Anonymity authentication method and device for vehicle-mounted network

Abstract

This invention provides an anonymous authentication method and apparatus for vehicular networks, relating to the field of intelligent transportation technology. The method includes: after system initialization and roadside unit registration, completing user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and a trusted authorization center; generating a blinded credential and a double Schnorr signature based on a generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) message to be transmitted; generating a verification code based on a second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and public key information; and performing authentication based on the verification code and the authentication verification code; in response to the roadside unit broadcasting the second temporary identity of the V2I-authenticated vehicle and the corresponding vehicle identity list after successful V2I authentication, generating a communication message set; the vehicle awaiting V2I authentication decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verified second temporary identity; and performing authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verified second temporary identity. This invention effectively improves the authentication security and efficiency of vehicular networks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of intelligent transportation technology, and more specifically, to an anonymous authentication method and apparatus for vehicle-mounted networks. Background Technology

[0002] As a core component of intelligent transportation systems, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) enable real-time information exchange between vehicles (V2V) and between vehicles and roadside infrastructure (V2I). They play a crucial role in improving road safety, optimizing traffic efficiency, and supporting the implementation of intelligent transportation applications such as autonomous driving, serving as a vital technological support for building smart city transportation systems. In the open communication environment of VANETs, ​​the location, speed, and road conditions broadcast by vehicles need to be verified for authenticity and integrity, while the true identity of the vehicles needs to be effectively hidden to balance communication security and user privacy protection. Conditional anonymity authentication technology has become a core technological direction to meet this requirement. This technology can anonymize vehicle identities during normal communication, and in cases of malicious behavior such as forged messages or cyberattacks, authorized institutions can trace the true identity of the vehicle. Furthermore, non-linkability, as a key requirement of conditional anonymity authentication, prevents attackers from linking multiple vehicle communication behaviors to the same vehicle, thereby protecting sensitive privacy information such as user travel trajectories and driving habits.

[0003] In existing technologies, conditional anonymity authentication for vehicular networks mainly employs pseudonymous certificates, group signatures / bilinear pairings, certificateless cryptography / knowledge signatures, and anonymous credentials. However, these methods still suffer from challenges in balancing storage, communication, and computational overhead with privacy protection strength, and their performance is insufficient for the highly dynamic and resource-constrained scenarios of vehicular networks. As vehicular ad hoc networks continue to evolve towards high-density, low-latency applications, the trade-off between storage overhead, communication efficiency, computational complexity, and privacy protection strength in various authentication schemes is becoming increasingly prominent, becoming a key factor restricting the large-scale deployment and application of vehicular ad hoc networks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The problem addressed by this invention is how to improve the authentication security and efficiency of in-vehicle networks.

[0005] To address the aforementioned problems, this invention provides an anonymous authentication method and apparatus for vehicle-mounted networks.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication method for vehicle-mounted networks, comprising: After system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed, user registration is completed based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. In response to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, a verification code verification value is generated based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication is performed based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, the authentication session key is used as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code are obtained based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. In response to the second temporary identity of the vehicle and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated is used to decrypt the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and to perform vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0007] Optionally, the trusted authorization center uses elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters, including: Using the elliptic curve cryptography described above, the prime order, the corresponding prime field, and the elliptic curve are obtained based on cryptographic security standards, and a prime order additive cyclic group and generator are generated. The system public key is obtained based on the generator and the system master private key; The common parameters are obtained based on the first hash function, the second hash function, the additive cyclic group, the generator, the prime order corresponding to the additive cyclic group, and the system public key; The common parameters are disclosed to the vehicle and the roadside unit.

[0008] Optionally, the roadside unit registration method includes: Generate the unit's real identity, randomly select the unit's private key, and obtain the unit's public key based on the public parameters; Generate a zero-knowledge proof corresponding to the unit's private key, and send the unit's true identity and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof to the trusted authorization center; The unit verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the unit verification equation. After verifying the validity of the zero-knowledge proof, the trusted authorization center generates the unit verification certificate based on the randomly obtained unit registration private key, the unit public key, and the public parameters. If verification is successful, registration is complete; if verification fails, registration is stopped.

[0009] Optionally, the step of completing user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center includes: Send the vehicle's true identity and the registered owner's personal information to the trusted authorization center; The long-term verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the vehicle registration verification equation. After verifying the legality of the personal information, the trusted authorization center obtains the long-term verification certificate based on a randomly selected scalar and the public parameters, and stores the vehicle index information locally. If the verification is successful, the registration is completed, and the matching set of the vehicle's real identity and the long-term verification certificate is stored as a long-term certificate for communication with the trusted authorization center. If the verification fails, the registration stops.

[0010] Optionally, when the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is then generated based on the blinding credential and a randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain a first authentication information set, including: The public key information broadcast by the roadside unit is verified according to a valid public key equation. If the valid public key equation is true, the public key information of the roadside unit is verified successfully. Based on the randomly generated first temporary identity and the temporary private key, as well as the generator and the verification long-term credential, the blinded credential and vehicle session parameters are generated. The encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity is generated through the second hash function and the public key information. The double Schnorr signature is generated by combining the blinded credential, the vehicle session parameters, the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted, and the first authentication information set is obtained.

[0011] Optionally, the roadside unit verifies the first authentication information set. Upon successful verification, it obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters, including: Decrypt the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity to obtain the first temporary identity; Verify the validity of the double Schnorr signature according to the signature verification equation; If the signature verification equation is true, the verification is successful. A random authentication number is randomly obtained. Based on the random authentication number, the second hash function, the system public key, and the first temporary identity, the second temporary identity, the unit session parameters, and the authentication session key are generated respectively. The authentication verification code is generated based on the authentication session key.

[0012] Optionally, the step of generating a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information, performing authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code, and using the authentication session key as the vehicle-to-infrastructure session key after successful vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication includes: A session key verification value is generated based on the temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, unit session parameters, the first temporary identity, and the unit real identity. Based on the session key verification value, the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, the public key information, and the real identity of the unit, the verification code verification value is generated. If the verification code value is the same as the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication is carried out through the authentication session key; If the verification code value is different from the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-road authentication fails.

[0013] Optionally, in response to the roadside unit broadcasting the second temporary identity of the vehicle undergoing vehicle-to-road authentication and the corresponding vehicle identity list after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters of the vehicle to be authenticated, the second temporary identity, the temporary private key, the current vehicle's vehicle session parameters, the second temporary identity, the temporary private key, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted, including: Obtain the identity list broadcast by the roadside unit, extract the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle waiting for vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, and generate a vehicle-to-vehicle session key by combining the current vehicle's temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, and second temporary identity. Encrypt the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key to generate vehicle ciphertext and obtain the communication message set.

[0014] Optionally, the waiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication vehicle decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and performs authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity, including: Based on the temporary private key and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, as well as the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the current vehicle, a vehicle-to-vehicle session key is generated. The current verified second temporary identity is obtained by decrypting the vehicle ciphertext using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key; If the current verified second temporary identity is the same as the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication is carried out through the vehicle-to-vehicle session key; If the current verified second temporary identity is different from the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication fails.

