A rational exchange protocol processing method, device, equipment and medium

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method, apparatus, device, and medium for processing a rational exchange protocol. The method comprises: conducting a dynamic game based on an improved Buttyan model and a rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree, the game results, and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies; based on the obtained benefits, determining a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of a first participant sending a target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of a second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol; and processing a rational electronic contract signing agreement to be processed based on the first and second conditions. The method of the present invention can make the second participant more cautious and improve the ability to identify false messages, thereby ensuring that both parties to the agreement comply with the agreement as much as possible, which helps maintain the fairness and effectiveness of the contract.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of rational cryptographic protocols, and in particular to a rational exchange protocol processing method, apparatus, device and medium. Background Art

[0002] The rational exchange protocol is a specialized cryptographic protocol that uses game theory to ensure secure and fair transactions between self-interested participants in the absence of a trusted third party (TTP). It is widely used in a variety of fields, including electronic contracts, micropayment systems, secure communications, online voting, and auctions. It improves transaction efficiency and security while reducing reliance on trusted third parties. Currently, research in game-theory-based cryptography focuses on three areas: rational exchange protocols, rational secret sharing, and rational secure multi-party computation.

[0003] Syverson first proposed the concept of rational exchange and designed a rational exchange protocol, the Syverson protocol, based on a weak bit-secret commitment function. Buttyan et al. analyzed rational exchange protocols using a formal model of basic game theory (called the Buttyan model), defined rational exchange, and explored its relationship to fair exchange. They also proved the rationality of the Syverson protocol under a reliable network. Subsequently, Almudena Alcaide et al. proposed a rational exchange protocol model based on Bayesian game theory, extending the Buttyan model and first proposed a rational and fair exchange protocol for multiple parties. These studies primarily focused on the fairness of the exchange protocol's outcomes, but did not include an analysis of the fairness of the protocol process. Therefore, Ding Hong et al. proposed a rational exchange protocol model based on mixed strategies. They modeled the exchange protocol using the extended game mixed strategy theory and introduced entropy theory to describe the fairness of the exchange process. However, this model does not account for network unreliability and non-strict fairness in the process. Furthermore, it lacks formal verification tools and has a limited scope. These shortcomings may affect the security and fairness of the protocol in practical applications. Tao et al. proposed a model based on incomplete information extended games to analyze IoT protocols, defining rationality and fairness properties and verifying these properties using tree analysis methods and linear-time algorithms. Furthermore, many scholars have applied game theory to fields such as blockchain, wireless sensor networks, and multi-agent systems.

[0004] The Buttyan model constructs a mathematical framework based on game theory for the analysis of rational exchange protocols, which can be expressed as a six-tuple Analyzing rational exchange protocols. However, this model has certain limitations in dealing with uncertainty and false information in rational exchanges. These limitations may lead to inaccurate assessments of the robustness, reliability, and adaptability of the protocol, and may even lead to incorrect decisions and behavioral deviations during the protocol execution.

[0005] Figure 2 This is the game tree description of the Syverson protocol using the Buttyan model. In one case, the action sequence in the Buttyan model is and right The income is 、 ,at this time, Will be due to Sending false messages and be punished for false information Assume that all can be From the perspective of rational participants, Identified false news It does not need to be considered because There is always a choice to withdraw from the agreement to protect their own interests. However, those who are not The false news identified Therefore, how to deal with unidentified false information is a technical problem that needs to be solved urgently in the existing technology. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a rational exchange protocol processing method, device, equipment and medium, aiming to solve at least one of the above technical problems.

[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a technical solution to the above-mentioned technical problem as follows: a method for processing a rational exchange protocol, the method comprising:

[0008] Obtaining a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and the first participant and the second participant are both rational;

[0009] A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies are obtained;

[0010] The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages.

[0011] In a dynamic game, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0012] Based on the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol is determined, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol is determined. When the first and second conditions are met, the rational exchange protocol is concluded.

[0013] Based on the first condition and the second condition, the processing of the rational electronic contract signing agreement is realized.

