Unmanned aerial vehicle system for inspecting railway assets

Abstract

To provide an unmanned aircraft system for inspecting railroad assets.SOLUTION: An aerial system control network and an unmanned aircraft (UAV) system and method (2600) are provided for inspecting railroad assets using a UAV. The aerial system control network comprises multiple towers and a ground control system connected to multiple communication towers. The ground control system includes: transmitting a flight plan including railroad lines and a flight path through the multiple communication towers; receiving data through the multiple communication towers while the UAV is monitoring railroad lines; detecting obstacles along the flight path based on the received data; and adjusting the flight plan based on the obstacles.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 26

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] This disclosure generally relates to railway asset management, and more specifically, to unmanned aerial vehicle systems for inspecting railway assets. [Background technology]

[0002] The safety and efficiency of railway operations depend heavily on the continuous analysis of trains, railway land, tracks, and other assets / equipment. A variety of factors exist that can affect track conditions and impact train movement, including criminal activity and extreme weather events that can cause track flooding and roadbed erosion or overheating (tracks can bend or deform due to high heat). Earthquakes, landslides, and abandoned vehicles and other objects at level crossings can also disrupt the tracks.

[0003] Vigilance is always the best defense against these hazards. As a result, in accordance with Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations and company policies, track / railway site and bridge maintenance personnel regularly inspect the tracks and underlying infrastructure (bridges, tunnels, support structures, signals, etc.). Currently, this work is primarily carried out by employees by car, on foot, using specialized rail equipment, or rail-mounted high-rail (railroad) vehicles. This work is often labor-intensive and can be physically demanding. Railroad companies can do everything possible to make human inspections as safe and accurate as possible. However, there are unavoidable risk factors that always accompany the need for employees to go outside to inspect the tracks and rail structures. Employees may need to straddle or walk on track structures. Track structures can be slippery, uneven, and / or exposed to all weather conditions. Some structures, such as bridges, are elevated above ground level. Trains passing through inspection zones can increase the risk, especially in areas with heavy traffic. [Overview of the project] [Means for solving the problem]

[0004] Embodiments of this disclosure provide an airborne system control network, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system, and a method for inspecting railway assets using an unmanned aerial vehicle.

[0005] In an exemplary embodiment, an aerial system control network provides for inspecting rail assets using unmanned aerial vehicles. The aerial system control network includes a plurality of towers and a ground control system connected to the plurality of towers. The ground control system transmits a flight plan, including rail routes and flight paths, via the plurality of communication towers, and receives data via the plurality of communication towers while the UAV monitors the rail routes, detects faults along the flight path based on the received data, and adjusts the flight plan based on the faults.

[0006] In another exemplary embodiment, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system provides for inspecting rail assets using an unmanned aerial vehicle. The UAV system includes a UAV and an airborne system control network. The airborne system control network includes a plurality of towers and a ground control system connected to the plurality of towers. The ground control system transmits a flight plan, including rail routes and flight paths, via the plurality of communication towers, receives data via the plurality of communication towers while the UAV is monitoring rail routes, detects obstacles along the flight path based on the received data, and adjusts the flight plan based on the obstacles.

[0007] In another exemplary embodiment, the method provides for inspecting rail assets using an unmanned aerial vehicle. The method includes transmitting a flight plan, including rail routes and flight paths, via a plurality of communication towers; receiving data via the plurality of communication towers while the UAV monitors the rail routes; detecting obstacles along the flight path based on the received data; and adjusting the flight plan based on the obstacles.

[0008] Other technical features may be readily apparent to those skilled in the art from the following figures, description, and claims.

[0009] For a more complete understanding of this disclosure and its merits, refer here to the following description in conjunction with the attached drawings. In the attached drawings, similar reference numerals represent similar parts. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0010] [Figure 1] This disclosure illustrates exemplary transmission line networks according to various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 2] This disclosure illustrates exemplary unmanned aerial system (UAS) operation flight control centers according to various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 3A] This disclosure illustrates exemplary UASs in various embodiments. [Figure 3B] This disclosure illustrates exemplary UASs in various embodiments. [Figure 4] Exemplary command center (CC) user interfaces (UIs) according to various embodiments of this disclosure are shown. [Figure 5] This disclosure illustrates exemplary ground control system (GCS) installations according to various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 6A] Exemplary telecommunications towers according to various embodiments of this disclosure are shown. [Figure 6B] Exemplary telecommunications towers according to various embodiments of this disclosure are shown. [Figure 7] This disclosure illustrates exemplary radio frequency (RF) reception range analysis according to various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 8] The following are schematic diagrams illustrating exemplary systems in various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 9] This disclosure outlines exemplary air traffic recognition systems according to various embodiments. [Figure 10] This disclosure outlines exemplary air traffic recognition systems according to various embodiments. [Figure 11] This disclosure illustrates exemplary user interface displays of air traffic in various embodiments. [Figure 12] This disclosure illustrates exemplary non-mitigated abnormal approach risks in various embodiments. [Figure 13]Exemplary pedestrian risk zones according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 14] Exemplary safety corridor airspace (SCA) interfaces according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 15A] Exemplary defective rail conditions according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 15B] Exemplary defective rail conditions according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 15C] Exemplary defective rail conditions according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 16] Exemplary concepts of operations according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 17] Exemplary UAS ecosystems according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 18] Exemplary UAS system components according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 19A] Exemplary UASs according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 19B] Exemplary UASs according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 19C] Exemplary UASs according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 20] Exemplary optical sensors according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 21A] Exemplary UAS safety boundaries according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 21B] Exemplary UAS safety boundaries according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 22A] Exemplary orbit integrity sensor images according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 22B] Exemplary orbit integrity sensor images according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 23A] Exemplary UAS potential rail head malfunctions according to various embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. [Figure 23B]This disclosure illustrates exemplary UAS potential railhead failures in various embodiments. [Figure 23C] This disclosure illustrates exemplary UAS potential railhead failures in various embodiments. [Figure 23D] This disclosure illustrates exemplary UAS potential railhead failures in various embodiments. [Figure 24] Exemplary block diagrams of control networks according to various embodiments of this disclosure are shown. [Figure 25] This disclosure illustrates exemplary railway land / airborne system control networks in various embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 26] This disclosure illustrates exemplary processes for inspecting railway assets using unmanned aerial vehicles according to various embodiments of this disclosure. [Modes for carrying out the invention]

[0011] Figures 1-26 and the various embodiments used to illustrate the principles of the present disclosure discussed herein are merely illustrative and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present disclosure. Those skilled in the art will understand that the principles of the present disclosure can be implemented in any type of device or system appropriately configured.

[0012] A preferred embodiment of the principles of the present invention is based on a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial vehicle (airplane). In particular, the aircraft includes an autopilot system that interfaces with a system command and control infrastructure. The aircraft also processes navigation information generated from a geographic information system and supports various onboard sensors that provide location information. The aircraft and the entire rail-laying land system are also characterized by having equipment capable of transmitting and receiving information with an onboard navigation beacon (ADSB) and / or a Mode C transponder or equivalent.

[0013] The aircraft embodiment has sufficient onboard power generation capability to provide reliable power to all of the other various aircraft systems, such as sensors, communication and control subsystems. In addition, the aircraft preferably has sufficient liquid fuel capacity to support flight times exceeding 8 hours. The aircraft also has payload capacity necessary to support multiple sensors for collecting information and communication and control subsystems necessary to transmit that information to the flight operations center in real time. The aircraft also preferably includes an onboard information storage medium for local storage of the collected information. In addition, the system includes both onboard and external subsystems to facilitate emergency maneuvers and landings of the aircraft in the flight corridor.

[0014] Generally, onboard sensors capture high-resolution, precise location photographs with a resolution of at least 1 / 4 foot above the flight altitude at least twice per second. Preferably, the sensor system also has built-in local computing capabilities and independent communication capabilities for communicating with other onboard subsystems, including its own navigation system and autopilot. Sensors may include photographic sensors, video cameras, thermal imaging cameras, and / or multispectral sensors. Specifically, the sensor system includes a real-time day / night video camera for pilot situational awareness, with at least some limited real-time protection capability.

[0015] The system also includes software focused on rail detection and analysis of railway track conditions. This provides advantageous support for inspecting linear assets such as tracks, bridges, and similar structures. In particular, the system software (both on-board and remote) includes machine vision software trained to understand and recognize critical situations within areas with at least two linear boundaries. The system software can also demonstrate normal functional conditions on linear areas.

[0016] More specifically, the onboard software is activated on the aircraft in a straight line connecting the sensor and the ground-based communication system. The onboard software processes the data collected by the sensor. This data is then loaded into the ground-based communication system. In response, the ground-based communication system outputs quantitative and qualitative data about what the sensor has captured. The software system processes the large dataset and creates another set of geographically located data, then creates the third dataset. The system software generates several reports associated with the target data and creates a geographic location file that allows the user to easily map the location of selected states of the target. Preferably, the large dataset is left unprocessed. The receiver receives only the truly necessary usable data. The large dataset is stored for future data mining and use.

[0017] The system software also includes field information software. This field information software can be used separately from the system, or even across multiple aircraft. The field information software embodies algorithms that map functionality, determining the order in which the software should perform operations, thereby favorably eliminating human error. Specifically, the field information software receives media generated by the sensor system, transfers that data to a laptop or other processing system, and then starts local software. The local software automatically codes, labels, and transfers the data to drives and files, ensuring that the data is appropriately transmitted to anyone who needs it (e.g., different departments within an organization). The field information software can be used for any data collected related to a field location. Preferably, the field information software is based on a network-connected system including a server or a set of hardware devices. In some embodiments, the field information software is activated after the aircraft's flight has ended (i.e., performs post-flight data processing). The data can be distributed across network-connected resources. The network-connected resources perform further analysis and ensure that the data is properly coded and stored. This helps maintain control over the distribution process and minimizes data errors.

[0018] The railway track, corridors, and towers are critical components of the aerial railway inspection system. This system accesses the 900 MHz channel used for the Automatic Train Control System (ATCS), which is implemented via AAR. However, the actual spectrum used is not a strict requirement for the implementation of this principle, and other secure and licensed spectra may be used. The system's hardware and software are optimized to use low-bandwidth AAR channels for higher functionality. For systems using preferred AAR channels, the user typically requires a license. Redundant Ethernet (registered trademark) controls communication with aircraft, including appropriate channels. These functions can be implemented by railway telecommunications assets.

[0019] The aircraft is preferably a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, operating (including landings) throughout the railway asset network. Upon takeoff, the pilot issues an autopilot command to begin flight. The aircraft begins flight along a route programmed by the geographic information system to the actual railway construction site, then follows that site. In other words, once the pilot activates autopilot, the system software takes over control and flies the aircraft as close to the track as possible when it is over the track. The software system also ensures that sensors automatically take images of the track twice per second. Simultaneously, the sensor and software systems control the pitch, yaw, and roll of the aircraft and sensors. As a result, one or more suitable sensors can be positioned over the track while remaining in focus to ensure the required resolution and overlapping images. If the analysis software determines after the flight that there was insufficient overlap or that part of the track was missing due to railway construction site occupancy, the route is quickly re-flew and the sensors take additional images.

[0020] With autopilot activated and sensors taking photographs, the aircraft control system utilizes space-based GPS (and ground-based GPS error correction where available) to maintain the aircraft's position over the railway construction site, while also maintaining compliance with operational altitude and linear flight path. Both ensure compliance with regulatory requirements regarding sensor resolution and flight path height and width.

[0021] In this case as well, preferably, the aircraft and the sensors have independent navigation systems. Advantageously, when both the aircraft and the sensors have independent navigation systems, computing power is conserved for critical items assigned to each component. For example, the sensor system may include sensor stabilization software and hardware. Furthermore, the image acquisition function of the sensors can be disabled if they are not over privately owned land of a railway operator.

[0022] Preferably, the aircraft broadcasts its location, speed, altitude, and heading via the existing FAA Surveillance Network (SBS), and also broadcasts these signals to other aircraft equipped to receive them. In addition, railway infrastructure can support the FAA SBS system using auxiliary ADSB / transponder receivers, radar, and other elements positioned along the railway track. While the aircraft is in flight, its operational status, location, and overall health are transmitted to the pilot via command and control links. Throughout all flight phases, the aircraft has access to multiple command and control transceiver locations, and a level of command and control redundancy is ensured.

[0023] If an aircraft loses connection to its command and control systems, after a period of time as determined by the operator and / or FAA regulations, the aircraft will initiate its “link loss profile” and return to its takeoff point via a predetermined route, or, in the case of loss of communication and power, automatically descend and land along the railroad track. The pilot will be aware of the link loss condition and, based on the last transmission from the aircraft, will inform railroad track ground users and dispatchers of the aircraft’s planned landing. Secondary sensor communication and navigation systems may also assist in positioning the aircraft.

[0024] In the event of another critical system failure during flight, the aircraft will automatically initiate one of several predefined termination procedures or return to its takeoff point or another safe location as programmed. During flight, the pilot has the option to utilize secondary sensors for real-time imaging of the railroad track. These secondary sensors can also be used for some situational analysis, but are primarily used for pilot recognition. If a critical situation is identified during flight, the aircraft's sensors can utilize a secondary communication channel, rather than the primary connection, to send immediate notification to the pilot.

