A method and device for computing train authorization in response to track circuit abnormality by a radio block center supporting mobile block

Abstract

This invention discloses a method and apparatus for calculating train permits in response to track circuit anomalies in a radio block center supporting moving block, applied in the field of data processing technology. For track circuit anomaly scenarios, this invention first acquires multi-source data (track circuit anomaly, train operation, on-site confirmation, etc.), and after preliminary judgment, activates a shortened train permit protection mechanism to generate initial safety data; then, after multi-source data processing, a section clearing command is issued and double-verified to determine the command's legality; next, the data is parsed to determine the lead car and generate a guidance mode permit, triggering track clearing interaction; subsequently, it monitors and determines whether the train has completely exited the faulty section to complete the clearing; based on the aforementioned results and combined with line parameters, speed limits are set and train permits are calculated; finally, the fault status is monitored, and after it is cleared, the speed limit is canceled, and the permit is calculated according to the normal state, achieving safe and efficient train permit calculation in anomaly scenarios.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data processing technology, and in particular to a method and apparatus for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies in a radio block center supporting moving block. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, China's Train Control System (CTCS) primarily relies on fixed block or quasi-moving block technology, using track circuits, transponders, and Radio Block Centers (RBCs) to achieve train positioning and interval control. Traditional CTCS-2 / CTCS-3 level train control systems use a fixed block system, dividing the track into multiple fixed-length sections (e.g., 1000 meters, 2000 meters, etc.), each section being called a block section. Each section can only be occupied by one train at a time. The occupancy status of each section is detected by track circuits, axle counters, and other equipment, and signals are sent to the train (e.g., speed codes or signal displays) to indicate whether the train can enter the next section.

[0003] In railway train control systems, the Radio Block Center (RBC), as the core ground equipment for realizing moving block operation, is responsible for generating and issuing train movement permits (MAs) based on various factors such as the status of track occupancy detection equipment (e.g., track circuits), train position, and route information. This directly determines the train's operating range and speed. Track circuits, as critical equipment for train occupancy detection, will directly affect the RBC's calculation of movement permits if they malfunction, thus impacting train operation efficiency and high-speed rail operational safety.

[0004] Currently, when track circuit malfunctions (e.g., displaying a red light band), the Track Block Controller (RBC) often only receives a single occupancy signal, unable to accurately distinguish between normal train occupancy and track circuit malfunction. This results in the RBC's calculated train clearances being unable to extend, leading to problems such as train speed reduction, stopping, or even line congestion. Dispatchers struggle to quickly develop targeted solutions. Existing technologies typically handle train clearances for track circuit malfunctions manually, implementing moving block signaling only after the fault in the affected section is cleared. This lacks a mechanism for classifying and handling malfunctions based on their type, and suffers from inefficiency in coordinating fault confirmation and temporary measures, making it difficult to balance train safety and operational efficiency. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0006] A method for calculating train operation permits in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block signaling includes: acquiring track circuit anomaly information, basic train operation data, on-site confirmation information, command information from the centralized dispatching system, and line parameters; making a preliminary judgment on the anomaly information; activating a shortened train operation permit protection mechanism; and generating initial safety protection data. The shortened train operation permit protection mechanism is used to characterize shortening the train operation permit to the starting point of the fault zone in non-adjacent sections, and triggering a conditional emergency stop in adjacent sections. The method involves comprehensively processing the basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information, issuing a section idle command containing the command number, fault zone, and effective duration through the centralized dispatching system, and simultaneously performing a double verification of the command execution to generate a valid command determination result. Finally, the method involves parsing and processing the train position report and communication status to determine the fault zone. The lead train generates and sends a guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the faulty section. Once the section ahead is clear and the train has traveled a certain distance to trigger the track clearing interaction, a full mode train operation permit data is generated and sent. The train position report and the following status are monitored and processed to determine whether the train has completely left the faulty section and whether there are no following trains. If so, the guidance clearing or the lead train clearing is completed, and the section clearing result is generated. Based on the legal command judgment result and the section clearing result, the fault speed limit value is set in combination with the line parameters, and the train operation permit is calculated to generate target train operation permit data for subsequent trains. The track circuit status and the fault speed limit cancellation command of the dispatching centralized system are monitored and processed. If the fault is cleared, the speed limit and text prompt are cancelled, and subsequent train operation permits are calculated according to the normal track circuit status, and train operation permits are generated.

[0007] A train permit calculation device for a wireless block center supporting moving block signaling in response to track circuit anomalies includes: an acquisition module for acquiring track circuit anomaly information, basic train operation data, on-site confirmation information, command information from the centralized dispatching system, and line parameters; making a preliminary judgment on the anomaly information; activating a shortened train permit protection mechanism; and generating initial safety protection data. The shortened train permit protection mechanism indicates that train permits in non-adjacent sections are shortened to the starting point of the fault zone, while conditional emergency stops are triggered in adjacent sections. A data processing module is used to comprehensively process the basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information; issue a section idle command containing command number, fault zone, and effective duration through the centralized dispatching system; simultaneously perform double verification of the command execution; and generate a valid command judgment result. The module also parses and processes train position reports and communication status. The system determines the lead car ahead of the faulty section, generates a guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the faulty section for the lead car, and sends it to the lead car. When the section ahead is clear and the train travels to a certain distance to trigger the track clearing interaction ahead, it generates full mode train operation permit data and sends it to the lead car. It monitors and processes the train position report and the following status to determine whether the train has completely left the faulty section and whether there are no following trains. If so, it completes the guidance clearing or the lead car clearing and generates the section clearing result. Based on the legal command determination result and the section clearing result, it sets the fault speed limit value in combination with the line parameters, calculates the train operation permit, and generates target train operation permit data for subsequent trains. It monitors and processes the track circuit status and the fault speed limit cancellation command of the dispatching centralized system. If the fault is cleared, it cancels the speed limit and text prompt, and the subsequent train operation permit is calculated according to the normal track circuit status and generates the train operation permit.

[0008] Its beneficial effects are as follows: This invention provides a method and apparatus for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies in a wireless block center supporting moving block. This application acquires multi-source data such as track circuit anomalies, train operation, and on-site confirmation. After preliminary judgment, a shortening of train clearance protection mechanism is activated to generate initial safety data. For non-adjacent sections, the clearance is shortened to the starting point of the fault zone; for adjacent sections, a conditional emergency stop is triggered. A section clearing command containing the command number, fault zone, and effective duration is issued through the centralized dispatching system, and its legality is determined through verification and confirmation double-checking. The train position and communication status are analyzed to determine the lead car ahead of the fault zone, generating a guidance mode clearance extending to the end point of the fault zone. When the train travels a specific distance, a track clearing interaction is triggered. Monitoring is conducted to ensure the train has completely exited the fault zone without any following trains, completing the clearing process and generating a result. A fault speed limit is set based on the legal command, clearing result, and line parameters, and the train clearance is calculated. The fault status is monitored; once cleared, the speed limit is canceled, and subsequent clearances are calculated according to normal conditions, achieving a balance between train safety and efficiency in abnormal scenarios. Attached Figure Description

[0009] Figure 1A flowchart illustrating a method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block, provided as an embodiment of the present invention;

[0010] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a module for a train operation permit calculation device provided by a radio block center supporting moving block in response to track circuit anomalies, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0011] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the preferred embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention. Figure 1 This application describes a smart hardware-based mobile phone file backup system and implementation method according to exemplary embodiments thereof.

