Scheduling-based rail traffic management system with a special operating interface

Abstract

The present invention discloses a scheduling-based rail traffic management system comprising: a) at least one traffic management system cell which is provided for train control within a predeterminable region of a rail network, wherein the traffic management system cell comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for implementing cell software, wherein the cell software comprises projected train protection rules for the train control; c) an operating workstation for a train controller, wherein the cell software provides the train controller with a series of manual operations for train control, wherein a special operating interface for the traffic management system cell is provided, via which interface an instance for train control management transmits a separate request for a train controller-independent operation of the traffic management system cell to the traffic management system cell, wherein the cell software is capable of checking this operation against specially projected rules and allows the operation if the check is positive and rejects the operation if the check is negative.

Description

[0001] Dispositive control system for rail traffic with a special operating interface

[0002] The present invention relates to a dispositive guidance system for rail traffic.

[0003] In rail transport, trains travel the railway network along routes requested by a control system at the level of operational train control (also called train routing). This request can be triggered automatically when trains are operating according to schedule, thus ensuring a sequence of previously planned routes. In the event of deviations from the timetable or other interventions, the routes are requested manually by the train dispatcher. Each requested route is set by a control unit, such as a signal box, centrally or decentrally, only when the route elements, such as points, signals, block occupancy detection, and moving blocks in ETCS, are available for that route and can be set accordingly and locked against other use by competing routes. After the route has been traversed...The closure of the roadway elements located within it will be lifted and the roadway elements will be available again for setting new routes.

[0004] Thus, signal boxes or virtual control instances are currently operated either manually by a train dispatcher at an operator workstation of a dispatching control system, such as Iltis Netz of Siemens Mobility AG, Wallisellen, Switzerland, or, if available (as in the case of Iltis Netz), by the automation of the dispatching control system.

[0005] Many railway companies operate so-called train management systems (TMS), which further automate operational processes in productive rail traffic and are designed to operate the control system like a virtual train dispatcher. Emergency operations are generally excluded and are still to be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation.

[0006] As mentioned above, there are still numerous applications today where certain operations of the interlocking system must be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation of the operational control system. This procedure often carries a certain potential for errors, because, for example, route settings in the shunting and depot areas must be requested by telephone from the shunting and depot personnel to the train dispatcher, and the transmissions can sometimes be inadequate due to ambient noise or other sources of interference, and thus misinterpreted by the train dispatcher.

[0007] The present invention is therefore based on the objective of providing a control system for rail traffic with which it is possible to make certain operations of the control system safer with and without operation of the signal box and thereby relieve the train dispatcher at the operating workstation of the control system.

[0008] This problem is solved according to the invention by a dispositive control system for rail traffic, which comprises the following components: a) at least one control system cell, which is provided for train control within a predetermined area of ​​a rail network, wherein the control system cell comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software comprises projected train protection rules for train control; c) an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides a timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with a corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of an overview image of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains traveling through the area at the operator workstation.and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control to the train dispatcher, which the latter is authorized to perform within the framework of the train protection rules contained in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements, characterized in that a special operating interface is provided for the control system cell, via which an instance for train control management transmits a separate request for a train dispatcher-independent operation of the control system cell to the control system cell, wherein the cell software is capable of checking this operation according to specially designed rules and, if the check is successful, permits it or rejects it if the check is unsuccessful.

[0009] In this way, the present invention ensures that a railway company can further automate operational processes in train production with its train management system (Traffic Management System TMS) and operate the control system like a virtual train dispatcher. Thus, the number of operations that must be performed manually by a train dispatcher at an operator workstation of the operational control system can be significantly reduced by appropriately protecting the special operating interface of the operational control system. However, exceptions to this include, for example, emergency operations, which are safety-critical and therefore, in compliance with current railway safety regulations, must continue to be performed manually by the train dispatcher at the operator workstation.

[0010] In a suitable embodiment of the present invention, the separate requirement can be classified as critical operation or as rule operation according to the specifically projected rules, as defined by the special operating interface. Thus, different requirements relating to safety, track and trace of operation, and similar railway-related criteria can be defined and assigned to the separate requirement.