[0014] The beneficial effect of the present invention is that, if a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant can then send a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game. If the first participant chooses to withdraw from the agreement during the third round of the game, this solution can not only make the second participant more cautious and improve their ability to identify false messages during the processing of the rational electronic contract signing agreement, thereby ensuring that both parties to the agreement comply with the agreement as much as possible. This not only helps protect their own interests, but also helps maintain the fairness and effectiveness of the contract.

[0015] On the basis of the above technical solution, the present invention can also be improved as follows.

[0016] Furthermore, the type of the first participant is a cooperative type or a non-cooperative type, and the type of the second participant is a cooperative type.

[0017] Furthermore, the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol are used to conduct a dynamic game to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies are obtained, including:

[0018] Based on the rational exchange protocol, a participant set, a participant action set, a participant action sequence set, an information set, a participant function, a preference relationship, a participant type, and a participant belief are obtained;

[0019] A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, where each participant acts according to a different strategy to obtain a game result, and all actions in the participant's action set include sending an action containing an attack message;

[0020] Construct a utility function and introduce a penalty value to calculate the benefits each participant gets from taking actions according to different strategies;

[0021] According to the participant set, participant action set, participant action sequence set, information set, participant function, preference relationship, participant type, participant belief, the game results obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, and the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model is constructed.

[0022] Furthermore, the first participant is a customer, the second participant is a merchant, and the purpose of the dynamic game is to exchange the items used by the first participant for exchange with the items used by the second participant for exchange, and each participant's benefit is maximized.

[0023] Furthermore, the determination of the first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, and the second condition that must be satisfied for the benefit of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, based on the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, includes:

[0024] For the first participant, the first condition is determined when the payoff corresponding to taking a first action sequence is not less than the payoff corresponding to taking a second action sequence, wherein the first action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the first round of the game, the second participant sending a true message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the third round of the game; the second action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending an attack message to the second participant during the first round of the game, and if the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sending a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant choosing to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0025] For the second participant, when the corresponding payoff of the second participant sending a target message including a copy of an attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game is greater than 0, the second condition is determined.

[0026] In a second aspect, in order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention further provides a rational exchange protocol processing device, which includes:

[0027] an acquisition module, configured to acquire a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and both the first participant and the second participant are rational;

[0028] A dynamic game module is used to conduct dynamic games based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, obtain the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and obtain the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies;

[0029] The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages.

[0030] In a dynamic game, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0031] a condition determination module, configured to determine, based on the benefits obtained by each participant from acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of a first participant sending a target message when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of a second participant when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, wherein the rational exchange protocol is concluded when the first and second conditions are satisfied;

[0032] The agreement processing module is used to process the rational electronic contract signing agreement based on the first condition and the second condition.

[0033] On the third aspect, in order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and runnable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the rational exchange protocol processing method of the present application is implemented.

[0034] In a fourth aspect, in order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the rational exchange protocol processing method of the present application is implemented.

[0035] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given in part in the following description, which will become apparent from the following description, or will be learned through practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for describing the embodiments of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 1 A flow chart of a rational exchange protocol processing method provided by one embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a game tree for analyzing the Syverson protocol using a Buttyan model in the prior art provided in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a Buttyan model game tree that introduces participant types and beliefs, provided in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 4 An embodiment of the present invention provides an attack message Interaction diagram of

[0041] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a game tree for a rational electronic contract signing protocol provided by one embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a Bayesian game analysis protocol according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the system structure of a solution provided in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 8 An embodiment of the present invention provides a method in which a participant A uses parameters The strategy diagram adopted below;

[0045] Figure 9 An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for participant B to use parameters The strategy diagram adopted below;

[0046] Figure 10A schematic structural diagram of a rational exchange protocol processing device provided by one embodiment of the present invention;

[0047] Figure 11 The present invention provides a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0048] The principles and features of the present invention are described below. The examples given are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0049] The following describes in detail the technical solution of the present invention and how the technical solution of the present invention solves the above-mentioned technical problems using specific embodiments. The following specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be repeated in some embodiments. The following embodiments of the present invention are described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0050] The solution provided by the embodiments of the present invention can be applied to any application scenario that requires processing a rational exchange protocol. The solution provided by the embodiments of the present invention can be executed by any electronic device, for example, a user's terminal device. The terminal device can be any terminal device that can install applications and access web pages through applications, including at least one of the following: a smartphone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a smart speaker, a smart watch, a smart TV, and a smart car device.