[0012] In this application embodiment, a method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block is provided, such as... Figure 1 As shown:

[0013] S101 acquires track circuit anomaly information, train operation basic data, on-site confirmation information, dispatching centralized system command information and line parameters, and makes a preliminary judgment on the anomaly information, activates the shortened train operation permit protection mechanism, and generates initial safety protection data car.

[0014] In one implementation, the following core data are acquired through track circuit monitoring equipment, on-board positioning system, on-site inspection terminal, centralized dispatching system (CTC), and track database to ensure that the data covers all dimensions of information required for anomaly detection and safety protection. For track circuit anomaly information, this includes the status data of the red light band of the track circuit uploaded by the interlocking equipment, including the anomaly section number (e.g., "K123+450-K123+600"), the anomaly start time (e.g., "2025-10-09 10:15:30"), and the anomaly type identifier (e.g., "red light band without vehicle occupancy"). For basic train operation data, this includes the real-time train position report sent by the on-board equipment (e.g., "Train A is located at K123+200, speed 60km / h"), train integrity status (e.g., "Train A carriage connection is normal, no separation alarm"), and communication link status (e.g., "Train A and RBC communication signal strength -75dBm, no packet loss").

[0015] For on-site confirmation information, this refers to the section verification results uploaded by on-site inspectors via mobile devices (e.g., "No train stops in the K123+450-K123+600 section, no physical damage to the track"), including the inspector's number, verification time, and on-site photo association identifier. For dispatching centralized system command information, this refers to the recent section control commands stored in the CTC system (e.g., "Issued a temporary speed limit of 40km / h in the K123+300-K123+500 section at 10:00, valid until 12:00"), including the command number, execution status, and feedback result. For line parameters, this refers to the basic data associated with the faulty section stored in the line database (e.g., "The K123+450-K123+600 section is a straight track with a gradient of 0‰, a maximum permissible speed of 120km / h, and a block section length of 150m").

[0016] After receiving multi-source data, the Radio Block Center (RBC) first performs a preliminary verification of the authenticity and correlation of track circuit anomaly information to rule out false alarms caused by data transmission errors or single device failures. Then, it combines this information with train position data to determine the relative positional relationship between the abnormal section and the train. The RBC compares the track circuit anomaly information with the status of adjacent track sections (e.g., "the abnormal section K123+450-K123+600 shows a red light band, while the adjacent sections K123+300-K123+450 and K123+600-K123+750 both show as empty"), and simultaneously checks the on-site confirmation information and train position reports. If it confirms that no train is in the abnormal section, it is determined that the abnormal occupancy is caused by a fault in the track circuit itself. Based on the train position report (e.g., "Train B is located at K123+100, approximately 350m from the start of the abnormal section at K123+450, with one block section in between"), the RBC determines that the abnormal section is not an adjacent section; if train C is located at K123+400, only 50m from the start of the abnormal section, with no other block section intervals, it is determined to be an adjacent section.

[0017] Based on the relative position determination of the abnormal section and the train, the RBC initiates corresponding safety protection operations, generates initial safety protection data, and ensures that the train's operating range is under control. The operation for non-adjacent section protection is as follows: For train B located at K123+100, the RBC shortens its original travel permit (e.g., "Destination K123+800") to the abnormal section's starting point K123+450, generates new travel permit data (e.g., "Train B Travel Permit: Starting Point K123+100, Destination K123+450, Permitted Speed ​​60km / h"), and simultaneously sends a permit update instruction to train B. The operation for adjacent section protection is as follows: For train C located at K123+400, the RBC determines that it is adjacent to the abnormal section, immediately generates a Conditional Emergency Stop (CEM) instruction, and simultaneously reports the train's operating position to the CTC system for real-time monitoring by dispatchers.

[0018] The RBC integrates the aforementioned judgment results and operational instructions to generate structured initial safety protection data, including data identifiers, generation time, associated objects, and protection content, ensuring data traceability and verifiability. For example, "Initial Safety Protection Data ID: 00000018, Generation Time: 2025-10-09 10:18:00, Anomaly Type 'Hidden Car Occupancy'". This data serves as the basis for subsequent train operation permit calculations within the RBC and for CEM (Continuous Emergency Management) of trains in adjacent sections. Simultaneously, it is uploaded to the CTC (Continuous Traffic Control) system and onboard equipment to ensure that both the dispatching and train control systems receive consistent safety protection instructions, avoiding operational risks caused by information asymmetry.

[0019] S102 comprehensively processes basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information, and issues a section idle command containing command number, fault section, and effective duration through the centralized dispatching system. Simultaneously, it performs double verification of command execution and confirmation to generate a legal command judgment result.

[0020] In one implementation, multi-source verification data, including train operation plans, onboard equipment location reports, and on-site inspection feedback, are integrated to generate initial section vacancy determination information. Dispatchers must combine this three types of information to confirm whether no train is scheduled to enter or is actually located or stationary in an abnormal section before initiating the subsequent command issuance process. The core is to ensure the accuracy of section vacancy determination through multi-source data verification, avoiding erroneous command issuance due to a single data deviation. The train operation plan shows "No trains are scheduled to enter the K123+450 - K123+600 section from 10:00 to 11:00 on the same day"; the onboard equipment location report (after RBC parsing and verification) shows "Train A is located at K123+200 and Train B is located at K123+700, both outside the abnormal section, and there is no trend of trains traveling towards the abnormal section"; the verification results uploaded by the on-site inspection personnel through the mobile terminal show "No trains are stopping in the K123+450-K123+600 section, there is no physical damage to the track, and no foreign objects encroaching on the limit". Based on the three types of data, it is determined that the section is a "false occupancy" caused by a track circuit fault, and the initial judgment information "The K123+450-K123+600 section is actually empty, and the abnormal occupancy is caused by a track circuit fault" is generated.

[0021] By selecting the abnormal section and entering the command validity period through the centralized scheduling system's operation interface, an idle command for the section containing a unique command number, fault section number, and validity period field is issued, generating initial command data. The command must carry a unique identifier and validity information to achieve accurate command traceability and timeliness control, avoiding the risk of multiple command conflicts or commands being executed after timeout. In the "Track Circuit Anomaly Handling" module of the CTC system, the dispatcher selects the abnormal section "K123+450-K123+600" (section number 0x0021) on the section map, enters "90 minutes" in the "Command Valid Duration" input box (which can be adjusted according to the estimated duration of fault diagnosis), and clicks "Generate Command". The system automatically assigns a unique command number "CMD-20251009-001" and the corresponding command ID information "0x00223101", and issues a section idle command containing "Command ID: 0x00223101, Fault Section Number: 0x0021, Valid Duration: 2025-10-09 10:15 to 11:45". At the same time, the CTC command log records the command generation time, operator and other information, generating initial command data.

