Multi-scene password application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles

Abstract

The application provides a multi-scene password application detection system of an intelligent connected vehicle, and belongs to the technical field of intelligent detection.The system comprises a simulation intelligent connected vehicle subsystem deploying a national secret algorithm, a simulation TSP cloud platform, a user terminal deploying a digital key APP, and a password application detection module.The password application detection module is used for password technology application data based on an inter-domain communication network in the vehicle, a vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and a human-vehicle near field communication network, and performs password application detection based on the national secret algorithm.The application verifies through simulation experiments that the intelligent connected vehicle applies the national secret algorithm to realize the effectiveness of a safe data communication mechanism in the three scenes of the inter-domain communication network in the vehicle, the vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and the human-vehicle near field communication network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of intelligent detection technology, and in particular to a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles. Background Technology

[0002] The vehicle communication system of intelligent connected vehicles covers key scenarios such as in-vehicle multi-domain controller interaction, vehicle-to-cloud remote data transmission, and digital key near-field authentication. The compliance and security of its cryptographic applications are directly related to vehicle driving safety and user information security, and are the core link in the construction of the vehicle safety system.

[0003] In the field of engineering applications, common technologies for detecting cryptographic applications in intelligent connected vehicles focus on areas such as network attack protection and communication encryption implementation.

[0004] However, research on full-scenario detection of cryptographic applications in the context of replacing national cryptographic algorithms in vehicle architecture is still in the exploratory stage. Existing research results are difficult to adapt to the detection needs of cryptographic applications in multiple scenarios such as in-vehicle, vehicle cloud, and digital key integration, and cannot provide full-process, high-precision detection support for the security assessment of cryptographic applications in vehicles. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention provides a multi-scenario password application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles, which solves the shortcomings of existing technologies that are difficult to adapt to the password application detection needs of multiple scenarios such as in-vehicle, vehicle cloud, and digital key integration.

[0006] This invention provides a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles, comprising: A simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem; the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem is deployed with national cryptographic algorithms; Simulated TSP cloud platform; User terminals for deploying the digital key app; The cryptographic application detection module is used to perform cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the cryptographic technology application data of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, vehicle-cloud remote communication network and human-vehicle near-field communication network. The in-vehicle inter-domain communication network is the communication network within the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem; the vehicle-cloud remote communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform, and the user terminal; and the human-vehicle near-field communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the user terminal.

[0007] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles includes the following steps: detecting cryptographic applications based on national cryptographic algorithms using cryptographic technology application data from the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network, and the human-vehicle near-field communication network. This includes: collecting first cryptographic technology application data from the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network using a CAN bus analyzer, and performing cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms using the first cryptographic technology application data; collecting second cryptographic technology application data from the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network using a network packet analysis tool, and performing cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms using the second cryptographic technology application data; and collecting third cryptographic technology application data from the human-vehicle near-field communication network using a Bluetooth sniffing tool, and performing cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms using the third cryptographic technology application data.

[0008] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles is provided. The step of detecting cryptographic applications based on national cryptographic algorithms based on the first cryptographic technology application data includes: detecting the validity of cryptographic algorithms based on the ciphertext data and authentication fields of CAN messages; detecting the periodicity of key updates during key negotiation based on key negotiation data; detecting the randomness of the first random number based on the first random number during key negotiation; and detecting the consistency of session parameters based on the CAN first frame parameters during session establishment.

[0009] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles is provided. The step of performing cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms based on the second cryptographic technology application data includes: performing compliance detection of encryption suites, encryption algorithms and encryption protocol version numbers based on session establishment data; performing randomness detection of the second random number based on the second random number in the session establishment process; and performing validity detection of certificate validity period based on two-way authentication data.

[0010] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles is provided. The cryptographic application detection based on the third cryptographic technology application data and the national cryptographic algorithm includes: detecting the timeliness of digital key management permissions based on digital key sharing data; detecting the randomness of a third random number generated during the digital key sharing process; detecting the correctness of a PIN code based on PIN code authentication data; detecting the encryption of data transmission based on sniffing data after Bluetooth pairing; and detecting the timeliness of sensitive parameters based on Bluetooth packets.

[0011] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by the present invention further includes: an in-vehicle security interface detection module, used to deploy probes to perform interface detection on the security function interfaces of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network; wherein, the security function interfaces include at least one of the following: a key pair generation and export interface, a session key import and export interface, a certificate import and export interface, a certificate signing and verification interface, a secure communication handshake interface, a secure data sending and receiving interface, an interface for using a built-in hardware encryption module, and a national cryptographic algorithm calculation interface.

[0012] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by the present invention further includes: an operating environment security detection module, used to execute preset attack methods against the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal using pre-built security assumptions and threat models, so as to detect the attack resistance indicators and security protection strength of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system.

[0013] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles includes a simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem comprising a simulated T-BOX component and a simulated Slave ECU component; the simulated T-BOX component and the simulated Slave ECU component communicate and interact via an in-vehicle CAN bus; the simulated T-BOX component is simulated using a first development board and a first Bluetooth module; the first development board has a built-in hardware encryption module for storing relevant keys and generating true random numbers; the simulated Slave ECU component is simulated using a second development board; the first development board and the second development board are different; the user terminal has a built-in security module and a second Bluetooth module.

[0014] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles includes a simplified GmSSL algorithm library for transport layer encryption between the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal. The simplified GmSSL algorithm library includes pre-configured core functions of national cryptographic algorithms. Furthermore, the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal employ a challenge-response bidirectional authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and the SM2 digital signature algorithm to achieve reliable authentication of both parties. The simulated TSP cloud platform and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem also employ a challenge-response bidirectional authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and the SM2 digital signature algorithm to complete identity verification between the vehicle and the cloud. The first Bluetooth module of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the second Bluetooth module of the user terminal exchange digital certificates issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and verify their legality. Based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, they complete the challenge-response bidirectional authentication mechanism. After successful authentication, they negotiate a session key to achieve secure communication interaction in short-range Bluetooth communication scenarios.

[0015] According to the present invention, a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles is provided, wherein the first development board is an S32K144 development board and the second development board is an STM32F407 development board.