[0051] The embodiment of the present invention provides a possible implementation method, such as Figure 1 As shown, a flowchart of a rational exchange protocol processing method is provided. The solution can be executed by any electronic device, for example, a terminal device, or jointly executed by a terminal device and a server. For ease of description, the method provided by the embodiment of the present invention will be described below using the terminal device as an example of the execution subject. Figure 1 As shown in the flowchart, the method may include the following steps:

[0052] S10, obtaining a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and both the first participant and the second participant are rational;

[0053] S20, performing a dynamic game based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and simultaneously obtaining the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies;

[0054] The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages.

[0055] In a dynamic game process, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0056] S30, based on the benefits obtained by each participant from acting according to different strategies, determining a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol. When the first condition and the second condition are satisfied, the rational exchange protocol is concluded.

[0057] S40: Based on the first condition and the second condition, the rational electronic contract signing agreement to be processed is processed.

[0058] The method of the present invention allows a first participant to send an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and if the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant can then send a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game. If the first participant chooses to withdraw from the agreement during the third round of the game, the second participant can be made more cautious and aware of the rational electronic contract signing agreement, improving their ability to identify false messages and ensuring that both parties comply with the agreement as much as possible. This not only helps protect their own interests, but also helps maintain the fairness and effectiveness of the contract.

[0059] The solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the following specific embodiments. In this embodiment, in order to facilitate the understanding of the present solution, the game tree of the Syverson protocol using the Buttyan model in the prior art is first introduced. The Buttyan model is a mathematical model based on game theory, proposed by Levente Buttyan et al., and is used to analyze and define rational exchange protocols, especially the analysis of the Syverson protocol. The model constructs an extended game through a series of elements to describe the interaction between protocol participants, which can be represented by a six-tuple. To represent a rational exchange agreement , see Figure 2 ,in:

[0060] (1) is the set of participants, including all individuals participating in the protocol. It can be expressed as: ,in and On behalf of both parties to the Agreement, represents the network that participants use to communicate with each other and is assumed to be completely reliable in this model.

[0061] (2) It is the set of actions of the participants, including all possible actions that the participants may take at each stage of the game. The protocol participants face three basic strategic choices: one is to follow the protocol and send real messages honestly. ; second, taking deceptive actions and sending false messages ; Third, withdraw from the agreement .

[0062] (3) is a set of action sequences. For any action , Indicates a sequence of non-terminal actions After the action , Indicates participants In non-terminal action sequences The set of optional actions after . If it is a terminal action sequence, it means the protocol execution is finished. Empty sequence It is also a subset of the action sequence set, indicating the starting point of the game. The Buttyan model does not allow the parties to run multiple protocol instances simultaneously, that is, it does not consider interleaving attacks.

[0063] (4) is a participant For any two non-terminal action sequences and ,if and ,So and Belong to participants The same information set.

[0064] (5) is the actor function. It is used to determine the next actor that should take action after a sequence of non-terminal actions. It can be expressed as: ,in is a terminal action sequence. For any non-terminal action sequence , Indicates that in the sequence Which participant will then take the next action. Among them, non-terminal action sequences can be used to describe unfinished actions or intermediate processes in a technical solution.

[0065] When all are completed, it is the terminal action sequence.

[0066] (6) is a participant Preference relationship. Indicates that each participant The preference ranking of different outcomes (different strategies adopted by participants) is used to describe the rational behavior of participants in the protocol, that is, they tend to choose actions that can maximize their own interests.

[0067] Defects of existing technology:

[0068] 1. Insufficient ability to handle uncertainty: The Buttyan model assumes that participants have complete information about the game structure, but in reality, information is often asymmetric, and participants may not be able to fully understand the strategies or payoff functions of other participants.