[0015] Secondly, the present invention provides an anonymous authentication device for vehicle-mounted networks, comprising: The initial registration module is used to complete user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center after system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. The signature generation module is used to generate a blinding credential based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted when the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit. If the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, the module generates a double Schnorr signature based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. The vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication module is used to respond to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit. It generates a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. It performs V2I authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, it uses the authentication session key as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, it obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. The vehicle-to-vehicle authentication module is used to respond to the second temporary identity of the vehicle to be authenticated and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication. It generates a communication message set based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and performs vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0016] The beneficial effects of the anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks of this invention are as follows: It relies on elliptic curve cryptography to generate and publish public parameters. User registration can be completed simply by the current vehicle submitting its identity information to a trusted authorization center, eliminating the need to pre-store massive amounts of pseudonymous certificates or credentials, significantly reducing the storage overhead of the vehicular unit. Furthermore, the registration process for roadside units and vehicles is based on the same public parameters, simplifying the basic configuration of the authentication system and improving the overall deployment and operational efficiency of the system. By combining the first temporary identity and the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) message to be transmitted to generate a blinded credential, and simultaneously generating a dual Schnorr signature based on the blinded credential and temporary private key, the vehicle identity information, transmitted messages, and signature are strongly bound together. This fundamentally eliminates the possibility of signature forgery, improving the security of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication. Moreover, both signature generation and verification are based on lightweight elliptic curve cryptography operations, avoiding computationally intensive bilinear pairing, zero-knowledge proof, and other operations, reducing computational overhead and adapting to the limited computing resources of the vehicular unit. After verifying the first authentication information set, the roadside unit can return the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code. The current vehicle completes authentication through a single verification code comparison, eliminating the need for multiple interactions and complex parameter parsing. This reduces the number of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication interactions and data transmission volume, lowering communication overhead. Simultaneously, the two-layer temporary identity design further conceals the vehicle's true identity, enhancing privacy protection. Based on the list of authenticated vehicle identities broadcast by the roadside unit, the current vehicle only needs to combine its own temporary identity, session parameters, and temporary private key with the vehicle awaiting V2I authentication to generate a communication message set. This eliminates the need for repeated interactions with the trusted authorization center for complex identity verification, achieving lightweight vehicle-to-vehicle authentication and significantly improving authentication efficiency. Furthermore, the use of session key encryption for message transmission, combined with the dynamic nature of the temporary identity, ensures the security of vehicle-to-vehicle communication and the unlinkability of identities.

[0017] This invention presents an anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks, which constructs a lightweight and efficient authentication system based entirely on elliptic curve cryptography. This fundamentally reduces the storage, computation, and communication overhead of vehicular units, adapting to the highly dynamic and resource-constrained scenarios of vehicular ad hoc networks. Simultaneously, through a multi-layered design of blinded credentials, dual Schnorr signatures, and dual-layer temporary identities, it achieves security protection effects such as signature anti-forgery, identity anonymity, and non-linkability of actions, effectively resisting common network attacks such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and tampering attacks, significantly improving authentication security. Furthermore, the design for the connection between vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication and vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, relying on roadside units to broadcast and assist authentication information, achieves efficient connection of the authentication process, balancing authentication efficiency and privacy protection strength. This solves the problem of balancing these two aspects in existing technologies, significantly improving the overall authentication security and operational efficiency of vehicular ad hoc networks. It provides technical support for the development of vehicular networks towards high-density, low-latency application scenarios, promoting the large-scale deployment and application of vehicular ad hoc networks. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an anonymous authentication method for vehicle-mounted networks according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an anonymous authentication device for vehicle-mounted networks according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] To make the above-mentioned objects, features, and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although some embodiments of the present invention are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present invention can be implemented in various forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided to provide a more thorough and complete understanding of the present invention. It should be understood that the accompanying drawings and embodiments of the present invention are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] It should be understood that the various steps described in the method embodiments of the present invention may be performed in different orders and / or in parallel. Furthermore, the method embodiments may include additional steps and / or omit the steps shown. The scope of the present invention is not limited in this respect.

[0021] The term "comprising" and its variations as used herein are open-ended, meaning "including but not limited to"; the term "based on" means "at least partially based on"; the term "one embodiment" means "at least one embodiment"; the term "another embodiment" means "at least one additional embodiment"; the term "some embodiments" means "at least some embodiments"; and the term "optionally" means "optional embodiments". Definitions of other terms will be given in the following description. It should be noted that the concepts of "first," "second," etc., mentioned in this invention are used only to distinguish different devices, modules, or units, and are not intended to limit the order of functions performed by these devices, modules, or units or their interdependencies.

[0022] It should be noted that the terms "a" and "a plurality of" used in this invention are illustrative rather than restrictive. Those skilled in the art should understand that, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the context, they should be understood as "one or more".

[0023] The names of the messages or information exchanged between the multiple devices in the embodiments of the present invention are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of these messages or information.

[0024] like Figure 1As shown in the figure, an anonymous authentication method for vehicle-mounted networks provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes: Step S1: After system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed, user registration is completed based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters.

[0025] Specifically, system initialization establishes a unified cryptographic foundation for the entire vehicular network conditional anonymity authentication system, determines the common operational rules and public parameters shared by the entire network, and ensures that the operational logic of all parties is consistent and the parameters are interoperable in operations such as registration, authentication, signing, and key negotiation. At the same time, relying on the lightweight and high security characteristics of elliptic curve cryptography, it reduces the computational and storage overhead of the entire authentication system from the bottom layer, adapts to the scenario of limited vehicular network resources, and provides cryptographic support for subsequent identity anonymity, signature anti-forgery, and privacy traceability, avoiding problems such as authentication failure and security vulnerabilities caused by inconsistent parameters.

[0026] Optionally, the trusted authorization center uses elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters, including: Using the elliptic curve cryptography described above, the prime order, the corresponding prime field, and the elliptic curve are obtained based on cryptographic security standards, and a prime order additive cyclic group and generator are generated.

[0027] Specifically, the Trusted Authorization Center adopts elliptic curve cryptography, follows cryptographic security standards (such as the Chinese national standard SM2 and the NIST elliptic curve standard), selects a large prime number as prime order q, determines the prime field Fp that matches the prime order q, where p is a large prime number that fits q, and selects an elliptic curve E on the prime order q; based on the selected elliptic curve E, it generates an additive cyclic group G with prime order q as its order, and selects an original point in the additive cyclic group G as a generator P, which is the basis for the elliptic curve dot product operation.

[0028] The system public key is obtained based on the generator and the system master private key.

[0029] Specifically, from the nonzero multiplicative group Z of prime order q q A large integer is randomly selected as the system master private key sk. The system master private key is a core confidential parameter of the trusted authorization center and is held only by the center itself. The system master private key sk is operated on with the generator P through elliptic curve dot product to obtain the system public key PK, which is expressed as: PK = sk·P. The system public key is a public parameter and is used by all authentication participants.

[0030] The common parameters are obtained based on the first hash function, the second hash function, the additive cyclic group, the generator, the prime order corresponding to the additive cyclic group, and the system public key.