[0022] The CTC sends a verification segment idle command to the Radio Block Center (RBC). The Radio Block Center (RBC) verifies the command number, segment number, and command type parameters, and outputs the parameter verification result. Then, based on the successful verification result, the CTC sends a confirmation segment idle command. The RBC verifies the consistency between the confirmation command and the verification command, as well as the time interval between them, and outputs the consistency and timeliness verification result. For the parameter verification phase, the CTC sends a "verify segment idle command" to the RBC. The RBC verifies the three core parameters—command number, segment number, and command type—according to preset rules. These parameters must completely match the abnormal segment information and the queue of commands to be verified stored in the RBC. The verification result is output through standardized feedback codes (a total of 5 types of feedback codes, including pass and 4 failure scenarios). After receiving the "verification command (command ID information "0x00223101", fault segment number: 0x0021, command type: segment idle setting)", the RBC verifies that the "fault segment number: 0x0021" matches the corresponding number (0x0021) of the abnormal segment sequence number "K123+450-K123+600" marked by the RBC, the "command type" is the system-supported "segment idle setting", and the "command number" exists in the verification queue. The verification passes, and the RBC sends a "verification passed (feedback code 0x0F)" message to the CTC. If the command ID format is incorrect (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF), the RBC verifies that the command ID does not conform to the ID generation rules and sends a "verification failed, command number error (feedback code 0x00)" message.

[0023] For the consistency and timeliness confirmation phase, after receiving the "verification passed" feedback, the CTC sends a "confirm segment idle command" to the RBC. The RBC needs to complete two checks: first, the command ID, segment number, and command type of the confirmation command and the verification command must be completely consistent; second, check whether the time interval between the sending of the verification command and the confirmation command is ≤60s. If both are satisfied, the confirmation is passed; otherwise, execution is rejected. The result is also output through standardized feedback codes (a total of 5 types of feedback codes, including success and 4 failure scenarios). If the command ID, segment number, and command type of the confirmation command and the verification command are completely consistent, and the time interval between sending is 45s (≤60s), the RBC will output "execution successful (feedback code 0xAF)"; if the time interval is 70s (exceeding 60s), it will output "execution failed, timeout (feedback code 0xA3)"; if the segment number of the confirmation command is incorrectly written as "K123+500-K123+650", it will output "execution failed, inconsistent with the verification command (feedback code 0xA2)".

[0024] Combining the results of the two-stage verification, if both stages pass, the command is deemed valid, and valid command verification data is generated. If either stage fails, the command is deemed invalid, and verification data containing the specific error reason is generated simultaneously. Only when both stages pass can the command be considered valid and used as the basis for subsequent train permit calculations. If either stage fails, the error reason must be clearly identified to facilitate dispatchers in quickly locating the problem (such as incorrect command parameters or timeout) and avoiding invalid retries. If both phases of verification pass (verification feedback 0x0F, confirmation feedback 0xAF), the RBC determines the command is valid and generates the judgment data "Command ID "0x00223101" is valid and can be used for vehicle permit calculation", which is then synchronously uploaded to the CTC command status module. If the parameter verification passes (0x0F), but the confirmation phase fails due to timeout (0xA3), the RBC determines the command is invalid and generates the judgment data "Command ID "0x00223101" is invalid because the timeout between the confirmation command and the verification command (70s>60s) requires re-initiating the verification-confirmation process", while recording the failure details in the RBC log.

[0025] The validity period is dynamically managed. If a command exceeds its validity period, the RBC automatically invalidates the command and treats it as an abnormal occupation. If the validity period needs to be reset, the RBC updates the command's validity period. The RBC monitors the validity period of idle commands in the segment throughout its entire lifecycle, achieving dynamic control of "automatic invalidation upon timeout and updateability in transit." The core purpose is to avoid the problem of commands being executed after fault recovery due to long-term validity, or the need for frequent resending due to insufficient validity. The command is valid for 90 minutes (10:15-11:45). At 11:45, the RBC detects that the command has expired and automatically marks it as "invalid". The K123+450-K123+600 section is then reprocessed as "abnormally occupied", and subsequent train operation permits will no longer extend to this section. If the dispatcher finds that the fault investigation needs to be extended by 1 hour through the CTC at 11:00, they can initiate a "command validity period update" operation on the CTC interface. After receiving the update instruction, the RBC will adjust the validity period to "10:15-12:45" and report "command duration update successful" to the CTC.

[0026] If a command exceeds its validity period but trains are still present in the track section, the RBC, upon receiving a section fault command from the CTC, will implement SMA / CEM safety protection for trains not yet in the section, and maintain the current processing for trains already in the section, without issuing additional emergency stop commands. When a command exceeds its validity period but trains are still running in the abnormal section, the RBC must, based on the "section fault command" issued by the CTC, take differentiated safety protection measures for trains in different locations. The core principle is "not affecting the normal operation of trains already in the section and ensuring the safety of trains not yet in the section" (avoiding safety risks caused by issuing emergency stop commands to trains already in the section). When the order expires at 11:45, train C is still running in the K123+450-K123+600 section. After receiving the CTC's "section fault order", the RBC activates SMA protection for train D (located at K123+300) which has not yet entered the section, shortening its original driving permission (end point K123+800) to the starting point K123+450 of the abnormal section. For train C, which is already in the section, the current driving permission (end point K123+600) is maintained, and no additional emergency stop order is sent. The driver is only notified through the onboard equipment that "the section order has expired and you should continue to drive according to the current permission".

[0027] If the CTC receives a normal segment status report from the RBC before the command's validity period expires, it directly executes the faulty segment rate limit cancellation procedure; otherwise, it sends a segment fault command to the RBC, setting the segment status to fault occupancy. During the command's validity period, the CTC monitors the segment status reports sent by the RBC in real time and executes different procedures depending on whether the segment has recovered: if the segment heals itself (abnormal occupancy information disappears), the rate limit is directly cancelled; if it does not heal itself, a "segment fault command" is issued after the command expires, ensuring seamless connection of segment status control. If, within the effective period of the command (11:00), the RBC detects that the abnormal occupancy information of the K123+450-K123+600 section has disappeared and the track circuit has returned to normal, it sends a "section status normal report" to the CTC. Upon receiving the report, the CTC directly executes the speed limit cancellation procedure for the faulty section, and the subsequent train operation permits will no longer include the faulty speed limit for that section. If, before the command expires at 11:45, the RBC does not detect the section self-healing and does not send a "section status normal report," the CTC sends a "section fault command" to the RBC, setting the status of the K123+450-K123+600 section to "fault occupancy."