[0069] 2. Insufficient handling of false information: The Buttyan model assumes that participants can identify all false information. However, in reality, participants’ technical detection capabilities may be limited, and new attack methods and tools may not be identified in a timely manner, resulting in the model’s inability to fully consider all potential fraudulent behaviors.

[0070] 3. Network unreliability is not taken into account: The model assumes that the network is reliable, but in actual applications, the network may be unreliable and messages may be delayed, lost or tampered with, which will affect the security and reliability of the protocol.

[0071] 4. Lack of formal verification tools: In existing research on rational exchange protocols, many studies rely on manual analysis to verify the security and fairness of the protocol. Although manual analysis can provide intuitive understanding, it has the following limitations:

[0072] 1) Subjectivity: Manual analysis relies on the researcher’s experience and intuition and is easily affected by subjective factors.

[0073] 2) Incompleteness: Manual analysis cannot take into account all possible behaviors of a protocol, especially complex protocols and potential attack paths.

[0074] 3) Irreproducibility: The results of manual analysis are difficult to be independently verified by other researchers, resulting in low credibility of the verification results.

[0075] Based on this, see Figure 1 , this embodiment proposes the following solutions, including:

[0076] S10, obtaining a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and both the first participant and the second participant are rational;

[0077] Optionally, the first participant is a customer and the second participant is a merchant. The objective of the dynamic game is to exchange the item used by the first participant for the item used by the second participant, maximizing the benefit for each participant. The items used by different participants can be different or the same. For example, the first participant's item can be money and the second participant's item can be merchandise.

[0078] S20, performing a dynamic game based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and simultaneously obtaining the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies;

[0079] The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages.

[0080] In a dynamic game process, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to exit the protocol during the third round of the game.

[0081] Optionally, a dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies are obtained, including:

[0082] S201, based on the rational exchange protocol, obtaining a participant set, a participant action set, a participant action sequence set, an information set, a participant function, a preference relationship, a participant type, and a participant belief;

[0083] S202, performing a dynamic game based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, wherein each participant performs actions according to different strategies to obtain a game result, wherein all actions in the participant action set include sending an action containing an attack message;

[0084] S203, constructing a utility function and introducing a penalty value to calculate the benefits each participant obtains by taking actions according to different strategies;

[0085] S204, constructing a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model based on the participant set, participant action set, participant action sequence set, information set, participant function, preference relationship, participant type, participant belief, the game results obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, and the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies.

[0086] The participant set refers to the set formed by the first and second participants. The participant type refers to the type of the first and second participants. The participant action set refers to the set formed by all possible actions that a participant can take at each stage of the game. The participant action sequence set refers to the set formed by all sequences of actions taken by a participant at each stage of the game.

[0087] The information set refers to the set of messages corresponding to the same stage in each stage of the game. and ,if and ,So and Belong to participants The same set of information.

[0088] The participant function determines the next participant to take action after a sequence of non-terminal actions. The preference relation is each participant's ranking of preferences for different outcomes and is used to describe the rational behavior of participants in the protocol.

[0089] The game result refers to the result corresponding to the leaf node in the game tree, which includes two situations: one is to exit the protocol, and the other is to continue sending messages to another participant.

[0090] In this solution, we first build a model and analyze the module. The specific process is as follows:

[0091] (1) Constructing the improved Buttyan model

[0092] In this scheme, the formal analysis method based on Bayesian game can more accurately simulate the uncertainty and information asymmetry in the real world. The Buttyan model can be expanded into an octet: Table 1 is the symbol table in this article.

[0093] Table 1 Symbol table

[0094]

[0095] Among them, compared with the basic game theory framework in the Buttyan model, Bayesian game provides a richer and more realistic analytical tool. By introducing the Buttyan model game tree description of participant types and participant beliefs, the improved Buttyan model is obtained, see Figure 3 .

[0096] Among them, participant type and type space: if the participant There is a type ,but is the type combination of participants, Combining spaces for the types of participants, where is a participant Each participant may have multiple types, which determine their utility function.

[0097] Optionally, the type of the first participant is a cooperative type or a non-cooperative type, and the type of the second participant is a cooperative type.