[0031] Specifically, two hash functions with cryptographic security properties are selected, namely the first hash function H1 and the second hash function H2, where H1 can be a binary string of arbitrary length multiplied by a non-zero multiplication group Z. q The mapping function, i.e., H1:{0,1} →Z q H2 can be a mapping function from a binary string of arbitrary length to a binary string of fixed length l, i.e., H2:{0,1} →{0,1} l , where l represents the output length of the second hash function H2. The generated additive cyclic group G, generator P, prime order q corresponding to the additive cyclic group, and system public key PK are integrated with the selected first hash function H1 and second hash function H2 to obtain the complete set of public parameters {G, q, P, PK, H1, H2}.

[0032] The common parameters are disclosed to the vehicle and the roadside unit.

[0033] Specifically, the integrated public parameter set is made public to all vehicles and roadside units within the vehicular network through a secure broadcast method, ensuring that all certification participants can obtain and use it synchronously and uniformly, laying the parameter foundation for subsequent roadside unit registration, vehicle registration, vehicle-to-road authentication, and vehicle-to-vehicle authentication.

[0034] Roadside Unit (RSU) registration is the process of legally registering a RSU with a Trusted Authorization Center (TA). This grants the RSU the legal qualification to participate in conditionally anonymous authentication for vehicular networks, making it a trusted relay and auxiliary node for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) authentication. By generating RSU private-public key pairs and using zero-knowledge proofs, the system verifies the legitimacy of the RSU's identity and key possession, preventing unauthorized RSUs from accessing the network and thus avoiding security risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and information tampering. Furthermore, the RSU verification credentials generated by the TA provide a basis for subsequent vehicle verification of the RSU's legitimacy, ensuring the security of the V2I authentication system from the network's origin and laying a trusted foundation for the efficient implementation of subsequent V2V authentication.

[0035] Optionally, the roadside unit registration method includes: Generate the unit's real identity, randomly select the unit's private key, and obtain the unit's public key based on the public parameters.

[0036] Specifically, each roadside unit first generates its own unique digital identifier as its true identity ID. RiThe unit's real identity ID Ri This serves as the fixed core identifier for roadside units, used for unique registration at trusted authorization centers. It is derived from the common parameters of the additive cyclic group corresponding to the modular prime order non-zero multiplicative group Z. q A large integer is randomly selected as the unit private key sk. Ri Unit private key sk Ri The private key PK is the core confidential parameter of the roadside unit and is held only by the unit itself. Based on the generator P in the public parameters, the unit's private key is multiplied by the generator P through elliptic curve dot product to obtain the unit's public key PK. Ri , represented as: PK Ri =sk Ri ·P, Unit Public Key PK Ri These parameters are made public for verification by vehicles and trusted authorization centers.

[0037] Generate a zero-knowledge proof corresponding to the unit's private key, and send the unit's true identity and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof to the trusted authorization center.

[0038] Specifically, based on the unit private key sk held by itself Ri Generate the corresponding zero-knowledge proof ∏ Ri For example, a user first generates a secret random number and calculates the public commitment value, then combines it with the unit public key and system public parameters to generate a hash challenge value, and then uses the random number, challenge value, and sk... Ri The response value is calculated, and the challenge value, response value, and commitment value are ultimately combined into π. Ri The trusted authorization center only needs to reconstruct the commitment value through public parameters and verify hash consistency to verify the validity of the proof, without needing to touch sk at all. Ri It only confirms that the user legally possesses the private key. Zero-knowledge proof ∏ Ri Used to prove to a trusted authorization center that the roadside unit itself legitimately possesses the unit's private key sk Ri And the unit's private key sk is not disclosed during the process. Ri Any information. The roadside unit will display its own unit's true identity ID. Ri and the generated unit private key sk Ri The corresponding zero-knowledge proof ∏ Ri Package the application, send it to the trusted authorization center, and initiate a registration and filing request.

[0039] The unit verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the unit verification equation. After verifying the validity of the zero-knowledge proof, the trusted authorization center generates the unit verification certificate based on the randomly obtained unit registration private key, the unit public key, and the public parameters.

[0040] If verification is successful, registration is complete; if verification fails, registration is stopped.

[0041] Specifically, after receiving the registration and filing information sent by the roadside unit, the trusted authorization center first verifies the zero-knowledge proof ∏. Ri The validity of the key is verified to confirm that the roadside unit legally holds the corresponding unit private key sk. Ri If the zero-knowledge proof verification is valid, the Trusted Authorization Center will proceed from Z. q A scalar (i.e., a random factor) is randomly selected as the unit registration private key r. Ri Combining the system master private key sk, the first hash function H1, and the generator P from the public parameters, a unit verification credential is generated. The unit verification credential includes unit verification point parameters and unit verification scalar parameters, where R is the unit verification point parameter. Ri Represented as: R Ri =r Ri • P, Unit verification scalar parameter S Ri Represented as: S Ri =H1(ID Ri ||PK Ri ||R Ri )sk+r Ri modq, where modq represents the modulo operation (remainder) on a large prime number q. The unit validation point parameters and unit validation scalar parameters are integrated into the unit validation credential {S}. Ri R Ri The system public key PK and the first hash function H1 from the public parameters are then sent back to the roadside unit that initiated the registration. After receiving the unit verification credential from the trusted authorization center, the roadside unit retrieves its own unit real identity ID and sends it back to the roadside unit that initiated the registration. Ri Unit public key PK Ri According to the unit verification equation S Ri ·P=H1(ID Ri ||PK Ri ||R Ri )·PK+R Ri Verification is performed; if the unit verification equation holds true, it indicates that the unit verification credential is valid, the roadside unit completes registration, and locally stores the complete set of parameters including the unit's real identity, unit private key, unit public key, and unit verification credential {ID}. Ri S Ri R Ri PK Ri ,sk Ri If the unit verification equation is not true, it means that the unit verification certificate is invalid, and the roadside unit will immediately stop the registration process and needs to re-initiate the registration request.

[0042] Vehicle registration is the legal filing of a vehicle within the vehicle network authentication system, granting it the legal identity and authority to participate in vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle anonymous authentication. It is a prerequisite for vehicles to access the V2I network and conduct secure communication. The Trusted Authorization Center verifies the legality of the vehicle's true identity and the personal information of the registrant, mitigating the security risks posed by unauthorized vehicle access to the network. Simultaneously, the Trusted Authorization Center generates a unique, long-term verification credential, serving as the core identity basis for all subsequent vehicle authentication operations. This ensures the traceability of the vehicle's identity and provides a foundation for the generation of subsequent anonymous and blind identity credentials, thereby safeguarding the security and standardization of the V2I authentication system at the terminal level.

[0043] Optionally, the step of completing user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center includes: The vehicle's true identity and the registered owner's personal information are sent to the trusted authorization center.

