication device 508 may then determine the access device public key Pterm using the hash value et, the ECC point Pt, and the resource provider public key Pmerch, for example, by calculating Pterm=(et.Pt)+Pmerch.
[0155] At step 724, the communication device 508 may use a key derivation function (KDF) to derive the second session key, as described herein. The inputs to the key derivation function may be a random value s (received in a GPO request from the access device 506), an access device public key Pterm, a communication device private key dc, a blinding factor r, and an unpredictable number UNc. The KDF may be the same as the KDF used by the access device 506 to determine the first session key described above, for example, at step 714.
[0156] If all input data elements of the KDF are expanded, it can be seen that the input data used to derive the first session key is the same as the input data used to derive the first session key used by access device 506 in step 714. Therefore, due to the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman technique, the first session key is equivalent to the second session key.
[0157] To demonstrate this, the access device 506 generates a first session key based on the random value s, the access device private key dterm, the temporary blind public key rQc, and the unpredictable number UNc. The temporary blind public key rQc is created using the blinding factor r and the communication device public key Qc, which is an elliptic curve point: Qc=dc.G, where dc is the communication device private key, and where G is the generating point of the curve. Therefore, the first session key is generated using the following input data: {s, dterm, r, dc, G, UNc}.
[0158] The communication device 508 generates a second session key based on the random value s and the access device public key Pterm, and the communication device private key dc, the blinding factor r, and the unpredictable number UNc, wherein the access device public key is an elliptic curve point: Pterm=dterm.G, where dterm is the access device private key, and where G is the generating point of the curve. Therefore, the second session key is generated using the following input data: {s, dterm, r, dc, G, UNc}. Therefore, the first session key and the second session key are the same, thereby allowing the access device 506 and the communication device 508 to communicate securely.
[0159] The access device 506 and the communication device 508 can use the data from the resource provider certificate and the access device certificate to establish a secure channel between the access device 506 and the communication device 508. For example, the communication device 508 can use the access device public key and the communication device private key to derive the second session key, wherein the first session key is used to form a secure channel. After the secure channel is established, the access device 506 can use the secure channel to transmit data to the communication device 508 and / or receive data from the communication device 508. In some embodiments, the access device 506 and the communication device 508 form a secure channel without authenticating each other. For example, before transmitting encrypted data to the communication device 508 in the established secure channel, the access device 506 does not need to transmit an authentication request message to the communication device 508 and wait for an authentication response message from the communication device 508. Similarly, before communicating via the secure channel, the communication device 508 does not need to transmit an authentication request to the access device 506 and receive a response message from the access device. Next, the data transmitted and / or received after the secure channel is established will be discussed.
[0160] Reference Figure 7CAt step 726, after generating the second session key, the communication device 508 may generate response data in response to the GPO request. The communication device 508 may use at least some of the received access device transaction data to generate dynamic transaction processing information, and may transmit a set of transaction processing information including the generated dynamic transaction processing information to the access device 506. In some embodiments, the transaction processing information may be sent in the form of a GPO response. In some embodiments, the transaction processing information may include one or more application file locators (AFLs) that may be used by the access device 506 as file addresses to read account data stored on the communication device 508, and an application exchange profile (AIP) that may be used to indicate the capabilities of the application. The communication device 508 may encrypt the GPO response using the second session key.
[0161] At step 728, the communication device 508 may transmit a GPO response including the encrypted data, which is encrypted with the second session key, to the access device 506. At step 730, upon receiving the GPO response, the access device 506, which has derived the first session key at step 714, may decrypt the encrypted data received in the GPO response from the communication device 508.
[0162] After the access device 506 decrypts the transaction processing information, the access device 506 may send an account data request to the application of the communication device 508 to read additional account data that may be stored on the communication device 508. In some embodiments, the account data request may be in the form of a read record command and may include an indicator indicating the address or location of the account data that the access device 506 is attempting to read. The indicator included in the account data request may correspond to the AFL in the transaction processing information provided from the communication device 508. At step 732, the access device 506 may issue one or more read record commands to the communication device 508.