[0098] The cooperation type refers to the type of the participant that cooperates with the second participant, and the non-cooperation type refers to the type of the participant that does not cooperate with the second participant.

[0099] Participant Beliefs: Participant beliefs are expressed in the form of probability distributions, which can be represented by the Greek letters 、 、 etc. to express. Participants For other participants The type of belief is achieved through Type space The set of all beliefs can be expressed as a probability distribution over express.

[0100] In this scenario, beliefs can be understood as probabilities. For example, player A might believe that player B has a 70% probability of choosing the "cooperate" strategy and a 30% probability of choosing the "defect" strategy. This probability distribution is player A's belief, reflecting player A's expectations of player B's behavior.

[0101] "nature" As an abstract entity and a participant function, it is responsible for assigning a type to each participant. This process is performed randomly based on the probability distribution of each participant's type space. This mechanism enables the Bayesian game to more realistically reflect the decision-making process of participants under uncertainty.

[0102] exist Figure 3In the game tree shown, 、 、… , indicating participants Different types of can be used to simulate the uncertainty of participants' behavior. In the process of protocol analysis, the network can be regarded as a participant with a specific type, whose behavior (such as the reliability of message delivery) can be uncertain. Belief is a description of the probability distribution of participants regarding the types of other participants. At the beginning of the game, naturally According to the probability distribution of each participant type space, a type is randomly selected and assigned to each participant. In the game tree, the leaf node symbolizes the end of the agreement, and other nodes (except the leaf node and the natural The nodes outside the game represent the decision points of each participant in the game process. The lines between the nodes represent the specific actions taken by the participants. These actions are part of their strategy and determine the direction of the game. Unknown participants The choice of action or strategy reflects the uncertainty of the game. yes The probability distribution on , which represents the probability of choosing which action (also called behavior) to take next, can be expressed as:

[0103]

[0104] in, 、 、 Respectively indicate sending messages 、 、 probability.

[0105] in, Represents the message sent during the first round of the game, Represents the message sent during the second round of the game, Represents the message sent during the third round of the game.

[0106] The various stages of the game can be expressed as:

[0107]

[0108] The first round of game process (message ): Participant Will as well as Send to participants and use Sign this information and then send the entire message Send to participants .

[0109] The second round of game process (message ): Participant To participants send . Contains copies, so participants Participants can be identified Already received the message .

[0110] The third round of game process (message ): Participant To participants send , participants get and use it to decrypt the participants Sign the contract to obtain .

[0111] After the above three rounds of game process, when the electronic contract signing agreement is executed, both parties can obtain the other party’s contract signature and the transaction is completed.

[0112] In this scheme, the attack message is also introduced , where the attack message It includes false messages that can be identified by participants and false messages that cannot be identified by participants.

[0113] See also Figure 4 The interactive diagram of introducing attack messages is shown in the figure. After the attack messages are introduced, the game process is as follows:

[0114] When participants (First participant) to the participant (Second participant) sends attack message When the false information is identified by participant B, participant Ability to opt out of the agreement , but in order to ensure Don't cheat next time , will give Certain punishment ( ). For those who are not Identified false news, due to the content and specific form of false news is unknown, so They may choose to continue the transaction, that is, send m2 to participant A, which may contain a copy of the attack message, or they may choose to exit the protocol. In a rational exchange agreement, the participants , participants They are rational participants who maximize their own interests. Therefore, in the third round of interaction (the third round of game process), participants Will not or (Contains attack messages ) sent to participants , but directly withdraw from the agreement . Introducing attack messages It not only enhances the real-world adaptability of the model, but also provides a more comprehensive perspective for analyzing participants' behavior when facing potential fraud, and can more realistically reflect the content of the message.

[0115] In combination with the above content, in this solution, the process of constructing the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model can also be specifically described as follows:

[0116] The first step is to give a rational exchange protocol to be analyzed, in which all participants (including participant A and participant B) are rational.