[0028] If the command verification and confirmation between RBC and CTC are not completed within the specified time, the section occupancy status will be maintained, and RBC will continue to perform safety protection. If the "verification-confirmation" process of the command is not completed between RBC and CTC within the specified time (set to 5-10 minutes) (e.g., communication interruption, feedback timeout), RBC will assume that the command failed verification, maintain the "occupancy" status of the abnormal section, and continue to perform SMA / CEM safety protection for subsequent trains to avoid a vacuum in section control due to unconfirmed commands. After CTC sends the verification command, due to a temporary interruption in vehicle-to-ground communication, no verification feedback is received from RBC within 5 minutes. RBC determines that "verification is incomplete" and maintains the "abnormal occupancy" status of the K123+450-K123+600 section. CEM protection is activated for train E (located at K123+350) traveling towards this section, generating a protection instruction that "train E must decelerate to 20km / h within 30 seconds, and if it does not leave the adjacent area within 1 minute, an emergency stop will be triggered" until communication is restored and verification is completed, or the dispatcher initiates a new processing procedure.

[0029] S103 analyzes and processes the train position report and communication status, determines the lead car ahead of the fault section, generates a guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the fault section for the lead car and sends it to it. When the section ahead is clear and the train travels to a certain distance to trigger the track clearing interaction ahead, it generates full mode train operation permit data and sends it to it.

[0030] In one implementation, train position reports and communication status data are parsed to generate train operation status analysis results. The train position report includes the section occupancy order and the distance of the train head to the signal. Parsing the train position report and communication status data extracts core information such as the section occupancy order and the distance of the train head to the signal, generating train operation status analysis results to provide basic data support for determining the lead car. The RBC receives the position report sent by train A and parses it to show that "Train A currently occupies the K123+300-K123+450 section (section occupancy order is K123+300→K123+450), and the train head is 50 meters away from the signal at K123+450." Simultaneously, the communication status between train A and the RBC is checked to be normal. The combined analysis results are then generated as follows: "Train A: Occupies the K123+300-K123+450 section, the train head is 50 meters away from the K123+450 signal, communication is normal."

[0031] Based on a triple-judgment rule of first train entering the section, positioning the locomotive at a specific distance, and TAF (Training Authority Request) confirmation, the leading car ahead of the faulty section is identified, generating leading car identity determination data. Similarly, based on the same triple-judgment rule, the leading car ahead of the faulty section is identified from multiple trains, generating leading car identity determination data (three leading car identification methods are used; any one of them is sufficient for identification). The faulty section is K123+450-K123+600. The RBC simultaneously monitors train A (occupying K123+300-K123+450) and train B (occupying K123+200-K123+300).

[0032] According to the "first train entering the section" rule, when the K123+300-K123+450 section changes from cleared to occupied, Train A is the first train to enter the section, meeting the lead car condition. According to the "specific distance positioning of the train head" rule, the train head of Train A is 50 meters away from the K123+450 signal. This distance is configured as "≤100 meters" according to the minimum train length of the line (150 meters), meeting the lead car condition. According to the "TAF request confirmation" rule, the RBC sends a TAF request to Train A, and Train A responds with "TAF confirmation", meeting the lead car condition. Based on the comprehensive judgment, Train A is determined to be the lead car ahead of the faulty section, generating the judgment data "Lead car: Train A, judgment basis: first train entering the section + specific distance positioning of the train head + TAF request confirmation".

[0033] For the identified lead car, calculate the guidance mode train operation permission extending to the end of the faulty section, clarify the permission boundaries and operational constraints, and generate initial guidance permission data. After the RBC confirms that the lead car's communication is normal and intact, and that there are no other communicating trains in the faulty section ahead, calculate the guidance mode train operation permission extending to the end of the faulty section for the lead car, clarify the permission boundaries and operational constraints, and generate initial guidance permission data (the guidance permission endpoint is the end of the abnormal section, and other trains in the faulty section must be excluded). RBC confirms that Train A's communication is normal, the carriages are intact, and there are no other trains communicating with RBC within the fault section K123+450-K123+600. Therefore, it calculates the guidance mode MA for Train A: the permitted start point is the current head position of Train A (K123+449.950), the end point is the end point of the fault section K123+600, and the operating constraints are "maximum speed 40km / h in guidance mode, real-time position feedback required." Initial guidance permission data is generated: "Train A Guidance Permission: Start point K123+449.950, End point K123+600, Mode: Guidance, Maximum speed 40km / h."

[0034] A dynamic distance calculation algorithm is used to determine the specific trigger distance for the Train Aid (TAF) based on the train's current speed, the permissible speed of the track, the gradient, and the radius of curvature, generating personalized trigger threshold data. The trigger distance needs to be dynamically configured for each section, associating multiple track parameters. For example, Train A's current speed is 35 km / h, the permissible speed of the track is 120 km / h, and the section from K123+450 to K123+500 before the fault section has a gradient of 0‰ and a radius of curvature of 3000 meters. The RBC calculates the trigger distance as 80 meters based on "Trigger distance = (current speed² - target speed²) / (2 × braking acceleration) + track safety margin," generating the threshold data "Train A TAF trigger distance: 80 meters (from the start of the fault section K123+450)".

[0035] When the train reaches the trigger distance, the interaction process of RBC sending a TAF request, train providing clear confirmation, and RBC issuing full mode permission is initiated. Upon receiving the TAF request, the train confirms that the area ahead is clear and sends a TAF confirmation message. RBC issues a full mode MA, and the train switches to full mode for high-speed operation. If the train determines that the clear condition ahead is not met, it continues to run in guide mode to the end of the fault section. If RBC determines that the condition for continuing operation ahead is met, it updates the guide mode MA, and the train continues running. If the condition for continuing operation ahead is not met, the train stops at the end of the fault section, waits to switch to manual mode, and then continues running until the TAF condition is met again and RBC initiates the interaction, generating guide mode and full mode switching data. When the train reaches the TAF trigger distance, the interaction process of "RBC sending a TAF request, train providing confirmation, and RBC issuing full mode permission" is initiated. Based on the train's feedback, a mode switch is performed or the guide mode is maintained, generating guide mode and full mode switching data. When Train A reaches 80 meters from K123+450 (the start of the fault section), the RBC sends a "Track Clearance Request (TAF)". Train A confirms that the section from K123+450 to K123+600 is clear and sends back "TAF Confirmation". The RBC immediately issues a full-mode MA (end point K123+800, maximum speed 100km / h), and Train A switches to full-mode high-speed operation, generating the switching data "Train A: TAF interaction successful, switching from guide mode to full mode, switching position 80 meters before K123+450". If Train A reports "Clearance condition not met", Train A continues to travel in guide mode to K123+600 (the end of the fault section). The RBC determines that the section from K123+600 to K123+750 is clear, updates the guide mode MA to K123+750, and generates the switching data "Train A: TAF". Interaction failed. Maintain boot mode and update license endpoint to K123+750.