[0025] Upon completion of the assigned mission, the pilot engages in landing procedures. The aircraft utilizes all of the aforementioned systems to reach the landing site and engages in landing procedures for a vertical landing. Landing procedures include activating the air-to-ground laser, which provides precise landing information to the aircraft. In the final stages of the flight prior to landing, the pilot uses the aircraft command and control systems to ensure a safe landing. The aircraft is equipped with multiple support systems to ensure a safe landing. If anything on the ground or in the landing area is present that would prevent a safe landing, abort procedures are initiated and an alternative landing site is used. After a safe landing, the pilot removes the sensor data storage drive and inserts it into the server. The server system then initiates an automated process of analysis and data distribution, resulting in the delivery of customized reports and actionable datasets.

[0026] Figure 1 shows exemplary line network 100 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. Although Figure 1 shows a line network, the principles of the present disclosure are equally applicable to other types of networks. The embodiments of line network 100 shown in Figure 1 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of line networks can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0027] The freight transport network shown in Figure 1 comprises approximately 32,500 miles of railroad tracks, much of which is rural in the western United States. To protect this critical transport infrastructure and nearby communities, regular inspections are currently conducted using various on-track vehicles and equipment. To enhance these inspections while also improving the occupational safety of railroad personnel, aerial surveillance of the rail infrastructure can be carried out using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS). These operations may be beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) day and night under visual weather conditions.

[0028] The tracks (including the freight transport network), the surrounding area ("Property"), and the property on the Property are precisely monitored using GPS (Global Positioning System) and other technologies (such as LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging)). Enterprise-level geographic information systems (GIS) include this data. This information is used for planning and conducting flights directly over the Property.

[0029] The unmanned aerial vehicle (UA) is capable of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) and has a flight time of 10 hours at a cruising speed of approximately 40 knots with sprint speeds exceeding 60 knots. Navigation is based on GPS waypoint-based flight planning. Flight routes are at an altitude of less than 400 ft above the ground, directly above railroad tracks. The cruising altitude is typically 380 ft AGL. The autopilot can maintain this altitude within + / - 10 feet in calm wind conditions and can correct if the aircraft is pushed up or down by wind or environmental factors. The system's navigation performance ensures that the UA can remain within a lateral corridor approximately + / - 100 ft from the centerline of major railroad tracks. This lateral corridor corresponds to the limits of property ownership. Most avoidance maneuvers or laurel circling can be completed within + / - 1,500 ft from the centerline of major tracks if necessary to maintain safety. The sensors mounted on the UA are designed to have a narrow field of view so that the collected data and images are limited to the orbital area.

[0030] The rail network is organized into sections and subsections. Each subsection contains 50 to 300 miles of track length. The subsections are interconnected. Near each terminus of a rail subsection are marshalling facilities occupying large plots of land (acres). These marshalling facilities can house staff and equipment to support UAS operations. Operators can operate UAS over much of the network by launching from a marshalling yard, flying along a subsection, and landing at the next marshalling yard (where UAS can be inspected, maintained, refueled, and restarted). Operators can perform up to two flight missions per day across a maximum of 100 subsections.

[0031] To monitor and control the UAS, the operator can leverage its experience in the development and deployment of PTC (Positive Train Control). For command and control (C2) of the UAS fleet, the operator will use its existing telecommunications infrastructure, including privately owned secure tower facilities and a terrestrial backhaul network, to implement voice communications over VHF airborne radio and provide the flight crew with weather information from a series of weather stations located along the orbit.

[0032] The telecommunications network is designed to be robust and redundant. The network extends to its headquarters' Network Operations Center (NOC). From the NOC, trains located in any sub-section of the network can be launched. From this central location, switches and signals along the route are fully controlled, and crew coordination is performed over voice radio. Similarly, each UAS can be controlled from its regional flight control center or central location by one pilot (PIC) and one co-pilot from the regional flight control center's ground control station (GCS). During flight, control of the aircraft from multiple locations is possible. For example, a regional flight control center can initiate flight and then hand over the aircraft to another flight control center without landing. Command and control can be performed using CNPC (Command Non-Payload Control) or C2 (Command and Control) radio variations in dedicated spectrum. Voice communication is performed via remotely controlled aeronautical VHF transceivers mounted on towers along the railway track. Furthermore, UAS operations also utilize the existing network of weather stations located alongside the orbit in that region.

[0033] Furthermore, the telecommunications infrastructure is also used to support the air traffic situation awareness system. This system can display the positions of both coordinated and non-coordinated air traffic to the UAS pilot. The UA itself is a coordinated aircraft. The UA can be equipped with a Mode S transponder with ADS-B output.

[0034] The UAS Operation Flight Control Center (GCS) is built within the marshalling yard facilities, enabling inspection missions to be carried out more efficiently and cost-effectively. Flight crews plan safety inspection missions for areas as needed. From the dedicated UAS maintenance and data processing facilities at the Operation Flight Control Center, ground crews can prepare the UAs for the mission and oversee launch and recovery operations. By flying the UAs from its GCS, flight crews can utilize the range and endurance of the UAs to fly over one or more sub-sections according to the flight plan. Some data is streamed live during flight operations. The remaining data is returned to the Flight Control Center for post-processing. All relevant data is transferred to cloud data storage for timely distribution to appropriate end-users such as orbit inspectors, technicians, and maintenance planners.

[0035] Figure 2 shows exemplary unmanned aerial system (UAS) operation flight control center 200 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the UAS operation flight control center 200 shown in Figure 2 are merely illustrative. Other embodiments of the UAS operation flight control center can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0036] Figure 2 illustrates the concept of a flight control center. Within the railway marshalling yard, five sub-sections are connected. The other four key sections are located within 175 miles. Across this area, numerous locations where flash floods have occurred, track sections prone to thermal buckling, areas where signal feedback for monitoring hazardous assets is unavailable, and several hazardous bridges are present. These connected sub-sections can benefit from aerial safety inspections and the timely detection of problems provided by this technology.

[0037] A typical rail subdivision 205 begins at a railyard on the outskirts of a densely populated area, extends into rural areas, and terminates at another railyard near a densely populated area. Along the way, track 210 runs close to major and surrounding roads, passes near or is near small towns or villages, and passes near airports. However, because UAs can fly directly over the rail operator's property, UAS may not fly directly over third parties, except for very brief moments (a few seconds) when crossing roads. UAS may feature several safety protocols designed to keep UAs over or on the rail operator's private property in the event of an emergency.

[0038] Because marshalling yards or subdivision sections may be located on the surface within the airspace boundary, UASs are subject to restrictions when flying in Class G, Class E, Class D, Class C, and Class B airspace below 400 ft AGL. UASs are designed to operate without requiring takeoffs or landings from airports with control towers. The procedures described in paragraphs

[0102] to

[0128] are used for operations in controlled airspace, near airports, and known flight activity areas. In conjunction with the technology, many operational and procedural safety mitigations can be implemented. They are all intended to maintain situational awareness and coordination with manned air traffic. Note that UAs are equipped with transponders and flight crews may have two-way voice communication. The position of the UA relative to airports and detected air traffic is monitored in the GCS using moving map display with VFR section chart overlays. In this manner, BVLOS UAS operations are similar to manned aircraft operations, particularly in Class B, C, and D airspace. In accordance with U.S. Federal Regulation Title 14, 91.1, Section 13, the position of other coordinated air traffic is known by using an air traffic situation awareness system. For recognition of non-coordinated traffic, additional sensors such as primary radar are used non-coherently. For further redundancy, a visual observer may be positioned at a location of choice during flight.

[0039] Figures 3A and 3B show exemplary UAS 300 and 301 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of UAS 300 shown in Figure 3A and UAS 301 shown in Figure 3B are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the UAS can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0040] UAS uses hybrid quadrotor technology, which combines a quadrotor system with a fixed-wing aircraft for long-duration forward flight for vertical takeoff and landing. Hybrid quadrotor technology allows UAs to launch and recover from near the orbit or from small areas of a marshalling yard, while still having the ability to fly hundreds of miles to inspect entire subdivisions.

[0041] In the case of BVLOS operations, examples of UASs include both the HQ-40, HQ-60B, and HQ-60C hybrid quadrotor aircraft. The HQ-40 is a small UAS with a wingspan of 10 feet. Its maximum gross weight is 45 lbs. The HQ-60B and HQ-60C are larger UASs with a wingspan of 15 feet. Their maximum gross weight is 115 lbs. The HQ-60B has a longer range, longer flight time, and larger payload capacity than the HQ-40. These aircraft share not only the same flight computer and flight control software, but also many of the same subsystems. Both aircraft can be controlled from the same GCS. The following is an overview of both aircraft.

[0042] The HQ-40 consists of a single fuselage, a single wing, two booms, two vertical stabilizers, and a single horizontal stabilizer. The forward-flight engine is mounted at the rear of the fuselage. The quad-rotor system motors are mounted on the booms. The aircraft uses two struts as landing gear: one at the front of the boom and one at the bottom of the vertical stabilizer. The aircraft controls its attitude using ailerons near the wingtips on the trailing edge of the wing and elevators on the horizontal stabilizer. The aircraft is equipped with strobes and position lights. The aircraft also features a high-visibility paint scheme. Figure 3A below shows the HQ-40 airframe. Tables 1 and 2 list its physical dimensions and performance characteristics.

[0043] [Table 1]

[0044] [Table 2]

[0045] The HQ-60B consists of a single fuselage, a single wing, two booms, two vertical stabilizers, and a single horizontal stabilizer. The forward-flight engine is mounted at the rear of the fuselage. Quad-rotor system motors are mounted on the booms. The aircraft uses structures located at the lower center of the fuselage and below the vertical stabilizers as landing struts. The aircraft controls its attitude with ailerons near the wingtips on the trailing edge of the wing, elevators on the horizontal stabilizers, and rudders on each vertical stabilizer. Each control surface is redundant and independently controlled and operated. The aircraft is equipped with strobes and position lights. The aircraft also features a high-visibility paint scheme. Figure 3B below shows the HQ-60B airframe. Tables 3 and 4 list its physical dimensions and performance characteristics.

[0046] [Table 3]

[0047] [Table 4]

[0048] The HQ-series UAS (HQ-40 and HQ-60B) have been issued special airworthiness certificates in the experimental category and have accumulated more than 360 hours of VLOS / EVLOS operations and more than 880 hours of BVLOS operations (including 18 hours of nighttime BVLOS). As of August 2017, this totals 1,258 hours of flight time.

[0049] Figure 4 shows exemplary command center (CC) user interface (UI) 400 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the CC UI 400 shown in Figure 4 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the CC UI can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0050] The GCS system is equipped with devices to support multiple individual flight crews. Each flight crew can operate a single UAS in multiple sub-sections. Each GCS shown in Figure 5 may include a ground station laptop, a PC computer that runs UA-specific GCS software, ground station devices including a communication radio for telemetry links and management of wireless links and bridges between the aircraft and the operator interface, a ground station communication antenna, and a ground station GPS antenna.

[0051] In addition to these components, the GCS may also include devices for connectivity with telecommunications networks, equipment and interfaces for the use of rail and aeronautical voice radio, equipment and interfaces for communication with the flight control center, software for monitoring train locations, and equipment and displays for air traffic situation awareness systems. The ground control station may also include electronic tools and backup power systems capable of supporting normal operation during flight.

[0052] The HQ-60B utilizes a UAS autopilot (onboard the aircraft) and a Ground Control System (GCS). This unit has been observed for well over 250,000 hours in the DoD program and has proven highly successful. The autopilot software features easily definable mission parameters and limitations, waypoint insertion, context menus for common functions, route copying between aircraft, easy route planning, high-performance smooth zoom 2D and 3D terrain mapping, integration of a terrain database with a web mapping server for elevation and imagery, an intuitive primary flight display, and the ability to change airspeed, altitude, and heading commands in the display. Display data can be configured according to user requirements. The status bar provides a high-level warning interface.

[0053] The pilot can determine the aircraft's attitude using the Primary Flight Display (PFD) on the operator interface and determine the aircraft's position using the geographically referenced image in the center of the default display. The aircraft's position is overlaid on this image. The PFD and aircraft position are updated at a maximum rate of 25 Hz.

[0054] Any command that could disrupt the normal operation of the UA is prevented by a confirmation window. Inputs that could lead to undesirable consequences are blocked. Activating this requires multiple steps.

[0055] Figure 5 shows exemplary ground control system (GCS) equipment 500 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the GCS equipment 500 shown in Figure 5 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the GCS equipment 500 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0056] Each flight control center may include a UAS launch and recovery station (LRS). Ground crew prepares and maintains the UA and oversees launch and recovery operations. The HQ-60B system requires the following equipment for pre-flight preparation and post-flight activities: land power (30 V DC power), lithium polymer (LiPo) battery safe storage, LiPo charging station (used to charge avionics and VTOL batteries), large fuel supply and transfer equipment, aircraft scale, tools and spare parts kit (including spare tools and consumables necessary for maintenance), abort system (ground crew can abort launch for safety reasons), webcam / VoIP equipment for communication with the flight crew at the GCS, and local C2 (command and control) radio for launch and recovery.

[0057] Ground crew and flight crew can receive training on crew roles and responsibilities, as well as crew competence management. The specific duties of ground crew are highlighted in paragraphs

[0102] to

[0128] .