[0016] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention achieves interconnectivity among its components by building three major communication network topologies: in-vehicle inter-domain, vehicle-to-cloud remote, and human-vehicle near-field, based on a simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, a simulated TSP cloud platform, and a user terminal deploying a digital key APP. The cryptographic application detection module performs cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms using cryptographic technology application data from the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network, and the human-vehicle near-field communication network. Thus, in the context of the immaturity of the national cryptographic technology application system for intelligent connected vehicles, simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of the secure data communication mechanism achieved by applying national cryptographic algorithms to the entire intelligent connected vehicle, effectively ensuring secure network communication, protecting user data privacy, and promoting the development of intelligent transportation and smart city construction. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by the present invention.

[0019] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure between the intelligent connected vehicle, the TSP platform, and the user terminal provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this invention without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0021] The following is combined with Figures 1 to 2 This invention describes a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles.

[0022] Driven by the development of the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence technologies, the rapid development of modern automobiles has brought significant cybersecurity challenges to the automotive industry. While enhancing user experience and vehicle functionality, this transformation has also exposed critical vulnerabilities that could jeopardize vehicle integrity, user security, and data confidentiality. With the comprehensive implementation of national commercial cryptographic algorithms (SM2 / SM3 / SM4, etc.) and the establishment of relevant standards for cryptographic application security assessment, the automotive industry, as a core component of critical information infrastructure, is undergoing a comprehensive upgrade of cryptographic algorithms and communication protocols at the vehicle architecture level. National cryptographic algorithms are gradually replacing traditional non-national cryptographic algorithms, becoming the core security support for in-vehicle communication, identity authentication, and data encryption.

[0023] The vehicle communication system of intelligent connected vehicles covers key scenarios such as in-vehicle multi-domain controller interaction, vehicle-to-cloud remote data transmission, and digital key near-field authentication. The compliance and security of its cryptographic applications are directly related to vehicle driving safety and user information security, and are the core link in the construction of the vehicle safety system.

[0024] In the field of engineering applications, common technologies for detecting cryptographic applications in intelligent connected vehicles focus on areas such as network attack protection and communication encryption implementation. These include: statistical tests for randomness verification and algorithm strength evaluation; statistical tests on the output sequences of pseudo-random number generators or cryptographic algorithms, such as frequency, run length, discrete Fourier transform, and linear complexity; and quantifying the minimum entropy of the sequence using entropy evaluation methods to determine whether the algorithm implementation meets cryptographic security requirements.

[0025] However, research on full-scenario detection of cryptographic applications in the context of replacing national cryptographic algorithms in vehicle architecture is still in the exploratory stage. Existing research results are difficult to adapt to the detection needs of cryptographic applications in multiple scenarios such as in-vehicle, vehicle cloud, and digital key integration. There is a lack of integrated detection methods and technical solutions for the standardization of cryptographic algorithm use, protocol execution security, and operational compliance after the national cryptographic transformation of the whole vehicle. Therefore, it is impossible to provide full-process, high-precision detection support for the security assessment of cryptographic applications in the whole vehicle.

[0026] In view of this, and in response to the actual needs of the national cryptographic standardization transformation of intelligent connected vehicles, this invention provides a multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles. Taking three core communication scenarios—in-vehicle inter-domain communication, vehicle-to-cloud remote interaction, and digital key near-field authentication—as research objects, the system simulates and recreates the actual application and communication interaction processes of national cryptographic algorithms in each scenario. It conducts research on cryptographic application detection technology that integrates multiple scenarios under the vehicle architecture, aiming to fill existing research gaps and provide feasible technical paths and implementation solutions for the security detection of cryptographic applications after the national cryptographic standardization transformation of intelligent connected vehicles.

[0027] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by the present invention, as shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the multi-scenario password application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles includes, but is not limited to, a simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, a simulated TSP (Telematics Service Provider) cloud platform 102, a user terminal 103 deploying a digital key APP, and a password application detection module 104.

[0028] The deployment of national cryptographic algorithms in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101.

[0029] The cryptographic application detection module 104 is used to perform cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the cryptographic technology application data of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, the vehicle-cloud remote communication network and the human-vehicle near-field communication network.

[0030] Among them, the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network is the communication network within the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101; the vehicle-cloud remote communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, the simulated TSP cloud platform 102, and the network terminal 103; and the human-vehicle near-field communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 and the user terminal 103.

[0031] By fully understanding the interaction between user terminals, intelligent connected vehicles, and TSP platforms, a framework for detecting cryptographic applications in intelligent connected vehicles covering three major scenarios—in-vehicle, vehicle-cloud, and digital key—can be built. This framework forms the basis for realizing the simulation and detection of cryptographic applications in intelligent connected vehicles.

[0032] There are two ways for user terminals and intelligent connected vehicles to interact: one is that the user terminal receives and processes instructions via WiFi or mobile network through the TSP cloud platform and forwards them to the T-BOX module of the intelligent connected vehicle. This is mostly used to transmit messages with a high level of security and is suitable for long-distance communication with good communication signals. The other is that when the user terminal is close to the intelligent connected vehicle or in an environment with poor network signal, the user terminal can use short-range communication such as Bluetooth, NFC (Near Field Communication), and UWB (Ultra-Wideband) to control basic commands such as unlocking the vehicle.

[0033] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure between the intelligent connected vehicle, the TSP platform, and the user terminal provided by the present invention, combined with... Figure 2 As shown, users can remotely view the status information of intelligent connected vehicles through user terminals to achieve remote control. Vehicle owners can also temporarily authorize the use of the vehicle to other users through the digital key APP to achieve vehicle sharing.

[0034] After the user terminal's digital key APP issues a query command, it is received by the TSP cloud platform. The TSP cloud platform needs to perform unified identity authentication, permission verification, and vehicle status linkage, while also realizing cross-regional remote control.

[0035] Intelligent connected vehicles include T-BOX components and ECU (Engine Control Unit) components.

[0036] Between the TSP cloud platform and the intelligent connected vehicle, the TSP platform and the T-BOX component of the intelligent connected vehicle complete data communication via WiFi / cellular network.

[0037] Inside a smart connected vehicle, the ECU components may specifically include the engine control ECU and ABS control ECU in the powertrain subnet, and the body control ECU and window control ECU in the body control subnet. The T-BOX component is connected to the in-vehicle network gateway via a CAN bus. The engine control ECU and ABS control ECU are both connected to the gateway via a high-speed CAN bus, while the body control ECU and window control ECU are both connected to the gateway via a low-speed CAN bus. The various parts of the ECU components transmit vehicle status information collected by the in-vehicle system to the T-BOX component via the in-vehicle CAN bus.