[0044] Specifically, the current vehicle will display its unique real vehicle identity ID. vi The system integrates the vehicle registration information and the personal information of the vehicle registrant, and sends it to the Trusted Authorization Center via a secure communication link to initiate a vehicle user registration request. The vehicle's true identity is its unique and traceable digital core identifier, which is the key basis for the Trusted Authorization Center to distinguish different vehicles. For example, the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN code) "LFV2A24G3EL000001" and the On-Board Unit (OBU) hardware serial number "OBU-20260304001" serve as the vehicle's true identity, used for the vehicle's unique identification and subsequent traceability. The registrant's personal information is the legal identity information of the entity to which the vehicle registration belongs, and is the basis for the Trusted Authorization Center to verify the legality of the vehicle registration. Examples of the registrant's personal information include the vehicle owner's name, ID number, and vehicle registration certificate information, which are used by the Trusted Authorization Center to complete the legality verification of the vehicle registration.

[0045] The long-term verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the vehicle registration verification equation. After verifying the legality of the personal information, the trusted authorization center obtains the long-term verification certificate based on a randomly selected scalar and the public parameters, and stores the vehicle index information locally.

[0046] Specifically, after receiving the registration information sent by the vehicle, the trusted authorization center first verifies the vehicle's real identity ID. vi The uniqueness and legality of the registered entity's personal information are fully verified. After verification, a scalar r is randomly selected from the non-zero multiplicative group of the prime order corresponding to the additive cyclic group in the public parameters. vi ∈Z q Combining the system master private key sk, generator P, first hash function H1, and system public key PK from the public parameters, the long-term credential point parameter R is calculated sequentially. vi R vi =r vi • P, long-term certificate scalar parameter S vi S vi =H1(ID vi ||PK||R vi )sk+r vi mod q, where || represents the concatenation operation. The long-term voucher point parameter R... vi and long-term certificate scalar parameter S vi Integration into verification of long-term vouchers {S vi R vi Simultaneously, the trusted authorization center generates vehicle index information {ID} based on the vehicle's true identity and relevant computational parameters. vi H1(ID) vi ||PK||R vi ) 1 ·R vi The system then completes local storage to provide data for tracing the identity of malicious vehicles, and subsequently sends the verification long-term credentials back to the vehicle that initiated the registration.

[0047] If the verification is successful, the registration is completed, and the matching set of the vehicle's real identity and the long-term verification certificate is stored as a long-term certificate for communication with the trusted authorization center. If the verification fails, the registration stops.

[0048] Specifically, after receiving the long-term verification certificate from the trusted authorization center, the vehicle retrieves the system public key PK and the first hash function H1 from the public parameters, and combines them with its own vehicle real identity ID. vi According to the vehicle registration verification equation S vi ·P=H1(ID vi ||PK||R vi )·PK+R vi Verification complete. If the vehicle registration verification equation holds true, it indicates that the long-term verification certificate is valid and legal. The current vehicle has completed user registration. The matching set {ID} of the vehicle's real identity and the long-term verification certificate is then established. vi R vi S vi The certificate is stored in the on-board unit (OBU) and serves as a long-term credential for subsequent authentication communication with trusted authorization centers and roadside units. If the vehicle registration verification equation is not true, it indicates that the long-term credential is invalid, the vehicle registration process will be stopped immediately, and the registration information needs to be re-verified before the registration request is initiated again.

[0049] This embodiment of the vehicle registration method uses a trusted authorization center to dual verify the vehicle's true identity and the registrant's personal information, thereby controlling the legitimacy of vehicles entering the network from the source and effectively avoiding the security risks of unauthorized vehicles accessing the vehicle network. It relies on public parameters to generate and verify long-term verification credentials. The computational logic is based on lightweight elliptic curve cryptography, requiring no complex calculations and adapting to the limited computing resources of the vehicle unit. The long-term verification credential serves as a unique, long-term identity for the vehicle, requiring only one copy stored locally to support all subsequent authentication operations, significantly reducing the storage overhead of the vehicle unit. Simultaneously, the vehicle index information stored in the trusted authorization center provides accurate evidence for tracing the identity of malicious vehicles, achieving a unified system of vehicle registration legitimacy, authentication efficiency, and privacy traceability. This lays a secure and reliable foundation for conditional anonymity authentication on the vehicle network.

[0050] Step S2: When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinding credential and a randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set.

[0051] Specifically, verifying the legitimacy of roadside unit public key information can effectively identify forged roadside nodes, avoiding security risks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and false authentication requests from the communication source, and ensuring that vehicles access legitimate roadside units registered with a trusted authorization center. Generating blinded credentials involves anonymizing long-term vehicle credentials, hiding the association between the vehicle's true identity and the long-term credential, achieving the core operation of identity anonymity. Generating dual Schnorr signatures provides unforgeable digital verification for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) messages and temporary identities, binding messages and session parameters (which may also include timestamps) to ensure message authenticity, integrity, and session freshness. Integrating this information results in a first authentication information set, enabling one-time packaged transmission of V2I authentication request parameters, reducing the number of communication interactions between vehicles and the infrastructure, lowering communication overhead, and adapting to the high-dynamic, low-latency communication requirements of vehicular networks.

[0052] Specifically, it includes: The public key information broadcast by the roadside unit is verified according to a valid public key equation. If the valid public key equation is true, the public key information of the roadside unit is verified successfully.

[0053] Specifically, after a vehicle enters the communication jurisdiction of a roadside unit, it receives the public key information {ID} broadcast by the roadside unit. Ri S Ri R Ri PK Ri}, retrieve the generator P, system public key PK, and first hash function H1 from the public parameters, and apply them according to the valid public key equation SRi ·P=H1(ID Ri ||PK Ri ||R Ri )·PK+R Ri The public key information is verified. If the equation for a valid public key is true, the public key information of the roadside unit is deemed to have been verified and the subsequent authentication operation continues. If the equation is not true, the public key information is deemed invalid, the broadcast message of the roadside unit is discarded, and the vehicle-to-road authentication initiation process is terminated.

[0054] Based on the randomly generated first temporary identity and the temporary private key, as well as the generator and the verification long-term credential, the blinded credential and vehicle session parameters are generated. The encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity is generated through the second hash function and the public key information. The double Schnorr signature is generated by combining the blinded credential, the vehicle session parameters, the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted, and the first authentication information set is obtained.

[0055] Specifically, the current vehicle uses a non-zero multiplication group of the prime order Z. q A meaningless digital identifier is randomly selected as the first temporary identity (TID). vi First Temporary Identity (TID) vi This only pertains to this vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication session and contains no information related to the vehicle's true identity. Meanwhile, from Z... q A scalar integer is randomly selected as the temporary private key d. i ∈Z q Temporary private key d i These are proprietary confidential parameters for this vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication, used only for signature generation and key negotiation within this session, and expire immediately upon the end of the session. The current vehicle retrieves its own stored long-term credentials {S}. vi R vi}, combined with the randomly generated first temporary identity TID vi The scalar parameter S of the blinded certificate is calculated sequentially using the first hash function H1 and the modular inverse operation. vi , denoted as S vi =H1(TID vi H1(ID) vi ||PK||R vi ) 1 ·S vi Blinding voucher point parameter R vi , represented as R vi =H1(TID vi H1(ID) vi ||PK||R vi ) 1 ·R vi Blinding voucher scalar parameter S vi And blinded voucher point parameter R vi This is integrated into a blinded credential. Simultaneously, relying on the generator P in the public parameters, the temporary private key is performed with generator P using an elliptic curve multiplication operation to obtain the vehicle session parameters D. i =d i • P. The current vehicle obtains the unit public key PK from the roadside unit public key information. Ri Combined with its own generated temporary private key d i Vehicle conversation parameters D i The current timestamp T1 is hashed using the second hash function H2 in the public parameters, and then compared with the first temporary identity TID. vi Perform an XOR operation to generate the encrypted ciphertext C of the first temporary identity. i , represented as C i =H2(d i ·PK R ||T1)⊕TID vi This achieves encrypted protection for the first temporary identity. The currently generated blinded credential and vehicle session parameter D... i The encrypted ciphertext C of the first temporary identity i The parameters are concatenated with the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message M to be transmitted and the current timestamp T1. After processing by the first hash function H1, a modulo-q operation is performed using the scalar parameters of the blinded credential and the temporary private key to generate a double Schnorr signature δ. i , represented as δ i =H1(S vi ||D i ||R vi ||C i ||T1||M)S vi +d i mod q. Then set the vehicle session parameter D. i Blinding credentials Rvi Current timestamp T1, encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity C i , Vehicle-to-Road Message M to be transmitted, Dual Schnorr Signature δ i After integration, the first authentication information set {D} is obtained. i R vi T1, Ci M, δ i The first authentication information set is sent to the roadside unit for subsequent authentication.