[0058] Figures 6A and 6B show exemplary telecommunications towers 600 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of telecommunications towers 600 shown in Figures 6A and 6B are merely illustrative. Other embodiments of telecommunications towers 600 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Figure 7 shows exemplary radio frequency (RF) reception range analysis 700 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of RF reception range analysis 700 shown in Figure 7 are merely illustrative. Other embodiments of RF reception range analysis 700 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0059] UA command and control can be carried out using a radio network. This UA command and control is independent of the series of GCSs that carry out handover procedures. Rather, there is one GCS connected to a network of ground-based radios positioned at equal intervals along the UA's flight path to maintain continuous communication.

[0060] To maintain the C2 link between the UA and the GCS, the UA must be within line of sight (LOS) of one or more antennas in this network. The antenna placement in the network is designed so that the receiving ranges overlap. This means that the UA is always within the LOS of two radios along the sub-section while in flight. The radio network connects to the GCS above the network, which is designed for latency of approximately 50 milliseconds.

[0061] Figures 6A and 6B show telecommunications towers. These towers are approximately 300 feet tall and are located at an elevation of approximately 1.6 nautical miles above the orbit. Towers of this type are positioned at intervals of approximately 15 to 30 nautical miles along the orbit. Figure 7 shows an RF reception range analysis for a C2 radio network using towers along a subdivision. The use of seven towers provides overlapping reception ranges at orbital elevations over the entire length of the subdivision. Existing towers can be used to install radio networks along other subdivisions. RF analysis and appropriate performance testing are performed before conducting routine BVLOS UAS operations on those networks.

[0062] The autopilot used by UA features a built-in C2 / telemetry link in the ISM (Industrial Scientific and Medical) band (2.4 GHz and 900 MHz). Integration with the CNPC / C2 radio adds a second C2 link to the aircraft. A requirement for performing normal VTOL takeoffs and recoveries is having a telemetry link with a higher bandwidth than that used for cruise flight. During takeoff, recovery, and local operations, the C2 link may be a 2.4 GHz radio. When the aircraft leaves the takeoff and recovery zone, the communication link is switched to the CNPC / C2 radio network by the flight crew.

[0063] Figure 8 shows an exemplary overall system schematic diagram 800 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The system schematic diagram 800 shown in Figure 8 is for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the system schematic diagram 800 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0064] Figure 8 shows the communication flow. Command, control, and telemetry data are transmitted locally in the 2.4GHz ISM band during takeoff and recovery. Once the aircraft has established its cruising configuration, the UAS can enter the CNPC / C2 network through the nearest CNPC / C2 tower. The pilot makes this change using a custom software application launched on the ground station computer. This software also provides feedback to the pilot regarding the health and status of the CNPC / C2 system. If the link health of the CNPC network is insufficient for any reason, the UA can be recovered on the local 2.4GHz ISM link at the flight control center. If there is a problem with the local C2 health for any reason, the flight can be postponed until the problem is resolved. The health of all radios in the CNPC network can be monitored by the pilot. If the link health of a radio is insufficient to continue the flight during cruising flight, the pilot can change the flight plan or perform an emergency vertical landing near the orbit.

[0065] Figure 9 shows an overview of an exemplary air traffic recognition system 900 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. Figure 10 shows an overview of an exemplary broadcast-type automatic location information transmission and monitoring (ADS-B) site 1000 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. Figure 11 shows an exemplary air traffic user interface display 1100 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the air traffic recognition system 900 shown in Figure 9, the embodiments of the ADS-B site 1000 shown in Figure 10, and the embodiments of the user interface display 1100 shown in Figure 11 are merely illustrative. Other embodiments of the air traffic recognition system 900, the ADS-B site 1000, and the user interface display 1100 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0066] In accordance with U.S. Federal Regulation Title 14, 91.1, 13, the ability to “visually avoid” other air traffic is important. Air traffic situation awareness systems can monitor coordinated and non-coordinated air traffic. Components of this system may include local sensors and dispatch and distance system software tools.

[0067] As shown in Figure 9, the dispatch system can be linked to the FAA Air Traffic Management System (Surveillance Broadcasting System) and also to a network of local sensors. The local network of ADS-B Xtend receivers can be installed along each subdivision to extend the ADS-B reception range below 500 feet AGL. An example of this is presented in Figure 10. RF analysis indicated that six additional receivers were installed on towers along the subdivision to provide ADS-B reception range down to the ground (50 ft AGL). Note that local sensor data is not incorporated into the SBS data feed.

[0068] Distance system software is an air traffic display designed to provide UAS pilots with situational awareness. This software assists pilots in avoiding approaches to manned air traffic (manned air traffic targets are unlikely to be able to see the UA). Using the dispatch system, data from FAA radar, as well as data from ADS-B, ADS-R, TIS-B, and FIS-B, are fused with detections from local sensors on the distance system to present the air traffic target paths to the UA PIC. As shown in Figure 11, various symbols and alert features present representations of both the UA and any air traffic target.

[0069] An example of a local sensor for detecting non-cooperative traffic is a radar being tested as part of this air traffic recognition system. This radar detects personnel, land vehicles, vessels, bird targets, and low-flying aircraft. Configured to detect and generate the flight paths of GA aircraft-sized targets, the radar tracked a GA aircraft at a distance of 5.4 NM (10 km) with a median distance error of 20 feet (approximately 6 meters). The tracking time was approximately 70–110 seconds. Note that, due to the lack of elevation data, radar tracking from this sensor is limited to a two-dimensional display. Without additional adjustments, pilots must assume that targets are at the same altitude and act appropriately to avoid them.

[0070] For the test configuration and environment, the air traffic recognition system enabled the UA PIC to recognize GA air traffic (coordinated and uncoordinated) at a distance of at least 3 NM. On average, there was at least 60 seconds between the initial recognition and the point of closest approach (between the “intruder” GA aircraft and the UA). One study to model human visual perception of air traffic presented the probability of visual recognition of a Piper Archer (typical size of a GA aircraft) by two pilots actively scanning air traffic. The probability of visual detection was shown to be only 10% at a distance of 3 NM (the probability was shown as 100% at less than 0.5 NM). Results from another test showed that recognition of an intruder by the UA PIC using the distance system occurred approximately 17 seconds before recognition by a ground-based visual observer. The test results indicate that the use of the air traffic situation recognition system provides the ability to detect air traffic at a level equivalent to or better than ground-based or onboard visual observers.

[0071] The deployment of local sensors for non-coordinated air traffic may be based on: (1) Ground-based ADS-B reception range along the entire length of the subdivision for detecting coordinated air traffic; (2) Locations known to have a high density of non-coordinated air traffic. This knowledge may be obtained as a result of outreach efforts. This may result in the deployment of sensors (radar) seasonally rather than yearly, depending on the nature of the activity; and (3) Risk assessment specific to the flight corridors above orbit. Deployment may initially be based on actual air traffic data or on modeling validated by such data. Sensors or other mitigation (visual observers) may be placed where the risk of mid-air collision exceeds the risk in locations where the risk is considered to be within the acceptable range of the non-mitigation risk of mid-air collision (relative non-mitigation risk).

[0072] As additional air traffic avoidance technologies become permitted for operational use, those technologies can be utilized. Examples of such technologies include alternative radar and onboard collision avoidance.

[0073] Two-way voice communication over aviation frequencies is a crucial safety mitigation. Two-way voice communication allows pilots who cannot visually see each other's aircraft to communicate their intentions and adjust their actions in a safe manner. Telecommunications infrastructure can be used with IP radio gateway / bridge systems to host local CTAF, tower, and approach frequencies for each sub-section. Such systems provide push-to-talk capability from towers equipped with VFTF transceivers. This capability is analogous to having a network of aeronautical ground station radios, such as those used at airports, for UNICOM / CTAF. In some embodiments, since the voice radio is not carried on board the UA aircraft, the ground station facilitates air-to-air communication.

[0074] This use of aviation VHF transceivers requires FAA / FCC approval. This use is an atypical deployment of such radios. On the one hand, its use has proven to be a crucial element in enabling UAS to operate in BVLOS on NAS in the same manner as manned aviation, and in securely integrating UA into NAS.

[0075] The following are the ATM (Aeronautical Information Manual) guidelines and procedures for VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights. The following is an overview of the procedures for a typical flight.

[0076] Flight planning can be carried out in the same manner as for manned aviation. The pilot (PIC) is familiar with all information applicable to the flight. The flight crew can use existing flight tools and information sources along with software designed for UAS flight planning over rail infrastructure. This software assists in developing flight plans using information gathered from GIS databases, field surveys, publicly available data, and approved navigation databases. Flight plans may take into account mission objectives (sub-sections, types of safety inspections, sensors), local terrain, takeoff and recovery sites, local weather along the flight route, population along the flight route, vertical obstacles, takeoff and recovery ascent and descent paths, local airspace and air traffic considerations, and gatherings of people or special events near the trajectory. The intended flight duration determines the flight fuel requirements. Takeoff times and total time in the air can be determined so that notifications can be distributed to other NAS users (DoD, Ag, GA) as needed, and NOTAMs (Notices to Aviation Personnel) can be stored as needed.

[0077] The output of the planning process includes sets of GPS coordinates defining launch and recovery locations, sets of GPS coordinates defining landing patterns to landing locations, sets of GPS waypoints defining flight routes for normal operation, sets of GPS waypoints defining flight routes for operation under C2 link disruption, sets of GPS coordinates defining airspace boundaries (geofences) designed to not deviate from railway operator property, descriptions of appropriate emergency landing areas (or areas to be avoided) within and immediately beyond geofences, aeronautical charts for use on the GCS moving map display, topographic and demographic map overlays, information and procedures for transitioning through any airspace or near any airport along the flight route, a schedule for issuing notices and NOTAMs, and payload / sensor placement and fuel loading plans for the ground crew.

[0078] If UAS PIC is convinced that it cannot safely conduct a flight at any point in the flight planning process, it may postpone the flight operation until it is possible to incorporate changes or implement appropriate mitigations. Examples of situations where it cannot safely conduct a flight include special events involving large crowds that could come very close to the orbit, seasonal and highly localized pesticide spraying operations that come very close to the orbit, or the installation of new vertical obstacles in areas where Reuters flights may be required.

[0079] Both the flight crew and ground crew are responsible for pre-flight actions. At the GCS, the flight crew can configure all software and displays according to the pre-flight checklist. The UA configuration file can be verified. Flight plan waypoints can be loaded into the autopilot interface. Maps and map overlays can be loaded into the autopilot interface and the air traffic situation awareness system. Commonly used radio frequencies can be pre-configured. Sensor interfaces can also be configured. Communication with the ground crew can be established at the launch and recovery station (LRS). At the LRS, the ground crew can perform pre-flight inspections of the UA, install and configure sensors according to the flight plan, and refuel the UA. After the software and displays are configured, the ground crew works with the flight crew to power up the UA systems.

[0080] The flight crew and ground crew complete the final GCS and UA pre-flight checks, respectively, including moving the flight plan and boundaries to autopilot, calculating and verifying the center of gravity, checking the C2 and payload links, checking battery voltage, verifying fuel quantity, checking control surface calibration, checking the IMU, checking the VTOL system, and checking the pusher engine start-up and RPM increase operation. Completing these tasks allows the flight crew and ground crew to coordinate to complete pre-takeoff checks at the flight control center, including visual confirmation of obstacles in the takeoff area. Ground crew members are responsible for takeoff abort control. At the GCS, the flight crew can conduct necessary pre-takeoff radio communications with ATC or communicate via CTAF. The final decision to proceed or abort can be made by the PIC.

[0081] Vertical takeoff and transition to forward flight are performed via autopilot mode. This involves a series of maneuvers that occur without manual control by the PIC. With the decision to proceed, the GCS can issue a takeoff command. During takeoff and transition, the ground crew may abort the takeoff for safety reasons.

[0082] The vertical ascent profile allows the UA to reach an altitude of approximately 60 feet AGL. From there, the UA transitions to forward flight under the thrust of its forward propulsion motors. Once the UA is in forward flight, the GCs' PIC verifies the health of the CNPC link and allows the UA to enter the CNPC network. The PIC can then initiate the flight plan. The UA proceeds along the pre-programmed route.

[0083] During the cruising phase, the aircraft can collect necessary data according to the flight plan to a specific target area along its trajectory. During flight, the flight crew can communicate with ATC and other NAS users and monitor displays indicating the positions of other air traffic. They can also continuously monitor weather, UA flight status, and system health (engine RPM, fuel level, battery life, GPS signal, C2 link, etc.). The UA's telemetry position on the moving map can be used to ensure the aircraft is correctly executing its flight plan. The PIC can take the lead at any time in modifying the flight plan or the UA's course, speed, and altitude.