[0117] Assume that participants and participants Each has a private key 、 , and participants and participants All parties are rational participants and do not rely on the participation of the arbitration party CMP (Contract Management Party). The specific contents of the agreement are:

[0118]

[0119] In the second step, based on the rational exchange protocol in the first step, the participant set is obtained. The participant set is the set of all possible participants in the protocol, expressed as .

[0120] The third step is to obtain the participant type. Each participant may have multiple types, and different types may have different utility functions. There is a cooperative type , non-cooperative type , participants Only one type of collaboration . Participants were assigned to types by natural N randomization.

[0121] The fourth step is to obtain the participant type space and type combination space. The participant type space refers to the set of all types that a participant may have, and the type combination space refers to the set of all possible combinations of participant types. Type space , the type space of participant B , the type combination space can be expressed as

[0122] Step 5: Determine the participant action set and introduce attack messages The participant action set refers to the set of all possible behaviors (also called actions) that the participants can take during the execution of the protocol. Action Set and participants Action Set Composition can be expressed as:

[0123]

[0124] in, Indicates sending a message , 、 Represents participants and participants Execute the operation of withdrawing from the agreement, Indicates the first message in the protocol It's an attack message.

[0125] Step 6: Determine participant beliefs.

[0126] yes The probability distribution on can be expressed as:

[0127]

[0128] Participants The belief is The probability distribution over (the probability μ of participant B sending m2 and the probability (1-μ) of exiting the protocol) is expressed as:

[0129]

[0130] Participants The belief is made The probability distribution on is expressed as:

[0131]

[0132] in, express The probability that type participant A sends m1 is 1- express Type participant A sends an attack message The probability of express The probability that type participant A sends m1 is 1- express Type participant A sends an attack message The probability of . Similarly, express The probability that type participant A sends m3 under the premise of sending m1 is 1- express The probability that type participant A chooses to exit the protocol after sending m1, express The probability that type participant A sends m3 under the premise of sending m1 is 1- express The probability that type participant A chooses to exit the protocol given that he sends m1.

[0133] In addition, participants Based on maximizing their own interests, participants There should also be the following beliefs:

[0134]

[0135] The seventh step is to determine the strategies of the participants. Strategy refers to the actions taken by the participants during the game. Strategy combination It can be expressed as:

[0136] Participants Pure strategy (This means that only the actions taken by participant A as the execution subject are considered, and the actions taken by participant B as the execution subject are not included) can be represented by a tuple:

[0137]

[0138] in, and The corresponding elements in represent the participants The optional actions in the first and third rounds of the game in the protocol, The corresponding elements in represent participants are cooperative and non-cooperative pure strategies respectively. After expansion, we can get:

[0139]

[0140] Similarly, participants Pure strategy (referring to the actions taken by participant B as the executive body) can be expressed as:

[0141]

[0142] in, The elements in the An optional action during the second step of a protocol.

[0143] The eighth step is to determine the participant action sequence. The participant action sequence refers to the order of a series of actions that the participants may take during the execution of the protocol. These sequences describe all possible paths from the beginning to the end of the protocol, including the interactive behaviors of all participants. It can be expressed as:

[0144]

[0145] The ninth step is to determine the information set. It describes the information that the participants have at a specific decision point. In the above protocol, the participants Actions are taken only in the first and third rounds of the game. In the first round of the game, there is no prior information to refer to, so the players Information collection , participants In the third round of the game, only the participants were observed implement After that, you can update your own information set:

[0146]

[0147] Participants In the second round of the game, the players take action and cannot know Type, so the participants The information set is represented as:

[0148]

[0149] Step 10: Construct a utility function and introduce a penalty value (The purpose is to reduce the possibility of protocol participants sending attack messages, safeguard the interests of the other party, and promote the agreement.) The utility function is to measure the benefits or satisfaction of each participant under a given strategy combination, usually expressed as For a given terminal action sequence , participants The utility function can be expressed as: ,in 、 Participants Execute terminal action sequence gains and losses (costs).

[0150] Action sequence at each terminal , cooperation type The net income is as follows:

[0151]

[0152] Similarly, 、 The net income can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3.