[0163] In response to receiving the read record command from the access device 506, the communication device 508 may encrypt the record data using the second session key at step 734. In some embodiments, the record data may include account data. The account data may include, for example, application usage controls indicating the issuer's restrictions on the use and services allowed by the application, the cardholder's name, account number, payment token, consumer-specific data, issuer country code, token requester ID (e.g., whether a token is used), and / or other account-related data accessible at the AFL location. In step 736, after encrypting the record data with the second session key, the communication device 508 may transmit the encrypted record data to the access device 506. In some embodiments, the communication device 508 may include the blinding factor r and the communication device public key Qc in the response.
[0164] At step 738, after receiving the encrypted recorded data, the access device 506 may decrypt the encrypted recorded data using the first session key to obtain the recorded data. At step 740, when the recorded data has been received and decrypted, the access device 506 may verify the secure channel using a certificate (e.g., a communication device certificate) and other data provided by the communication device 508. The data elements used to verify the secure channel may include: 1) a temporary blind public key rQc (received by the access device 506 in step 712); 2) a blinding factor r (received by the access device 506 in the GPO response at step 728 and / or received by the access device in the recorded data at step 736); and 3) a communication device public key Qc (received by the access device 506 in the recorded data at step 736).
[0165] Verification may involve the access device 506 verifying that the temporary blind public key rQc is equal to the communication device public key Qc blinded with the blinding factor r (i.e., rQc=r.Qc), thereby indicating that the data received from the communication device 508 originated from the device (i.e., the communication device 508) having the communication device private key dc, which corresponds to the communication device public key included in the communication device public key certificate. It should be noted that steps 738 and 740 may occur after the communication device 508 has moved away from the vicinity (i.e., communication range) of the access device 506.
[0166] For example, in some embodiments, the access device 506 may receive the communication device public key Qc and the blinding factor r. The access device 506 may then verify that the blind public key (ie, the temporary blind public key rQc) is equal to the communication device public key Qc blinded with the blinding factor r.
[0167] In some embodiments, the access device 506 may receive one or more public key certificates from the communication device 508. The access device 506 may authenticate the communication device public key (e.g., Qc) using a suitable certificate verification technique (including ECC-based techniques such as ECDSA, ECSDSA, or ECQV, or RSA-based techniques). This step may assure the access device 506 that the data from the communication device 508 is provided by an authentic device.
[0168] For example, communication device 508 may provide at least one public key certificate (i.e., communication device public key certificate, certificate authority public key certificate, etc.) to access device 506. Upon receiving the at least one public key certificate, access device 506 may verify the at least one public key certificate in any suitable manner as described herein.
[0169] Once access device 506 has received the necessary data (i.e., record data) from the transaction processing information and / or one or more account data transmissions, some or all of the data elements in the transaction processing information and / or one or more account data transmissions may be used by access device 506 to generate a transaction authorization request message to request authorization of the transaction from the issuer.
[0170] As another example, refer to Figure 1 , the transaction processing system may include a communication device having access data. The communication device 102 may be operated by a user. The user may use the communication device 102 to pay for goods or services at a resource provider, such as a merchant. The resource provider may operate a resource provider computer 106 and / or an access device 104. The resource provider may communicate with an authorization computer 114 (e.g., an issuer computer) via a transmission computer 110 (e.g., an acquirer computer) and a processing network 112 (e.g., a payment processing network).
[0171] The processing network 112 may include data processing subsystems, networks, and operations to support and deliver authorization services, exception file services, and clearing and settlement services. Exemplary payment processing networks may include VisaNet TM For example, VisaNet TM Payment processing networks such as VisaNet can process credit card transactions, debit card transactions and other types of commercial transactions. TM Specifically, it includes the VIP system (Visa Integrated Payment System) that processes authorization requests, and the Base II system that performs clearing and settlement services. The payment processing network can use any suitable wired or wireless network, including the Internet.