[0084] Crucial to the safe operation of UAs in controlled airspace are procedures designed to enable BVLOS inspection missions to ensure safe and minimally impactful manned aircraft operations. For operations in Class B, C, and D airspace, UAs may not be detectable by FAA radar, given their low cruising altitudes, although they are coordinated. For routes affected by this issue, report and Reuters points can be established 1.5–3 nautical miles on either side of the intersection of the trajectory with the airspace boundary and the intersection of the trajectory with the runway approach path. These points can be designated and named in the Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the control facility (e.g., Point Q (latitude / longitude)). Alternatively, these points can be referenced by distance and in relation to landmarks (e.g., "1.5 NM from the intersection of the trajectory and runway 36"). The UA PIC can call ATC over aeronautical voice radio at each report point in the flight path. In Class D, an ATC transmission acknowledgment is equivalent to receiving authorization to proceed to the next report point unless instructed to wait. In Class B and C, a transmission acknowledgment and permission to proceed must be obtained. If a hold is requested at a report and Reuters point, the UAS may fly a circular path designed to avoid people and structures on the ground. If there is no traffic and ATC provides an order to proceed to the next point, the UA may continue its course.

[0085] The same applies to operations in Class E and Class G near the airport. The UA PIC can monitor the CTAF and provide position reports. Based on voice radio position reports and air traffic movement on the air traffic situation recognition display, the PIC can use reports and Reuters points to coordinate with manned air traffic. If necessary, the PIC can Reuters fly a sufficient distance from the runway centerline and wait for the manned aircraft to complete its instrument approach or landing pattern.

[0086] It should be noted that unplanned lauttes or turns may cause a lateral deviation of -1,500 ft from the + / - 100 ft corridor over railroad operator property. Performing such maneuvers safely requires knowledge of vertical obstacles and local terrain in the area. This information can be displayed to the pilot on the GCS Moving Map to aid situational awareness. Since UA's cruising altitude is -350 ft, the flight path lies above most vertical obstacles (less than 200 ft in height) not shown on the map. If a lateral maneuver would pose a risk of collision with an obstacle, the pilot must descend or land off-track or on-track.

[0087] As the mission nears its end, the LRS ground crew can be alerted to prepare the recovery site. Because the UA is close to the flight control center, the PIC can switch the C2 link from the CNPC C2 network to the local C2 network. The ground crew can clear any obstructions in the landing area and secure the area. The PIC can then work with the ground crew to initiate the predefined landing pattern and approach. Once the aircraft has reached an altitude of approximately 60 feet within a designated distance from the touchdown point, it can transition to vertical flight and begin its vertical descent to the landing point. After reaching the landing point and touching down, the aircraft can decelerate its motors and complete the recovery phase.

[0088] After landing, the ground crew can perform a post-flight inspection of the UA according to procedures using a checklist. The ground crew can complete records of UA flight time, VTOL and pusher motor operating time, aircraft operational time, etc. Maintenance records comply with U.S. Federal Regulation Title 14, 91.4, 17. The UAS can be placed in a hangar and secured. Data can be transferred from onboard storage. In the GCS, the flight crew can record PIC / SIC flight time.

[0089] Engine Start: The autopilot features engine stop / start switches for both the pusher motor and the VTOL motor. Both the pusher motor and the VTOL motor are set to stop in the GCS before the pre-flight check. The switches located on the side of the fuselage are set to "off". The VTOL motor start plugs are removed by the ground crew. Pusher engine start occurs at the end of the pre-flight check. First, the pusher engine is made available. Next, the switch is set to "on". Then, a member of the ground crew starts the pusher engine using an electric starter. Once the pusher engine has passed the pre-flight check, the plug for the VTOL engine is inserted. Then, the VTOL engine is made available in the GCS. At that point, the ground crew may leave the area near the aircraft.

[0090] Abort: The takeoff phase of a flight can be aborted for any reason. This abort can be performed by the PIC from the GCS or from the LRS abort control. The abort control is a special device that can connect to the GCS via a telecommunications network.

[0091] Link disruption plans and geofence updates: Link disruption flight plans and airspace boundaries (geofences) may be updated as needed during long-duration flights to ensure that the latest information is taken into consideration.

[0092] Weather: UA cannot operate in temperatures below the dew point or in strong winds, as per its restrictions. Local weather stations, aviation weather forecasts, and reports (including weather radar) can be continuously monitored by the flight crew. In the event of dangerous weather conditions, the mission may be aborted, and the UA may land in orbit or near orbit. The nearest ground crew may be dispatched to recover the UA.

[0093] Pilot (PIC): The PIC is responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. The PIC can verify that all checklist items related to the operation of the aircraft are followed under normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. Pre-flight checks of the GCS and all flight phases (from "engine start" to "shutdown") may be the pilot's responsibility. The decision to proceed or abort and any decisions regarding safe flight may be the PIC's ultimate authority. This ultimate authority of the PIC includes decisions and actions regarding the operation of the UA to avoid air traffic based on information displayed on the Air Traffic Situation Awareness System.

[0094] First Officer (SIC): The SIC may be responsible for assisting the PIC in providing traffic warnings and weather information. The SIC may also prepare position reports and handle air-to-air, ATC, or emergency communications. The SIC may communicate with ATC when appropriate. If necessary, the SIC may also communicate with entities to coordinate aircraft positioning and use.

[0095] Both PIC and SIC may hold an FAA Private Pilot License and a Class III Aviation Medical Certificate.

[0096] Ground Crew A (GCA): The GCA may be responsible for ensuring that physical pre-flight checks of the aircraft and logbook entries related to physical aircraft components are completed. The GCA may be required to ensure that necessary aircraft maintenance is completed before flight in accordance with the applicable latitudinal maintenance manual. The GCA may have final authority in determining whether the aircraft is in a flyable condition. During takeoff, the GCA may be responsible for “aborting” the aircraft’s takeoff if any abnormality or hazard is observed. During landing, the GCA may be responsible for ordering an “abort” if necessary. Upon recovery, the GCA may walk around the aircraft after the flight for a thorough inspection and document any damage, abnormality or other problems that occurred on the aircraft.

[0097] Ground Crew B (GCB): The GCB may be responsible for site access and safety and may assist the GCA as needed. The GCB may ensure that no personnel, objects, or equipment are present in the launch and recovery area for launch and entry. In the event of a malfunction or injury to the GCA, the GCB may be responsible for disabling the engine ignition switch while the GCA is starting the engine. After launch and recovery, it may be the GCB's responsibility to ensure that all equipment related to the operation has been recovered and removed from the site.

[0098] Ground crews can launch and recover UA aircraft at night. Therefore, ground crews can be trained to recognize and overcome optical illusions caused by darkness and to understand the physiological conditions that can impair night vision.

[0099] Ground crew members may hold FAA A&P mechanic certification.

[0100] UAS-specific training programs can be conducted under the direction of qualified instructors. Flight crews can be provided with ground classroom instruction on the operation of all systems necessary for BVLOS operations (UA autopilot interface, C2 network control and health monitoring interface, air traffic situation awareness software, and air traffic control software interface). Through ground classroom instruction, both flight crews and ground crews can be trained on UA ​​pre-flight checks, UA preventive maintenance, and takeoff and recovery operations. Through flight training, flight crews can become proficient in normal and emergency procedures.

[0101] Personnel cannot perform flight duties without completing a documented training program. Recurrent training may include a combination of ground training and flight training.

[0102] Voice Communication Disruption: Voice communication among crew members is crucial for safety. The PIC and SIC can occupy the GCS and communicate directly with each other. The PIC and SIC can have voice communication with ground crew members at remote launch / recovery sites via VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) and IP camera equipment. If voice communication cannot be established or maintained, the operation may be postponed until communication is established.

[0103] Voice communication is a critical operational safety mitigation for BVLOS operations. A UA may not enter or take off from Class B, C, or D airspace without two-way voice communication with ATC. Loss of voice communication with ATC in Class B, C, or D controlled airspace will result in immediate VTOL recovery of the UA on its current location. A UA may not enter or take off from Class E airspace without two-way voice communication over the local CTAF. A UA may not fly within 2 miles of an airport approach area without two-way voice communication over the CTAF.

[0104] Link Disruption: If a C2 link disruption occurs, a warning will appear on the GCS, accompanied by repeated audible warnings. This warning is triggered based on a timeout defined by the PIC, which is typically 30 seconds. The autopilot handles the link disruption event using a set of parameters defined by the PIC for a given flight mission, including a flight timer that defines the maximum amount of time the aircraft can fly. The flight timer is typically based on the amount of fuel loaded or mission requirements. A safe link disruption location (latitude, longitude, altitude) that the aircraft can reach via a set of waypoints is also defined, called the "link disruption flight plan." Upon reaching the link disruption location, the aircraft can fly a circular path with a defined radius. This location may be within the boundaries of the flight area and away from people or structures. In most situations, this location may be above or immediately next to a railway line. Attempts can also be made to restore communication with the aircraft. If this restoration is unsuccessful, several flight termination techniques may be used.

[0105] If a link loss occurs during takeoff, the aircraft may continue its takeoff plan and then follow the link loss procedure. During climb, cruise, and descent, the aircraft may follow the link loss procedure. During landing, the aircraft may continue to follow the pre-programmed landing plan. If the flight time (the length of the timer set by the PIC before operation) is exceeded, the aircraft may guide itself to a pre-programmed automated landing waypoint. The aircraft may perform a VTOL landing at the automated landing waypoint.

[0106] GPS Loss: In the event of a GPS failure, the aircraft will revert to the Inertial Navigation System (ENS). Attitude and heading will be maintained. Heading will be determined using a magnetometer. Because the aircraft position estimate is propagated, the aircraft position may be deviated by errors in heading measurement and wind direction / speed estimation. If the GPS loss is temporary, the autopilot can be returned to GPS guidance once the GPS signal is regained. If the GPS loss is persistent, the flight may be terminated.

[0107] Flyaway: An airspace boundary or geofence can be established. In any situation where the aircraft's onboard autopilot is still functioning, but the aircraft is flying off its planned course and is not responding to commands to return to course (most likely resulting from human error in flight planning, communication loss, or other human error in flight planning), a VTOL landing will be performed within 20 meters of the boundary due to termination of flight due to airspace boundary violation.

[0108] Aircraft System Failures: Major system failures of UA aircraft are likely to result in uncontrolled or uncontrolled crashes. VTOL motor failures typically result in uncontrolled landings. Forward flight motor failures may result in forced landings, as the HQ system has the capability to automatically transition to hovering flight and land in the event of a pusher engine failure. Failure of a single control device may result in a forced landing. Failure of multiple control devices is likely to result in an uncontrolled landing.

[0109] GCS Failure: In the event of a GCS failure, the aircraft may continue its programmed flight plan. However, the loss of control station functionality may ultimately lead to a loss of command and control links. The aircraft may perform its link disruption procedures until communication can be restored.

[0110] Flight Termination: Flight termination mode can be entered based on any of the following criteria: GPS failure (timeout), GPS and C2 link (timeout), airspace infringement (based on geofence boundary), or minimum / maximum altitude violation (restriction to prevent deviation above 400ft AGL).

[0111] In addition to the above criteria list, a deliberate termination of flight can be performed by PIC at any time. Once the aircraft enters termination mode, it can automatically perform an emergency VTOL recovery.

[0112] Any incident, accident, or flight operation that crosses the lateral or vertical boundary of a flight area or enters a restricted or restricted airspace as defined by an applicable COA must be reported to the UAS Integrated Office. Accidents and incidents must be reported to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in accordance with U.S. Federal Regulations Title 49 Section 830.5 and as instructed on the NTSB website.

[0113] Quarterly post-flight reports can document not only the operations carried out and planned future activities, but also lessons learned from the flight activities (including, but not limited to, any unusual phenomena encountered and their impact on airspace and other users, if any). This information can be provided to the FAA to support future rule-making.

[0114] In summary, the following conditions apply to BVLOS aerial inspection operations: (1) Daytime and nighttime VMC only. (2) Takeoff and recovery: Only from private property of the railway operator, not from an airport. (3) Flight route: Cruising below 400ft AGL (typically 350ft AGL). Directly over railway operator property (within the lateral boundary of + / - 100ft from the centerline of the main tracks). Class B, C, D, E and G airspace (except over airport grounds). Remote, rural, suburban and urban areas. Surrounded by a "geofence". (4) UAS: Hybrid fixed-wing configuration capable of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). 15-hour endurance. 750nm range. +475 hours (and ongoing) of operational history and holds an experimental category (SAC-EC) special airworthiness certificate. Uses +250,000 hours (and ongoing) of autopilot under the DoD system. Equipped with a Mode S transponder and ADS-B output (TSO unit can be used if available). Equipped with strobes and position lights, and a high-visibility paint scheme. Flight termination mode is emergency vertical landing. (5) 91.1 13: Air traffic situation awareness system integrating FAA SBS feed and local sensors. Moving map display of targets similar to other traffic display systems. (6) Two-way voice communication: Enables coordination between pilots and with ATC.

[0115] The following harms, namely a UAS having a near-miss (NMAC) with a manned aircraft and a UAS colliding with a person on the ground, may result from this operation.

[0116] The risk to third parties on the ground exists when the aircraft loses control and lands over private property. This risk is mitigated by procedures, improved visibility (as a result, people on the ground may be able to see the object approaching them) and several safety features of the UAS (including geofencing and flight termination modes, designed to perform emergency vertical landings on private property of railway operators (railway tracks) under various circumstances).