[0036] By integrating initial guidance permission data, personalized trigger threshold data, and mode switching data, complete guidance mode permission data is generated. Specifically, by integrating "initial guidance permission (destination K123+600, guidance mode), TAF trigger distance (80 meters), and mode switching result (switched to full mode)," complete data "Train A Guidance Mode Permission" is generated. The initial permission is (starting point K123+449.950, ending point K123+600, guidance mode, 40km / h); TAF trigger threshold (80 meters); interaction result (TAF confirmation, switched to full mode, new permission destination K123+800, 100km / h); generation time is 2025-10-09 11:00.

[0037] S104 monitors and processes the train position report and the following status, determines whether the train has completely left the fault section and there are no following trains. If the conditions are met, it completes the guided cleaning or the cleaning of the preceding train and generates the section cleaning result.

[0038] In one implementation, train position reports and following status data are collected to generate a train dynamic monitoring dataset. The train position report includes the train's trajectory within the fault section and the location information of its tail end exiting the fault. The collected train position reports and following status data are integrated to form a dynamic monitoring dataset covering the train's trajectory, location information, and following status, providing basic data for subsequent cleaning determination (position reports and following status are the core inputs for cleaning determination). The RBC collects the location report of train A and extracts the "trajectory within the fault section K123+450-K123+600 (K123+450→K123+500→K123+600) and the tail position location information (the tail completely left K123+600 at 11:20)". At the same time, it monitors the status of trains behind and records "Train B is located at K123+300, not traveling towards the fault section, and no other trains follow train A into the fault section". The data is then integrated to generate the dataset "Train A: Fault section trajectory K123+450-K123+600, tail left at 11:20; Rear status: no trains followed into".

[0039] A dual-condition integrity judgment rule is constructed. Based on continuous communication in the fault section and confirmation of the tail end's departure location, the train's complete passage status is determined, generating a train passage integrity verification result. The rule, "continuous communication in the fault section + confirmation of tail end's departure location," verifies whether the train has completely passed through the fault section, generating a passage integrity verification result (both judgment conditions must be met to confirm complete passage). For train A, the RBC verifies two conditions: first, "continuous communication in the fault section," meaning train A maintains uninterrupted communication with the RBC during its operation from K123+450 to K123+600, thus meeting the condition; second, "confirmation of tail end's departure location," meaning the RBC receives a location report (positioning accuracy ±5 meters) confirming that train A's tail end has completely left K123+600, thus meeting the condition. If Train A passes through the faulty section completely, the verification result "Train A: Passage integrity verification passed (continuous communication + tail end departure confirmation)" is generated; if Train A experiences a 10-second communication interruption within the section, the verification fails and the result is "Passage integrity verification failed (communication interruption in the faulty section)".

[0040] The system monitors the following trains in real time within the faulty section. Once it confirms that no other trains are entering, it generates confirmation data for the section's clearing status. No following trains are a necessary condition for successful clearing. After train A leaves the faulty section, the RBC continuously monitors the area behind for 30 minutes (covering 11:20-11:50). It finds that train B remains at K123+300, showing no tendency to move towards K123+450-K123+600, and no other trains are entering the section. Confirmation data is generated: "Faulty section K123+450-K123+600: No trains entered after 11:20, section cleared." If train C is detected moving towards the section at 11:25, the confirmation data is "Section not cleared (train C intends to enter)."

[0041] Based on the cleaning type adaptation logic, a guiding cleaning determination is performed for scenarios where the lead car is in guidance mode, and a preceding car cleaning determination is performed for scenarios where the preceding car is in visual mode, generating cleaning type matching data. Based on the cleaning type adaptation logic, the corresponding cleaning type is matched according to the train's operating mode (guidance mode / visual mode), a determination is performed, and cleaning type matching data is generated. Example 1: Train A passes through a fault section in guidance mode. The RBC determines the cleaning type according to the "guidance cleaning" logic and generates the matching data "Cleaning type: Guidance cleaning, Applicable scenario: Lead car guiding mode passage".

[0042] Example 2: Train C does not meet the conditions for the lead car and passes through the fault section in visual mode. The RBC determines the fault according to the "lead car cleaning" logic and generates matching data "Cleaning type: lead car cleaning, applicable scenario: lead car visual mode passage".

[0043] The system integrates the results of the traffic integrity check, the section vacancy confirmation data, and the cleaning type matching data. If all conditions are met, the cleaning is considered successful; otherwise, it is considered a failure. Section cleaning data containing the cleaning result and the reason for failure is generated. All three data conditions must be met for a cleaning success to be considered successful. For example, in Train A, the traffic integrity check is passed, the section vacancy confirmation is made, and the cleaning type matching is "guided cleaning." All three conditions are met, so the cleaning is considered successful, and the data "Section K123+450-K123+600: Guided cleaning successful, judgment criteria: traffic integrity + section vacancy + guide mode matching; RBC reports 'faulty section cleared' to CTC" is generated.

[0044] Example 2: Train C passes the pass integrity check, but train D is detected following and entering the fault section (the section is not idle). The cleaning is determined to be a failure, and the data "Section K123+450-K123+600: The preceding train failed to clean. Reason for failure: Train D followed and entered the section. The section is not idle" is generated.

[0045] S105, based on the results of legal command judgment and section cleaning, combined with the line parameters, sets the fault speed limit value, calculates the train operation permit, and generates target train operation permit data for subsequent trains.

[0046] In one implementation, the validity verification and correlation analysis are performed on the legal command judgment result, the valid status identifier (such as legal command / successful cleaning) in the section cleaning result, and the fault section range parameters (such as K123+450-K123+600), and the permission calculation trigger conditions, fault section adaptation weight and security constraint priority are extracted to form basic information. The RBC verification checks the correlation between "Legitimate command judgment result (command CMD20251009001 legitimate)" and "section cleaning result (K123+450-K123+600 guided cleaning successful)" to confirm that they both point to the same fault section and there is no parameter conflict; it generates the trigger condition features "Legitimate command + successful cleaning → start extended permission calculation", fault section adaptation weight "K123+450-K123+600 weight 1.0 (highest priority)" and safety constraint priority coefficient "fault speed limit > normal speed", and integrates them to form the basic information "permission calculation trigger: command + cleaning both passed; fault section: K123+450-K123+600 (weight 1.0); safety constraint: speed limit priority".

[0047] The line parameters, including line operating speed, gradient, and fault section length, are quantified, converted, and safety thresholds are defined to determine the fault speed limit baseline, dynamic adjustment coefficient, and speed curve adaptation parameters, forming speed limit setting constraint information (speed limits need to be dynamically configured in conjunction with line parameters). For example, if the line parameters are "line operating speed 120km / h, gradient 0‰, fault section length 150m", after RBC quantization: First, the fault speed limit baseline is set to 40km / h (RBC default configuration); second, due to the gentle gradient (0‰) and short section (150m), the dynamic adjustment coefficient is set to 1.0 (no additional adjustment required); third, based on the speed curve model, the adaptation parameter is set to "smoothly reduce from 60km / h to 40km / h, deceleration distance 50m", generating constraint information "speed limit baseline 40km / h, adjustment coefficient 1.0, speed curve adaptation: 60→40km / h (50m deceleration)"; if the line gradient is 5‰, the adjustment coefficient is set to 1.2, and the speed limit baseline becomes 48km / h.

