Secure telephone communications device

Abstract

The present invention relates to a secure telephone communications device, essentially consisting of a hermetic switchboard, in turn connected to a second backup switchboard having similar features, which is provided as a backup in case of failure, in order to guarantee the communications services in operation. The aforementioned hermetic switchboard establishes communication between extensions, without the possibility of making external calls, as it lacks an open communication backbone and because users can register through a server via an APP downloaded onto their mobile phone, which allows access through the data network to a server connected to the hermetic central switchboards. Furthermore, communications between extensions of the hermetic switchboard can be carried out for voice, videoconference or chat. The device lacks a log of the communications carried out or of voice recordings, thus safeguarding privacy of communications.

Description

[0001]SECURE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE The present invention, a secure telephone communications device, consists of an assembly comprising a sealed switchboard with a web server that enables secure communications between smartphones while ensuring privacy. Therefore, the subject matter of the present invention will be of interest to the telecommunications industry. BACKGROUND: The problem that the subject matter of this patent application seeks to solve is described in US Patent No. 61 / 973,072 of 2014, entitled "Peer-to-Peer Meeting System for Minimizing Visibility of Third-Party Server", which disclosed a peer-to-peer meeting system for minimizing visibility by a third-party server.This document explains how service providers build telecommunications systems to connect users who are willing to pay to provide information to each other. Telecommunications systems have evolved from physical mail systems to telegraph and telephone operations, typically operated by a government monopoly known as the Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT) administration. More recently, telecommunications have been transmitted through a set of public and private packet networks called the Internet, and through mobile telephony and data networks to connect cell phones. It also explains how, throughout the history of telecommunications network development, governments have worked closely with industry to design and build them.Typically, a government grant for the use of public land or airwaves has resulted in reciprocal support from local governments in the form of taxes and public services. Almost all governments consider these telecommunications networks an integral part of the local and national infrastructure and require them to support emergency services. Thus, a user may use a telecommunications network to conduct commercial or government business, or share personal information. The user trusts that the content of their communication with another user over the telecommunications network will remain private. However, it has recently become public knowledge that it is not always possible to trust that intermediate servers or nodes, or the network itself, have not been compromised by the government, service providers, or criminal elements exploiting weaknesses in the technology.To overcome this, direct peer-to-peer (P2P) communications have been created, secured through strong encryption of transmitted data. Today, many applications are typically web-based (Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)), run on top of a service provider's packet networks (OTT), and thus limit their exposure to what is available in low-level packet headers. However, they rely on proxy servers operated by third parties to interconnect users. These solutions change the nature of the third party from a network operator to an application service provider. A system running a traditional application (e.g., Google®) is vulnerable to a security issue. An ideal solution would be to have direct connections between peer applications without third-party servers being involved.Traditionally, this solution has been hampered by a feature of almost all networks. First, Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT). NAPT was introduced to allow users on a private side of a network to share limited public Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) addresses available to a public or private service provider's network. NAPT enables sharing (optionally adding security) by opening pinholes for a limited time when a packet is sent from the private side to the public Internet. A pinhole is a temporary mapping of a public Internet Protocol (IP) and port number to a communication source's private IP address / port. When a pinhole is mapped, a packet from the distant side can traverse the NAPT inbound. NAPT can also exhibit a variety of restrictive behaviors.On the other hand, mobility introduces another potential security weakness. If both peer applications move simultaneously, their IP addresses may no longer be valid. Peer applications require a mechanism to rediscover each other's IP addresses. A typical approach is for a peer application to connect to a registry and report the peer application's identity and current location or address. With P2P, this approach can be avoided if only one peer application moves at a time and keeps the other peer updated. However, due to coverage or inactivity, peer applications may no longer have valid IP addresses for other peer applications. In this regard, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has developed solutions to establish connections through NAPT, recognized by the acronyms Session Traversal Utilities for Network Address Translation (NAT) (STUN) and Relay Traversal Around NAT (TURN).Although initially designed to allow direct Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) connections between Voice over IP (VoIP) user agents, STUN and TURN have since become more generic. However, they still rely on an existing communication path to share candidate IP addresses and ports to initiate a direct communications session. Many secure systems today rely on centralized servers to perform a variety of functions, providing a network point at which third-party monitoring can occur. Registrars and proxies provide a potential weak point in a system's security. A typical telecommunications system relies on a service provider network to connect two users who wish to communicate via voice, text, video, and / or file transfer.The service provider network supports communication between two users from a network and an application perspective. A conventional telecommunications network, such as the public switched telephone network (PSTN), does not separate the network and application aspects; however, a service provider network can create the separation between the network and the application aspects by supporting applications through the Internet Protocol (IP) layer. The network aspect of communication involves the transmission of a message or the transfer of a file from one user to another. The application aspect of communication involves the control and management of the flow of messages / files and user identities. Recent telecommunications systems allow the