[0117] The risk of collision with a manned aircraft is inherent in the U.S. aviation system. A conservative approach can be taken in this assessment. Rather than focusing solely on the risk of a mid-air collision (MAC), the risk of a near miss (NMAC) can be addressed. This NMAC risk increases if a UA deviates from its planned flight path and cruising altitude, or encounters a manned aircraft in an unexpected manner (e.g., not detected by the Air Traffic Information System, no response to coordination requests via two-way voice communication, or inconsistent or unpredictable maneuvering that a difficult-to-handle UA cannot avoid). These situations can be mitigated by flying below 400 ft AGL where air traffic density is low. Other mitigations include the Air Traffic Information System, the storage of NOTAMs (notification and coordination with the DoD and other NAS users), and improved visibility (resulting in the possibility of manned aircraft pilots visually spotting the UA during flight).

[0118] The following describes the models used to assess the impact of safety mitigations and mitigation failures in these BVLOS operations and to prevent harm.

[0119] The primary assumption in this risk assessment is that each individual safety mitigation is 100% effective in preventing harm under normal operating conditions. If none of these mitigations fail, no harm will occur. This is a simplified assumption used to avoid more complex modeling of the relative effectiveness of the mitigations and their possible interactions.

[0120] CONOPS and Crew Effectiveness: BVLOS CONOPS and crew training have been developed by experienced aviation professionals. Their effectiveness is being continuously evaluated under the R&D flight test program. Based on this risk assessment, the effectiveness of panning behind these operations and the highly trained personnel capable of executing these plans is assumed to have a 5% chance of failing to prevent harm in all airspace classes.

[0121] Two-way voice communication: Voice communication is a critical operational safety mitigation for BVLOS operations. Voice communication allows aircraft pilots to coordinate their actions even when they are not visually connected to each other. However, human error is inevitable. As shown in Table 5, this mitigation is assumed to fail 25% of the time in all airspace classes. It is also assumed that this mitigation does not affect the risk of a UAS striking a person on the ground. Debris from a mid-air collision is not considered.

[0122] Air Traffic Situation Awareness System: The ability to “visually avoid” other air traffic is important in accordance with U.S. Federal Regulation Title 14, 91.1, 13. The Air Traffic Situation Awareness System is not a certified ground-based detection and avoidance (GBDSAA) system. The Air Traffic Situation Awareness System can monitor and display the position and path of coordinated and uncoordinated air traffic. This allows UA pilots to avoid nearby manned air traffic. This ability is important in uncontrolled airspace. The percentages in Table 5 are estimates based on the assumption that this system is likely to fail to prevent NMACs in environments where there may be more uncoordinated low-altitude air traffic. Failure rates range from 5% in Class B, C, and D airspace to 20% in Class E and Class G airspace. This mitigation is assumed to have no impact on the risk of collision with people on the ground.

[0123] UAS Mode S Transponder with ADS-B: This equipment makes the UA a coordinating aircraft, allowing the UAS to enter Class B and C airspace in accordance with existing regulations (along with two-way radio communication). The percentages in Table 5 are estimated under the assumption that this system is likely to fail to prevent NMACs in environments where there may be more uncoordinated low-altitude air traffic. Failure rates range from 1% in Class B and Class C airspace and 10% in Class D airspace to 20% in Class E and Class G airspace. This mitigation is assumed to have no impact on the risk of collision with people on the ground.

[0124] Airport Reuters Points: Procedures have been established to enhance safety in areas close to the airport. These procedures instruct UAs to hold / Reuters flights away from the extension of the runway centerline and the approach path to the runway when manned air traffic is in a landing pattern or instrument approach. These locations are planned and known to be free of vertical obstacles. The percentages in Table 5 are estimated under the assumption that this system is likely to fail to prevent NMACs in environments where there may be more uncooperative low-altitude air traffic. Failure rates range from 10% in Class B, C, and D airspace to 20% in Class E and Class G airspace. This mitigation is assumed to have no impact on the risk of collision with people on the ground. Debris from mid-air collisions is not considered.

[0125] Airspace Class-Specific Procedures: Procedures have been developed for operations in various airspace classes. These procedures include emergency procedures and link-breaking flight plans tailored to specific locations to take into account waiting before entering / exiting controlled airspace, laurel points, and avoiding ground occupants, vertical obstacles, and airport premises. The percentages in Table 5 range from 5% for Class B and Class C airspace to 10% for Class D, Class E, and Class G airspace. This mitigation is assumed to have no impact on the risk of collision with ground occupants. Debris from mid-air collisions is not considered.

[0126] Pre-flight Checklist: Proper execution of pre-flight checks ensures that the system is functioning correctly as designed. A fully functional system is most likely to be effective in preventing NMACs and injuries to people on the ground. As shown in Table 5, this mitigation is estimated to fail in 25% of cases across all airspace classes in preventing NMACs and collisions to people on the ground. Again, this is a conservative estimate, similar to assuming the pilot community consists of C-class students.

[0127] Strobes and High-Visibility Paintwork: UAS are smaller than manned aircraft. High-visibility paintwork, strobes, and position lights increase the likelihood (especially at night) that other pilots and ground personnel can see the UAS. This risk assessment assumes that if the visibility of the UAS is not improved, there will be a 10% chance of failing to prevent a North Mobility Accident (NMAC) and a 90% chance of failing to prevent a collision with ground personnel. This implies that ground personnel are more likely to visually perceive and act upon lighting and paint schemes than pilots of manned aircraft.

[0128] NOTAM: This NOTAM informs other NAS users about UA flight activities. This NOTAM is most likely to prevent NMACs if it is issued in a timely manner and correctly read and interpreted by other NAS users. In this risk assessment, it is assumed that failure to issue, read, understand, and comply with or correctly use the information in the NOTAM will result in human error and therefore a 25% chance of failing to prevent harm.

[0129] Table 5 below lists the safety mitigations presented above, along with estimates of the likelihood that failure of these mitigations will lead to failure in preventing harmful consequences.

[0130] [Table 5]

[0131] System failures that result in control loss causing the UAS to deviate from its planned course are likely to cause the harms listed above. These failures and events were developed using knowledge (UAS subsystems, how they fail, and what happens when they fail). Failure conditions, along with the resulting deviations from the planned course over the private property of the rail operator, are listed below.

[0132] For this risk assessment, the two main assumptions regarding system failure are that there is a 0.01% (1%) chance of a single system failure occurring and a 0.0001% (0.01%) chance of multiple failures occurring (failure rates are expressed per hour).

[0133] Flyaway: In any situation where the aircraft's onboard autopilot is still functioning, but the aircraft is flying off its planned course and is not responding to commands to return to course (most likely resulting from human error in flight planning, communication loss, or other human error in flight planning), a VTOL landing will be performed within 20 meters of the airspace boundary due to a boundary violation. The maximum deviation is 166 feet.

[0134] Ground Control System (GCS) Failure: In the event of a GCS failure, the aircraft can continue its programmed flight plan. However, the loss of control station functionality can ultimately lead to a loss of command and control links. The aircraft can then perform its link-breaking procedures and ultimately make a controlled landing on the railway operator's property. For example, the landing zone is 66 feet in diameter and is located within a + / - 100-foot corridor on the railway operator's private property.

[0135] GPS Loss: In the event of a GPS failure, the aircraft will revert to the Inertial Navigation System (INS). Attitude and heading will be maintained. Heading will be determined using a magnetometer. Since the aircraft position estimate is propagated, the aircraft position may deviate due to errors in heading measurement and wind direction and speed estimation. If the GPS loss is temporary, the autopilot can be returned to GPS guidance once the GPS signal is regained. If the GPS loss is persistent, the flight can be terminated. The deviation is 66 feet.

[0136] Link Disruption: Command and Control (C2) If a link disruption occurs, a warning will appear on the GCS, accompanied by repeated audible warnings. This warning is triggered based on a pilot-defined timeout, typically 30 seconds. The autopilot handles the link disruption event using a set of pilot-defined parameters for a given flight mission, including a flight timer that defines the maximum amount of time the aircraft can fly. The flight timer is typically based on the amount of fuel loaded or mission requirements. A safe link disruption location (latitude, longitude, altitude) that the aircraft can reach via a defined set of waypoints is also defined, called the "link disruption flight plan." Upon reaching the link disruption location, the aircraft can fly a circular path within a defined radius until the flight timer expires. If a link disruption occurs during takeoff, the aircraft can continue its takeoff plan and then follow the link disruption procedure. During climb, cruise, and descent, the aircraft can follow the link disruption procedure. During landing, the aircraft can continue to follow a pre-programmed landing plan. If the flight time (the length of the timer set by the PIC before the flight) is exceeded, the aircraft can guide itself to a pre-programmed automated landing waypoint. The aircraft can then perform a VTOL landing. The landing zone is 66 feet in diameter and is located within a + / - 100 ft corridor on the private property of the railroad operator.

[0137] Voice Communication Loss: Voice communication is a critical operational safety mitigation for BVLOS operations. UA aircraft may not enter or take off from Class D or C airspace without two-way voice communication with ATC. Loss of voice communication with ATC in Class D or C controlled airspace will result in immediate VTOL recovery of any UA aircraft on its own ground at its current location. UA aircraft may not enter or take off from Class E airspace without two-way voice communication over the local CTAF. UA aircraft may not fly within 2 miles of the airport approach area without two-way voice communication over the CTAF. The landing zone is 66 ft in diameter and is located within a + / - 100 ft corridor on private property owned by the railroad operator.

[0138] Power System Distribution Failure: Unlike larger transport aircraft with redundant power distribution systems, this aircraft has only one power distribution system. Battery backup eliminates several power loss scenarios. Connector and cable wiring issues that could lead to power distribution loss should be identified before flight through pre-flight and routine maintenance inspections. Complete power loss could lead to autopilot failure and potentially cause the pusher engine ignition to shut down. Without power from the forward-flight engines and the ability to receive control inputs, a statically stable aircraft may glide along a trajectory determined by the final control surface position before failure. In the worst-case scenario, with a glide ratio of approximately 8:1, the aircraft would continue straight for approximately 3200 linear feet before crashing into the ground.

[0139] Onboard Computer Failure: There is only one flight computer / autopilot. If this computer fails, the forward-flight engines will automatically shut down via a so-called dead man's circuit on the control panel. This is a safety feature of the autopilot connected to the forward-flight engine ignition system. If the dead man's circuit loses the hardware signal from the autopilot, the engines will shut down. Without power from the forward-flight engines and the ability to receive control inputs, a statically stable aircraft may glide along the trajectory determined by the final control surface position before the failure. In the worst-case scenario, with a glide ratio of approximately 8:1, the aircraft would continue straight for approximately 3200 linear feet before crashing into the ground.

[0140] The assumption for this failure scenario is that the onboard computer experiences a "hard" failure that renders the autopilot function unavailable. Note that engine shutdown will prevent a true flyway condition.

[0141] The worst-case scenario is that a combination of several functions within the flight computer fails, but the UA can still maintain controlled flight without responding to pilot commands. In this scenario, the UA can fly until it runs out of fuel. The UA has a range of at least 450 nautical miles (27,337,750 feet). According to the autopilot developers, this failure has never occurred in the operational history of this unit.

[0142] IMU Sensor Failure: The aircraft has only one IMU and no redundant sensors (gyroscope, accelerometer). A failure that provides incorrect data can lead to uncontrollable flight. An emergency VTOL landing may not be possible. System status is monitored during flight. If a sensor failure leads to inconsistent flight behavior, the pilot may initiate an abort and make an emergency landing on or near their home ground. However, the outcome may vary depending on the sensor failure. In this case, the deviation is assumed to be 600 ft.

[0143] Airborne Data System Failure: Loss of the airborne data system can result in inaccurate altitude and airspeed readings. The aircraft may ascend or descend (depending on the failure). However, the aircraft may still remain on its flight path. The aircraft may experience an aerodynamic stall due to an incorrectly high airspeed reading. In this case, the aircraft may stall and crash near its current location. An alternative example is an incorrectly low airspeed reading, causing the aircraft to dive to match the airspeed and crash into the ground. In either case, horizontal navigation is maintained. Prolonged loss of airborne data can lead to loss of control of the aircraft.

[0144] To ensure the availability of this system, there is a pre-flight check to verify the function of the airspeed sensor. During flight, the status of the airspeed data system is monitored. If an airspeed data system anomaly is quickly identified during flight, the aircraft may land on the railway operator's property. The landing zone is 66 feet in diameter and is located within a + / - 100 ft corridor on the railway operator's private property.

[0145] Air Traffic Situation Recognition System Failure: Loss of SBS data feed and / or loss of local sensor network or local sensor failure that impairs data fusion capabilities may result in an inaccurate representation of air traffic. As a result, mid-air collisions may occur. Flight crews can monitor the health of the system. This includes monitoring system indicators, the progress of coordinated and non-coordinated targets, and time synchronization with the system server. If an anomaly is quickly identified during flight, the aircraft may land on private property. The landing zone is 66 ft in diameter. It is located within a + / - 100 ft corridor on private property of the railroad operator.

[0146] Propulsion System Failure: In the event of a propulsion system failure while the autopilot is still functioning, the pilot can control the landing. By turning at a 20-degree bank angle, the UA can descend with a turning radius of 665 feet.

[0147] Table 6 below summarizes the most likely deviations from the flight path corridor that would occur in the event of a single failure (on the diagonal of the table) and in the event of two failures. This information can be used to expand the probabilities in Table 7 below. Table 7 can be used in Item 6 to determine the risk of the UAS hitting / colliding with people on the ground.