[0038] The T-BOX component transmits vehicle status information in encrypted form to the TSP platform via an encrypted channel, allowing users to view it through their user terminals.

[0039] Understandably, in order to achieve encrypted communication between the vehicle and the cloud remotely, the user terminal and the T-BOX component of the intelligent connected vehicle are equipped with necessary security modules; in order to achieve near-field communication between people and vehicles, the user terminal and the T-BOX component of the intelligent connected vehicle are also equipped with Bluetooth communication modules.

[0040] Based on the interconnected relationship between intelligent connected vehicles, TSP platforms, and user terminals, the multi-scenario password application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles can include a simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, a simulated TSP cloud platform 102, a user terminal 103 with a deployed digital key APP, and a password application detection module 104.

[0041] The simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 is a simulation subsystem built using a development board that can simulate intelligent connected vehicles.

[0042] The communication network within the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 is mainly an in-vehicle inter-domain communication network jointly formed by the simulated T-BOX component and the simulated ECU component via a CAN bus. Furthermore, the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network needs to deploy the SM series national cryptographic algorithms to simulate the network topology of the entire vehicle in order to verify the role of encrypted communication in reducing network security risks in real-world automotive scenarios.

[0043] The simulation TSP cloud platform 102 is a simulation cloud platform built in conjunction with the simulation intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, conforming to the vehicle-to-cloud communication scenario. As a centralized node, the simulation TSP cloud platform 102 centrally manages all vehicle data and provides application services.

[0044] User terminal 103, also known as mobile terminal, provides an entry point for vehicle networking applications through the deployed digital key APP, and simulates remote control of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101.

[0045] In the vehicle-to-cloud remote scenario, the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 establishes a communication link with the simulated TSP cloud platform 102 through the simulated T-BOX component, and the user terminal 103 establishes a communication link with the simulated TSP cloud platform 102 through WiFi / mobile network. The user terminal 103 can remotely control the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 through the simulated TSP cloud platform 102, thus obtaining a vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network composed of the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, the simulated TSP cloud platform 102 and the user terminal 103.

[0046] In near-field scenarios involving people and vehicles, the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 establishes a communication link with the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 via a Bluetooth communication module. The user terminal 103 then performs direct near-field control of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101, resulting in a vehicle-cloud remote communication network composed of the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 and the user terminal 103.

[0047] Understandably, in order to simulate encrypted communication between the vehicle and the cloud remotely, the user terminal 103 and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 have the necessary security modules to realize security functions such as identity authentication and data encryption; in order to simulate near-field connection communication between people and vehicles, the user terminal 103 and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem 101 also have a Bluetooth communication module.

[0048] Specifically, when simulating and verifying the cryptographic application detection of intelligent connected vehicles in three major scenarios—in-vehicle inter-domain communication, vehicle-to-cloud remote communication, and human-vehicle near-field communication—the system collects cryptographic technology application data generated by the application of cryptographic technologies (such as national cryptographic algorithms) in the three communication networks of the intelligent connected vehicle's multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system: in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network, and human-vehicle near-field communication network. The cryptographic application detection module 104 then performs cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms on the cryptographic technology application data to obtain the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection results of the intelligent connected vehicle, thereby verifying the effectiveness of the secure data communication mechanism.

[0049] It should be noted that the technical means of cryptographic application detection include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following detection methods: randomness verification; algorithm correctness detection; statistical tests such as frequency, run length, discrete Fourier transform, and linear complexity on the output sequence of pseudo-random number generators or cryptographic algorithms; security consistency verification; quantifying the minimum entropy of the sequence by combining entropy evaluation methods to determine whether the algorithm implementation meets cryptographic security requirements, etc.

[0050] Randomness verification refers to verifying whether parameters with randomness, such as random numbers and encrypted initialization vectors (IVs) generated during the interaction between the two communicating parties, meet the randomness standard through statistical testing methods such as frequency, runs, discrete Fourier transform, and linear complexity.

[0051] The algorithm correctness detection includes a first sub-functional unit and a second sub-functional unit. The first sub-functional unit is used to determine whether the encryption requirements are met based on the entropy value statistics of the ciphertext data. The second sub-functional unit is used to verify the correctness of the algorithm implementation using standard test vectors, that is, given compliant standard input and configuration parameters, calling the cryptographic algorithm interface to determine whether the output meets expectations.

[0052] Security consistency verification involves extracting cryptographic features through message analysis as evidence for reviewing the security attributes of the protocol consistency, and verifying whether the implementation of the security protocol meets the requirements through compliance judgment rules.

[0053] The technical means for detecting cryptographic applications can be determined based on the specific circumstances, such as different communication networks and different national cryptographic algorithms used, and will not be elaborated here.

[0054] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention achieves interconnectivity among its components by building three major communication network topologies: in-vehicle inter-domain, vehicle-to-cloud remote, and human-vehicle near-field, based on a simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, a simulated TSP cloud platform, and a user terminal deploying a digital key APP. The cryptographic application detection module performs cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms using cryptographic technology application data from the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network, and the human-vehicle near-field communication network. Thus, in the context of the immaturity of the national cryptographic technology application system for intelligent connected vehicles, simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of the secure data communication mechanism achieved by applying national cryptographic algorithms to the entire intelligent connected vehicle, effectively ensuring secure network communication, protecting user data privacy, and promoting the development of intelligent transportation and smart city construction.

[0055] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem includes a simulated T-BOX component and a simulated Slave ECU component; the simulated T-BOX component and the simulated Slave ECU component communicate and interact via an in-vehicle CAN bus; the simulated T-BOX component is simulated using a first development board and a first Bluetooth module; the first development board has a built-in hardware encryption module for storing relevant keys and generating truly random numbers; the simulated Slave ECU component is simulated using a second development board; the first development board and the second development board are different. The user terminal has a built-in security module and a second Bluetooth module.

[0056] Specifically, in the communication architecture of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles, the construction of the communication environment for the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem involves, on the one hand, using a first development board and a first Bluetooth module to simulate the T-BOX component of the intelligent connected vehicle, thus obtaining the simulated T-BOX component. The simulated T-BOX component serves as a bridge between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform, and the user terminal, enabling multiple functions such as data relay and remote upgrades.