[0056] This embodiment uses a valid public key equation to accurately verify the public key information of the roadside unit, effectively blocking the access of unauthorized roadside nodes and ensuring the communication security of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication from the source. The generation of blinded credentials decouples the vehicle's long-term credentials from its real identity. Combined with a randomly generated first temporary identity, it achieves anonymization protection of the vehicle's identity from the underlying layer. The generation of dual Schnorr signatures deeply binds session parameters, messages, and timestamps, mathematically eliminating the possibility of signature forgery. Simultaneously, signature generation is based on lightweight computation using elliptic curve cryptography, requiring no complex calculations and adapting to the limited computing resources of the onboard unit. The integration of the first authentication information set enables the one-time transmission of authentication request parameters, significantly reducing the number of communication interactions between the vehicle and the road, lowering communication overhead. Furthermore, all parameters are generated exclusively for this session, ensuring the uniqueness and non-linkability of the session. Overall, this improves the security, efficiency, and privacy protection level of the V2I authentication initiation process, laying a solid parameter foundation for subsequent V2I bidirectional authentication.

[0057] Step S3: In response to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, generate a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. Perform vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, use the authentication session key as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, obtain the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters.

[0058] Specifically, the roadside unit's verification of the first authentication information set is a comprehensive check of the vehicle's identity legitimacy, message authenticity, and signature validity, ensuring that the accessing vehicle is a legitimate registered node and that the transmitted messages have not been tampered with. The current vehicle generates a verification code and compares it with the authentication verification code returned by the roadside unit; this is a crucial step in completing vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) two-way authentication, confirming that the feedback information comes from a legitimate roadside unit and avoiding the risks of key leakage and identity forgery caused by false feedback. The authentication session key is designated as the V2I session key, providing a dedicated encryption key for subsequent secure communication between the vehicle and the infrastructure, ensuring the confidentiality of V2I communication data.

[0059] Optionally, the roadside unit verifies the first authentication information set. Upon successful verification, it obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters, including: Decrypt the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity to obtain the first temporary identity.

[0060] Specifically, after receiving the first authentication information set sent by the current vehicle, the roadside unit extracts the encrypted ciphertext C of the first temporary identity. i Vehicle conversation parameters D i 1. Current timestamp T1, retrieve the unit private key sk stored within itself. Ri Combining the second hash function H2 in the public parameters, the first temporary identity is obtained by decryption through XOR inverse operation, represented as: TID vi =C i ⊕H2(sk Ri ·D i ||T1), and at the same time check the freshness of the timestamp T1. If the timestamp has expired, the verification process will be terminated directly.

[0061] Verify the validity of the double Schnorr signature according to the signature verification equation; If the signature verification equation is true, the verification is successful. A random authentication number is randomly obtained. Based on the random authentication number, the second hash function, the system public key, and the first temporary identity, the second temporary identity, the unit session parameters, and the authentication session key are generated respectively. The authentication verification code is generated based on the authentication session key.

[0062] Specifically, the roadside unit extracts the dual Schnorr signature δ from the first authentication information set. i Blinding vouchers R vi The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message M to be transmitted retrieves the generator P, system public key PK, and first hash function H1 from the public parameters, and verifies them according to the signature verification equation δ. i ·P=H1(S vi ||D i ||R vi ||C i ||T1||M)(H1(TID vi )·PK+R vi )+D i Perform the verification operation, checking the elliptic curve point operation results on both sides of the equation one by one. If the signature verification equation holds, the first authentication information set is deemed successfully verified, and the roadside unit extracts the non-zero multiplicative group Z of the modulus prime order corresponding to the addition cyclic group from the common parameters. q A scalar integer is randomly selected as the authentication random number t. iThe authentication random number ti is a parameter specific to this vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication session and is only used to generate the response parameters for this session; it expires after the session ends. Simultaneously, it retrieves the system public key PK, the second hash function H2, and its own unit's real identity ID from the public parameters. Ri This prepares for the subsequent generation of parameters such as the second temporary identity and authentication session key. The roadside unit will then use its own unit private key sk Ri Perform an elliptic curve multiplication operation with the system public key PK in the public parameters, input the result along with the timestamp T2 into the second hash function H2 to obtain the hash value, and then multiply it with the first temporary identity TID. vi Perform an XOR operation to generate a second temporary identity PID. i =H2(sk Ri ·PK)⊕TID vi At the same time, the authentication random number t will be... i Performing an elliptic curve dot product with the generator P in the common parameters yields the unit session parameter T. i =t i ·P. The roadside unit will authenticate the random number t. i Vehicle conversation parameters D i Unit session parameter T i First Temporary Identity (TID) vi Unit Real Identity ID Ri The strings are concatenated in a fixed order and input into the second hash function H2 for processing, generating a fixed-length binary string as the authentication session key, denoted as k. vr =H2(t i ·D i ||D i ||T i ||TID vi ||ID Ri ); then the authentication session key k vr Second temporary identity PID i First Temporary Identity (TID) vi Unit Real Identity ID Ri The current timestamp T2 is concatenated and input into the second hash function H2 to generate the authentication verification code, represented as: VC=H2(kvr||PID i ||TID vi ||ID Ri ||T2). The verification code and authentication code are sent to the current vehicle for final authentication.

[0063] This embodiment intercepts replay attacks from a time perspective by decrypting the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity and verifying its timestamp freshness, ensuring the timeliness of the authentication session. It accurately verifies the double Schnorr signature using a signature verification equation, effectively identifying forged authentication requests and tampered messages, thus ensuring the security of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication from the source. A unique second temporary identity is generated using a randomly selected authentication random number, further enhancing the anonymity and unlinkability of the vehicle identity, laying a secure identity foundation for subsequent V2I authentication. The generation of the authentication session key and authentication verification code is based entirely on public parameters and session-specific parameters, achieving dedicated encryption and two-way authentication verification for V2I communication. All operations are based on elliptic curve cryptography and hash operations, resulting in lightweight and computationally efficient operations that are well-suited to the computational resource characteristics of roadside units. Simultaneously, all response parameters are generated and fed back at once, reducing the number of communication interactions between vehicles and the road, lowering communication overhead, and achieving secure and efficient verification and response for V2I authentication, thus improving the security, privacy protection, and communication efficiency of the V2I authentication process.