[0148] [Table 6]

[0149] Using the information presented above, the incidence rates of three different sizes of deviation incidents can be estimated. The first size is a deviation of 166 ft. The second size is a deviation of 3200 ft. The third size is a longer deviation (the UAS is considered to be wandering or out of control (flyaway scenario)). Any deviation of less than 100 ft from the course is considered part of normal UAS operations.

[0150] Table 7 shows the percentages of different deviations that occur based on this analysis. Note that the most likely deviation (overall) is at a maximum of 3200 ft (but above 166 ft). However, under a single failure, the UAS is most likely to experience no deviation at all.

[0151] [Table 7]

[0152] As stated above, it is assumed that there is a 0.01% chance of a single failure occurring per flight hour and a 0.0001% chance of multiple failures occurring (1% and 0.01%, respectively). Therefore, by combining these assumptions with the estimates in Table 7, we can estimate the probability of deviation from a given path for different deviation magnitudes. These are listed in Table 8.

[0153] [Table 8]

[0154] Based on this analysis and the design of this UAS, short deviations are far more likely to occur than large wandering deviations. The probability of a wandering deviation failure is smaller than the other two probabilities and can therefore be ignored for the time being. Thus, the probability of a deviation incident is P DI = 9.22 × 10 -4 +1.88 × 10 -3 = 2.80 × 10 -3That is the case.

[0155] The following sections discuss the assumptions and methods for calculating associated risks used in the analysis of near misses.

[0156] The main assumptions in this analysis are as follows: (1) Air traffic density correlates with airspace class; namely, Class B has the highest traffic volume, followed by Classes C, D, and E. Class G has the lowest traffic density. (2) Air traffic density is lower below 400 ft AGL. (3) Air traffic below 400 ft is uniformly disrupted within a given airspace class. (4) Deviation incidents are not considered in determining NMAC risk.

[0157] An abnormal close call (NMAC), as defined by AIM(7-6-3), is "an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that there is a potential for collision as a result of being less than 500 feet away from another aircraft, or that there is a risk of collision between two or more aircraft."

[0158] For this risk assessment, the NMAC volume is modeled as a sphere around the aircraft. NMAC occurs when spheres surrounding two aircraft intersect. The NMAC volume for a UA is a sphere with a radius of 500 ft. Since the UA has a wingspan of approximately 15 ft, this sphere encloses the UA itself and includes a 500 ft buffer. The NMAC volume for a manned aircraft is a sphere with a radius of 700 ft. Since the wingspan of a civilian aircraft is approximately 200 ft, this sphere encloses the largest manned aircraft and also includes a 500 ft buffer.

[0159] For this risk assessment, it is assumed that air traffic is uniformly disrupted within a given airspace class. This assumption allows for the calculation of collision probabilities using a basic geometric (spatial) model. Under this assumption, the airspace is modeled as a collection of grid cells. Within each cell, air traffic is approximated as having a constant density.

[0160] Furthermore, U.S. Federal Regulation Title 14, 91.1, 19, also assumes that, excluding the airspace directly surrounding an airport, air traffic density will be lower at altitudes below the circumferential path altitude (approximately 800 ft AGL) and even lower at altitudes below 400 ft AGL.

[0161] In reality, there are areas with higher aircraft density. Aircraft are more likely to follow specific routes (Victor air routes, IR and VR routes, and straight routes between airports). Typically, density is higher near airports (especially near densely populated areas and in areas where Class C and B airspace designations are authorized). However, this environmental variation can only be considered with location-specific data, which is not readily available and requires more complex modeling.

[0162] Table 9 provides estimated frequencies of air traffic in different airspace classes per cubic mile per hour. These values ​​can be used to calculate exposure to the risk of close approaches in different airspace classes.

[0163] [Table 9]

[0164] Figure 12 shows exemplary non-relaxed near-miss risk 1200 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of non-relaxed near-miss risk 1200 shown in Figure 12 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of non-relaxed near-miss risk can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0165] The air traffic frequency (per hour) within one cubic mile (per hour) is applied to a 1 nm × 1 nm × 800 ft cell. Due to the reduction in this area, the air traffic density value is a conservative estimate. An abnormal close encounter occurs when one aircraft enters the NMAC volume of another. A Monte Carlo simulation was performed to estimate this probability. One billion pairs of random points were selected within the airspace cell as shown in Figure 12. The percentage of these point pairs where the distance between them was less than 700 ft was calculated. The criterion for NMAC was met at a rate of 39%. This 3.9 × 10⁻⁶ -1 The value of can be called the geometric risk for NMAC. This represents the unmitigated risk of an abnormal approach for all airspace classes.

[0166] It should be noted that this is a very conservative estimate. NMAC events are assumed to occur in all cases below 1,200ft (below 500ft are dual NMAC events). However, in reality, because the aircraft's position follows its trajectory, any value below 1,200ft already triggers an NMAC event for a manned aircraft. This is an artifact of the Monte Carlo simulation.

[0167] In this case as well, the primary assumption of this risk assessment is that the safety mitigations employed for these operations are fully effective. If none of them fail, NMAC will not occur. The worst-case scenario is when all possible mitigation system failures occur under the assumptions in Table 5. Table 10 below presents the probability of NMAC for different airspace classifications using the above values ​​and exposure assumptions.

[0168] [Table 10]

[0169] Figure 13 shows exemplary pedestrian risk zones 1300 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of pedestrian risk zones 1300 shown in Figure 13 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of pedestrian risk zones can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0170] The following sections describe the assumptions and methods used to calculate associated risks in the analysis of impacts on people on the ground.

[0171] The main assumptions in this analysis are as follows: (1) All people on the ground are unprotected. (2) The population on the ground correlates with the airspace class; namely, Class B is located in metropolitan areas, Class C in urban areas, Class D in suburban areas, and Classes E and G in rural areas. (3) The population on the ground is uniformly disturbed within a given airspace class. (4) Any individual on the railway tracks is an active participant in the operation; intruders are not considered special cases; namely, intruders are engaged in illegal activities and accept the associated risks. (5) People crossing roads are assumed to be unprotected and are considered in a uniform distribution of population density. This is a conservative estimate. (6) Course deviation incidents are considered in determining the risk to people on the ground.

[0172] For this risk assessment, it is assumed that the population is uniformly disturbed within a given airspace class. This assumption allows for the calculation of collision probability using a basic geometric (spatial) model. Considering the flight path of the UAS operation, the ground risk zone is modeled on both sides of the path as shown in Figure 13. The length of each zone segment is 1 mile, and its width is determined by the UAS's gliding capability. In one embodiment, the UA can glide from a starting altitude of 400 ft AGL to 3,200 ft. The geometric risk for one pedestrian per mile is the ratio of the area of ​​one typical human to the area of ​​the segment in question. For the calculation, the area of ​​a human (viewed from above) is assumed to be 2.25 square feet. The resulting geometric risk value is 6.66 × 10⁻¹⁶ per segment. -8 That is the case.

[0173] Considering flight routes, population density along the route can be estimated in areas directly adjacent to the path. For this risk assessment, population densities associated with different airspace classes are estimated based on exemplary census data for representative areas. Table 11 lists these population estimates.

[0174] [Table 11]

[0175] Considering a worst-case scenario in which all mitigation systems fail, Table 12 gives the probabilities of human impact for different airspace classes, calculated using the assumed population per segment against the assumed population value. These values ​​represent the population density of the segment applied to the geometric risk and reflect the magnitude of the non-mitigation risk of human impact. A more accurate analysis would involve using a portion of census block data (or data from another source such as land scans) collected along a specific flight path.

[0176] [Table 12]

[0177] The main assumption of this risk assessment is that the safety mitigations adopted for these operations are fully effective. If none of them fail, an NMAC will not occur. The worst-case scenario is when all of the mitigation system failures that could occur under the assumptions of Table 5 occur. Table 13 below presents the probability of collision with people on the ground for different airspace classifications using the above values and assumptions.

[0178]

Table 13

[0179] The probability of collision with people on the ground is also assumed to depend on the incidents that occur. A UAS cannot collide with a third-party person unless it deviates from its course. Therefore, a method for evaluating the reliability of UASs beyond the mitigation systems discussed must be developed. In general, this is a difficult task because very limited data or no data exist for accurately assessing the reliability of UAS components. Therefore, estimations must be made.

[0180] Therefore, here, P SH =PSH\DIP DI can be calculated (P DI is defined in the above paragraphs

[0177] ,

[0178] ). Table 14 is presented to include the probability of deviation incidents.

[0181]

Table 14

[0182] Some estimations are that the inherent risk of an NMAC for general aviation VFR flights in the NAS is approximately 1.33×10 per hour -7This suggests that, using conservative assumptions, this risk assessment indicates that the proposed BVLOS operation would be at existing risk levels and would not substantially increase the risk in NAS.

[0183] The estimated risk of death from being hit by a falling object is approximately 1.44 × 10⁻⁶ per hour. -9 (3 x 10 per year) -6 ) 2 This risk assessment, using conservative estimates, shows that the proposed BVLOS operation does not substantially increase the risk to people on the ground. Table 15 provides a summary of the operational risk analysis.

[0184] [Table 15]

[0185] Figure 14 shows exemplary Safety Corridor Airspace (SCA) interface 1400 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the SCA interface 1400 shown in Figure 14 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the SCA interface 1400 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0186] Figures 15A, 15B, and 15C illustrate exemplary defective rail conditions 1500, 1501, and 1502 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of defective rail conditions 1500, 1501, and 1502 shown in Figure 15 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of defective rail conditions 1500, 1501, and 1502 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0187] Defect condition 1500 is called a broken rail or rail gap. Defect condition 1500 is caused by rapid cooling in the area where the rails are pulled apart.

[0188] Defect condition 1501 is called ballast soil inclusion. Defect condition 1501 is caused by silt buildup on the rails and sleepers. Ballast soil inclusion causes erosion of the rail and sleeper base. Because ballast absorbs the load of the train from the rails, silt buildup makes the ballast less tolerant of the rails. This lack of tolerance creates stress on the rail components (such as sleepers), which may potentially loosen or detach from the rails. Ballast soil inclusion can be determined when a new, non-ballast material appears to be spreading in the image or when sleepers are covered.

[0189] Defect condition 1502 is called a curved rail, corrugated rail, or misaligned rail. Defect condition 1502 is caused by the cutting motion of the rail due to rapid heating. The rail expands to some extent due to the heat, which pushes the rail outwards. This expansion of the rail causes deviations in the measurements between the rails.

[0190] Defect conditions 1500, 1501, and 1502 can be detected by comparing the image with a previous image of the rail, or by comparing the image with a previously taken image or series of images of the rail.

[0191] All of these defect conditions 1502 are analyzed for changes in pixel coloration, pixel density, and the number of pixels between components (indicating distance). Changes are identified when one of the changes occurs in a series of images from a single flight, and when one of the changes occurs in images of the same rail from different UAV flights.

[0192] Furthermore, defect conditions can also be detected based on specific measurements. For example, one standard for rail width is 1435 mm (4 ft 8.5 in). In this embodiment, if the captured image shows that the rail deviates from 1435 mm, a curved rail defect condition 1502 is detected.

[0193] To avoid false positives or non-substantial detections, thresholds can be assigned to each defect condition 1500, 1501, and 1502. For example, one standard for the gap between continuous rails is 14.30 mm. To include tolerances, the gap threshold may be 14.50 mm. If a gap is detected at less than 14.50 mm, the system will not identify the gap.

[0194] Furthermore, the system can identify the length of each rail and use that length to demonstrate different gaps. For example, one standard for rail length is 39ft. For rails of this length, the system can use gap thresholds for the range corresponding to each rail. In the embodiment of 39ft rails, the system can use gap thresholds to describe the gaps between rails, but using much smaller gap thresholds within that range. For example, the system uses a gap threshold of 5mm for distances greater than 1ft from the end of the rail and a gap threshold of 15mm for distances of 1ft or less from the end of the rail.

[0195] The system can also make decisions or identify defects based on their severity. Some defects can be considered critical or warning defects. A critical defect is one that could potentially cause a derailment, damage the train, or significantly impede its movement. A warning defect is one that requires maintenance but does not pose a risk of train derailment, damage, or significant disruption.

[0196] Figure 16 illustrates an exemplary concept of Operation 1600 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the concept of Operation 1600 shown in Figure 16 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the concept of Operation 1600 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0197] Different concepts of Operation 1600 include, but are not limited to, auxiliary tunnel and bridge inspections 1605, continuous asset overflights 1610, auxiliary track inspections 1615, and auxiliary track integrity flights 1620.

[0198] Figure 17 shows exemplary UAS ecosystem 1700 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of UAS ecosystem 1700 shown in Figure 17 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the concept of UAS ecosystem 1700 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0199] The UAS ecosystem includes satellites 1705, GPS modules 1710, propellers 1715, control systems 1720, motor controllers 1730, motors 140, frames 1745, LED positioning lights 1750, RC receivers 155, remote controllers 1760, camera mounts 1765, cameras 1770, live image broadcasting 1775, virtual reality goggles 1780, lithium polymer batteries 1785, and more.

[0200] Satellite 1705 enables communication between the UAS and the flight control center.

[0201] The GPS module 1710 is a device that can receive location information from GPS satellites. The GPS module is used both for tracking the UAS and to ensure that the UAS follows a programmed flight plan.