[0057] On the other hand, a second development board, different from the first development board, is used to simulate the ECU components of an intelligent connected vehicle, resulting in a simulated ECU component. This simulated ECU component enables functional control of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and communicates with the simulated T-BOX component via the in-vehicle CAN bus.

[0058] Among them, the simulated T-BOX component can act as the Master ECU, responsible for system parameter and session management synchronization, while the simulated ECU component acts as the Slave ECU.

[0059] Furthermore, the first development board simulating the T-BOX component also has a built-in hardware encryption module CSEc, which is used to store relevant keys and generate true random numbers.

[0060] For example, the root key and session key of the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm of the simulated T-BOX component can be stored in the restricted access area of ​​the CSEc_KEY_STORAGE of the hardware encryption module CSEc using the Key_Load() storage function, replacing ordinary Flash storage. When using the key, it can be read using the Key_Export() export function. The restricted access area is an area accessible only to the CPU, and its storage location cannot be read or located externally by the debugger; it exists in a completely physically isolated environment.

[0061] By storing relevant keys through a built-in hardware encryption module, hard-coding of keys at the software code level can be avoided, ensuring that keys circulate only internally, preventing key leakage, realizing key security management and control, and facilitating simulation experiments.

[0062] For example, calling the CSEc_GetRandom() function to generate truly random numbers in the hardware encryption module CSEc can serve as the initialization vector (IV) for the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm, thus avoiding the unreliability of software random numbers.

[0063] Currently, most development boards natively support only AES-128 / 192 / 256 ECB and CBC modes, as well as the SHA-256 hash algorithm. They do not reserve hardware circuits and instruction sets for the SM4 / SM3 / SM2 series of national cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, by integrating a hardware encryption module on the first development board, in addition to ensuring the closed nature of the encrypted communication link, it also supports the use of a hardware-software hybrid implementation of the SM encryption mechanism. That is, it supports the adaptation of SM-related national cryptographic algorithms by combining hardware and software.

[0064] In addition, the user terminal has a built-in security module for identity authentication and data encryption / decryption. The user terminal also has a built-in second Bluetooth module; in scenarios involving short-range Bluetooth communication, the first Bluetooth module is activated to enable secure pairing, authentication, and command interaction with the vehicle.

[0065] Furthermore, the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem can achieve Bluetooth pairing and secure data transmission with the second Bluetooth module built into the user terminal through the first Bluetooth module, so as to realize digital key near-field authentication and near-field communication between people and vehicles.

[0066] Optionally, the first development board is an S32K144 development board.

[0067] Optionally, the second development board is an STM32F407 development board.

[0068] Optionally, the first Bluetooth module is an ESP32 Bluetooth module.

[0069] Optionally, the second Bluetooth module is an ESP32 Bluetooth module.

[0070] The ESP32 Bluetooth module is equipped with both a built-in Bluetooth module and a WiFi module for communication with the cloud.

[0071] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention simulates T-BOX components based on a first development board and a first Bluetooth module, and simulates ECU components based on a second development board. A hardware encryption module is built into the first development board to simulate the subsystems of the intelligent connected vehicle. A security module and a second Bluetooth module are built into the user terminal. In three core communication scenarios—in-vehicle inter-domain communication, vehicle-to-cloud remote interaction, and digital key near-field authentication—the system achieves hardware-level interconnection and interoperability among the various components of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system. This helps to verify the effectiveness of the secure data communication mechanism achieved by the application of national cryptographic algorithms in the intelligent connected vehicle through simulation experiments.

[0072] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal use a simplified GmSSL algorithm library to implement transport layer encryption; the simplified GmSSL algorithm library includes pre-configured core functions of Chinese cryptographic algorithms; The simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal also establish a challenge-response two-way identity authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and the SM2 digital signature algorithm to achieve reliable authentication of the identities of both parties. The simulated TSP cloud platform and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem use a challenge-response mechanism to construct a two-way identity authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform, in order to complete the identity verification of both the vehicle and the cloud. The first Bluetooth module of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the second Bluetooth module of the user terminal exchange digital certificates issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and verify the legality of the certificates. Based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, they complete the challenge-response mechanism for two-way identity authentication. After successful authentication, they negotiate the session key to achieve secure communication interaction in short-range Bluetooth communication scenarios.

[0073] Specifically, on the one hand, in the vehicle-cloud remote communication network that includes vehicle-cloud communication and terminal cloud communication, vehicle-cloud secure communication mainly completes functions such as data encryption transmission and firmware remote upgrade. For the data to be transmitted, it relies on the SM algorithm to complete instruction encryption and integrity verification, thereby achieving end-to-end encryption.

[0074] Therefore, at the software level, the transport layer encryption in the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network has been transformed from the traditional TLS / SSL to a GmSSL algorithm library compliant with Chinese national cryptographic standards. The simplified GmSSL algorithm library is used to encrypt instructions or information at the transport layer between the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal, and between the simulated TSP cloud platform and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem. This comprehensive adoption of Chinese national cryptographic algorithms better adapts to the security challenges and compliance requirements of the modern network environment. The simplified GmSSL algorithm library includes pre-configured core functions of Chinese national cryptographic algorithms; these pre-configured core functions include, but are not limited to, filtered core functions such as SM4-CTR, SM4-GCM, and SM3-HMAC.

[0075] In addition, the application layer protocol in the vehicle-cloud remote communication network adopts the MQTT protocol in the embedded environment to complete the topic publish-subscribe, that is, the user terminal and the simulated TSP cloud platform use the MQTT protocol to implement topic publish and subscribe.

[0076] GmSSL achieves two-way authentication through a handshake protocol, selects the SM algorithm suite for subsequent encrypted communication, and issues a root certificate by a CA for authentication. The certificate issuance uses SM2 signature to ensure certificate security. The security controls that the cloud platform can implement include transport layer encryption, client authentication, ACL permission control, firmware security upgrades, etc., and set up access control mechanisms to authenticate user roles and published topics.

[0077] Furthermore, the simulated TSP cloud platform and user terminal, as well as the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, in the vehicle-cloud remote communication network adopt digital signatures issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform. The SM2 digital signature algorithm is used to construct a challenge-response two-way identity authentication mechanism to achieve reliable identification and verification of the identities of both parties. Ultimately, the digital key APP based on the user terminal can complete vehicle control, status monitoring and other functions of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem.

