Train hibernation wakeup system and method

CN122501419APending Publication Date: 2026-08-04CRRC QINGDAO SIFANG ROLLING STOCK RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
CRRC QINGDAO SIFANG ROLLING STOCK RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD
Filing Date
2026-06-16
Publication Date
2026-08-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

[0003]然而,上述现有方案在实际应用中存在以下技术缺陷:第一、位置信息来源单一,仅依赖列车自主防护系统(列车自主防护系统)自身存储的休眠前位置信息,当列车被意外移动或存储芯片数据损坏时,列车自主防护系统(列车自主防护系统)无法察觉,可能导致位置报告错误或唤醒失败,存在安全隐患

Benefits of technology

(1)通过引入自主感知单元与列车自主防护系统、休眠唤醒单元构建三重独立位置信源交叉校验机制,解决了现有方案中位置信息来源单一、单点故障导致安全隐患或唤醒失败的问题,实现了在任一信源失效时仍能准确判断列车位置,显著提升了唤醒过程的安全性和系统可用性。

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Abstract

This invention pertains to the field of rail transit train operation control technology, and particularly relates to a train hibernation and wake-up system and method. The train autonomous protection system receives a hibernation command, calculates the train's position, and stores it in its own memory to form first position data. An autonomous sensing unit collects real-time environmental data and forms third position data based on this data. The system also receives and stores the train's position to form second position data. During the train wake-up process, the autonomous protection system reads the first position data, the second position data, and receives the third position data, and cross-compares these three data. If at least two of the data match, the train position is considered valid, and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated, and fault information is reported. This invention's technical solution uses cross-verification from three independent sources to avoid single-point failures leading to position errors, thus improving wake-up security and system availability.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This field belongs to the technical field of rail transit train operation control, and in particular relates to a train hibernation wake-up system and method. Background Technology

[0002] In rail transit train operation control systems, train hibernation and wake-up technology is a key function for enabling trains to automatically power on, self-test, wake up and depart from the depot, and automatically power off and hibernate after operation. Existing hibernation and wake-up schemes typically use the train autonomous protection system (APS) as their core. A typical wake-up process is as follows: the dispatch center (ATS) sends a wake-up command to the train on the depot line according to plan; the APS controls the train to activate its battery and perform a power-on self-test, then sends commands to the vehicle control unit (CCU) to wake up each subsystem of the vehicle sequentially; in the position confirmation stage, the APS reads the last position information stored in its non-volatile memory before hibernation as the sole or primary basis for the train's position; finally, it completes all tests and enters a standby departure state. The hibernation process is typically as follows: after the train returns to the depot line, the APS stores the current position information in its own memory, then controls each subsystem to power off, and the train enters hibernation mode.

[0003] However, the existing solutions described above have the following technical drawbacks in practical applications: First, the source of location information is singular, relying solely on the pre-sleep location information stored within the train's autonomous protection system (APS). When the train is accidentally moved or the stored chip data is damaged, the APS cannot detect this, potentially leading to incorrect location reports or wake-up failures, posing a safety hazard. Second, there is a lack of environmental change detection. During sleep, surrounding terrain data is not collected, making it impossible to determine upon wake-up whether the train has been moved, whether any vehicles have intruded, or whether the train's direction has changed; it can only rely on static location information. Third, fault detection is delayed. Potential faults (such as slightly open doors or air pressure leaks) are only discovered upon wake-up the following day, causing delays in departure. Finally, there is a high degree of reliance on manual intervention. Drivers must perform routine checks and functional tests before each departure, resulting in high labor costs, low efficiency, and the need for on-site manual intervention in case of abnormalities.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a train sleep wake-up device and method to achieve safe wake-up of trains without human intervention throughout the entire process, thereby improving train dispatch efficiency and fault handling efficiency. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention addresses at least some of the aforementioned technical problems, providing a train hibernation wake-up system and method. By introducing an autonomous sensing unit to construct a triple independent position information source cross-verification mechanism, and combining hibernation environment fingerprint collection with wake-up fingerprint comparison, a fully unattended and secure wake-up process is achieved, effectively improving the security, availability, and automation level of train hibernation wake-up.

[0006] The first aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure provides a train sleep-wake system, comprising: The train's autonomous protection system is configured to receive wake-up commands and issue inspection request signals; receive hibernation commands and calculate the train's position and store it in its own memory to form first position data; The autonomous sensing unit is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system and is configured to collect current environmental data in real time based on the inspection request signal and send it to the train autonomous protection system. The sleep / wake-up unit is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system and the autonomous sensing unit, and is configured to send the wake-up command or the sleep command to the train autonomous protection system according to the control command of the control center system; receive and store the train position to form second position data; The vehicle control unit is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system and to each subsystem of the train. It is configured to perform comprehensive checks and tests on each subsystem of the train according to the instructions of the train autonomous protection system. In the train wake-up process, the train autonomous protection system receives the current environmental data and forms third location data based on the current environmental data. The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data match, the train position is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

[0007] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: by cross-checking three independent information sources, it avoids location errors caused by single point of failure, and improves wake-up security and system availability. A second aspect of the present disclosure provides a train hibernation and wake-up method, implemented based on the train hibernation and wake-up system provided in the first aspect of the present disclosure. The method includes a hibernation process and a wake-up process. The hibernation process includes: The train autonomous protection system receives a hibernation command, calculates the train's position, and stores it in its own memory to form first position data; at the same time, it sends the train's position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form second position data. The wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system sends an inspection request signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information in real time based on the inspection request signal and sends it to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data match, the train position is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

[0008] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: it enables automatic wake-up without human intervention throughout the entire process, ensures accurate positioning through three-source cross-verification, reduces labor costs, and improves vehicle dispatch efficiency. In other embodiments of this application, the current environmental information includes at least one of the following: the direction of the train head, the trains coupled to the head, the trains coupled to the tail, and intrusion information within the safe range of the train. The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following beneficial effects: the technical solution of this invention enables the system to have environmental awareness, provides a data basis for security judgment before wake-up, and prevents wake-up with faults. In other embodiments of this application, the hibernation process further includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train autonomous protection system sends a hibernation preparation signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects train terrain data based on the hibernation preparation signal to form and store first environmental information. The wake-up process also includes: After receiving the current environmental information, the train autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information. If the current environment information is inconsistent with the first environment information, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the train environment change information. If the current environmental information is consistent with the first environmental information, the train autonomous protection system calculates the current train position based on the current environmental information to form the third position data; The train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data. When at least two of the data match, the train autonomous protection system determines that the train location data is valid and continues the wake-up process; otherwise, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

[0009] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following beneficial effects: by comparing environmental fingerprints, it can detect whether the train has been moved or whether the environment has changed during the hibernation period, thus preventing the train from being woken up with hidden dangers.