[0202] Propeller 1715 is rotatably coupled to the UAS and provides lift to the UAS. The propeller is used for takeoff and landing purposes. The UAS may include multiple propellers.

[0203] The control system 1720 includes programming for the flight plan for the UAV's takeoff and landing. The control system 1720 is installed on the UAS. The control system 1720 controls the propellers according to the flight plan.

[0204] The motor controller 1730 is included in the UAS. The motor controller 1730 controls the motor 140.

[0205] Motor 140 provides forward thrust to the UAS. The UAS may include multiple motors 140.

[0206] The UAS frame 1745 provides support and protection for the UAS components. The frame 1745 is structured to allow the UAS to continue gliding in the event of a failure of a thrust or lift component or system.

[0207] The LED positioning lights 1750 are installed on the UAS. The LED positioning lights 1750 provide indication of the UAS to other aircraft and help locate the UAS. The LED positioning lights are also beneficial in low-visibility environments such as tunnels, fog, and nighttime.

[0208] The RC receiver 1755 is a wireless receiver built into the UAS. The RC receiver can communicate with the tower or other satellites to receive signals. The command center transmits signals to the UAS through the RC receiver 1755.

[0209] The remote controller 1760 is installed in frame 1745 of the UAS or communicates via RC receiver 1755. The remote controller 1760 may load a flight plan before flight, receive an updated flight plan, or be a controller via RC receiver 1755.

[0210] The camera mount 1765 is used to mount the camera 1770. The camera mount 1765 provides support for the camera 1770. The camera mount 1765 can be attached to the base of the frame 1745.

[0211] Camera 1770 is used to capture images and video data of railway lines. Multiple cameras and different types of cameras can be mounted on the UAS.

[0212] Camera 1770 is used to identify the route network for monitoring. The railway images can also be used to adjust the flight plan. In other words, if the UAV's location from the flight plan cannot be confirmed by the images, the flight plan can be adjusted. The UAV can also transmit a discrepancy indication to the command center, showing the difference between the location determined from the flight plan or sensors and the location determined from the images.

[0213] Furthermore, camera 1770 is used to identify defects in railway lines. Camera 1770 can detect rail obstructions such as engines stalled or parked cars, debris or other rubble on the tracks. When detecting defects, camera 1770 can be used to capture images of the rails to be analyzed for broken rails / rail gaps 1500, fine soil contamination in ballast 1501, curved rails 1502, etc.

[0214] The live image broadcast 1775 is performed using camera 1770 and RC receiver 1755. Images / frames captured by camera 1770 can be broadcast to a command center or the like. The live image broadcast can provide real-time images or video for users to further analyze the defect situation.

[0215] The virtual reality goggles 1780 can be used by operators on the ground or in the command center. The virtual reality goggles can display live image broadcasts 1775 from the camera 1770.

[0216] The lithium polymer battery 1785 is integrated into the UAS frame 1745. The battery 1785 can be used to power different components of the UAS.

[0217] Figure 18 shows exemplary UAS system component 1800 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the UAS system component 1800 shown in Figure 18 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the UAS system component 1800 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0218] The UAS system components 1800 include, but are not limited to, software 1805, UAS 1810, tracker control module 1815, autopilot 1820, laser ground altimeter sensor 1825, rack-mounted ground control station 1830, and the like.

[0219] Software 1805 can be installed in the UAS and the command center. Software 1805 can perform any of the functions described in this application.

[0220] The UAS 1810 is an unmanned aerial vehicle system. The UAS flies over railway lines to monitor track integrity. It also monitors for rail obstacles.

[0221] The tracker control module 1815 tracks the UAS during operations. The tracker control module 1815 includes the flight plan and can detect when the UAS is obstructing the flight plan. The tracker control module 1815 can update the flight plan, determine problems with the UAS itself, or display an alarm to the user at the command center.

[0222] The autopilot 1820 controls the UAS 1810. The autopilot 1820 can be installed on the UAS or on the ground and can transmit commands via an RC receiver.

[0223] The laser ground altimeter sensor 1825 determines the altitude of the UAS 1810. The laser altimeter 1825 communicates with the command center.

[0224] The rack-mounted ground control station 1830 provides a command center for the UAS 1810. The control station 1830 can control the UAS's flight plan and monitor the UAS while it is executing the flight plan.

[0225] Figures 19A, 19B, and 19C show exemplary UAS 1900, 1905, and 1910 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of UAS 1900, 1905, and 1910 shown in Figure 19 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the UAS can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0226] Figure 20 shows exemplary optical sensors 2000 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of optical sensors 2000 shown in Figure 20 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of optical sensors 2000 can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0227] Figures 21A and 21B show exemplary UAS safety boundaries 2100 and 2101 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of UAS safety boundaries 2100 and 2101 shown in Figures 21A and 21B are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of UAS safety boundaries can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0228] Figures 22A and 22B show exemplary orbital integrity sensor images 2200 and 2201 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of orbital integrity sensor images 2200 and 2201 shown in Figures 22A and 22B are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of orbital integrity sensor images can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0229] In images 2200 and 2201, the UAS is monitoring rail 2205. The UAS is inspecting each joint 2210 for possible failures.

[0230] Figures 23A, 23B, 23C, and 23D illustrate exemplary potential railhead defects 2300 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of potential railhead defects 2300 shown in Figure 23 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of potential railhead defects can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0231] Images 2300, 2305, 2310, and 2315 show rail defects detected by the UAS. In the first image, 2300, the UAS system detects a possible defect. The UAS system zooms in on the rail to capture image 2305. The UAS system repeatedly zooms in on images 2315 and 2320 until a defective or non-defective state is identified and confirmed. A non-defective state is when it is determined that the rail does not require repair.

[0232] Figure 24 shows an exemplary block diagram of the control network 2400 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of the control network 2400 shown in Figure 24 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of the control network can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0233] The control network 2400 includes, but is not limited to, fixed operator locations 2405, field operator locations 2410, autopilot 2415, UAS 2420, wired network 2425, tower 2430, and aeronautical radio 2435. The control network 2400 is used to monitor defects or obstacles in the railway line. The aeronautical radio 2435 communicates with another aircraft 2440, which may be manned or unmanned.

[0234] The fixed operator location 2405 is a permanently located command center. The fixed operator location 2405 can be connected to tower 2430 by wire or wirelessly for communication with the UAV.

[0235] Field operator location 2410 is a temporarily located command center. In other words, field operator location 2410 is located far from the command center and can monitor the UAS in the field. Field operator location 2405 can wirelessly connect to tower 2430 for communication with UAS 2420. Field operator location 2410 can also communicate directly with or control the UAS without using the tower. Field operator location 2410 can also communicate with the fixed operator location 2405.

[0236] Furthermore, although the autopilot 2415 is indicated to be located at the field operator location 2410, it can also be located at the fixed operator location 2405. The autopilot 2415 is used to control the UAS 2420.

[0237] UAS 2420 flies over railway lines and monitors for defects or obstacles. UAS 2420 may also include an autopilot 2415. UAS 2420 can communicate directly with the autopilot 2415 (if located at field operator location 2410), the system at field operator location 2410, or Tower 2430.

[0238] The UAS 2420 can be programmed to maintain communication with multiple towers (e.g., at least two towers). This means that a transition to a third tower may be required before disconnecting from one of the two connected towers. The UAS 2420 (or the system of Autopilot 2415, fixed operator location 2410, or field operator location 2405) can determine the number of towers or which towers to connect to based on signal strength, signal quality, etc.

[0239] The wired network 2425 connects a fixed operator location to multiple towers 2430. Each tower 2430 is individually connected to other towers through the wired network 2425. Because towers 2430 are connected to the wired network 2425, the field operator location 2410 can maintain communication with the UAS 2420 even after the UAS has flown out of the wireless signal range of the field operator location 2410.

[0240] Tower 2430 transmits and receives wireless signals with the UAS, other towers 2430, and the system at field operator location 2410. Tower 2430 is also connected to a wired network 2425 for communication with the fixed operator location 2405 and other towers 2430.

[0241] Figure 25 shows exemplary railroad site / airborne system control networks 2500 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The embodiments of railroad site / airborne system control networks 2500 shown in Figure 25 are for illustrative purposes only. Other embodiments of railroad site / airborne system control networks can be used without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.

[0242] The railway track / airborne system control network 2500 includes, but is not limited to, UAS 2505, first tower 2510, second tower 2515, ground control system 2520, automatic control 2530, RTK 2545, tower wire relay receiver 2550, UAV wire relay receiver 2555, automatic control 2560, and others.

[0243] Long-range UAS deployments have attracted attention in military airspace where commercial aviation regulations are not as prevalent, or in military operations within combat zones in foreign countries. Considerations for aircraft positioning accuracy, terrain avoidance, communication / command and control wait times, and aircraft payload are fundamentally different and often not applicable to commercial, low-altitude, or domestic use.

[0244] In the development of methods / means for pursuing long-distance flight operations, a system solution with several major features has been created.

[0245] First, the control network 2500 provides the ability to capture FAA air traffic data (if available) and merge that data with additional air traffic and obstacle data (including dedicated geographic information data installed at various tower sites along railroad rights-of-way and data collected from auxiliary aviation voice / data receivers).

[0246] Second, the control network 2500 assembled in FIG. 25 provides mission planners and pilots with navigation guarantees for both aircraft below 500 ft AGL and various data collection sensors. The navigation guarantees assist in terrain avoidance, navigation accuracy, sensor / payload focus, location accuracy, and ground altitude verification. The components of RTK 2545, UAS 2505, PCC 2530, tower wireless transceiver 2550, UAV wireless transceiver 2555, ground control system 2520, first tower 2510, and second tower 2515, taken together, provide this awareness for remote plotting such that an opinion can be held regarding the performance of the aircraft, the environment, flight accuracy, sensor performance, and compliance with FAA aviation regulations and our flight requirements. Finally, in the event of an emergency or malfunction, the system, taken together, enables the pilot to safely land the aircraft on the railroad right-of-way.

[0247] Third, in addition to the network used for data transmission / reception between tower wireless receivers 2550 and UAV wireless receivers 2555 and autopilot 2560 and ground control 2520, an aviation band radio 2435 is installed at almost all airports (within the vicinity of 2510 and 2515). The aviation band radio 2435 provides the pilot with the ability to communicate with other aircraft near the airport, thereby avoiding low-altitude encounters near airports without local / control towers (an important safety feature and something very unique to this deployment).

[0248] Figure 26 shows an exemplary process for inspecting railway assets using an unmanned aircraft according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. For example, process 2600 can be executed using a UAS.

[0249] In operation 2605, the system performs railway visual information processing. Railway visual information processing includes locally or remotely processing images to detect obstacles or defects on the railway line. Railway visual information processing also includes locally storing the results and transferring the results for archiving at the command center. The system transmits a flight plan including the railway line and the flight path via a plurality of communication towers. The railway line can include multiple railways over a geographical location. The flight path is the path along which the UAV moves to monitor the railway line. The flight path can include flying along the track, flying around the bridge, flying through the tunnel, etc. The flight path can have a starting point and an ending point at a set location or different locations.

[0250] In operation 2610, the system monitors the railway line for the detection of track components and other features. The system can receive data while the UAV is monitoring the railway line via a plurality of communication towers. The UAV can be connected to a plurality of towers (at least two towers). The communication towers can be connected based on signal strength, signal quality, etc. The plurality of communication towers includes an airborne radio configured to communicate data with other aircraft.

[0251] The system can detect obstacles along the flight path based on the received data. The received data can include data from other sources such as local airports of the FAA, other aircraft, etc. The received data can be combined with operator data to reduce the risk of collision or interference with the UAV or a general change in the flight plan. The received data can include current air traffic data, obstacle data, geographical information data, airborne audio data, weather data, etc.

[0252] In Operation 2615, the system performs flight path grouping. Flight path grouping includes changing the heading or speed and adjusting to avoid gaps in image overlap.

[0253] In Operation 2620, the system performs image stitching. Sequential images are stitched together for a complete understanding of the railway line. Image stitching also provides appropriate alignment for analysis.

[0254] In Operation 2625, the system performs image post-processing. Image results (including geographical location, time, etc.) are collected from the camera and GPS receiver. Based on the received data, the system can detect defects along the flight path. Rolling window logic is used for defects. Rolling window logic compares changes in pixel color, pixel density, and pixel length between rails in a sequence or series of images. The system recognizes that the pixel color and pixel density of the rails differ from those of components from the surrounding environment, such as sleepers, ballast, and surrounding environment components (e.g., rocks, soil, mud). The system also recognizes the distance from common components, such as the distance between rails and the distance between sleepers. In Operation 2630, the system performs report generation. Report generation includes HTML navigation and KML display. The report can be published in any known format, including PDF, CSV, etc.

[0255] In Operation 2635, the system performs a data transfer. The data is stored in the UAS's local storage and retrieved or downloaded to either a fixed operator location or a field operator location.

[0256] Figure 26 shows an example of process 2600 for inspecting railway assets using unmanned aerial vehicles. However, various modifications to Figure 26 are possible. For example, although described herein as a series of steps, the steps of the process may overlap, occur in parallel, occur in different orders, or occur multiple times.