[0011] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it may be provided that a control operation can be transmitted to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a single channel and / or that a critical operation can be transmitted to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a two-channel manner.

[0012] In an equally advantageous embodiment of the present invention, a control operation, insofar as it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via a single channel and / or a critical operation, insofar as it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via two channels.

[0013] A special range of previously impossible operations (because the train dispatcher is bypassed) can now be provided if the separate request, according to the specifically designed rules, can be classified as an operation that either deactivates operations designed within the cell software or prevents such operations from being deactivated within the cell software. Further advantageous embodiments of the present invention can be found in the remaining dependent claims.

[0014] Advantageous embodiments of the present invention are explained in more detail with reference to the drawing. The figure shows a schematic view of a solution concept for operating a control system 2 and, optionally, an interlocking system 4 via a special interface 6 of the control system 2. In a manner not shown here, the interlocking system 6 is located in a section of a railway network, in which the control system 2 manages the train movements carried out in this section.

[0015] With the inventive implementation of the special operating interface 6 for the control system 2, for example, a control operation in control engineering jargon, such as "switch (WU)", can be transmitted from an external system, such as a traffic management system (TMS), to the control system 2 via a single channel using the special operating interface 6, which is provided on a process interface (PSS). In the control system cell 2a, the external operation is first converted into an internal control system operation in an operation converter (not shown in the figure). The operation converter sends the internal control system operation to an operator processor. In this part, the approval check takes place first. In the approval check, element states in the process image are queried. Which elements are checked and which states they must have are defined in the project for this control operation.After successful testing, the corresponding command output is initiated, depending on the interlocking type. The necessary commands are then issued to interlocking 4 via an interlocking connection. A critical operation, in control engineering terminology, such as "Operational Dissolution Shunting Ahrstrasse (BAR)", is transmitted by the external system to control system 2 via the special operating interface 6 in two channels. Because the operations received via special operating interface 6 are not processed on the process interface (PSS), separate PSS instances are not required for the two-channel transmission of critical operations. Subsequently, however, the two-channel operations are fully processed in two channels by control system cell 2a and also output in two channels to interlocking 4.To ensure that the control signal is transmitted to signal box 4 simultaneously (synchronized), the control processing on the mirror computer (redundant computer) synchronizes with the control processing on the main computer. For synchronization, the operator's identifier (operator and order number) is exchanged and compared. If a match is found within a short time window, the critical control signal is transmitted (simultaneously) to signal box 4 via the signal box connection.

[0016] During the critical operation "BAR," the approval check verifies not only the status of internal control system elements but also the status of the external system (Traffic Management System, TMS), such as "Stop message from TMS present." It's worth noting that the approval check is also performed in two channels (once on the main computer and once on the mirror computer). This is indicated by the dashed lines / frames in the diagram. The stop message is received via a message interface (labeled S4MLD.TPD in the diagram) in the process image, which is also present in two channels, within control system cell 2a.

[0017] With the aid of the solution concept described above, the special operating interface 6 allows the Traffic / Train Management System 12, for example, of the railway operator, to transmit desired control operations, such as "switch points," in a single channel via this new operating interface 6 to the control system 2, i.e., to the control system cell 2a responsible for this area of ​​the railway network. In the control system 2, i.e., in the cell software of control system cell 2a, a simple approval check, designed according to the valid operating regulations, is then carried out before processing. The term "simple approval check" used here can refer, for example, to checks of the element states (point position) of the controlled element (points). If the standard operation involves interlocking operation, it will also be output to interlocking 4 after successful testing.

[0018] Critical operations, such as "Operational shutdown shunting Ahrstrasse", are transmitted to control system 2 via the new special operating interface 6 using two channels. In control system 2 (control system cell 2a with the rules defined for special interface 6), the defined approval checks are performed before processing the operation. The term "defined approval checks" refers, for example, to checks such as "Standstill message from TMS 12 present", "Start and destination dwarf signals displaying "STOP", etc. If the critical operation involves an interlocking control, the operation is output to interlocking 4 via two channels after successful verification.