[0010] In other embodiments of this application, the wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system determines whether the train meets the wake-up conditions, which include the train being on the depot line, without manual blocking, and without an emergency stop command. If the wake-up conditions are met, the train autonomous protection system sends the verification request signal to the autonomous sensing unit; if the wake-up conditions are not met, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

[0011] The technical solution provided in this application has at least the following beneficial effects: By setting a safety gate at the wake-up entry point, the technical solution of this invention ensures that the wake-up process is started only under safe conditions, thus avoiding dangerous wake-ups. In other embodiments of this application, the hibernation process includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train autonomous protection system controls the vehicle control unit to perform a comprehensive inspection of all train subsystems. If the comprehensive test fails, the vehicle control unit sends a sleep timeout signal to the train autonomous protection system, and the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information after receiving the sleep timeout signal. If the comprehensive test passes, the vehicle control unit sends a hibernation ready signal to the train autonomous protection system. After receiving the hibernation ready signal, the train autonomous protection system calculates the train position and stores it in its own memory to form first position data, and sends the train position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form second position data.

[0012] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: comprehensive detection before hibernation, early detection and alarm of faults, facilitating nighttime maintenance and avoiding delays in starting work the next day.

[0013] In other embodiments of this application, the hibernation process includes: After the first location data is generated, the train autonomous protection system calculates the CRC code of the first location data to obtain the first CRC code and stores it in its own memory; The wake-up process includes: The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data and calculates the CRC code of the first location data to obtain the second CRC code. The train autonomous protection system compares the second CRC code with the first CRC code; If the second CRC code is inconsistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information; if the second CRC code is consistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data.

[0014] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: it detects the integrity of stored data through CRC check, prevents the use of corrupted location data, and ensures security.

[0015] In other embodiments of this application, the wake-up process further includes: After the train autonomous protection system determines that the train's position is valid, the train autonomous protection system sends a test command to the vehicle control unit; The vehicle control unit executes the test according to the test command; If the test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure mode.

[0016] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: it provides dual protection through CRC check and cross-comparison: first, data integrity, and second, multi-source consistency. In other embodiments of this application, the test instructions include static test instructions and dynamic test instructions. After the train autonomous protection system sends the static test command to the vehicle control unit, the vehicle control unit controls the train to perform the static test. If the static test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the static test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system sends the dynamic test command to the vehicle control unit, and the vehicle control unit executes the dynamic test. If the dynamic test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the dynamic test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure condition.

[0017] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: by adding functional testing after position verification, the train can be allowed to leave the depot for operation only after ensuring that all subsystems of the train are normal.

[0018] In other embodiments of this application, the wake-up process further includes: When the vehicle control unit performs the test, the train autonomous protection system continuously monitors the status of the train's dual-end keys and the status of the maintenance button. When both ends of the key are detected to be active at the same time, or when the maintenance button is detected to be active, the train autonomous protection system terminates the test and reports the corresponding safety status abnormality.

[0019] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following benefits: real-time monitoring of safety status during testing, prevention of key conflicts or erroneous testing in maintenance mode, and protection of personnel and equipment safety. Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: (1) By introducing an autonomous sensing unit, a train autonomous protection system, and a sleep-wake unit to construct a triple independent position information source cross-verification mechanism, the problem of single position information source and single point failure leading to safety hazards or wake-up failure in the existing scheme is solved. It can still accurately determine the train position when any information source fails, which significantly improves the safety of the wake-up process and the availability of the system.

[0020] (2) By collecting and storing train terrain data as an environmental fingerprint during hibernation and comparing the current environmental information with the fingerprint when the train is awake, the problem that the existing scheme cannot detect whether the train has been moved or invaded during hibernation is solved. This realizes the active perception of environmental changes and abnormal alarms, effectively preventing safety accidents caused by changes in location or intrusion.

[0021] The above description is merely an overview of the technical solution disclosed herein. In order to better understand the technical means of this disclosure and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this disclosure more apparent and understandable, specific embodiments of this disclosure are described below. Attached Figure Description

[0022] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0023] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the train hibernation and wake-up system according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the wake-up process in the train hibernation wake-up method of this application embodiment; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the hibernation process in the train hibernation wake-up method of this application embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0024] To make the technical problems, technical solutions, and beneficial effects to be solved by this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0025] The prefixes such as "first" and "second" used in this application embodiment are merely for distinguishing different descriptive objects and do not limit the position, order, priority, quantity, or content of the described objects. The use of ordinal numbers and other prefixes used to distinguish descriptive objects in this application embodiment does not constitute a limitation on the described objects. The description of the described objects is given in the claims or the context of the embodiments, and should not constitute unnecessary restrictions due to the use of such prefixes. Furthermore, in the description of this embodiment, unless otherwise stated, "multiple" means two or more.

[0026] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B; the term "and / or" in this document is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone.

[0027] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0028] In this application, the terms "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., refer to a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example, which is included in at least one embodiment or example of this application. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of different embodiments or examples.

[0029] To address the issue of relying on a single source of location information during train wake-up, existing technologies have introduced improved solutions employing dual verification. For example, patent CN104354726B discloses an automatic train wake-up method and system, employing a dual verification approach using both onboard and ground safety protection systems: after verifying the train's position, the onboard system sends the location information to the ground system for further verification; train operation is only permitted after both systems have verified the information correctly. Another example is patent CN106314485B, which discloses a rapid positioning method for dormant trains based on memory storage. This method uses the onboard train's autonomous protection system to memorize the pre-dormant position and performs dual positioning verification using positioning loops or beacons. Furthermore, patent CN109677453A discloses an unmanned dormant train wake-up device that detects whether the train has shifted during dormancy by comparing the consistency of sensors at the front and rear of the train.

[0030] However, the aforementioned existing technologies still have the following technical defects: 1. Homogeneous information source types, lacking heterogeneous redundancy; In the above dual verification scheme, the two information sources are mostly the same type of data (such as vehicle storage and ground storage, memory location and loop positioning, front sensor and rear sensor), which are essentially different storage or acquisition methods of the same location information, making it difficult to form truly independent heterogeneous redundancy.

[0031] 2. Lack of ability to detect environmental changes; the above solution only verifies location data and does not actively collect and store terrain data of the hibernation environment. When the train is woken up the next day, the system cannot determine whether the train was accidentally moved during hibernation, whether other vehicles have intruded into the train's track, or whether the train's direction has changed.

[0032] 3. High reliance on manual labor: Drivers need to perform routine checks and multi-functional tests before each trip, resulting in high labor costs, low efficiency, and potential for missed checks due to fatigue during early morning work. Furthermore, in case of abnormal situations, dispatch or driver intervention is required, impacting overall trip efficiency.