[0064] Optionally, the step of generating a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information, performing authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code, and using the authentication session key as the vehicle-to-infrastructure session key after successful vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication includes: A session key verification value is generated based on the temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, unit session parameters, the first temporary identity, and the unit's real identity.

[0065] Specifically, the vehicle currently receives the second temporary identity PID fed back by the roadside unit. i Unit session parameter T i After the authentication verification code VC and the current timestamp T2, the freshness of the timestamp T2 is first checked. If the timestamp has expired, the authentication process is terminated directly; if the timestamp is valid, the temporary private key d stored within itself is retrieved. i Vehicle conversation parameters D i And the unit's real identity ID extracted from the public key information of the roadside unit. Ri Combined with the feedback unit session parameter T i The first temporary identity (TID) generated by itself vi Following the same rules as generating authentication session keys for roadside units, the temporary private key is concatenated with the dot product of the unit session parameters, the vehicle session parameters, the unit session parameters, the first temporary identity, and the unit's real identity in a fixed order. This concatenation is then input into the second hash function H2 in the common parameters for computation, generating the session key verification value k'. vr , represented as: k' vr =H2(d i T i||D i ||T i ||TID vi ||ID Ri ).

[0066] The verification code verification value is generated based on the session key verification value, the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, the public key information, and the real identity of the unit.

[0067] Specifically, the session key verification value k' generated above will be used. vr The second temporary identity fed back by the roadside unit, its own first temporary identity, the unit's real identity, and the current timestamp T2 are concatenated in a fixed order, and then input into the second hash function H2 in the common parameters for hash operation to generate a fixed-length binary string as the verification code verification value VC'=H2(k' vr ||PID i ||TID vi ||ID Ri The generation rules for ||T2) are completely consistent with those for generating authentication verification codes for roadside units.

[0068] If the verification code value is the same as the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication is carried out through the authentication session key; If the verification code value is different from the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-road authentication fails.

[0069] Specifically, the generated verification code value VC' is compared bit by bit with the authentication verification code VC returned by the roadside unit. If the two are exactly the same, the vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication is considered successful, and the authentication session key k generated by the roadside unit is then passed to the system. vr It is directly used as the vehicle-road session key. All subsequent business data communication between vehicles and roads is encrypted and decrypted through this vehicle-road session key. If the verification code VC' is different from the authentication verification code VC in any bit, the vehicle-road authentication is determined to be unsuccessful. The communication process with the roadside unit is terminated immediately, and no related parameters are stored. The vehicle-road authentication request can be re-initiated.

[0070] Step S4: In response to the second temporary identity of the vehicle to be authenticated and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated is used to decrypt the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and to perform vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0071] Specifically, to synchronize information on legitimate vehicles within its jurisdiction to all vehicles that have completed vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication, the roadside unit broadcasts a list of the identities of the V2I-authenticated vehicles. This provides legitimate identities and parameter basis for V2I authentication, preventing vehicles from communicating with unauthorized nodes. Vehicles generate communication message sets to encrypt the V2I messages to be transmitted and their own secondary temporary identity before transmission, ensuring the confidentiality and anonymity of V2I communication. Vehicles awaiting V2I authentication complete the authentication process through decryption and identity verification, enabling lightweight, secure, and anonymous communication between vehicles. This eliminates the need for repeated interaction with a trusted authorization center, significantly improving V2I authentication efficiency and reducing communication and computational overhead.

[0072] Optionally, in response to the roadside unit broadcasting the second temporary identity of the vehicle undergoing vehicle-to-road authentication and the corresponding vehicle identity list after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters of the vehicle to be authenticated, the second temporary identity, the temporary private key, the current vehicle's vehicle session parameters, the second temporary identity, the temporary private key, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted, including: Obtain the identity list broadcast by the roadside unit, extract the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle waiting for vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, and generate a vehicle-to-vehicle session key by combining the current vehicle's temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, and second temporary identity. Encrypt the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key to generate vehicle ciphertext and obtain the communication message set.

[0073] Specifically, after a vehicle completes vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication, it receives a list of V2I-authenticated vehicle identities {(PID1, D1), (PID2, D2)...(PID1, D1)} broadcast by the roadside unit to the jurisdictional area. N D N This list contains the second temporary identities and corresponding vehicle session parameters of all vehicles within the region that have completed legitimate vehicle-to-road authentication. The current vehicle selects a vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication from the identity list, accurately extracts that vehicle's second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters, and simultaneously retrieves its own stored temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, and second temporary identity to prepare for subsequent vehicle-to-vehicle session key generation. The current vehicle performs an elliptic curve multiplication operation on its own temporary private key and the vehicle session parameters of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication. The result is concatenated with its own vehicle session parameters, its own second temporary identity, the second temporary identity of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, the vehicle session parameters of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, and the current timestamp T3 in a fixed order. This concatenation is then input into the second hash function H2 in the common parameters for hashing, generating a fixed-length binary string as the vehicle-to-vehicle session key, represented as: k vij =H2(d i D j ||PID i ||PIDj ||D i ||D j ||T3), this vehicle-to-vehicle session key is the exclusive communication key between the current vehicle and the vehicle to be authenticated. The current vehicle's second temporary identity, the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted, and the current timestamp T3 are concatenated in a fixed order to form the data to be encrypted. This data is then encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm with the generated vehicle-to-vehicle session key, producing the vehicle ciphertext C. vij , represented as C vij =Ek vij (PID i ||M 车 ||T3), to achieve confidentiality protection of the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted, where vehicle M is the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The current vehicle integrates its own second temporary identity, current timestamp T3, and generated vehicle ciphertext to obtain the vehicle-to-vehicle communication message set {PID i T3, C vij The system then sends the communication message set to the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, initiating a vehicle-to-vehicle authentication and communication request. The vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication then performs the authentication.

[0074] Optionally, the waiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication vehicle decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and performs authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity, including: A vehicle-to-vehicle session key is generated based on the temporary private key and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, as well as the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the current vehicle.

[0075] Specifically, after receiving the communication message set sent by the current vehicle, the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication first verifies the freshness of the timestamp T3. If the timestamp has expired, the authentication process is terminated directly. If the timestamp is valid, it retrieves its own stored temporary private key and vehicle session parameters, extracts the current vehicle's second temporary identity from the communication message set, and retrieves the current vehicle's vehicle session parameters from the identity list broadcast by the roadside unit. Following a rule that is completely consistent with the current vehicle, it performs an elliptic curve multiplication operation on its own temporary private key and the current vehicle's vehicle session parameters. The result is then concatenated with the current vehicle's second temporary identity, its own second temporary identity, the current vehicle's vehicle session parameters, its own vehicle session parameters, and the timestamp T3 in a fixed order. This concatenation is then input into the second hash function H2 in the common parameters for hashing to generate the vehicle-to-vehicle session key k. vij The calculation formula is k vij =H2(d j D i ||PID i ||PID j ||D i||D j ||T3).