[0172] A typical payment transaction flow using the communication device 102 at an access device 104 (e.g., a POS location) can be described as follows. A user presents his communication device 102 to the access device 104 to pay for an item or service. The communication device 102 and the access device 104 can interact so that access data (e.g., PAN, payment token, verification value, expiration date, etc.) from the communication device 102 is received by the access device 104 (e.g., via a contact or contactless interface). As described above, the communication device 102 and the access device 104 can generate a session key. The communication device 102 can transmit data encrypted with a second session key to the access device 104. If the access device 104 is honest, that is, the access device 104 has provided a valid resource provider public key certificate and a valid access device public key certificate to the communication device 102, the access device 104 is able to decrypt the received encrypted data. If the access device 104 is an honest access device, the access device 104 is able to generate a correct session key that can decrypt the encrypted data, and then the information can be transmitted to the resource provider computer 106.
[0173] The resource provider computer 106 may then receive this information (i.e., access data) from the access device 104 via the external communication interface. The resource provider computer 106 may then generate an authorization request message including the information received from the access device 104 (i.e., information corresponding to the communication device 102) and additional transaction information (e.g., transaction amount, merchant-specific information, etc.), and electronically transmit this information to the transmission computer 110. The transmission computer 110 may then receive, process, and forward the authorization request message to the processing network 112 for authorization.
[0174] In general, before a credit or debit card transaction occurs, the processing network 112 has an established agreement with each authorization computer regarding how transactions with issuers will be authorized. The processing network 112 may receive the authorization request message, determine the issuer associated with the communication device 102, and forward the authorization request message for the transaction to the authorization computer 114 for verification and authorization. Once the transaction is authorized, the authorization computer 114 may generate an authorization response message (which may include an authorization code indicating that the transaction is approved or denied) and transmit this electronic message to the processing network 112 via its external communication interface. The processing network 112 may then forward the authorization response message to the transmission computer 110, which in turn may then transmit an electronic message (e.g., an authorization response message) including an authorization indication to the resource provider computer 106 and then to the access device 104.
[0175] At the end of the day or at some other suitable time interval, a clearing and settlement process may be performed for the transaction between the resource provider computer 106, the transmission computer 110, the processing network 112, and the authorization computer 114.
[0176] Embodiments of the present invention have several advantages. For example, the communication device can transmit data encrypted with the second session key to the access device without authenticating the identity of the access device. The transmitted encrypted data is protected from attack by a malicious access device, but can be decrypted by an honest access device. Therefore, embodiments of the present invention are more efficient than systems in which the communication device and the access device must first authenticate before transmitting sensitive encrypted data.
[0177] In addition, embodiments allow the access device to verify the public key and temporary blind public key of the communication device after receiving the encrypted data. In this way, verification can be performed by the access device without the need for additional messages strictly for authentication. In addition, embodiments of the present invention allow efficient implicit authentication between the access device and the communication device because the devices do not need to send additional messages strictly for authentication and use ECQV certificates, which can save 64 bytes compared to other certificate schemes, thereby allowing fast interaction between devices.
[0178] Any software components or functions described in this application may be implemented as software code executed by a processor using any suitable computer language such as Java, C, C++, C#, Objective-C, Swift, or a scripting language such as Perl or Python using, for example, conventional or object-oriented techniques. The software code may be stored as a series of instructions or commands on a computer-readable medium for storage and / or transmission, suitable media including random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic media such as a hard drive or floppy disk, or optical media such as a compact disk (CD) or digital versatile disk (DVD), flash memory, etc. The computer-readable medium may be any combination of such storage or transmission devices.
[0179] Such programs can also be encoded and transmitted using carrier signals adapted to be transmitted via wired, optical and / or wireless networks that meet multiple protocols including the Internet. Therefore, the computer-readable medium according to an embodiment of the present invention can be created using data signals encoded with such programs. The computer-readable medium encoded with program code can be encapsulated with compatible devices or provided separately from other devices (e.g., downloaded via the Internet). Any such computer-readable medium can reside on or inside a single computer product (e.g., hard drive, CD or entire computer system), and can be present on or inside different computer products in a system or network. The computer system may include a monitor, a printer, or other suitable displays for providing any result mentioned herein to the user.