[0033] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides a train hibernation wake-up device and method. By introducing an autonomous sensing unit to construct a triple independent position signal source cross-verification mechanism, it achieves fully unattended and secure wake-up throughout the entire process. The specific embodiments of this invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0034] The embodiments disclosed herein are based on the TACS (Train Autonomous Circumambulation System) architecture. TACS is a train control system with vehicle-to-vehicle communication as its core. Trains directly exchange information such as position, speed, and braking through wireless communication. Only object controllers (OC) are set up at the trackside, eliminating the need for traditional zone controllers (ZC) and computer interlocking (CI). It features a simplified architecture, fewer ground devices, and high operating efficiency.

[0035] The first aspect of this disclosure discloses a train sleep-wake system, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the train hibernation and wake-up system includes a train autonomous protection system, an autonomous sensing unit, a hibernation and wake-up unit, and a vehicle control unit.

[0036] The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system is the core of train safety, achieving a Safety Integrity Level (SIL4). It is responsible for safety functions such as overspeed protection, collision protection, position detection, and brake monitoring. The ATP system receives wake-up commands and issues inspection request signals; it also receives sleep commands, calculates the train's position, and stores it in its own memory to form initial position data.

[0037] The autonomous sensing unit communicates with the train's autonomous protection system. It is an environmental sensing module based on multiple sensors (camera, millimeter-wave radar, lidar, inertial navigation unit) and is responsible for collecting current environmental data in real time based on the inspection request signal and sending it to the train's autonomous protection system. The Awakening Operating Module (AOM), also known as auxiliary driving equipment, is deployed at both ends of the train. It communicates with the train's autonomous protection system and autonomous sensing unit. The AOM issues wake-up commands or sleep commands to the train's autonomous protection system based on control instructions from the control center system; it also receives and stores the train's position, forming secondary position data.

[0038] The Central Control Unit (CCU) is the central control unit of the train. It communicates with the train's autonomous protection system and connects with various subsystems of the train. It is responsible for managing and coordinating vehicle subsystems such as traction, braking, doors, and air conditioning. It performs comprehensive checks and tests on various subsystems of the train according to the instructions of the train's autonomous protection system.

[0039] In the train wake-up process, the train autonomous protection system receives the current environmental data and forms third location data based on the current environmental data. The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data match, the train position is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

[0040] For example, suppose a train is accidentally pushed 5 meters during its sleep period due to a neighboring train's TACS communication operation. In existing solutions, the train's autonomous protection system only reads its stored position before sleep and cannot detect the movement. Upon waking up, it uses the wrong position, which may lead to a side collision with a vehicle on the adjacent track when leaving the depot.

[0041] In the technical solution of the present invention, when the train is in a hibernation state, the train autonomous protection system has stored the first position data calculated during the last hibernation in its own memory, and at the same time, the hibernation wake-up unit stores the same second position data as a backup.

[0042] After the wake-up process is initiated, the autonomous sensing unit, based on the inspection request signal issued by the train's autonomous protection system, uses sensors such as onboard cameras, millimeter-wave radar, and lidar to collect real-time environmental data around the train and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system. The train's autonomous protection system uses Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) or feature matching algorithms to calculate the train's current actual position coordinates from the current environmental data, which serves as the third-party location data.

[0043] The train's autonomous protection system acquires position data from three independent sources: first position data in its own memory, second position data in the AOM (Automatic Train Management) system, and third position data, and performs pairwise cross-comparisons of these three data. If the cross-comparisons reveal inconsistencies among the three data points, the system immediately terminates the wake-up process and reports a "train position anomaly" fault. Upon receiving the alarm, the TACS (Train Control and Safety Administration) dispatch center uses vehicle-to-vehicle communication to notify adjacent trains to take evasive action and arranges for personnel to inspect the situation, thus preventing a safety incident. Furthermore, if at least two of the three data points match, the train's position is considered valid, ensuring the train's normal wake-up and departure from the depot.

[0044] The technical solution of this application introduces an autonomous sensing unit, a train autonomous protection system, and a sleep / wake-up unit to construct a triple independent position information source cross-verification mechanism. This solves the problem of single position information source and single-point failure leading to safety hazards or wake-up failure in existing solutions. It enables accurate determination of train position even when any information source fails, significantly improving the safety of the wake-up process and system availability.

[0045] The second aspect of the present disclosure discloses a train hibernation wake-up method, which is implemented based on the train hibernation wake-up system provided in the first aspect of the present disclosure. The train hibernation wake-up method includes a hibernation process and a wake-up process.

[0046] like Figure 3 As shown, the hibernation process includes: The train autonomous protection system receives a hibernation command, calculates the train's position, and stores it in its own memory to form the first position data; at the same time, it sends the train's position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form the second position data.

[0047] like Figure 2 As shown, the wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train's autonomous protection system sends an inspection request signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information in real time based on the inspection request signal and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system reads the first position data, the second position data, and the third position data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data match, the train position is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

[0048] Specifically, after the train completes its daily TACS operation and returns to the depot line, the TACS dispatch center issues a hibernation command to the train's autonomous protection system via the hibernation / wake-up unit. Upon receiving the hibernation command, the train's autonomous protection system calculates its current precise position using the position information of neighboring trains obtained from speed sensors, transponder antennas, and TACS vehicle-to-vehicle communication. This position is stored in its own FRAM memory to form the first position data, and simultaneously transmitted to the hibernation / wake-up unit via the TACS communication network. The hibernation / wake-up unit stores this as the second position data. After storage, the train's autonomous protection system sends a power-off command to the vehicle control unit. The vehicle control unit then sequentially shuts down the traction, braking, and auxiliary power subsystems, and the train enters a low-power hibernation state.

[0049] The following morning, the TACS dispatch center issued a wake-up command to the train autonomous protection system via the sleep / wake-up unit. Upon receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system sent a verification request signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit activated its cameras and radar to collect environmental data in front of, behind, and to the sides of the train, and sent this data to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system received the environmental data from the autonomous sensing unit, calculated the current actual position through feature matching, and formed the third position data. Simultaneously, the train autonomous protection system read the first position data from the FRAM, requested the sleep / wake-up unit to read the second position data, and compared the three position data pairs. When at least two of the data matched, the train autonomous protection system determined the position was valid and continued with the subsequent power-on and testing procedures; if all three did not match, the train autonomous protection system terminated the wake-up process and reported a "position verification failure" fault to the TACS dispatch center via the sleep / wake-up unit.

[0050] When a train's FRAM experiences a bit flip due to electromagnetic interference, the first position data is corrupted, but the second position data backed up by the sleep / wake-up unit remains intact. The third position data provided by the autonomous sensing unit is consistent with the second position data, and the train's autonomous protection system can still recognize the position as valid and continue waking up.