[0078] On the other hand, in the near-field communication network between human and vehicle, the first Bluetooth module of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the second Bluetooth module of the user terminal exchange digital certificates issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and verify the legality of the certificates. Based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, the challenge-response mechanism is used to complete two-way identity authentication. After successful authentication, the session key is negotiated to realize secure communication interaction including pairing authentication and command interaction in the near-field Bluetooth communication scenario.

[0079] Optionally, when a user logs into the application system using a user terminal with a username / password, the security of the authentication data is protected by the secure transmission channel established between the user terminal and the simulated TSP cloud platform. The first Bluetooth module and the second Bluetooth module use the Bluetooth communication key generated and distributed by the simulated TSP cloud platform for secure data transmission.

[0080] On the other hand, in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, key negotiation, data encryption, and integrity verification mechanisms are designed. The SM4 symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt plaintext data such as vehicle status information collected by simulated ECU components, and a counter parameter is introduced to ensure message freshness and prevent replay attacks. Specifically, during secure communication, the two communicating parties in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network exchange secure CAN messages. First, authentication is required. After receiving the message, the receiver calculates a new MAC value using the negotiated key and compares it with the MAC value of the original message data to verify message consistency. At the same time, it verifies whether the received message counter value is greater than the value of the last successful reception.

[0081] The secure CAN message consists of ciphertext data and an authentication field. The ciphertext data is obtained by encrypting the plaintext data, and the authentication field is used to ensure the integrity of the CAN message information and to ensure the information security of the onboard CAN bus communication.

[0082] The authentication field can be a MAC value or a tag, where the MAC value is a hash MAC value calculated by the SM3-HMAC security algorithm, and the tag is determined based on the SM4-HMAC algorithm.

[0083] Optionally, considering the limited length of the CAN data field in the CAN message, with a standard frame data length of only 8 bytes, the HMAC length can be appropriately compressed to only 16 bytes.

[0084] Optionally, when the CAN message uses the CAN FD extended frame, the ID field is extended to 29 bits and the payload is 64 bytes.

[0085] Furthermore, based on the aforementioned encryption algorithm mechanism between the simulated TSP cloud platform, user terminal, and simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the full lifecycle management of keys within the vehicle, vehicle-cloud, and human-vehicle relationship is as follows: (1) The root key of the simulated T-BOX component in the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem is correctly stored in the hardware encryption module and cannot be located by the debugger, and is in an absolutely physically isolated environment; (2) Both the encryption public and private keys and the signing public and private keys are generated by the built-in cryptographic module, and the public key is uploaded to the cloud platform CA system for certificate issuance; the CA verifies the device public key and device identification information and generates a digital certificate, thereby establishing a PKI trust system between the vehicle and the digital key; the device's internal security module implements key protection and key derivation based on the root key, which is used for session key generation and communication encryption, thereby ensuring the secure storage and use of the key; (3) Public keys are not managed directly as raw keys, but are encapsulated in digital certificates after being issued by a CA, and are used for storage, distribution, import, and verification. When a certificate expires, a device is decommissioned, or permissions are changed, the CA will revoke the certificate through a certificate revocation mechanism. Private keys are always securely stored, accessed, and destroyed within the hardware cryptographic module and are never exported in plaintext. Private keys used for encryption can be imported into the cryptographic module offline according to the secure key injection process. Private keys used for digital signatures are, in principle, generated and used within the local hardware cryptographic module and do not involve importing or exporting.

[0086] The management of keys for the simulated TSP cloud platform and user terminal is the same as that for the simulated T-BOX component. The private key storage environment for the simulated TSP cloud platform is a server-side cryptographic machine similar to a cryptographic module, while the private key storage environment for the user terminal is a security module similar to a cryptographic module. The vehicle-cloud and terminal-cloud session keys are negotiated between the communicating parties, temporarily stored in their respective cryptographic modules, and are not involved in key import or export; they are destroyed immediately after use. The Bluetooth communication key is used for encrypted communication between the user terminal and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem via Bluetooth; it is destroyed immediately after use on each device.

[0087] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention deploys layered security mechanisms such as national cryptographic algorithm encryption, dynamic key management, and security protocol adaptation between the simulated TSP cloud platform, user terminal, and simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem for different scenarios such as in-vehicle CAN bus, vehicle-cloud MQTT / HTTP link, and human-vehicle BLE communication, in order to ensure the security of communication across the entire link.

[0088] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm, using cryptographic technology application data from the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and human-vehicle near-field communication network, includes: A CAN bus analyzer is used to collect the first cryptographic technology application data of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, and based on the first cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed. Network packet analysis tools are used to collect the second cryptographic technology application data of the vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and based on the second cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed; A Bluetooth sniffing tool is used to collect data on the third cryptographic technology application of the human-vehicle near-field communication network, and based on the third cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed.

[0089] The first cryptographic technology application data is the data generated in the vehicle-to-domain communication network due to the application of cryptographic technology; the second cryptographic technology application data is the data generated in the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network due to the application of cryptographic technology; and the third cryptographic technology application data is the data generated in the human-vehicle near-field communication network due to the application of cryptographic technology.

[0090] To implement end-to-end testing of Chinese cryptographic algorithms, specialized equipment such as CAN bus analyzers, Bluetooth sniffing tools, and network packet analysis tools (such as Wireshark) were selected. Different communication data were collected based on the characteristics of cryptographic applications in different scenarios. This allowed for testing of cryptographic applications based on Chinese cryptographic algorithms in different scenarios, completing data parsing and cryptographic application testing, and realizing the compliance and validity verification of cryptographic algorithms, key management, and security protocols, as well as randomness compliance testing.

[0091] Specifically, on the one hand, in the scenario of inter-domain communication within the vehicle, a CAN bus analyzer is used to collect the first cryptographic technology application data (including but not limited to CAN message and other communication data) of the inter-domain communication network within the vehicle. Based on the first cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms is performed. Specifically, this includes but is not limited to at least one of the following: the security of key storage within the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem; the key update cycle and the correctness of algorithm application; the verification of encryption and decryption and message integrity effects; whether encryption parameters (such as IV, random number) are updated with the session; the verification of synchronization mechanisms; and the presence of hard-coded and pseudo-random numbers.