[0048] A calculation model is constructed for the target train operation permit. Parameter calibration and permit validity assessment are performed by combining the abnormal section ignoring logic, speed limit fusion rules, and train operation safety boundaries. This generates characteristics of the permit extension range and speed information integration indicators, forming optimized permit calculation information. When constructing the RBC model, the fault occupancy status of K123+450-K123+600 is ignored, and a 40km / h fault speed limit is integrated. The permit extension range is calibrated according to train braking performance (braking distance 80m). The evaluation results show "Permit extended to K123+750 (fault section end + safety distance), speed information integration compliant," generating optimized information: "Permit extension range: K123+450-K123+750; speed integration: fault section 40km / h, subsequent section 100km / h."

[0049] Integrating basic information, speed limit constraints, and optimization information, an extended train operation permit is generated, including fault speed limits and a "track circuit fault ahead" text prompt. The speed limit status is simultaneously reported to the CTC. After integration, the train operation permit for train A is generated as follows: "Starting point K123+400, ending point K123+750, static speed information: K123+450-K123+600 speed limit 40km / h, other sections 100km / h; text prompt: track circuit fault ahead"; the RBC simultaneously reports to the CTC: "K123+450-K123+600 40km / h fault speed limit set, permit issued."

[0050] If, within the validity period of the section clearing command, the RBC detects that the track circuit has returned to normal (e.g., the abnormal occupancy information disappears), it reports "Faulty section cleared" to the CTC. This ensures that subsequent trains are processed according to the normal status when calculating their travel permits, ultimately forming the target travel permit data. Within the command validity period (10:15-11:45), at 11:30, the RBC detects that the track circuit from K123+450 to K123+600 has returned to normal and reports "Faulty section cleared" to the CTC. When calculating the permit for subsequent train B, the section status is no longer ignored; the permit is generated according to the normal track circuit occupancy: "Starting point K123+300, Ending point K123+800, Speed ​​120km / h, No fault indication." This integrates the previous extended permit and the normal permit, forming the target travel permit data: "Train A: Extended permit (including speed limit + indication); Train B and subsequent trains: Normal permit (no speed limit); Faulty section status: Returned to normal after 11:30."

[0051] S106 monitors and processes the speed limit cancellation command for track circuit status and fault in the centralized dispatching system. If the fault is cleared, the speed limit and text prompt are cancelled, and subsequent train operation permits are calculated based on the normal track circuit status and a train operation permit is generated.

[0052] In one implementation, the system monitors the track circuit status and the fault speed limit cancellation command from the Centralized Dispatch Control (CTC) system in real time, capturing matching features indicating fault resolution (e.g., the disappearance of track circuit anomaly and the cancellation command pointing to the same segment), and generates a fault recovery trigger vector (fault resolution requires a dual judgment of equipment status and dispatch command). The RBC detects the disappearance of the "red light band" status in the abnormal track circuit segment K123+450-K123+600 (abnormal occupancy information cleared), and simultaneously receives a "fault speed limit cancellation command" (command number CMD20251009002, target segment K123+450-K123+600) issued by the CTC, confirming that both point to the same fault segment. It captures the matching feature of "status self-healing + command cancellation," generating a trigger vector: "Fault segment: K123+450-K123+600; Trigger type: track circuit self-healing + CTC cancellation command; Trigger time: 2025-10-09 11:30."

[0053] The fault recovery trigger vector comprehensively judges and dynamically verifies the integrity of state recovery (whether the track circuit is completely normal), the legality of command execution (whether the cancellation command is compliant), and the confirmation result of no train occupation (whether there is no train in the section), and generates a fault clearance confirmation result (multi-dimensional confirmation of fault clearance is required to avoid misjudgment). The RBC verifies three items: First, "Integrity of State Recovery", the track circuit from K123+450 to K123+600 shows idle for 3 consecutive minutes without abnormal occupation recurrence, and is judged to be fully recovered; Second, "Legality of Command Execution", the section number and command type of the CTC cancellation command are compliant and have passed the verification-confirmation process (feedback code 0xAF), and are judged to be compliant; Third, "Confirmation of No Train Occupation", the train position report confirms that there is no train in the K123+450-K123+600 section, and the section is judged to be idle. The overall generated confirmation result is “K123+450-K123+600: Fault clearance confirmation passed (state fully restored + command valid + section free)”; if the verification finds that there are still trains in the section, the result is “Fault clearance confirmation failed (train occupied in section)”.

[0054] Based on the fault clearance confirmation, the intelligent mitigation logic for train operation permit protection is used to cancel the fault speed limit and the "Ahead track circuit fault" text prompt in the faulty section. Subsequent train operation permits are calculated based on the actual track circuit occupancy status (normal permit logic needs to be restored after the fault is cleared). After RBC confirms the fault clearance for K123+450-K123+600, the intelligent mitigation logic is activated: first, the 40km / h fault speed limit for this section is canceled; second, the "Ahead track circuit fault" text prompt is removed from the train operation permit. When calculating permits for subsequent train B, the section status is no longer ignored, and a permit is generated based on normal track circuit occupancy: "Starting point K123+300, ending point K123+800, permitted speed 120km / h, no fault-related restrictions," thus achieving a switch from fault protection to normal control.

[0055] If a train is still within the faulty section when the fault is cleared, the RBC maintains the current train's travel permit and protection status, and does not issue an emergency stop order for that section. Once the train has completely left the faulty section, the RBC updates the permit configuration for subsequent trains. At 11:30, when the fault is cleared, Train A is still running in the K123+450-K123+600 section (current permit endpoint K123+600, speed limit 40km / h). The RBC maintains Train A's current permit and protection status, does not issue an emergency stop order, and only informs the driver that "the section fault has been cleared; continue driving according to the current permit." After Train A has completely left K123+600 at 11:35, the RBC immediately updates the permit configuration for subsequent trains, generating a normal permit (no fault speed limit) for Train C.

[0056] By synchronizing the CTC system status in real time with the intelligent mitigation logic, seamless integration between fault speed limit cancellation and normal permit calculation is ensured (e.g., synchronously reporting the speed limit cancellation result to the CTC). This ultimately generates post-fault recovery permit configuration data containing permit rules, speed limit status, and section information. The RBC synchronously reports to the CTC, "Fault at K123+450-K123+600 resolved, speed limit cancelled, subsequent permits calculated normally." Simultaneously, it integrates "permit calculation rules (based on the actual track circuit status), speed limit status (fault-free speed limit), and section basic parameters (K123+450-K123+600, permissible speed 120km / h)," generating configuration data: "Post-fault recovery permit configuration: Section K123+450-K123+600; Permit rule: Normal track circuit occupancy logic; Speed ​​limit: None; CTC synchronization status: Reported; Effective time: 2025-10-09 11:35 (after train A departs)."