[0051] When a train is in sleep mode on the depot line, a communication module failure or aging storage unit in the sleep wake-up unit causes an error in the backup second location data (e.g., changing from K100+235 to K100+300). The first location data (K100+235) stored in the train's autonomous protection system's own FRAM memory remains intact. The autonomous sensing unit is functioning normally, and upon wake-up, it collects environmental data and calculates the third location data (K100+235). The following morning, the dispatch center issues a wake-up command to the train. Upon wake-up, the train's autonomous protection system reads the first location data (K100+235) from the FRAM, the second location data (K100+300) from the sleep wake-up unit, and receives the third location data (K100+235) from the autonomous sensing unit.

[0052] The train's autonomous protection system cross-compares the three data points: the third position data (K100+235) is consistent with the first position data (K100+235), but inconsistent with the second position data (K100+300).

[0053] According to the verification rule "when the third position data is consistent with at least one of the first position data or the second position data, the position is considered valid", in this case, the train autonomous protection system recognizes the position as valid (using K100+235) and continues the wake-up process.

[0054] Under all the above circumstances, the trains departed the depot normally, avoiding delays in the entire line's operation due to a single point of failure. Furthermore, the entire process required no driver intervention, significantly reducing the wake-up time for a single train and lowering labor costs.

[0055] The technical solution of this application avoids location errors caused by single point of failure through a triple cross-checking mechanism, improves wake-up security and system availability, and realizes fully automatic train wake-up, thereby improving train dispatching efficiency and reducing labor costs.

[0056] In other embodiments of this application, the current environmental information includes at least one of the following: the direction of the train head, the train coupled to the head, the train coupled to the tail, and intrusion information within the safe range of the train.

[0057] For example, the autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information through multi-sensor fusion and packages the raw sensing data of the following status information and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system: Image data acquisition: Images of the front, rear, and coupler areas of the train are acquired using cameras at the front and rear of the train, including track alignment, sign content, and coupler area views.

[0058] Point cloud data acquisition: Three-dimensional point cloud data around the train is acquired using LiDAR, including track feature points, obstacle outlines, and point cloud distribution in the coupler area.

[0059] Radar echo acquisition: Acquire echo data of metallic objects in front of and behind the train using millimeter-wave radar.

[0060] Inertial data acquisition: Data such as the train's orientation angle and acceleration are collected through the inertial navigation unit.

[0061] After receiving the current environmental information, the train's autonomous protection system processes the raw sensing data and determines the following train status: Vehicle direction determination: Perform image recognition on the camera image to identify the content of the sign in front (such as "up direction" or "down direction"); combine the orientation angle data of the inertial navigation unit to determine whether the current vehicle direction is consistent with the direction stored during sleep.

[0062] Coupling status judgment: Target detection is performed on the camera images in the coupler area to identify whether there is a coupler or car body of an adjacent vehicle; the lidar point cloud in the coupler area is analyzed to determine whether there is a dense point cloud with a contour matching the train; the millimeter-wave radar echo is analyzed to determine whether there are strong metallic echo features.

[0063] Intrusion status assessment: Obstacle detection is performed on the lidar point cloud to determine whether there are abnormal point clouds within the safety envelope; the millimeter-wave radar echo is analyzed to determine whether there are metal objects in the off-track area; cross-validation is performed by combining the location information reported by adjacent trains in the TACS system.

[0064] Position offset judgment: Compare the feature point positions in the current environment information with the feature point positions in the first environment information stored during hibernation to determine whether an overall offset has occurred.

[0065] The technical solution of this invention collects key safety information such as the direction of the train head, coupling status, and intrusion status from the current environmental information, enabling the on-board train autonomous protection system to accurately identify safety hazards such as depot line intrusion, train head / tail coupling, and direction changes. This provides the train autonomous protection system with richer environmental perception data and further enhances the environmental safety detection capability of the wake-up process.

[0066] In other embodiments of this application, such as Figure 3 As shown, the hibernation process also includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train's autonomous protection system sends a hibernation preparation signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects train terrain data based on the hibernation preparation signal to form and store the first environmental information; like Figure 2 As shown, the wake-up process also includes: After receiving the current environmental information, the train autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information. If the current environmental information is inconsistent with the first environmental information, the train autonomous protection system will terminate the wake-up process and report the changes in the train environment. If the current environmental information is consistent with the first environmental information, the train autonomous protection system calculates the train's current position based on the current environmental information to form the third position data; The train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first, second, and third location data. When at least two of the data match, the train autonomous protection system recognizes the train location data as valid and continues the wake-up process; otherwise, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

[0067] In a specific illustrative embodiment, a train is in normal dormancy on a depot track. At night, a non-communications engineering vehicle illegally enters the train's depot track and stops approximately 15 meters in front of the train. The train itself is not moved. The following morning, the dispatch center issues a wake-up command to the train. If the train wakes up and immediately leaves the depot, it will collide with the engineering vehicle 15 meters in front, causing a serious accident.

[0068] In the technical solution of this invention, when the train is in sleep mode on the depot line, the autonomous sensing unit collects the first environmental information. At this time, the area within 15 meters in front of the train is an open area, and the lidar point cloud data shows no obstacles.

[0069] Upon activation, the autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information. LiDAR scanning detects an abnormal point cloud approximately 15 meters ahead, the point cloud outline matching the characteristics of the engineering vehicle. Millimeter-wave radar confirms the obstacle is a metallic object; camera images identify the engineering vehicle. This information is then sent to the train's autonomous protection system.

[0070] The train's autonomous protection system compares the received current environmental information with the first environmental information and detects a new obstacle in the area 15 meters ahead. The difference in the comparison exceeds the preset threshold.

[0071] The train's autonomous protection system detected a security intrusion in the environment, immediately terminated the wake-up process, and reported to the dispatch center via the hibernation wake-up unit that "an intruding vehicle exists on the depot line, approximately 15 meters away." After the dispatch center arranged for personnel to remove the engineering vehicle, the train successfully woke up again.

[0072] In a specific illustrative embodiment, a train is parked at the end of a depot track. Due to brake degradation from parking, the train rolls backward approximately 2 meters along the slope overnight. No other vehicles intrude around the train. The following morning, the dispatch center issues a wake-up command to the train.

[0073] The train's autonomous protection system requests movement authorization from the OC using the location stored before hibernation, but the actual location has shifted, posing a risk of location reporting errors.

[0074] In the technical solution of this invention, during hibernation, the first environmental information collected by the autonomous sensing unit records the terrain features corresponding to the original position: there is a track joint feature point 5 meters in front of the front of the vehicle, and there is a signal foundation 3 meters behind the rear of the vehicle.