[0092] Optionally, the CAN bus analyzer is connected to the CAN bus in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network; the data frame filtering function of the CAN bus analyzer is disabled. By disabling the data frame filtering function, it is possible to ensure the reception of all types of CAN messages.

[0093] On the other hand, in the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication scenario, network packet analysis tools are used to collect the second cryptographic technology application data (including but not limited to MQTT messages and other communication data) of the vehicle-to-cloud remote communication network. Based on the second cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms is performed. Specifically, this includes but is not limited to at least one of the following: verification of the correctness of identity authentication and encryption / decryption functions between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal; normal login and abnormal login attempts by the terminal; checking whether the effect meets expectations; whether the communication protocol complies with national cryptographic standards; and whether the confidentiality and integrity of message transmission can be guaranteed.

[0094] When using network packet analysis tools such as Wireshark to monitor communication links, the corresponding ports should be opened to filter transport layer and application layer related packets.

[0095] On the other hand, in the context of near-field communication between humans and vehicles, a Bluetooth sniffing tool is used to collect the third cryptographic technology application data (including but not limited to BLE data packets and other communication data) of the near-field communication network between humans and vehicles. Based on the third cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms is performed. Specifically, this includes, but is not limited to, when the simulated T-BOX component of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the digital key APP of the user terminal complete the initial pairing and conduct Bluetooth communication, at least one of the following is detected: pre-shared PIN code, encryption algorithm identifier, key negotiation rules, verification of legitimate pairing process, and data encryption transmission.

[0096] Optionally, Bluetooth sniffing tools such as BLE Sniffer can be configured to use the communication channel between the digital key app and the emulated T-BOX component to ensure that BLE packets and other communication data are captured throughout the process for protocol analysis.

[0097] Optionally, the start and end of the test can be determined using the pre-configured start test function TEST_ON() and end test function TEST_OFF() to facilitate accurate acquisition of the operation time of the encryption and decryption functions.

[0098] Optionally, a random number detection tool is used to collect random parameters with randomness from the first cryptographic technology application data, the second cryptographic technology application data, and the third cryptographic technology application data; the random parameters include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following parameters: random number, IV, challenge value, etc.

[0099] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention uses professional equipment such as CAN bus analyzers, Bluetooth sniffing tools, and network packet analysis tools to collect different cryptographic technology application data based on the characteristics of cryptographic applications in different scenarios. This allows for the detection of cryptographic applications based on national cryptographic algorithms in different scenarios, completing data parsing and cryptographic application detection, and realizing the implementation of full-link national cryptographic algorithm application detection.

[0100] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the step of performing cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the first cryptographic application data includes: The validity of cryptographic algorithms is tested based on the ciphertext data and MAC value of CAN messages. Based on the key negotiation data, periodic detection of key updates is performed during the key negotiation process; Based on the first random number generated during the key negotiation process, the randomness of the first random number is detected. Based on the CAN first frame parameters during the session establishment process, a consistency check of the session parameters is performed.

[0101] The first cryptographic technology application data includes, but is not limited to, CAN messages, key negotiation data, the first random number, and CAN first frame parameters.

[0102] Key negotiation data is the cryptographic application data generated during the key negotiation process.

[0103] The first random number is a random number generated during the key negotiation process.

[0104] The parameters of the first CAN frame include, but are not limited to, initial vector, counter, password mode and other related parameters.

[0105] Specifically, when performing cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms within the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication scenario, the detection includes valid detection of cryptographic algorithms, periodic detection of key updates, randomness detection of the first random number, and consistency detection of session parameters.

[0106] Specifically, based on the ciphertext data and MAC value of the CAN message, the validity of the cryptographic algorithm is tested. This includes using a CAN analyzer to capture CAN data frames via the bus to extract the ciphertext field of the payload, performing entropy value statistical analysis and verification, and applying MAC verification to verify the validity of the cryptographic algorithm, thus obtaining the CAN bus data encryption and decryption effect.

[0107] Based on key negotiation data, periodic detection of key updates during the key negotiation process is performed, including capturing key negotiation process data to verify whether the key update cycle is updated with the session.

[0108] Based on the first random number in the key negotiation process, the randomness of the first random number is detected, including using a random number detector to verify whether the first random number is generated by a true random number generator (TRNG) to ensure that there are no hard-coded keys or sensitive parameters.

[0109] Based on the CAN first frame parameters during session establishment, a consistency check of session parameters is performed. This includes synchronizing the CAN first frame parameters during session establishment, calculating the time interval between two session establishments, and checking whether the two sessions use the same initial counter value and initial vector for encryption.

[0110] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention utilizes the first cryptographic technology application data collected by a CAN bus analyzer in the in-vehicle inter-domain communication scenario to perform cryptographic algorithm validity detection, key update periodicity detection, first random number randomness detection, and security protocol consistency detection, thereby realizing the detection of CAN bus data encryption and decryption effects based on national cryptographic algorithms within the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network.

[0111] Furthermore, in the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles, the cryptographic features generated during the secure interaction between the two communicating parties are used as test samples for the detection system. Feature fields are extracted after parsing CAN bus protocol, MQTT protocol, and BLE protocol messages and used as input for the compliance judgment module. Compliance detection of the consistency of security protocol implementation is achieved through rule matching.

[0112] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the step of performing cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the second cryptographic application data includes: Based on session establishment data, perform compliance checks on encryption suites, encryption algorithms, and encryption protocol version numbers; Based on the second random number generated during the session establishment process, the randomness of the second random number is detected. Based on the two-way authentication data, the validity of the certificate is checked.

[0113] The second cryptographic technology application data includes, but is not limited to, session establishment data, second random numbers, and two-way authentication data.

[0114] Session establishment data refers to the cryptographic application data generated during the session establishment process.

[0115] The second random number is a random number generated during the session setup process.

[0116] Specifically, when conducting cryptographic application testing based on national cryptographic algorithms within the vehicle-cloud remote communication network in a vehicle-cloud remote communication scenario, the testing includes compliance checks on encryption suites, encryption algorithms, and encryption protocol version numbers, randomness checks on the second random number, and validity checks on the certificate validity period.