[0057] In one implementation, such as Figure 2As shown, this application also provides a train control authorization calculation device for a radio block center supporting moving block in response to track circuit anomalies, comprising:

[0058] The acquisition module 201 is used to acquire track circuit abnormal information, train operation basic data, on-site confirmation information, dispatching centralized system command information and line parameters, and to make a preliminary judgment on the abnormal information, activate the shortened train permit protection mechanism, and generate initial safety protection data. The shortened train permit protection mechanism is used to indicate that the train permit in non-adjacent sections is shortened to the starting point of the fault zone, and the conditional emergency stop is triggered in adjacent sections.

[0059] Data processing module 202 is used for comprehensive processing of basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information. It issues a section clearing command containing command number, fault section, and valid duration through the centralized dispatching system, and simultaneously performs double verification of command execution (verification and confirmation) to generate a valid command determination result. It also parses and processes train position reports and communication status, determines the lead car ahead of the fault section, generates a guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the fault section for the lead car, and sends it to it. Once the preceding section is clear and the train has traveled a specific distance to trigger the preceding track clearing interaction, it generates full mode train operation permit data and sends it to the lead car. Send; monitor and process train position reports and following status to determine whether the train has completely left the fault section and is not followed by any other train. If so, complete the guidance cleaning or preceding train cleaning and generate the section cleaning result; based on the legal command judgment result and the section cleaning result, set the fault speed limit value in combination with the line parameters, calculate the train operation permit, and generate target train operation permit data for subsequent trains; monitor and process the track circuit status and the fault speed limit cancellation command of the dispatching centralized system. If the fault is cleared, cancel the speed limit and text prompt, and calculate the subsequent train operation permit according to the normal track circuit status and generate the train operation permit.

[0060] An electronic device includes a first processor and a memory for storing executable instructions of the first processor; wherein the first processor is configured to execute, by executing the executable instructions, any method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block.

[0061] A computing device includes a memory for storing computer program instructions and a processor for executing the computer program instructions, wherein when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, the device is triggered to execute any of the train clearance calculation methods for a radio block center supporting moving block in response to track circuit anomalies.

[0062] The methods and / or embodiments in this application can be implemented as computer software programs. For example, embodiments of this disclosure include a computer program product comprising a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, the computer program containing program code for performing the methods shown in the flowchart. When the computer program is executed by a processing unit, it performs the functions defined in the methods of this application.

[0063] It should be noted that the computer-readable medium described in this application can be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of a computer-readable storage medium may include, but are not limited to: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. In this application, a computer-readable medium can be any tangible medium that contains or stores a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0064] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that this application is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above, and that this application can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics of this application. Therefore, the embodiments should be regarded as exemplary and non-limiting in all respects, and the scope of this application is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description. Thus, all variations falling within the meaning and scope of equivalents of the claims are intended to be embraced within this application.

Claims

1. A method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block, characterized in that, include: The system acquires track circuit anomaly information, basic train operation data, on-site confirmation information, dispatching centralized system command information and line parameters, and makes a preliminary judgment on the anomaly information. It then activates the shortened train permit protection mechanism and generates initial safety protection data. The shortened train permit protection mechanism is used to characterize the shortening of train permits to the fault zone start point in non-adjacent sections, and the triggering of conditional emergency stop in adjacent sections. The system comprehensively processes basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information, and issues section idle commands containing command numbers, fault sections, and effective durations through the centralized dispatching system. Simultaneously, it performs double verification of command execution and confirmation to generate a legal command judgment result. The train position report and communication status are parsed and processed to determine the lead car ahead of the fault section. A guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the fault section is generated for the lead car and sent to it. When the section ahead is clear and the train travels to a certain distance to trigger the track clearing interaction ahead, a full mode train operation permit data is generated and sent to it. The system monitors and processes train position reports and following status, determines whether the train has completely left the fault section and is not followed by any other train, and if so, completes guided cleaning or preceding train cleaning and generates section cleaning results. Based on the legal command judgment results and section cleaning results, combined with the line parameters, the fault speed limit value is set, the train operation permit is calculated, and target train operation permit data is generated for subsequent trains. The system monitors and processes commands to cancel speed limits in track circuit status and in the centralized dispatching system in case of faults. If the fault is cleared, the speed limit and text prompt are canceled, and subsequent train operation permits are calculated based on the normal track circuit status.

2. The method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The system comprehensively processes basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information, and issues section idle commands containing command numbers, fault sections, and valid durations through the centralized dispatching system. Simultaneously, it performs dual verification of command execution—verification and confirmation—to generate a valid command determination result, including: By integrating multi-source verification data from train operation plans, on-board equipment location reports, and on-site inspection feedback, initial idling determination information for the section is generated. By selecting the abnormal section and entering the command validity period through the centralized scheduling system operation interface, the system issues a section idle command containing a unique command number, fault section number, and validity period field to generate initial command data. The CTC sends a verification segment clear command to the radio block center. The RBC verifies the command number, segment number, and command type parameters, and outputs the parameter verification result. Then, based on the verification result, the CTC sends a confirmation segment clear command. The RBC verifies the consistency between the confirmation command and the verification command and the time interval between them, and outputs the consistency and timeliness verification result. If both stages pass the verification, the command is deemed valid, and valid command verification data is generated. If either stage fails, the command is deemed invalid, and verification data containing the specific error reason is generated simultaneously. The validity period is dynamically managed. If a command exceeds its validity period, the RBC automatically invalidates the command and treats it as an abnormal occupation. If the validity period needs to be reset, the RBC updates the validity period of the command. If the order exceeds its validity period but there are still trains in the track section, after receiving the section fault order from the CTC, the RBC will implement SMA / CEM safety protection for trains that have not yet entered the section, and maintain the current processing for trains that have already entered the section, without sending additional emergency stop orders. If the CTC receives a normal segment status report from the RBC before the command's validity period expires, it will directly execute the faulty segment rate limit cancellation procedure; otherwise, it will send a segment fault command to the RBC and set the segment status to fault occupancy. If the command verification and confirmation between RBC and CTC are not completed within the specified time, the segment occupancy status will be maintained, and RBC will continue to provide security protection.