[0075] Upon wake-up, the autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system. As the train rolls backward by 2 meters, the track joint feature point in front of the train head appears 7 meters ahead, and the signal foundation behind the train tail appears 1 meter behind. The feature points are shifted backward by 2 meters as a whole.

[0076] The train's autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information and finds that the relative positions of the original feature points have shifted as a whole, with a shift of 2 meters, exceeding the preset threshold, and no new obstacles have been added.

[0077] The train's autonomous protection system detected a change in the train's position, immediately terminated the wake-up process, and reported to the dispatch center via the hibernation wake-up unit that "the train's position has shifted by approximately 2 meters, in the direction of backwards." The dispatch center arranged for personnel to inspect and confirm the runaway malfunction. After the malfunction was confirmed and resolved, the train successfully re-wake up.

[0078] In one specific illustrative embodiment, a train completes a turn in the triangular area and then stops, with its front facing forward during hibernation. At night, maintenance personnel turn the train around, reversing its direction. The following morning, the dispatch center issues a wake-up command to the train.

[0079] If the train's autonomous protection system still requests a route from the OC in the original direction, the OC will switch the wrong direction, causing the train to be unable to leave the depot along the planned route; at the same time, the driver's cab will activate incorrectly and the TACS communication direction will be incorrect.

[0080] In the technical solution of this invention, the first environmental information collected by the autonomous sensing unit during hibernation includes directional features: an "upward direction" sign in the image in front of the vehicle and an orientation angle of 45 degrees recorded by the inertial navigation unit.

[0081] When the train is awakened, the autonomous sensing unit collects the current environmental information and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system: a "downward direction" sign appears in the image in front of the train, and the inertial navigation unit detects an orientation angle of 225 degrees (180 degrees different).

[0082] The train's autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information and finds that the content of the directional signs is inconsistent and the inertial navigation orientation angle is 180 degrees different.

[0083] The train's autonomous protection system determines that the locomotive's direction has changed, immediately terminates the wake-up process, and reports to the dispatch center via the sleep wake-up unit that "the locomotive's direction has changed, and the current locomotive direction is reversed." After confirmation, the dispatch center arranges for shunting to reset the locomotive or, based on operational needs, remotely confirms and allows wake-up.

[0084] In a specific illustrative embodiment, a train is in normal dormancy on the depot line. At night, the dispatch center arranges for another train to be coupled to the locomotive of this train. The next morning, the dispatch center issues a wake-up command to this train.

[0085] If this train is woken up alone and attempts to move, it will drag the coupled train, which may cause damage to the coupler or disengagement; the length of the train increases after coupling, and the movement authorization calculation is incorrect.

[0086] In the technical solution of this invention, during sleep mode, the first environmental information collected by the autonomous sensing unit shows that the area of ​​the vehicle head and coupler is open, and the lidar point cloud shows that there are no obstacles within 2 meters in front of the coupler.

[0087] Upon wake-up, the autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information and sends it to the train's autonomous protection system: the camera image shows the coupler and car body of another train in the coupler area; the lidar point cloud shows a dense point cloud about 0.5 meters in front of the coupler; and the millimeter-wave radar echo shows the presence of a strong metallic echo.

[0088] The train's autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information and finds new point clouds and metal echoes in the coupler area, and the open area is shortened from 2 meters to 0.5 meters.

[0089] The train's autonomous protection system detects a coupled train at the locomotive, immediately terminates its wake-up function, and reports "a coupled train exists at the locomotive." After confirmation by the dispatch center, the system can be allowed to wake up again after uncoupling or regrouping the train according to operational needs.

[0090] The technical solution of this invention collects environmental fingerprints during hibernation and compares them item by item during wake-up, which can simultaneously detect three major categories of security risks: security intrusion, position change, and state change, ensuring that the train only enters the subsequent wake-up process under the condition that the environment is safe and the state is normal.

[0091] In other embodiments of this application, such as Figure 2 As shown, the wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system determines whether the train meets the wake-up conditions. The wake-up conditions include the train being on the depot line, without manual blocking, and without an emergency stop command. If the wake-up conditions are met, the train autonomous protection system sends a verification request signal to the autonomous sensing unit; if the wake-up conditions are not met, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

[0092] Specifically, after receiving the wake-up command, the train's autonomous protection system does not immediately execute the wake-up operation. Instead, it first determines whether the wake-up conditions are met through the following steps: Depot Line Judgment: The train autonomous protection system obtains the current position coordinates through the onboard positioning system and compares them with the TACS line electronic map stored in the hibernation wake-up unit to confirm whether the train is within the depot line range that allows wake-up. At the same time, it can query the positions of adjacent trains through TACS vehicle-to-vehicle communication to assist in confirmation.

[0093] No manual closure determination: The train's autonomous protection system queries the sleep / wake-up unit for valid manual closure instructions. The sleep / wake-up unit maintains a list of closure instructions, including closure areas, start and end times, and is linked to the construction plan of the TACS dispatch center. The train's autonomous protection system confirms that there are no valid closures on the current depot line during this time period.

[0094] No emergency stop command determination: The train autonomous protection system queries the sleep wake-up unit to see if there is a valid emergency stop command, which is triggered by the TACS dispatch center or personnel in the warehouse.

[0095] The train autonomous protection system will only send a verification request signal to the autonomous sensing unit when all three conditions are met. If any condition is not met, the train autonomous protection system will immediately terminate the wake-up process and report the specific unmet condition to the TACS dispatch center through the sleep-wake-up unit.

[0096] In a specific illustrative embodiment, on a certain day, overhead contact line maintenance work was being carried out in a section of a depot within the TACS depot. The TACS dispatch center issued a manual closure order for this section of the line. The following morning, the dispatch center issued a wake-up order to the trains on this section of the line as planned. The train's autonomous protection system checked the dormant wake-up unit and found that the section of the line was effectively closed, immediately terminated the wake-up operation, and reported the incident. At this time, maintenance personnel were working on the overhead contact line; if the train were to wake up and leave the depot, it would cause a serious accident.

[0097] The technical solution of this invention forms the first safety gate by judging the pre-wake-up conditions and automatically interlocking with the scheduling construction plan.

[0098] In other embodiments of this application, such as Figure 3 As shown, the hibernation process includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train's autonomous protection system controls the vehicle control unit to perform a comprehensive test on all subsystems of the train. If the comprehensive test fails, the vehicle control unit sends a sleep timeout signal to the train autonomous protection system, and the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information after receiving the sleep timeout signal. If the comprehensive test is passed, the vehicle control unit sends a hibernation ready signal to the train autonomous protection system. After receiving the hibernation ready signal, the train autonomous protection system calculates the train position and stores it in its own memory to form the first position data. It then sends the train position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form the second position data.