[0153] Table 2 The profit matrix

[0154]

[0155] Table 3 The profit matrix

[0156]

[0157] The eleventh step is to construct the protocol game tree (Buttyan model game tree). Combined with the improved Buttyan model, the rational electronic contract signing agreement (that is, the rational exchange agreement in the first step above) can be represented as a game tree. For details, please refer to Figure 5 .

[0158] S30, based on the benefits obtained by each participant from acting according to different strategies, determining that the first participant sends a target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol The first condition that needs to be satisfied by the probability of the second participant to be satisfied, and the second condition that needs to be satisfied by the benefit of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol. When the first and second conditions are met, the rational exchange protocol is reached;

[0159] Optionally, in S30 above, determining the first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, and the second condition that must be satisfied for the benefit of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, includes:

[0160] S301, for a first participant, when the payoff corresponding to taking a first action sequence is not less than the payoff corresponding to taking a second action sequence, determining the first condition, wherein the first action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the first round of the game, the second participant sending a true message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the third round of the game; the second action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending an attack message to the second participant during the first round of the game, and if the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sending a target message including a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant choosing to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0161] S302: For the second participant, when the corresponding benefit of the second participant sending a target message including a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game is greater than 0, determine the second condition.

[0162] The first and second conditions are both determined based on the goal of maximizing the benefits of the first and second participants. Specifically, continuing with the previous example, the specific process of determining the first and second conditions is as follows:

[0163] Step 12: Action Sequence in Buttyan Model and For participants The income is 、 , participants Participants will Sending false messages And be punished, assuming false information Can be used by participants From the perspective of rational participants, Identified false news It does not need to be considered because the participants They will always choose to withdraw from the agreement to protect their own interests. Identified false news, to participants Therefore, the unidentified false news is the focus of this analysis.

[0164] Different strategies correspond to different benefits. The following will be and participants The expected returns under different pure strategies (in this solution, expected returns are used as returns) are analyzed. , the corresponding expected returns under different pure strategies can be expressed as:

[0165]

[0166] From the above expected returns, we can get that when The type is When participants To comply with the rules of the agreement and not commit fraud, you only need to:

[0167]

[0168]

[0169] Right now , where μ represents the probability that the second participant B sends m2. When participant A sends an attack message to participant B, m2 is the target message, that is, the message containing a copy of the attack message. When participant A sends a message to participant B that does not contain an attack message, that is, a true message, m2 does not contain a copy of the attack message but a copy of the true message. As the first condition.

[0170] when When unchanged, increase the penalty value , The larger the value, the more participants Send a message The probability of an attack will increase, making it more likely that an agreement will be reached. Therefore, appropriately increasing the penalty for sending attack messages during the contract signing process can effectively encourage participants to comply with the agreement. However, excessively high penalties can also be counterproductive, as participants may be deterred by the high penalties and thus shy away from participating, affecting the chances of reaching an agreement.

[0171] When the penalty value Reduce costs while keeping the same , Therefore, when a small contract is signed (participants low cost), participants More likely to abide by the agreement. However, when it comes to signing large contracts, participants We should be more cautious and improve our ability to identify false information to ensure that both parties abide by the agreement as much as possible. This will not only help protect our own interests, but also help maintain the fairness and effectiveness of the contract.

[0172] Similarly, when participants The type is When satisfied Only then will they be more willing to abide by the terms of the agreement and not commit fraud.

[0173] For participants , the corresponding expected returns under different pure strategies are:

[0174]

[0175] You can Record , to participate Comply with the agreement, only .

[0176] Right now ,Will As the second condition.

[0177] As an example, 、 、 、 、 、 Given a set of data, , , , , , , we can calculate =0.6285. 、 The four groups of examples are shown in Table 4.

[0178] Table 4 、 Instance Table

[0179]

[0180] The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 4:

[0181] when When it is fixed, the cost-benefit ratio should be reduced as much as possible , that is, increase revenue , reduce costs .when When the cost-benefit ratio of After weighing the pros and cons, they will be more inclined to exchange signatures. On the one hand, increasing the benefits will make participants Seeing more profit space and development opportunities has increased the motivation to participate; on the other hand, reducing costs has reduced the participation of participants. This combined effect will effectively increase the probability of reaching agreements and the efficiency of their execution, promoting cooperation and mutual benefit between the two parties.