3. The method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The train position report and communication status are analyzed and processed to determine the lead car ahead of the fault section. A guidance mode driving permit extending to the end of the fault section is generated for the lead car. After the train travels a certain distance and triggers the track clearing interaction ahead, guidance mode permit data is generated, including: The train position report and communication status data are analyzed to generate train operation status analysis results. The train position report includes the section occupancy order and the distance of the train head from the signal. Based on the triple determination rule of the first vehicle entering the section, the positioning of the front of the vehicle at a specific distance, and the confirmation request from TAF, the leading vehicle in front of the fault section is identified and the leading vehicle identity determination data is generated. Calculate the guidance mode driving permission for the identified lead car to extend to the end of the fault section, clarify the permission boundary and operational constraints, and generate initial guidance permission data; Using a dynamic distance calculation algorithm or static data configuration, the specific distance for TAF triggering is determined based on the train's current speed, the line's permissible speed, gradient, and radius of curvature, generating highly flexible triggering threshold data; When the train reaches the trigger distance, the interaction process is initiated: RBC sends a TAF request, the train responds with a clear confirmation, and RBC issues a full-mode permit. After receiving the TAF request, the train confirms that the area ahead is clear and sends back a TAF confirmation message. RBC issues a full-mode MA, and the train switches to full-mode high-speed operation. If RBC determines that the clear condition ahead is not met, it restricts the train to continue running in guide mode to the end of the fault section. If RBC determines that the conditions for continuing to run ahead are met, it updates the guide mode MA, and the train continues to run. If the conditions for continuing to run ahead are not met, the train stops at the end of the fault section and waits to switch to manual mode before continuing to run until the TAF conditions are met again and RBC initiates the interaction to generate a full-mode driving permit. The train then switches to full mode and runs. By integrating initial guidance permission data, highly flexible trigger threshold data, and mode switching data, guidance / full mode driving permission data is generated.

4. The method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The system monitors and processes train position reports and following status to determine whether the train has completely exited the fault section and is not followed by any other train. If so, it completes guided cleaning or preceding train cleaning and generates section cleaning results, including: Collect train position reports and following status data to generate a train dynamic monitoring dataset. The train position report includes the train's running trajectory within the fault section and the tail position information. A dual-condition integrity judgment rule is constructed. By continuously communicating with the fault section and confirming the departure location of the tail end, the train's complete passage status is determined, and the train passage integrity verification result is generated. Real-time monitoring of trains following the faulty section; once it is confirmed that no other trains have entered, generate section clearance status confirmation data. Based on the cleaning type adaptation logic, guided cleaning determination is performed for scenarios where the lead vehicle is in guided mode, and front vehicle cleaning determination is performed for scenarios where the lead vehicle is in visual mode, generating cleaning type matching data. The system integrates the passability integrity verification results, the section idle status confirmation data, and the cleaning type matching data. If all conditions are met, the cleaning is considered successful; otherwise, the cleaning is considered a failure, and section cleaning data containing the cleaning results and the reasons for failure is generated.

5. The method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the results of the legal command determination and the section cleaning, combined with the fault speed limit value set by the line parameters, the train operation permit is comprehensively calculated to generate train operation permit data for subsequent trains, including: The validity of the legal command judgment results, the valid status identifiers in the section cleaning results, and the fault section range parameters are verified and analyzed for correlation. The characteristics of the permit calculation triggering conditions, the fault section adaptation weights, and the safety constraint priority coefficients are generated to form the basic information for driving permit calculation. The constraints such as line operating speed, gradient, and fault section length in the line parameters are quantified, converted, and safety thresholds are defined to generate fault speed limit benchmark values, dynamic adjustment coefficients, and speed curve adaptation parameters, thus forming speed limit setting constraint information. A calculation model is constructed for the target train operation permit. The abnormal section ignoring logic, speed limit fusion rules and train operation safety boundaries are combined to perform parameter calibration and permit validity assessment. The characteristics of the extended range of the train operation permit and the speed information integration index are generated to form permit calculation optimization information. Integrate basic information for driving permit calculation, speed limit setting constraint information, and permit calculation optimization information to generate an extended driving permit that includes fault speed limit and text prompts for track circuit faults ahead, and simultaneously report the speed limit status to CTC; If the RBC determines that the track circuit has returned to normal within the validity period of the section idle command, it will report the faulty section clearing to the CTC and process it according to the normal track circuit state when calculating the driving permission for the following train, thus forming the target driving permission data.

6. The method for calculating train clearance in response to track circuit anomalies by a radio block center supporting moving block as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The system monitors and processes commands to cancel speed limits in track circuit status and fault conditions in the centralized dispatching system. If the Central Traffic Control Center (CTC) issues a command to cancel a fault-related speed limit or resolves the fault, the speed limit is canceled and a text message is displayed. Subsequent train operation permits are calculated based on normal track circuit status, generating normal train operation permit configuration data, including: Monitor the real-time status of track circuits and the fault speed limit cancellation command of the centralized scheduling system, capture the matching characteristics of fault clearance signal and cancellation command, and generate fault recovery trigger vector; The integrity of state recovery, legality of command execution, and confirmation of no train occupation in the fault recovery trigger vector are comprehensively judged and dynamically verified to generate a fault clearance confirmation result. Based on the fault clearance confirmation result, the fault speed limit and the text prompt of the ahead track circuit fault are canceled using the intelligent mitigation logic of the driving permit protection. Subsequent driving permits are calculated according to the actual occupancy status of the track circuit. If a train is still in the faulty section when the fault is cleared, the RBC will maintain the current train's travel permission and protection status, and will not send an emergency stop order to that section. The subsequent train's permission configuration will be updated synchronously after the train has completely left the faulty section. The intelligent mitigation logic synchronizes the CTC system status in real time to ensure seamless connection between speed limit cancellation and normal driving permit calculation, and generates driving permits.

7. A train control authorization calculation device for a wireless block center supporting moving block signaling in response to track circuit anomalies, characterized in that, The device includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire track circuit abnormal information, train operation basic data, on-site confirmation information, dispatching centralized system command information and line parameters, and to make a preliminary judgment on abnormal information, activate the shortened train permit protection mechanism, and generate initial safety protection data. The shortened train permit protection mechanism is used to indicate that the train permit in non-adjacent sections is shortened to the starting point of the fault zone, and the conditional emergency stop is triggered in adjacent sections. The data processing module is used to comprehensively process basic train operation data and on-site confirmation information. It issues section clearing commands containing command numbers, fault sections, and valid durations through the centralized dispatching system, and simultaneously performs double verification of command execution (verification and confirmation) to generate a valid command determination result. It also parses and processes train position reports and communication status, determines the lead car ahead of the fault section, generates a guidance mode train operation permit extending to the end of the fault section for the lead car, and sends it to it. Once the preceding section is clear and the train has traveled a specific distance to trigger the preceding track clearing interaction, it generates full mode train operation permit data and sends it to the lead car. The system monitors and processes train position reports and following status to determine if the train has completely exited the fault section and is not followed by any other train. If so, it completes guided cleaning or preceding train cleaning and generates section cleaning results. Based on the legal command determination results and section cleaning results, it sets the fault speed limit value in conjunction with line parameters, calculates the train operation permit, and generates target train operation permit data for subsequent trains. It monitors and processes track circuit status and fault speed limit cancellation commands in the centralized dispatching system. If the fault is cleared, it cancels the speed limit and text prompts, and subsequent train operation permits are calculated based on normal track circuit status, generating train operation permits.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: First processor; and a memory for storing executable instructions of the processor; wherein the processor is configured to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 6 by executing the executable instructions.

9. A computing device, the device comprising a memory for storing computer program instructions and a second processor for executing the computer program instructions, wherein, When the computer program instructions are executed by the second processor, the device is triggered to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 6.

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