[0117] Specifically, based on session establishment data, compliance checks are performed on the encryption suite, encryption algorithm, and encryption protocol version number. This includes using the gm version of Wireshark to identify the encryption suite used, extracting the complete session establishment process, and verifying whether the national cryptographic algorithm suite (including key exchange algorithm, encryption algorithm and key length, verification algorithm, etc.) is used during the handshake connection phase. If RSA, SHA-256, etc. are found, it proves that the application is non-compliant. At the same time, it also checks whether the protocol version number is GmSSL instead of TLS.

[0118] Based on the second random number generated during the session establishment process, the randomness of the second random number is detected, including using a random number detector to check whether the randomness of the random number is good.

[0119] Based on the two-way authentication data, the validity of the certificate validity period is checked, including verifying the validity of the certificate during the two-way mutual authentication stage, checking whether the certificate chain includes the root certificate, the authoritative issuance and authorization of the secondary certificate, checking whether the session is established within the certificate validity period, and verifying whether the update cycle of the dynamic session key is updated with the session during the key exchange process.

[0120] Furthermore, unlike standard TLS which primarily uses a single set of certificate keys to complete authentication and key exchange, the national cryptographic TLS mechanism adopted by GmSSL typically employs a dual-certificate system, that is, using a signing certificate and an encryption certificate to perform different cryptographic functions. Therefore, during the handshake process, it is generally necessary to send both the signing certificate and the encryption certificate, rather than just sending a single business certificate.

[0121] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention utilizes network packet analysis tools to collect second cryptographic technology application data in the vehicle-cloud remote communication scenario. This data is used to perform compliance checks on encryption suites, encryption algorithms, and encryption protocol version numbers, randomness checks on second random numbers, and validity checks on certificate validity periods. This enables the implementation of communication link security detection based on national cryptographic algorithms within the vehicle-cloud remote communication network.

[0122] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the step of performing cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the third cryptographic technology application data includes: Based on the shared data of digital keys, the timeliness of digital key management permissions is detected; Based on the third random number generated during the digital key sharing process, the randomness of the third random number is detected. The correctness of the PIN code is checked based on the PIN code authentication data. Encryption of data transmission is detected based on sniffed data after Bluetooth pairing. Timeliness detection of sensitive parameters is performed based on Bluetooth message packets.

[0123] Third-party cryptographic technology applications include, but are not limited to, digital key sharing data, third-party random numbers, PIN code authentication data, transmission data, and Bluetooth packets.

[0124] Digital key sharing data refers to the cryptographic application data generated during the digital key sharing process.

[0125] The third random number is a random number generated during the digital key sharing process.

[0126] Specifically, when conducting cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms within a human-vehicle near-field communication network in a human-vehicle near-field communication scenario, the detection includes timeliness detection of digital key management permissions, randomness detection of the third random number, correctness detection of the PIN code, encryption detection of data transmission, and timeliness detection of sensitive parameters.

[0127] Specifically, based on the digital key sharing data, the timeliness of digital key management permissions is checked, including whether the relevant permissions are revoked in a timely manner after the digital key sharing ends.

[0128] Based on the third random number generated during the digital key sharing process, the randomness of the third random number is detected, including using a random number detection tool to detect the randomness of the random number generated during the pairing stage.

[0129] Based on PIN code authentication data, the correctness of the PIN code is checked, including verifying whether the vehicle terminal only verifies the correct PIN code.

[0130] Based on the sniffing data after Bluetooth pairing, the encryption of data transmission is tested, including verifying that all data transmitted after successful pairing is transmitted in encrypted form, that there are no plaintext leaks related to random numbers, and that there is no fixed random number sequence in the sniffing results.

[0131] Based on Bluetooth packets, the timeliness of sensitive parameters (such as keys, initialization vectors, etc.) is detected, including capturing BLE packets throughout the entire process of key negotiation, encrypted message sending, and encrypted response, to ensure that sensitive parameters are updated with the session.

[0132] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention utilizes third-party cryptographic technology application data collected by Bluetooth sniffing tools in human-vehicle near-field communication scenarios to perform timeliness detection of digital key management permissions, randomness detection of third-party random numbers, correctness detection of PIN codes, encryption detection of data transmission, and timeliness detection of sensitive parameters. This enables the implementation of digital key terminal detection based on national cryptographic algorithms for permission management and encrypted communication detection within the human-vehicle near-field communication network.

[0133] As an optional implementation, after conducting cryptographic application testing based on national cryptographic algorithms, a standardized testing report containing compliance judgment and risk point identification is generated based on the features extracted in the three major scenarios.

[0134] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles further includes: The in-vehicle security interface detection module is used to deploy probes to perform interface detection on the security function interfaces of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network; The secure function interface includes at least one of the following: key pair generation and export interface, session key import and export interface, certificate import and export interface, certificate signing and verification interface, secure communication handshake interface, secure data sending and receiving interface, built-in hardware encryption module usage interface, and national cryptographic algorithm calculation interface.

[0135] Specifically, to achieve compliance testing of cryptographic algorithms at the code level, the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles also includes an in-vehicle security interface detection module. This module deploys probes on relevant security function interfaces to perform interface testing on the security function interfaces of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network. These security function interfaces include at least one of the following: key pair generation and export interface, session key import and export interface, certificate import and export interface, certificate signing and verification interface, secure communication handshake interface, secure data transmission and reception interface, interface for using built-in hardware encryption modules, and national cryptographic algorithm calculation interface. The national cryptographic algorithm calculation interface includes, but is not limited to, interfaces for SM2, SM3, SM4, random number generation, and HMAC calculation.

[0136] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention, by setting up an in-vehicle security interface detection module, performs interface detection on the security function interface of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network by deploying probes, and realizes compliance detection of cryptographic algorithms at the code layer audit.

[0137] Based on the above embodiments, as an optional embodiment, the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles further includes: The runtime environment security detection module is used to execute preset attack methods against the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform, and the user terminal using pre-built security assumptions and threat models, in order to detect the attack resistance indicators and security protection strength of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system.

[0138] Specifically, the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles also includes an operating environment security detection module. This module pre-constructs security assumptions and threat models that fit actual applications, and uses these models to perform preset attack methods on the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, simulated TSP cloud platform, and user terminal, such as message interception and content tampering, historical message replay, and unauthorized user impersonation access to the cloud platform. This enables comprehensive detection of the attack resistance indicators and security protection strength of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system in response to various malicious attacks.