[0076] The current verified second temporary identity is obtained by decrypting the vehicle ciphertext using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key; Specifically, the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication extracts the vehicle ciphertext from the communication message set, uses the generated vehicle-to-vehicle session key and the corresponding symmetric encryption / decryption algorithm to decrypt the vehicle ciphertext, obtaining the decrypted data packet. From this data packet, the current vehicle's second temporary identity is extracted and used as the PID for verifying the second temporary identity. i It can also extract the vehicle-to-vehicle information and timestamp to be transmitted for auxiliary verification.

[0077] If the current verified second temporary identity is the same as the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication is carried out through the vehicle-to-vehicle session key.

[0078] If the current verified second temporary identity is different from the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication fails.

[0079] Specifically, the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication will decrypt its current verified second temporary identity and compare it with the second temporary identity of the current vehicle directly received from the communication message set. If they are identical, vehicle-to-vehicle authentication is successful, and subsequent vehicle-to-vehicle communication between the two parties will be encrypted and decrypted using this dedicated vehicle-to-vehicle session key to ensure secure information transmission. If the current verified second temporary identity differs from the received second temporary identity, vehicle-to-vehicle authentication is deemed to have failed, and the communication process with the current vehicle is immediately terminated, with no related data being received.

[0080] This invention utilizes elliptic curve cryptography to generate and publish public parameters. User registration is completed simply by the vehicle submitting its identity information to a trusted authorization center, eliminating the need for pre-storing massive amounts of pseudonymous certificates or credentials. This significantly reduces the storage overhead of the on-board unit. Furthermore, the registration process for both the roadside unit and the vehicle is based on the same public parameters, simplifying the basic configuration of the authentication system and improving the overall deployment and operational efficiency. A blinded credential is generated by combining the first temporary identity and the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) message to be transmitted. Simultaneously, a dual Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinded credential and the temporary private key, strongly binding the vehicle identity information, transmitted message, and signature. This fundamentally eliminates the possibility of signature forgery, enhancing the security of V2I authentication. Moreover, both signature generation and verification are based on lightweight elliptic curve cryptography operations, avoiding computationally intensive bilinear pairing and zero-knowledge proof operations, reducing computational overhead and adapting to the limited computing resources of the on-board unit. After verifying the first authentication information set, the roadside unit can return the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code. The current vehicle completes authentication through a single verification code comparison, eliminating the need for multiple interactions and complex parameter parsing. This reduces the number of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication interactions and data transmission volume, lowering communication overhead. Simultaneously, the two-layer temporary identity design further conceals the vehicle's true identity, enhancing privacy protection. Based on the list of authenticated vehicle identities broadcast by the roadside unit, the current vehicle only needs to combine its own temporary identity, session parameters, and temporary private key with the vehicle awaiting V2I authentication to generate a communication message set. This eliminates the need for repeated interactions with the trusted authorization center for complex identity verification, achieving lightweight vehicle-to-vehicle authentication and significantly improving authentication efficiency. Furthermore, the use of session key encryption for message transmission, combined with the dynamic nature of the temporary identity, ensures the security of vehicle-to-vehicle communication and the unlinkability of identities.

[0081] The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks presented in this invention is based entirely on elliptic curve cryptography to construct a lightweight and efficient authentication system. This fundamentally reduces the storage, computation, and communication overhead of vehicular units, adapting to the highly dynamic and resource-constrained scenarios of vehicular ad hoc networks. Simultaneously, through a multi-layered design of blinded credentials, dual Schnorr signatures, and dual-layer temporary identities, it achieves security protection effects such as signature anti-forgery, identity anonymity, and non-linkability of actions, effectively resisting common network attacks such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and tampering attacks, significantly improving authentication security. Furthermore, the design for connecting vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication and vehicle-to-vehicle authentication relies on roadside units to broadcast and assist authentication information, achieving efficient connection of the authentication process. This balances authentication efficiency and privacy protection strength, solving the problem of balancing these two aspects in existing technologies. It significantly improves the overall authentication security and operational efficiency of vehicular ad hoc networks, providing technical support for the development of vehicular networks towards high-density, low-latency application scenarios, and promoting the large-scale deployment and application of vehicular ad hoc networks.

[0082] In another implementation, this application also includes malicious vehicle tracking, including: When malicious communication behavior is detected in the vehicle network, the Trusted Authorization Center obtains the second temporary identity (PID) of the malicious vehicle. i PK with the public key information of the corresponding roadside unit Ri The first temporary identity TID is calculated. vi , represented as: TID vi =H2(sk PK Ri )⊕PID i ; The Trusted Authorization Center obtains the blinded credential point parameter R of malicious vehicles. vi * Calculate H1(TID) vi ) -1 R vi * =H1(ID vi ||PK||R vi ) -1 ·R vi and the index information {ID} stored locally vi H1(ID) vi ||PK||R vi ) -1 R vi}match; After a successful match, the Trusted Authorization Center obtains the true identity of the malicious vehicle and completes the identification of the malicious vehicle.

[0083] like Figure 2 As shown, an anonymous authentication device 200 for vehicle-mounted networks provided in this embodiment of the invention includes: The initial registration module 210 is used to complete user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center after the system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. The signature generation module 220 is used to generate a blinding credential based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted, and generate a double Schnorr signature based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key when the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, to obtain the first authentication information set. The vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication module 230 is used to respond to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, generate a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information, perform V2I authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code, and use the authentication session key as the V2I session key after successful V2I authentication. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set, and after successful verification, obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. The vehicle-to-vehicle authentication module 240 is used to respond to the second temporary identity of the vehicle to be authenticated and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication. It generates a communication message set based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity and performs vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0084] like Figure 3 As shown, an electronic device 300 provided in this embodiment of the invention includes a memory 310 and a processor 320; the memory 310 is used to store a computer program; the processor 320 is used to implement the anonymous authentication method for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described above when the computer program is executed.

[0085] Alternatively, an electronic device 300 includes a memory 310 and a processor 320 coupled to the memory 310; the memory 310 is configured to store a computer program; and the processor 320 is configured to perform the following operations when the computer program is executed: After system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed, user registration is completed based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. In response to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, a verification code verification value is generated based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication is performed based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, the authentication session key is used as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code are obtained based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. In response to the second temporary identity of the vehicle and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated is used to decrypt the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and to perform vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0086] This invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the anonymous authentication method for vehicle-mounted networks as described above.

[0087] Alternatively, a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the following operations: After system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed, user registration is completed based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. In response to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, a verification code verification value is generated based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication is performed based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, the authentication session key is used as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code are obtained based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. In response to the second temporary identity of the vehicle and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated is used to decrypt the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and to perform vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

[0088] The present invention will now be described an electronic device 300 that can serve as a server or client of the present invention, which is an example of a hardware device that can be applied to various aspects of the present invention. Electronic device 300 is intended to represent various forms of digital electronic computer devices, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workstations, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. Electronic device 300 can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processors, cellular phones, smartphones, wearable devices, and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the implementation of the invention described and / or claimed herein.