[0257] Some embodiments of this disclosure are based on a vertical takeoff and landing UAS. In particular, the UAS includes an autopilot system that interfaces with a system command and control infrastructure. The UAS also processes navigation information generated from a geographic information system and supports various onboard sensors that provide location information. Specifically, these sensors are capable of transmitting and receiving information with an onboard navigation beacon (ADSB) and a Mode C transponder or equivalent.

[0258] The UAS embodiment has sufficient onboard power generation capability to provide reliable power to all of the other various aircraft systems, such as sensors, communication and control subsystems. In addition, the UAS preferably has sufficient liquid fuel capacity to support flight times exceeding 8 hours. The UAS also has the payload capacity necessary to support multiple sensors for collecting information and the communication and control subsystems necessary to transmit that information to the flight operations center in real time. The UAS also preferably includes an onboard information storage medium for local storage of the collected information. In addition, the system includes both onboard and external subsystems to facilitate emergency maneuvering and landing of the UAS in the flight corridor.

[0259] Generally, onboard sensors capture high-resolution, precise location photographs with a resolution of at least 1 / 4 foot above the flight altitude at least twice per second. Preferably, the sensor system also has built-in local computing capabilities and independent communication capabilities for communicating with other onboard subsystems, including its own navigation system and autopilot. Sensors may include photographic sensors, video cameras, thermal imaging cameras, and / or multispectral sensors. Specifically, the sensor system includes a real-time day / night video camera for pilot situational awareness, with at least some limited real-time protection capability.

[0260] The system also includes software focused on rail detection and analysis of railway track conditions. This provides advantageous support for inspecting linear assets such as tracks, bridges, and similar structures. In particular, the system software (both on-board and remote) includes machine vision software trained to understand and recognize critical situations within areas with at least two linear boundaries. The system software can also demonstrate normal functional conditions on linear areas.

[0261] More specifically, the onboard software is activated on the UAS in a straight line connecting the sensor and the ground-based communication system. The onboard software processes the data collected by the sensor. This data is then loaded into the ground-based communication system. In response, the ground-based communication system outputs quantitative and qualitative data about what the sensor has captured. The software system processes the large dataset and creates another set of geographically located data, then creates the third dataset. Finally, the system software creates several reports associated with the target data and a geographic location file that allows the user to easily map the location of the selected state of the target. Preferably, the large dataset is left unprocessed. The receiver receives only the truly necessary usable data.

[0262] The system software also includes field information software. This field information software can be used separately from the system or in conjunction with multiple UASs. The field information software embodies algorithms that map functionality, determining the order in which the software should perform operations, thereby favorably eliminating human error. Specifically, the field information software receives media generated by the sensor system, transfers that data to a laptop or other processing system, and then starts local software. The local software automatically codes, labels, and transfers the data to drives and files, ensuring that the data is appropriately transmitted to anyone who needs it (e.g., different departments within an organization). The field information software can be used for any data collected related to a field location. Preferably, the field information software is based on a network-connected system including a server or a set of hardware devices. In some embodiments, the field information software is activated after the UAS flight has ended (i.e., performs post-flight data processing). The data can be distributed across network-connected resources. The network-connected resources perform further analysis and ensure that the data is properly coded and stored. This helps maintain control over the distribution process and minimizes data errors.

[0263] The railway track, corridors, and towers are important factors in the aerial railway inspection system. This system accesses the 900MHz channel used for the Automatic Train Control System (ATCS), which is implemented via AAR. However, this is not a strict requirement for the implementation of this principle. The system's hardware and software are optimized to use low-bandwidth AAR channels for higher functionality. For systems using preferred AAR channels, the user typically requires a license. Redundant Ethernet controls communication with the UAS, including the appropriate channel. These functions can be implemented by the railway telecommunications assets.

[0264] The UAS is preferably a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft that operates (including landings) throughout the rail asset network. Once the UAS takes off, the pilot issues an autopilot command to begin flight. The UAS begins flight along a route programmed by the geographic information system to the actual railroad track, and then follows that track. In other words, once the pilot activates the autopilot, the system software takes over control and flies the UAS as close to the track as possible when it is in the airspace above it. The software system also ensures that sensors automatically take pictures of the track twice per second. Simultaneously, the sensors and software system control the pitch, yaw, and roll of the UAS. As a result, one or more suitable sensors can be positioned above the track while remaining in focus to ensure the required resolution and overlap images. If the analysis software determines after the flight that there was insufficient overlap or that part of the track is missing due to railroad track occupancy, the route is quickly re-flew and the sensors take additional images.

[0265] With autopilot activated and sensors taking photographs, the UAS control system utilizes space-based GPS (and ground-based GPS error correction where available) to maintain the UAS's position over the railroad construction site, while also maintaining compliance with operational altitude and linear flight path. Both ensure compliance with regulatory requirements regarding sensor resolution and flight path height and width.

[0266] In this case as well, preferably, the UAS and sensors have independent navigation systems. Advantageously, when both the UAS and sensors have independent navigation systems, computing power is conserved for critical items assigned to each component. For example, the sensor system may include sensor stabilization software and hardware.

[0267] Preferably, the UAS broadcasts its location, speed, altitude, and heading via the existing FAA Surveillance Network (SBS), and also broadcasts these signals to other aircraft equipped to receive them. In addition, rail infrastructure can support the FAA SBS system using auxiliary ADSB / transponder receivers, radar, and other elements along the railroad track. While the UAS is in flight, its operational status, location, and overall health are transmitted to the pilot via command and control links. Throughout all flight phases, the UAS has access to multiple command and control transceiver locations, and a level of command and control redundancy is ensured.

[0268] If the UAS loses connection with the command and control systems, after a period of time as determined by the operator and / or FAA regulations, the UAS will initiate its “link loss profile” and automatically descend and land along the railroad site. The pilot will be aware of the link loss condition and, based on the last transmission from the UAS, will inform the railroad site ground users and dispatchers of the aircraft’s designated landing. Secondary sensor communications and navigation systems can also assist in positioning the UAS.

[0269] In the event of another critical system failure during flight, the UAS will automatically initiate one of several predefined flight termination procedures or return to its launch site or another safe location as programmed. During flight, the pilot has the option to utilize secondary sensors for real-time imaging of the railroad track. These secondary sensors can also be used for some situational analysis, but are primarily used for pilot recognition. If a critical situation is identified during flight, the UAS sensors can utilize a secondary communication channel, not the primary connection, to send immediate notification to the pilot.

[0270] Upon completion of the specified mission, the pilot engages in the landing procedure. The UAS utilizes all of the aforementioned systems to reach the landing site and engages in the landing procedure for vertical landing. The landing procedure includes activating an air-to-ground laser that provides precise landing information to the UAS. In the final stage of the flight before landing, the pilot uses the UAS command and control system to ensure a safe landing. The UAS is equipped with multiple support systems to ensure a safe landing. If anything that impedes a safe landing is present on the ground or in the landing area, the landing abort procedure is initiated and an alternative landing site is identified. After a safe landing, the pilot removes the sensor data storage drive and inserts it into the server. The UAS then initiates an automated process of analysis and data distribution, resulting in the distribution of a customized report and a useful dataset.

[0271] The invention has been described with reference to specific embodiments. However, these descriptions are not intended to be construed in a limiting sense. Various modifications of the disclosed embodiments and alternative embodiments of the present disclosure may become apparent to those skilled in the art by reference to the description of the invention. Those skilled in the art should understand that the disclosed concepts and specific embodiments may be readily utilized as a basis for modifying or designing other structures for carrying out the same purposes of the present disclosure. Also, those skilled in the art should clearly understand that such equivalent constructions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure as set forth in the appended claims.

[0272] <舍 It is therefore intended that the claims may embrace any such modifications or embodiments that fall within the true scope of the present disclosure.

[0273] It should be noted that there is a character "舍" in the original text at line ID=7 which seems to be an incorrect character. I translated it as it is in the provided text. If this is an error, please correct the original text for a more accurate translation.The descriptions in this patent document should not be interpreted as implying that any particular element, step, or function must be included in the claims as an essential or important element. Furthermore, unless the exact terminology of “means for” or “steps for” and the subsequent participial phrase specifying the function are explicitly used in a particular claim, none of the claims are intended to exercise Section 112(f) of the U.S. Patent Act against any of the appended claims or claim elements. The use of terms such as “mechanism,” “module,” “device,” “unit,” “component,” “element,” “member,” “apparatus,” “machine,” “system,” “processor,” “processing device,” or “controller” in the claims is understood and intended to refer to structures known to those skilled in the art, which may be further modified or enhanced by the features of the claim itself, and is not intended to exercise Section 112(f) of the U.S. Patent Act.

[0274] It may be beneficial to provide definitions of specific terms and descriptions used throughout this patent document. The terms “include” and “contain” and their derivatives mean unrestricted inclusion. The term “or” means comprehensive and / or. The description “associated with” and its derivatives may mean include, contain, interconnected, enclose, be embedded, connected to or with, linked to or with, communicate, cooperate, alternate, juxtapose, closest, linked to or with, have, possess, have a characteristic, have a relationship to or with, or similar. The description “at least one” means, when used in a list of items, that one or more different combinations of list items may be used, or only one item in the list may be required. For example, “at least one of A, B and C” includes any of the following combinations: A, B, C, A and B, A and C, B and C, A and B and C.

[0275] This disclosure describes certain embodiments and generally associated methods. However, variations and substitutions of these embodiments and methods may be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the above description of exemplary embodiments does not define or limit this disclosure. Other variations, substitutions and modifications are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of this disclosure, as defined by the following claims.

Claims

1. An aerial system control network for unmanned aerial vehicles for inspecting railway assets, Includes a ground control system configured to transmit a flight plan, including railway routes and flight paths, to the unmanned aircraft, and to detect obstacles along the flight path and adjust the flight plan based on the obstacles, The received data includes multiple images taken from at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle. The ground control system is further configured to monitor multiple images of the defect status of the railway line, The defect state is identified by detecting a potential defect state in the area of ​​the railway line included in the first image, and by continuously zooming in on the area of ​​the railway line included in the first image using at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle until it is confirmed whether the potential defect state is a defect state or a non-defect state, according to the aerial system control network.

2. The aforementioned defect state is, An aerial system control network according to claim 1, identified by the difference between the first image and a stored image captured of the same location from a previous flight of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

3. Includes multiple communication towers, each equipped with an aeronautical band radio configured to communicate data with other aircraft, The aerial system control network according to claim 1, wherein the flight plan is adjusted based on the communicated data.

4. The aerial system control network according to claim 1, wherein the unmanned aerial vehicle includes at least one camera configured to capture images of the railway line.

5. The aforementioned ground control system is The deviation from the aforementioned flight plan is monitored by the aforementioned multiple images, Adjusting the flight plan in the aforementioned multiple images to maintain the railway line The aerial system control network according to claim 4, further configured to perform the following:

6. An unmanned aerial vehicle system for monitoring railway lines, Unmanned aerial vehicles and Airborne system control network and Includes, The aforementioned aerial system control network is Transmitting a flight plan, including railway routes and flight paths, to the aforementioned unmanned aircraft, Based on the received data, detect obstacles along the aforementioned flight path, Adjusting the flight plan based on the aforementioned obstacles Includes a ground control system configured to perform the following: The received data includes a plurality of images taken from at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle. The ground control system is further configured to monitor multiple images of the defect status of the railway line, An unmanned aerial vehicle system in which the defect state is identified by detecting a potential defect state in the area of ​​the railway line included in the first image, and by continuously zooming in on the area of ​​the railway line included in the first image with at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle until it is confirmed whether the potential defect state is a defect state or a non-defect state.

7. The aforementioned defect state is, The unmanned aerial vehicle system according to claim 6, identified by the difference between the first image and a stored image captured of the same location from a previous flight of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

8. It includes multiple communication towers equipped with aeronautical band radios configured to communicate data with other aircraft, The unmanned aerial vehicle system according to claim 6, wherein the flight plan is adjusted based on the communicated data.

9. The aforementioned ground control system is The deviation from the aforementioned flight plan is monitored by the aforementioned multiple images, Adjusting the flight plan in the aforementioned multiple images to maintain the railway line The unmanned aerial vehicle system according to claim 6, further configured to perform the following:

10. A method for an airborne system control network for unmanned aerial vehicles to inspect railway assets, Transmitting a flight plan, including railway routes and flight paths, to the aforementioned unmanned aircraft, The system detects obstacles along the flight path based on received data having multiple images taken from at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle, Adjusting the flight plan based on the aforementioned obstacle, To monitor multiple images regarding the defect status of the aforementioned railway line and Includes, A method for identifying the defect state by detecting a potential defect state in the region of the railway line included in the first image, and by continuously zooming in on the region of the railway line included in the first image with at least one camera mounted on the unmanned aerial vehicle until it is confirmed whether the potential defect state is a defect state or a non-defect state.

11. The aforementioned defect state is, The method according to claim 10, which is determined by the difference between the first image and a stored image captured of the same location from a previous flight of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

12. Communicating data with other aircraft via aviation band radios. It further includes, The method according to claim 10, wherein the flight plan is adjusted based on the communicated data.

13. The deviation from the aforementioned flight plan is monitored by the aforementioned multiple images, Adjusting the flight plan in the aforementioned multiple images to maintain the railway line The method according to claim 10, further comprising:

Images