[0139] The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention, by setting up an operating environment security detection module, uses pre-built security assumptions and threat models to execute preset attack methods against simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystems, simulated TSP cloud platforms and user terminals to detect the system's attack resistance indicators and security protection strength. After the deployment and implementation of the national cryptographic algorithm cryptographic security mechanism at the vehicle end, cloud platform and digital key end, it can carry out full-scenario operating environment security detection.

[0140] Overall, the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles provided by this invention addresses the problem of insufficient attention paid to the application of national cryptographic algorithms in detection technologies. It eliminates cryptographic application detection schemes based on national cryptographic algorithms such as SM2, SM3, and SM4, and covers all scenarios of in-vehicle communication, vehicle-to-cloud communication, and terminal-to-cloud communication through a hardware and software collaborative key security management mechanism and a multi-dimensional cryptographic application detection framework design, ensuring the compliance and effectiveness of cryptographic algorithms. In the hardware-software collaborative key security management mechanism, the CSEc module stores the root key and generates truly random numbers at the hardware level, avoiding hard-coding of the key. At the software level, the GmSSL library is simplified to retain the core national cryptographic algorithm functions, achieving secure control over the entire lifecycle of the key. In the design of the multi-dimensional cryptographic application detection framework, a full-process framework covering "communication topology construction - security mechanism implementation - detection scheme formulation - feature extraction and report generation" is constructed. Combined with devices such as CAN bus analyzers and Bluetooth sniffing tools, the correctness of cryptographic applications can be verified from multiple dimensions, including the code layer (security interface auditing), the data layer (encryption and decryption effect verification), and the protocol layer (national cryptographic suite compliance). This fills the gap in the programmatic research of cryptographic detection for intelligent connected vehicles, ensuring that cryptography can be correctly and compliantly applied in the system architecture of intelligent connected vehicles, and protecting user data and privacy security.

[0141] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without any creative effort.

[0142] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0143] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles, characterized in that, include: A simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem; the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem is deployed with national cryptographic algorithms; Simulated TSP cloud platform; User terminals for deploying the digital key app; The cryptographic application detection module is used to perform cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm based on the cryptographic technology application data of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, vehicle-cloud remote communication network and human-vehicle near-field communication network. The in-vehicle inter-domain communication network is the communication network within the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem; the vehicle-cloud remote communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform, and the user terminal; and the human-vehicle near-field communication network is the communication network between the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the user terminal.

2. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, The cryptographic application data based on the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and human-vehicle near-field communication network are used for cryptographic application detection based on national cryptographic algorithms, including: A CAN bus analyzer is used to collect the first cryptographic technology application data of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network, and based on the first cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed. Network packet analysis tools are used to collect the second cryptographic technology application data of the vehicle-cloud remote communication network, and based on the second cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed; A Bluetooth sniffing tool is used to collect data on the third cryptographic technology application of the human-vehicle near-field communication network, and based on the third cryptographic technology application data, cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm is performed.

3. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of performing cryptographic application detection based on the first cryptographic technology application data and the national cryptographic algorithm includes: The validity of cryptographic algorithms is tested based on the encrypted data and authentication fields of CAN messages. Based on the key negotiation data, periodic detection of key updates is performed during the key negotiation process; Based on the first random number generated during the key negotiation process, the randomness of the first random number is detected. Based on the CAN first frame parameters during the session establishment process, a consistency check of the session parameters is performed.

4. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of performing cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm using the second cryptographic technology application data includes: Based on session establishment data, perform compliance checks on encryption suites, encryption algorithms, and encryption protocol version numbers; Based on the second random number generated during the session establishment process, the randomness of the second random number is detected. Based on the two-way authentication data, the validity of the certificate is checked.

5. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that, The process of performing cryptographic application detection based on the national cryptographic algorithm using the data from the third cryptographic technology application includes: Based on the shared data of digital keys, the timeliness of digital key management permissions is detected; Based on the third random number generated during the digital key sharing process, the randomness of the third random number is detected. The correctness of the PIN code is checked based on the PIN code authentication data. Encryption of data transmission is detected based on sniffed data after Bluetooth pairing. Timeliness detection of sensitive parameters is performed based on Bluetooth message packets.

6. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The in-vehicle security interface detection module is used to deploy probes to perform interface detection on the security function interfaces of the in-vehicle inter-domain communication network; The secure function interface includes at least one of the following: key pair generation and export interface, session key import and export interface, certificate import and export interface, certificate signing and verification interface, secure communication handshake interface, secure data sending and receiving interface, built-in hardware encryption module usage interface, and national cryptographic algorithm calculation interface.

7. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The runtime environment security detection module is used to execute preset attack methods against the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem, the simulated TSP cloud platform, and the user terminal using pre-built security assumptions and threat models, in order to detect the attack resistance indicators and security protection strength of the multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system.

8. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, The simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem includes a simulated T-BOX component and a simulated Slave ECU component; the simulated T-BOX component and the simulated Slave ECU component communicate and interact via an in-vehicle CAN bus; the simulated T-BOX component is simulated using a first development board and a first Bluetooth module; The first development board has a built-in hardware encryption module for storing relevant keys and generating true random numbers; the simulated Slave ECU component is simulated using the second development board; the first development board is different from the second development board; The user terminal has a built-in security module and a second Bluetooth module.

9. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 8, characterized in that, The simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal use a simplified GmSSL algorithm library to implement transport layer encryption; the simplified GmSSL algorithm library includes pre-configured core functions of Chinese cryptographic algorithms. The simulated TSP cloud platform and the user terminal also establish a challenge-response two-way identity authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and the SM2 digital signature algorithm to achieve reliable authentication of the identities of both parties. The simulated TSP cloud platform and the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem use a challenge-response mechanism to construct a two-way identity authentication mechanism based on the digital certificate issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform, in order to complete the identity verification of both the vehicle and the cloud. The first Bluetooth module of the simulated intelligent connected vehicle subsystem and the second Bluetooth module of the user terminal exchange digital certificates issued by the simulated TSP cloud platform and verify the legality of the certificates. Based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, they complete the challenge-response mechanism for two-way identity authentication. After successful authentication, they negotiate the session key to achieve secure communication interaction in short-range Bluetooth communication scenarios.

10. The multi-scenario cryptographic application detection system for intelligent connected vehicles according to claim 8, characterized in that, The first development board is the S32K144 development board, and the second development board is the STM32F407 development board.

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