[0099] Specifically, after receiving the hibernation command from the TACS dispatch center, the train's autonomous protection system first sends a comprehensive test command to the vehicle control unit. The vehicle control unit then performs diagnostic tests on each subsystem of the train in sequence: Door system: Test the opening and closing action, anti-pinch function, and door closing signal; Traction system: Test the condition of the traction converter and the insulation resistance of the motor; Braking system: Test brake cylinder pressure, brake pad wear, and emergency brake solenoid valve; TACS communication equipment: Tests the status of vehicle-to-vehicle communication antennas and communication units; Auxiliary systems: testing battery voltage, air conditioning, and lighting; High-voltage system: Test pantograph raising / lowering and high-voltage busbar insulation.

[0100] If any subsystem fails the test, the vehicle control unit sends a "sleep timeout signal" and fault code to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then reports the fault information to the TACS dispatch center, and the train remains awake awaiting maintenance. If all subsystems pass the test, the vehicle control unit sends a "sleep ready signal" to the train autonomous protection system. Only then does the train autonomous protection system begin calculating its position, storing it in its own memory and backing it up in the sleep / wake-up unit. Finally, it sends a sleep success signal to the sleep / wake-up unit, which then sends a power-off command to the vehicle control unit, and the train safely enters sleep mode.

[0101] The technical solution of this invention performs comprehensive detection before hibernation, which can detect and alarm faults in advance, making it easier to carry out maintenance at night and avoiding delays in starting work the next day.

[0102] In other embodiments of this application, the hibernation process includes: After the first position data is generated, the train autonomous protection system calculates the CRC code of the first position data, obtains the first CRC code, and stores it in its own memory. The wake-up process includes: After reading the first position data, the train's autonomous protection system calculates the CRC code of the first position data to obtain the second CRC code. The train's autonomous protection system compares the second CRC code with the first CRC code; If the second CRC code is inconsistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information; if the second CRC code is consistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first position data, the second position data, and the third position data.

[0103] As an illustration, after the train's autonomous protection system calculates and forms the first position data during the hibernation process, it applies the CRC-32 algorithm to calculate the check code of the position data before writing it into the FRAM, and obtains the first CRC code, which is then written into the FRAM along with the first position data.

[0104] During the wake-up process, the train autonomous protection system reads the first position data and its first CRC code from the FRAM, recalculates the CRC of the read position data to obtain a second CRC code, and compares it with the first CRC code. If they do not match, it indicates that the data was corrupted during the sleep period due to electromagnetic interference, bit flipping, or other reasons, and the train autonomous protection system immediately terminates the wake-up and reports a "first position data corruption fault." If they match, it indicates that the data is complete, and the train autonomous protection system continues subsequent cross-comparisons.

[0105] The technical solution of this invention uses CRC check to detect the integrity of stored data, prevents the use of corrupted location data, and ensures the safety of train wake-up and operation.

[0106] In other embodiments of this application, the wake-up process further includes: After the train autonomous protection system confirms that the train's position is valid, the train autonomous protection system sends a test command to the vehicle control unit; The vehicle control unit executes the test according to the test command; If the test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure operation.

[0107] After the train's autonomous protection system completes triple position verification and confirms the position is valid, it enters the functional testing phase. Specifically, the train's autonomous protection system sends test commands to the vehicle control unit. Upon receiving the commands, the vehicle control unit sequentially performs functional tests on each subsystem of the train: Braking system test: The vehicle control unit instructs the train to apply the holding brake, and the pressure value is confirmed to have reached the predetermined threshold by the brake cylinder pressure sensor; the emergency brake solenoid valve action response is tested to confirm that the emergency brake command can be triggered normally.

[0108] Door system test: The vehicle control unit instructs all doors to perform a single opening and closing action, and confirms through feedback signals from the door controller that the doors are in position and the anti-pinch function is working properly.

[0109] Traction system test: The vehicle control unit performs a self-test on the traction converter to confirm that the insulation resistance and cooling system status are normal; the train is instructed to move a short distance at a low speed (e.g., 3-5 km / h) and the speed sensor confirms that the traction command response is normal.

[0110] Pantograph test: The vehicle control unit instructs the pantograph to perform a pantograph raising operation, and confirms that the pantograph is raised in place and the contact pressure is normal through the pantograph raising status sensor.

[0111] Auxiliary system testing: The vehicle control unit tests the startup and operation status of the air conditioning, lighting, and passenger information systems.

[0112] If any of the above tests fails, the vehicle control unit sends a test failure signal and fault code to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then reports the specific fault information to the TACS dispatch center via the sleep wake-up unit, and the train remains on the depot line awaiting manual intervention.

[0113] If all tests are successful, the vehicle control unit sends a test success signal to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then controls the train to enter the "waiting to leave the depot" mode: the train maintains a low-power standby state, and each subsystem maintains basic operational readiness, ready to receive the departure instruction from the TACS dispatch center and enter mainline operation at any time.

[0114] In a specific illustrative embodiment, during the morning rush hour on a certain TACS line, after a train completes triple position verification and the train autonomous protection system has determined that the train's position is valid, the train autonomous protection system sends a test command to the vehicle control unit.

[0115] When the vehicle control unit performs a door test, it instructs a certain door to open or close. The door controller reports a timeout indicating the door is fully closed, and the vehicle control unit determines that the door's anti-pinch function is malfunctioning. The vehicle control unit immediately sends a test failure signal and fault code "Door 3 Anti-pinch Fault" to the train's autonomous protection system.

[0116] The train's autonomous protection system reports fault information to the TACS dispatch center via the sleep / wake-up unit. Upon receiving the alarm, the dispatch center dispatches another train from the backup depot and simultaneously notifies maintenance personnel to handle the faulty train. Based on the method described in claim 2, the train position verification has passed; however, this claim detects the door fault before the train leaves the depot through functional testing, thus preventing potential safety accidents caused by the train leaving the depot with a fault.

[0117] The functional testing phase of this invention establishes a complete wake-up process: "position verification → functional testing → waiting to leave the depot." Functional testing ensures that all train subsystems (brakes, doors, traction, pantograph, and auxiliary systems) are in normal working order after wake-up, forming the final safety line in the wake-up process. This ensures that the train is only allowed to leave the depot for operation if all functions are normal, effectively preventing operational safety accidents caused by equipment failure.

[0118] In other embodiments of this application, the test instructions include static test instructions and dynamic test instructions. After the train autonomous protection system sends a static test command to the vehicle control unit, the vehicle control unit controls the train to perform a static test. If the static test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the static test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system sends a dynamic test command to the vehicle control unit, and the vehicle control unit executes the dynamic test. If the dynamic test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the dynamic test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure condition.