[0180] The above description is illustrative and non-restrictive. After those skilled in the art have read this disclosure, many variations of the present invention will become apparent to them. Therefore, the scope of the present invention should not be determined with reference to the above description, but should be determined with reference to the pending claims and their full scope or equivalents.
[0181] One or more features of any embodiment may be combined with one or more features of any other embodiment without departing from the scope of the present invention.
[0182] As used herein, the use of "a," "an," or "the" is intended to mean "at least one" unless clearly indicated to the contrary.
Claims
1. A method comprising: The resource provider computer transmits the certificate request value to the certificate authority computer; Receiving, by the resource provider computer, a resource provider certificate from the certificate authority computer; Creating an access device certificate by the resource provider computer; as well as The access device certificate and the resource provider certificate are transmitted by the resource provider computer to the access device.
2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: A resource provider public key and a resource provider private key are determined by the resource provider computer using at least the resource provider certificate.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the certificate request value comprises a first elliptic curve cryptographic point and a resource provider identifier, wherein the certificate authority computer: The resource provider credential is generated using at least the credential request value. 4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the resource provider computer creates more than one access device certificate for more than one access device.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein before the resource provider computer transmits the certificate request value, the certificate authority computer generates a certificate authority key pair including a certificate authority public key and a certificate authority private key.
6. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: A resource provider public key and a resource provider private key are determined by the resource provider computer, the resource provider private key being determined using a hash of the resource provider certificate and a random value. 7 . The method of claim 6 , wherein the resource provider public key is determined using the resource provider certificate, the random value, and a private key derived value.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the access device is a POS terminal.
9. The method of claim 7, wherein the resource provider computer is a merchant computer operated by a merchant.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the access device is a POS terminal and the resource provider computer is a merchant computer operated by a merchant.
11. A resource provider computer, comprising: processor; Memory device; as well as A computer readable medium coupled to the processor, the computer readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to implement a method comprising: Transmitting the certificate request value to the certificate authority computer; receiving a resource provider certificate from the certificate authority computer; Creating access device credentials; and The access device certificate and the resource provider certificate are transmitted to an access device.
12. The resource provider computer of claim 11, wherein the method further comprises: At least a resource provider public key and a resource provider private key are determined using the resource provider certificate.
13. The resource provider computer of claim 11, wherein the certificate request value comprises a first elliptic curve cryptographic point and a resource provider identifier, wherein the certificate authority computer: The resource provider credential is generated using at least the credential request value.
14. The resource provider computer of claim 11, wherein the resource provider computer creates more than one access device credential for more than one access device.
15. A method comprising: Receiving, by the certificate authority computer, a certificate request value from the resource provider computer; generating a resource provider certificate by the certificate authority computer using the certificate request value; as well as A resource provider certificate is transmitted by the certificate authority computer to the resource provider computer, wherein the resource provider computer subsequently creates an access device certificate and transmits the access device certificate and the resource provider certificate to an access device.
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the certificate request value comprises a first elliptic curve cryptographic point and a resource provider identifier.
17. The method according to claim 15, further comprising: generating, by the certificate authority computer, a certificate authority key pair including a certificate authority public key and a certificate authority private key; generating, by the certificate authority computer, a private key export value based on the certificate authority private key; The private key derivative value is transmitted by the certificate authority computer to the resource provider computer and is used by the resource provider computer to determine a resource provider private key.
18. The method of claim 15, wherein after receiving the resource provider certificate, the resource provider computer uses at least the resource provider certificate to determine a resource provider public key and a resource provider private key.
19. The method of claim 15, wherein the resource provider computer is a merchant computer and the access device is a POS terminal.
20. A certificate authority computer, comprising: processor; as well as A computer readable medium comprising code executable by the processor to perform a method comprising: receiving a certificate request value from a resource provider computer; generating a resource provider credential using the credential request value; and transmitting a resource provider certificate to the resource provider computer, The resource provider computer then creates an access device certificate and transmits the access device certificate and the resource provider certificate to the access device.