[0019] The specific tests to be carried out in the approval test of each of the enabled operating modes are defined in the project design of the special operating interface 6.

[0020] Operating instructions are generally acknowledged with an operating receipt. If an operation is not carried out, the reason for the error can be stated in the operating receipt, such as "switching points is not possible because the desired points are locked in the current point position and therefore cannot be operated."

[0021] The controls that are possible via the new special operating interface 6 can be assigned to the following categories: i) Controls that can be switched off ii) Controls that cannot be switched off

[0022] The term "controls that can be switched off" refers to controls that simplify operational processes (e.g., 'switching points') or automatic controls (e.g., 'dissolving train route'), which, according to regulations of a railway authority, such as the BAV (Federal Office of Transport, CH) or the Federal Railway Authority (DE), must be predictable and switchable.

[0023] The phrase "Operating controls that cannot be deactivated" refers to controls that serve to avert danger and / or are supportive and / or cannot directly lead to additional hazards (e.g., "Deactivate automatic signal operation"). The assignment of controls to the relevant category is also defined in the configuration of the special operating interface 6.

[0024] The train dispatcher can activate / deactivate the execution of the switchable controls via the special operating interface 6 at their workstation 8. The "External controls OFF" status is displayed to the train dispatcher in the magnified view 14 at workstation 8. This also allows the train dispatcher to deactivate the following automatic functions with an (emergency) control (similar to a red buzzer): i) Train control ii) Shunting control iii) Operating interface

[0025] This quick-access control allows, for example, compliance with relevant regulations of the railway authority, which require that the operator be able to switch off or cancel automatic processes.

[0026] Within the scope of the present invention, the following operations are provided as exemplary embodiments: i) Switching the turnout:

[0027] Currently, maintenance staff must contact the train dispatcher by phone to request that a switch be thrown. This results in waiting times on the phone until the train dispatcher can answer. The communication is time-consuming and prone to errors. With the special operating interface 6, the TMS can now send the "swap switch" command to the control system 2, thus providing the maintenance staff with relevant additional information, such as the reason the switch was not thrown. Upon successful completion of the test, the switch can then be thrown in response to the maintenance staff's command by activating the interlocking system. ii) Deactivate automatic signal operation

[0028] With the currently available exchange between the TMS and the control system, it is possible to prevent trains from being automatically routed on a specific section by inputting a command at the TMS. This is achieved by setting a disposition stop (Discri D) in the train routing data. However, this measure is always linked to a specific train and therefore requires prior calculations in the TMS to determine which train will next travel the section in question. With the new special operating interface 6, it is now possible for the TMS to send the command "Switch off automatic signal operation" to the control system, so that no train automatically receives a proceed aspect at the relevant signal section. iii) Route cancellation

[0029] The "Route Disconnection" function allows residual train routes to be released under certain circumstances. For a train dispatcher to perform this action, they must ensure that all dependent driving elements (points, level crossings) have been traversed or that the train has come to a complete stop. With the new special operating interface 6, the TMS can now send the "Route Disconnection" command to the control system 2. This capability allows, for example, the following scenarios to be covered in conjunction with shunting control:

[0030] - The train arrives and terminates at the relevant station; the train is then shunted away in the opposite direction.

[0031] - The train arrives and terminates at the relevant station; subsequently, a shunting movement against the direction of travel of the arriving train is to be carried out (e.g., to strengthen a train set). iv) Shunting operation cancellation

[0032] The "Shunting Route Operation Dissolution" function allows shunting routes to be dissolved. Currently, the train dispatcher must first verify that all dependent track elements have been traversed (points, level crossings) or that the train has stopped (communication with the shunting supervisor). With the new special operating interface 6 according to the invention, it is now also possible for the Traffic Management System (TMS) to send the "Shunting Route Operation Dissolution" command to the control system. This command is also related to shunting control. The shunting setup process can only be fully automated if shunting routes can also be dissolved via an operating interface of the control system. v) Emergency Stop Signal for Shunting Route