[0119] Specifically, after the train's autonomous protection system completes the position verification and confirms the position is valid, it sends a test command to the vehicle control unit. The test command is divided into two stages: static test command and dynamic test command.

[0120] Static testing: The train's autonomous protection system sends a static test command to the vehicle control unit. After receiving the command, the vehicle control unit performs static functional tests on each subsystem sequentially while the train is stationary. Static test of braking system: The vehicle control unit instructs the train to apply the holding brake, and the pressure value is confirmed to reach the predetermined threshold by the brake cylinder pressure sensor; the action response of the emergency brake solenoid valve is tested to confirm that the emergency brake command can be triggered normally.

[0121] Static test of the door system: The vehicle control unit instructs all doors to perform a single opening and closing action, and the door controller sends a feedback signal to confirm that the door is in position and the anti-pinch function is normal.

[0122] Static test of pantograph: The vehicle control unit commands the pantograph to perform a pantograph raising operation, and the pantograph raising status sensor confirms that the pantograph is raised in place and the contact pressure is normal.

[0123] Static test of traction system: The vehicle control unit performs a self-test on the traction converter to confirm that the insulation resistance and cooling system status are normal.

[0124] Static testing of auxiliary systems: Testing the start-up and operation status of the vehicle control unit, including the air conditioning, lighting, and passenger information systems.

[0125] If any of the above static tests fails, the vehicle control unit sends a static test failure signal and fault code to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then reports the specific fault information to the TACS dispatch center via the sleep wake-up unit. The train remains on the depot line awaiting manual intervention and does not enter the dynamic testing phase.

[0126] If all static tests are passed, the vehicle control unit sends a static test success signal to the train's autonomous protection system.

[0127] After receiving the static test success signal, the train's autonomous protection system sends a dynamic test command to the vehicle control unit. Upon receiving the command, the vehicle control unit controls the train to perform the dynamic function test while moving at low speed. Traction dynamic test: The vehicle control unit commands the train to move forward a short distance (e.g., 10 meters) at a speed of 5 km / h. The speed sensor confirms that the traction command response is normal and the actual speed is consistent with the commanded speed.

[0128] Braking dynamic test: The vehicle control unit instructs the train to apply service braking, and the deceleration sensor confirms that the braking response is normal and the stopping accuracy is within the allowable range.

[0129] Reversing dynamic test (if applicable): The vehicle control unit instructs the train to move backward a short distance at a speed of 3 km / h to test the reversing traction and braking functions.

[0130] During dynamic testing, the train autonomous protection system continuously exchanges location information with adjacent trains through TACS vehicle-to-vehicle communication to ensure test safety.

[0131] If the dynamic test fails, the vehicle control unit sends a dynamic test failure signal and fault code to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then reports the fault information to the TACS dispatch center through the sleep wake-up unit, and the train remains on the depot line awaiting manual intervention.

[0132] If the dynamic test is successful, the vehicle control unit sends a success signal to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system then puts the train into a "waiting to leave the depot" state: the train maintains a low-power standby state, and all subsystems maintain basic operational readiness, ready to receive the departure instruction from the TACS dispatch center and enter mainline operation at any time.

[0133] This invention divides the testing instructions into two phases: static testing and dynamic testing. Static testing verifies the basic functions of each subsystem while the train is stationary, while dynamic testing verifies the dynamic response performance of traction and braking while the train is moving at low speed. The two-phase testing forms a progressive verification: if the static test fails, dynamic testing does not proceed, avoiding the safety risks associated with conducting mobile testing when basic functions are malfunctioning; dynamic testing only proceeds after the static test passes, ensuring the train's safety performance at low speeds. This phased testing design further improves the security and efficiency of the wake-up process.

[0134] In other embodiments of this application, such as Figure 2 As shown, the wake-up process also includes: When the vehicle control unit performs the test, the train's autonomous protection system continuously monitors the status of the train's dual-end keys and the status of the maintenance buttons. When both ends of the key are detected to be active at the same time, or when the maintenance button is detected to be active, the train's autonomous protection system terminates the test and reports the corresponding safety status abnormality.

[0135] Specifically, throughout the entire testing process of the vehicle control unit, the train's autonomous protection system continuously monitors two key safety states: the status of the train's dual-key system and the status of the maintenance button.

[0136] Dual-ended key status monitoring: The train's autonomous protection system continuously monitors the activation key status of the driver's cab at both ends of the train (end A and end B) via hard-wired connections. The key status at each end includes two states: activated and deactivated. The train's autonomous protection system collects the status signals from both ends in real time.

[0137] Under normal conditions, only one end of the key is in the active position (e.g., the driver's cab key at end A is in the open position), while the other end is in the closed position. If the train's autonomous protection system detects that both ends of the key are active at the same time, it determines that there is a "double key conflict".

[0138] Maintenance button status monitoring: The train's autonomous protection system continuously monitors the status of the maintenance buttons. These buttons, typically located under the train or in the driver's cab, are used to switch the train to maintenance mode. In maintenance mode, some safety interlocks are bypassed to allow for static maintenance work without moving the train.

[0139] The train's autonomous protection system collects the status signals of the maintenance buttons in real time, including two states: activated (maintenance mode) and deactivated (normal mode).

[0140] Exception handling logic: During the vehicle control unit's testing (including static and dynamic tests), the train's autonomous protection system continuously monitors the two safety states mentioned above: If both keys are detected to be active simultaneously: the train autonomous protection system immediately sends an emergency stop command to the vehicle control unit through a hard-wire interruption test, terminates the currently executing test, and reports a "dual-key conflict" fault to the TACS dispatch center through the sleep wake-up unit.

[0141] If the maintenance button is detected to be active: If dynamic testing is currently underway, the train autonomous protection system will immediately terminate the test and report a fault message: "Train is in maintenance mode, dynamic testing is prohibited"; if static testing is currently underway, the train autonomous protection system may terminate the test or record the status and issue an alarm, depending on the system safety policy. The specific policy is determined by the TACS system configuration.

[0142] The train autonomous protection system will only allow the test to continue until completion when both ends of the key are in normal condition (only one end is activated) and the inspection button is not activated (normal mode).

[0143] In a specific illustrative embodiment, on a certain TACS line, after a train completes position verification, it enters the testing phase. The vehicle control unit is performing dynamic testing, with the train moving within the depot line at a speed of 5 km / h.

[0144] At this moment, another maintenance worker inside the depot accidentally inserted the activation key at the rear of the train (end B) (while the driver was already operating it at end A). The hard-wired detection circuit of the train's autonomous protection system immediately detected that both keys were activated simultaneously and sent an emergency stop command to the vehicle control unit within milliseconds, bringing the train to an emergency stop. Simultaneously, the train's autonomous protection system reported a "dual-key conflict" alarm to the TACS dispatch center via the sleep / wake-up unit. The dispatch center notified relevant personnel to handle the situation, preventing a potential loss of train control or collision caused by traction / braking command conflicts resulting from simultaneous operation at both ends.