network aspect to be operated and controlled by a provider, while the application aspect is operated and controlled by an independent application provider.In this case, application-related information and network-related information are shared between two operators. Application-related information and network-related information may be visible to a third-party operator or an intermediary between two communicating users. Systems based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) model transfer application aspects to the two communicating user devices. However, most application providers claiming to be P2P typically have a third-party server that controls the application information. Finally, the metadata associated with a user and the user device are created and managed by a central authority, typically through a user registry.The user registry may contain information that may be of interest to users who wish to have a greater degree of privacy through true P2P communication with other users. For all these reasons, the present patent application represents an advance in this described State of the Art, by devising a novel system that facilitates secure communications and guarantees their privacy. DESCRIPTION The present secure telephone communications device described below consists of a combination of a mobile telephone services website with a communication service management software program, which in turn communicates with a sealed telephone switchboard. Said switchboard is sealed because it does not accept outside calls, but only and exclusively calls between the extensions supported by the switchboard.The difference with traditional communication service systems is that their function is to provide communication services between the internal extensions of the switchboard. This device assigns users or clients of the communication service an extension number for calls, videoconferences, or chats through a web server, providing international communication service coverage. As previously mentioned, the difference between traditional communication services and this device is that mobile telephony uses public telecommunications networks through communication trunks. This means that any communication through these common services is open and therefore lacks minimal security. This means that communications can be easily intercepted by authorities, hackers, or unauthorized groups with a simple scanner.6 This device has advantages over other secure communications systems that employ encryption and special terminals, which are nonetheless no more secure, as has been demonstrated in the past, given that their telephone exchanges always have at least one open communications trunk, through which communications can be intercepted. Furthermore, with this device, communications are supported on the user's or client's smartphone through the simple installation of an app that connects to the sealed telephone exchange, intended exclusively for internal calls between extensions. Calls cannot be made to external numbers outside the exchange.In this way, the sealed switchboard houses an internal communication system between the communication service clients. Call traffic is not recorded on the switchboard, nor are chat exchanges or voice recordings. Consequently, since there are no records, call traffic cannot be recorded on the corresponding invoice for the communication services provided with this device. In this way, all the device's functions are combined through commands, which are interactively generated through a web page and combined with a computer program that regulates the different communication options offered to the client through an app. Each client can implement these options through their smartphone. There is no record or log of the communication service provided, thus safeguarding and ensuring their privacy.This device uses a V16-update SSL-certified encrypted communication tunnel, which guarantees the security and privacy of communications. With this device, the user does not require special terminals, and can communicate with their mobile terminal, regardless of its operating system 7, in a secure manner where the security and privacy of their communications are guaranteed, both voice and videoconference and chat. PREFERRED EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION Below, a detailed description of the , with reference to the accompanying drawings, which represent, by way of simple, non-limiting example, a preferred embodiment susceptible to all those variations in detail that do not entail a fundamental alteration of the essential characteristics of said improvements.In said drawings are illustrated: In figure 1: Functional diagram of the device According to the exemplary embodiment shown, the secure telephone communications device illustrated in this preferred embodiment is essentially made up of a hermetic switchboard (1), in turn connected to a second backup switchboard (2), with similar characteristics, as a reserve in case of failure, in order to keep the communications service running. The aforementioned hermetic switchboard establishes communication between incoming extensions (5) and (3) outgoing extensions, with no possibility of making external calls, as it lacks an open communications trunk. Outgoing call users (4) and incoming call users (6) can register through a server (7) by means of an APP downloaded onto their mobile phone, which allows access via the data network to a server connected to the switchboards of the hermetic switchboard.In this way, users can communicate between extensions of the sealed switchboard, whether for voice, video conferencing, or chat. 8 The secure telephone communications device does not record the communications made or make voice recordings, thus safeguarding the privacy of communications. Finally, the shape, materials, and dimensions may be variable, as well as, in general, anything accessory or secondary, provided that it does not alter, change, or modify the essence of the improvements described.

Claims

CLAIMS 1st.- Secure telephone communications device, consisting essentially of a hermetic switchboard (1), in turn connected to a second backup switchboard (2), with similar characteristics, as a reserve in case of failure, to guarantee the communications service in operation, characterized in that said hermetic switchboard establishes communication between extensions, (5) incoming and (3) outgoing, not having the possibility of making external calls, as it lacks an open communications trunk and because the users, (4) outgoing calls and (6) incoming calls, can register through a server (7) by means of an APP downloaded onto their mobile phone, which allows access via the data network to a server connected to the switchboards of the hermetic switchboard. 2nd.- Secure telephone communications device, according to the first claim, characterized in that communications between extensions of the sealed switchboard can be made via voice, videoconference, or chat.

3. - Secure telephone communications device, according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that it does not record the communications made or voice recordings, thus safeguarding the privacy of the communications. 10.

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