[0089] Electronic device 300 includes a computing unit that can perform various appropriate actions and processes based on a computer program stored in read-only memory (ROM) or a computer program loaded from a storage unit into random access memory (RAM). The RAM may also store various programs and data required for device operation. The computing unit, ROM, and RAM are interconnected via a bus. Input / output (I / O) interfaces are also connected to the bus.

[0090] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), or random access memory (RAM), etc. In this application, the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the embodiments of the present invention according to actual needs. Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present invention can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated units can be implemented in hardware or as software functional units.

[0091] While the present invention has been disclosed above, its scope of protection is not limited thereto. Those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, and all such changes and modifications will fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks, characterized in that, include: After system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed, user registration is completed based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is generated based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. In response to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit, a verification code verification value is generated based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication is performed based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, the authentication session key is used as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code are obtained based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. In response to the second temporary identity of the vehicle and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication, a communication message set is generated based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated is used to decrypt the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and to perform vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

2. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trusted authorization center uses elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters, including: Using the elliptic curve cryptography described above, the prime order, the corresponding prime field, and the elliptic curve are obtained based on cryptographic security standards, and a prime order additive cyclic group and generator are generated. The system public key is obtained based on the generator and the system master private key; The common parameters are obtained based on the first hash function, the second hash function, the additive cyclic group, the generator, the prime order corresponding to the additive cyclic group, and the system public key; The common parameters are disclosed to the vehicle and the roadside unit.

3. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The roadside unit registration method includes: Generate the true identity of the roadside unit, randomly select the unit's private key, and obtain the unit's public key based on the public parameters; Generate a zero-knowledge proof corresponding to the unit's private key, and send the unit's true identity and the corresponding zero-knowledge proof to the trusted authorization center; The unit verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the unit verification equation. After verifying the validity of the zero-knowledge proof, the trusted authorization center generates the unit verification certificate based on the randomly obtained unit registration private key, the unit public key, and the public parameters. If verification is successful, registration is complete; if verification fails, registration is stopped.

4. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of completing user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and a trusted authorization center includes: Send the vehicle's true identity and the registered owner's personal information to the trusted authorization center; The long-term verification certificate generated by the trusted authorization center is verified according to the vehicle registration verification equation. After verifying the legality of the personal information, the trusted authorization center obtains the long-term verification certificate based on a randomly selected scalar and the public parameters, and stores the vehicle index information locally. If the verification is successful, the registration is completed, and the matching set of the vehicle's real identity and the long-term verification certificate is stored as a long-term certificate for communication with the trusted authorization center. If the verification fails, the registration stops.

5. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 2, characterized in that, When the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit, if the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, a blinding credential is generated based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted. A double Schnorr signature is then generated based on the blinding credential and a randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain a first authentication information set, including: The public key information broadcast by the roadside unit is verified according to a valid public key equation. If the valid public key equation is true, the public key information of the roadside unit is verified successfully. Based on the randomly generated first temporary identity and the temporary private key, as well as the generator and the verification long-term credential, the blinded credential and vehicle session parameters are generated. The encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity is generated through the second hash function and the public key information. The double Schnorr signature is generated by combining the blinded credential, the vehicle session parameters, the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted, and the first authentication information set is obtained.

6. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 5, characterized in that, The roadside unit verifies the first authentication information set. Upon successful verification, it obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters, including: Decrypt the encrypted ciphertext of the first temporary identity to obtain the first temporary identity; Verify the validity of the double Schnorr signature according to the signature verification equation; If the signature verification equation is true, the verification is successful. A random authentication number is randomly obtained. Based on the random authentication number, the second hash function, the system public key, and the first temporary identity, the second temporary identity, the unit session parameters, and the authentication session key are generated respectively. The authentication verification code is generated based on the authentication session key.

7. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of generating a verification code based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information, performing authentication based on the verification code and the authentication verification code, and using the authentication session key as the vehicle-to-infrastructure session key after successful vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication includes: A session key verification value is generated based on the temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, unit session parameters, the first temporary identity, and the unit real identity. Based on the session key verification value, the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, the public key information, and the real identity of the unit, the verification code verification value is generated. If the verification code value is the same as the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication is carried out through the authentication session key; If the verification code value is different from the authentication verification code, the vehicle-to-road authentication fails.

8. The anonymous authentication method for vehicle-mounted networks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The second temporary identity of the vehicle to be authenticated and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication, in response to the successful vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication, generates a communication message set based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-infrastructure information to be transmitted, including: Obtain the identity list broadcast by the roadside unit, extract the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle waiting for vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, and generate a vehicle-to-vehicle session key by combining the current vehicle's temporary private key, vehicle session parameters, and second temporary identity. Encrypt the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key to generate vehicle ciphertext and obtain the communication message set.

9. The anonymous authentication method for vehicular networks according to claim 8, characterized in that, The waiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication vehicle decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and performs authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity, including: Based on the temporary private key and vehicle session parameters of the vehicle awaiting vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, as well as the second temporary identity and vehicle session parameters of the current vehicle, a vehicle-to-vehicle session key is generated. The current verified second temporary identity is obtained by decrypting the vehicle ciphertext using the vehicle-to-vehicle session key; If the current verified second temporary identity is the same as the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication is successful, and vehicle-to-vehicle communication is carried out through the vehicle-to-vehicle session key; If the current verified second temporary identity is different from the received second temporary identity of the current vehicle, then vehicle-to-vehicle authentication fails.

10. An anonymous authentication device for vehicle-mounted networks, characterized in that, include: The initial registration module is used to complete user registration based on the current vehicle's identity information and the trusted authorization center after system initialization and roadside unit registration are completed. The system initialization includes the trusted authorization center using elliptic curve cryptography to obtain and publish public parameters. The signature generation module is used to generate a blinding credential based on the generated first temporary identity and the vehicle-road message to be transmitted when the current vehicle enters the jurisdiction of the roadside unit. If the public key information of the roadside unit is verified, the module generates a double Schnorr signature based on the blinding credential and the randomly obtained temporary private key to obtain the first authentication information set. The vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) authentication module is used to respond to the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code fed back by the roadside unit. It generates a verification code verification value based on the second temporary identity, the first temporary identity, and the public key information. It performs V2I authentication based on the verification code verification value and the authentication verification code. After successful V2I authentication, it uses the authentication session key as the V2I session key. The roadside unit is used to verify the first authentication information set. After successful verification, it obtains the second temporary identity, authentication session key, and authentication verification code based on the first temporary identity and the public parameters. The vehicle-to-vehicle authentication module is used to respond to the second temporary identity of the vehicle to be authenticated and the corresponding vehicle identity list broadcast by the roadside unit after successful vehicle-to-road authentication. It generates a communication message set based on the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the vehicle to be authenticated, the vehicle session parameters, second temporary identity, and temporary private key of the current vehicle, and the vehicle-to-vehicle information to be transmitted. The vehicle to be authenticated decrypts the communication message set to obtain the current verification second temporary identity, and performs vehicle-to-vehicle authentication based on the current vehicle's second temporary identity and the current verification second temporary identity.

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