[0145] In another specific illustrative embodiment, after a train completes position verification, it enters the testing phase. The vehicle control unit is performing static testing, and the maintenance personnel forget to reset the maintenance button after completing the work; the maintenance button remains active.

[0146] After the static test is passed, the train's autonomous protection system prepares to send a dynamic test command to the vehicle control unit. The system continuously monitors the status of the maintenance button and detects that it is active. The system determines that dynamic testing is prohibited in maintenance mode, does not send a dynamic test command, immediately terminates the test, and reports a "Train in maintenance mode, dynamic testing prohibited" fault to the dispatch center via the sleep / wake-up unit. The dispatch center notifies maintenance personnel to arrive, reset the maintenance button, and re-execute the test, which is successfully completed. This solution effectively avoids serious accidents that could result in injury or death to maintenance personnel during dynamic testing in maintenance mode.

[0147] This invention's technical solution establishes a complete safety interlock by adding a safety supervision mechanism during testing, forming a "test execution → safety supervision → abnormal termination" system. Continuous monitoring of the dual-key status prevents control conflicts caused by simultaneous operation of both ends during testing; continuous monitoring of the maintenance button status prevents personnel injuries caused by dynamic testing in maintenance mode. This constructs a critical safety barrier in the final stage of train wake-up testing, further improving train safety performance.

[0148] A third aspect of the present disclosure provides a train including the train sleep-wake system provided in the first aspect of the present disclosure.

[0149] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the modules, units, and method steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0150] Although embodiments of this application have been shown and described above, it is understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and should not be construed as limiting this application. Those skilled in the art can make changes, modifications, substitutions and variations to the above embodiments within the scope of this application.

Claims

1. A train sleep-wake system, characterized in that, include: The train's autonomous protection system is configured to receive wake-up commands and issue inspection request signals; receive hibernation commands and calculate the train's position and store it in its own memory to form first position data; The autonomous sensing unit, which is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system, is configured to collect current environmental data in real time based on the inspection request signal and send it to the train autonomous protection system. The sleep / wake-up unit is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system and the autonomous sensing unit, and is configured to send the wake-up command or the sleep command to the train autonomous protection system according to the control command of the control center system; receive and store the train position to form second position data; The vehicle control unit is communicatively connected to the train autonomous protection system and to each subsystem of the train. It is configured to perform comprehensive checks and tests on each subsystem of the train according to the instructions of the train autonomous protection system. In the train wake-up process, the train autonomous protection system receives the current environmental data and forms third location data based on the current environmental data. The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data match, the train position is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

2. A method for waking up a train from hibernation, characterized in that, Based on the train hibernation and wake-up system described in claim 1, the method includes a hibernation process and a wake-up process. The hibernation process includes: The train autonomous protection system receives a hibernation command, calculates the train's position, and stores it in its own memory to form first position data; at the same time, it sends the train's position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form second position data. The wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system sends an inspection request signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects current environmental information in real time based on the inspection request signal and sends it to the train autonomous protection system. The train autonomous protection system receives the current environmental data and forms third location data based on the current environmental data. The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data, and cross-compares the three. When at least two of the data are consistent, the train location is deemed valid and the wake-up process continues; otherwise, the wake-up process is terminated and fault information is reported.

3. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The current environmental information includes at least one of the following: the direction of the train's head, the trains coupled to the head, the trains coupled to the tail, and intrusion information within the train's safe range.

4. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2 or 3, characterized in that, The hibernation process also includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train autonomous protection system sends a hibernation preparation signal to the autonomous sensing unit. The autonomous sensing unit collects train terrain data based on the hibernation preparation signal to form and store first environmental information. The wake-up process also includes: After receiving the current environmental information, the train autonomous protection system compares the current environmental information with the first environmental information. If the current environment information is inconsistent with the first environment information, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the train environment change information. If the current environmental information is consistent with the first environmental information, the train autonomous protection system calculates the current train position based on the current environmental information to form the third position data; The train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data. When at least two of the data match, the train autonomous protection system determines that the train location data is valid and continues the wake-up process; otherwise, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

5. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The wake-up process includes: After receiving the wake-up command, the train autonomous protection system determines whether the train meets the wake-up conditions, which include the train being on the depot line, without manual blocking, and without an emergency stop command. If the wake-up conditions are met, the train autonomous protection system sends the verification request signal to the autonomous sensing unit; if the wake-up conditions are not met, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information.

6. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The hibernation process includes: After receiving the hibernation command, the train autonomous protection system controls the vehicle control unit to perform a comprehensive inspection of all train subsystems. If the comprehensive test fails, the vehicle control unit sends a sleep timeout signal to the train autonomous protection system, and the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information after receiving the sleep timeout signal. If the comprehensive test passes, the vehicle control unit sends a hibernation ready signal to the train autonomous protection system. After receiving the hibernation ready signal, the train autonomous protection system calculates the train position and stores it in its own memory to form first position data, and sends the train position to the hibernation wake-up unit for backup to form second position data.

7. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The hibernation process includes: After the first location data is generated, the train autonomous protection system calculates the CRC code of the first location data to obtain the first CRC code and stores it in its own memory; The wake-up process includes: The train autonomous protection system reads the first location data and calculates the CRC code of the first location data to obtain the second CRC code. The train autonomous protection system compares the second CRC code with the first CRC code; If the second CRC code is inconsistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system terminates the wake-up process and reports the fault information; if the second CRC code is consistent with the first CRC code, the train autonomous protection system cross-compares the first location data, the second location data, and the third location data.

8. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The wake-up process also includes: After the train autonomous protection system determines that the train's position is valid, the train autonomous protection system sends a test command to the vehicle control unit; The vehicle control unit executes the test according to the test command; If the test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure mode.

9. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The test instructions include static test instructions and dynamic test instructions. After the train autonomous protection system sends the static test command to the vehicle control unit, the vehicle control unit controls the train to perform the static test. If the static test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the static test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system sends the dynamic test command to the vehicle control unit, and the vehicle control unit executes the dynamic test. If the dynamic test fails, the train autonomous protection system reports the fault information; if the dynamic test succeeds, the train autonomous protection system controls the train to execute the waiting-to-departure condition.

10. The train hibernation wake-up method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The wake-up process also includes: When the vehicle control unit performs the test, the train autonomous protection system continuously monitors the status of the train's dual-end keys and the status of the maintenance button. When both ends of the key are detected to be active at the same time, or when the maintenance button is detected to be active, the train autonomous protection system terminates the test and reports the corresponding safety status abnormality.