[0033] With the emergency stop signal for shunting on Ahrstrasse, a dwarf signal can be immediately set to stop. Currently, this function is operated exclusively manually by the train dispatcher at the control system 2 operator workstation. With the new special operating interface, the TMS can now also send the "Emergency Stop Signal for Shunting on Ahrstrasse" command to the control system. This allows the operator of a TMS user interface to immediately set a dwarf signal to stop in the event of reported hazards. Furthermore, the TMS can initiate the release process in the event of disruptions to a shunting movement, as reported by the shunting locomotive driver. (vi) Moving forward to the dwarf signal

[0034] Currently, there is no explicit safety measure for the "advance to dwarf signal" maneuver. No route exists for this maneuver in the interlocking system, as the advance only takes place within a section that is not subdivided by further dwarf signals. In the current process, the train dispatcher verbally grants the shunting supervisor permission to advance to the dwarf signal. The train dispatcher alone is responsible for ensuring that neither the control system's automation sets a train route against the advancing shunting movement, nor does the dispatcher themselves set a shunting or train route against the advancing shunting movement. With the new special operating interface 6, advance movements to the dwarf signal are now secured, so that neither train routes nor shunting routes are automatically set for this section of the advance to the dwarf signal. The safety measure is activated and deactivated via the TMS (Train Management System) using a control panel.However, the safety measure can also be manually switched off by the train dispatcher.

[0035] The solution concept according to the invention allows the aforementioned use cases to be automated via special operating interface 6. This solution can also be easily adapted to the needs of other railway operators. Which operations are permitted / possible via special operating interface 6 can be fully defined in the design of the special operating interface 6. To ensure railway safety, a limitation of operations, for example, operations involving interlocking bypass, can be provided here.

[0036] Thus, the solution concept described above is suitable for simplifying operational processes in rail transport and reducing costs. A typical distinguishing feature for the use of the invention presented here is the (documented) special operating interface 6, via which a secondary system, such as the TMS 12, can transmit regular and critical operating commands to the control system 2.

[0037] The present invention can thus be seen, among other things, as another important piece of the puzzle for a new automated shunting setup process. However, numerous other operational processes can also be simplified and automated with this invention. Furthermore, the present invention involves corresponding, sometimes extensive, tests (approximately the same ones that the train dispatcher currently has to perform manually), with the aim of automating frequently occurring operational processes and simultaneously minimizing sources of error. Thus, by creating the special operating interface and its corresponding protection, a way is provided to automate certain standard and critical operations without having to first transmit the entire requirement for such operation to the train dispatcher and have him check its feasibility.

Claims

Patent claims 1. Dispositive control system (2) for rail-bound traffic, comprising: a) at least one control system cell (2a) intended for train control within a predetermined area of ​​a rail network, wherein the control system cell (2a) comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software comprises projected train protection rules for train control; c) an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with a corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of an overview of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains traversing the area at the operator workstation.and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which the latter is authorized to perform within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements, characterized in that a special operating interface (6) is provided for the control system cell (2a), via which an instance for train control management transmits a separate request for a train dispatcher-independent operation of the control system cell to the control system cell, wherein the cell software is capable of checking this operation according to specially designed rules and, if the check is successful, permits it or, if the check is unsuccessful, rejects it.

2. Dispositive control system according to claim 1, characterized in that the separate request can be classified as critical operation or as regular operation according to the specially projected rules, according to the projection of the special operating interface.

3. Dispositive control system according to claim 2, characterized in that a control operation can be transferred to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a single channel and / or a critical operation can be transferred to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a two-channel manner.

4. Dispositive control system according to claim 2 or 3, characterized in that a control operation, insofar as it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via a single channel and / or a critical operation, insofar as it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via two channels.

5. Dispositive control system according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the separate request according to the specifically projected rules can be classified as an operation which switches off projected operations within the cell software or makes projected operations not switchable within the cell software.

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