[0182] when When fixed, increase value, that is, to increase the participants For participants The level of trust of participants This is another important factor in facilitating the conclusion of an agreement.

[0183] See also Figure 8 and Figure 9 , participants In the first condition, participants Under the second condition, adopt the corresponding strategy diagram. and Only when these conditions are met simultaneously will both parties be willing to comply with the agreement. To ensure the cooperation of both parties during the signing of an electronic contract, the agreement should include appropriate penalties for sending attack messages, while also improving users' ability to identify false messages. Furthermore, establishing a trust mechanism within the agreement can further enhance both parties' willingness to comply.

[0184] S40: Based on the first condition and the second condition, the rational electronic contract signing agreement to be processed is processed.

[0185] The above process for handling rational electronic contract signing agreements can be found in Figure 6 The processing process shown in Figure 6 In the process of processing the rational electronic contract signing agreement, it is necessary to define (which can be understood as obtaining) the participant types and beliefs, determine the action sequence and information set, etc., and construct the utility function based on the same processing method as the rational interaction agreement in the previous article. Based on this information, the expected benefits are calculated. Then, based on the expected benefits, it is judged whether participant A meets the conditions for complying with the agreement (whether μ meets the first condition). If μ meets the conditions, it is then judged whether participant B meets the conditions for complying with the agreement ( Whether the second condition is met), if μ is not satisfied, then the exit protocol operation is executed. If the agreement is reached, If not satisfied, the protocol exit operation will be executed.

[0186] This solution also provides a simulation verification module, and UPPAAL Stratego can be used as a verification tool. UPPAAL Stratego is a policy-based verification tool that integrates with the UPPAAL model checker to analyze and verify real-time system models. UPPAAL Stratego allows users to define and explore different strategies to ensure that system models meet specific performance and safety requirements. It is particularly suitable for complex systems that need to consider multiple runtime decisions. In this application solution, the verification process is as follows:

[0187] Step 1: Abstract the above protocol interaction process (dynamic game process) into an automaton model.

[0188] Define states: Identify all states that occur during a rational protocol interaction. These states can be various stages in the protocol, such as initialization, waiting, exchange, completion, etc.

[0189] Define transitions: Define transitions between states. Transitions are typically triggered by events, which can be actions within the protocol or external conditions. For example, when one party sends a request, the state might transition from "Waiting" to "Exchange."

[0190] Define inputs and outputs: For automata models, you need to define inputs and outputs. Inputs can be actions taken by protocol participants, and outputs can be state changes or outcomes of the protocol.

[0191] Define the initial state and accepting states: Determine the initial state of the automaton, which is the state at the beginning of the protocol. At the same time, define which states are accepting states, indicating that the protocol has successfully completed or reached a certain goal.

[0192] Build the automaton: Use the above definitions to build the automaton model. This can be done with graphical tools or programmatically to visualize the states and transitions.

[0193] Step 2: Select the security attributes that need to be verified and describe them using LTL formulas.

[0194] Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a logic used to describe and verify the time-varying behavior of systems. It is particularly well-suited for model checking, where it is used to formally specify and verify the properties of concurrent and distributed systems, hardware designs, and more. LTL extends propositional logic by adding a set of time-related quantifiers, enabling the expression of assertions about the future behavior of a system.

[0195] The following is the language that the validator understands

[0196] E<>p: There exists a path where p eventually holds.

[0197] A[]p: For all paths, p always holds.

[0198] E[]p: There exists a path where p always holds.

[0199] A<>p: For all paths, p will eventually hold.

[0200] p-->q: Whenever p holds, q will eventually hold.

[0201] Where p and q are state formulas, for example (P1.cs and x<3).

[0202] Step 3: Input the formula into UPPAAL to obtain the verification result of whether the attribute is met.

[0203] Compared with the prior art, the solution of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0204] 1. By incorporating participant types and beliefs through Bayesian game theory, we enhance real-world uncertainty. This technology extends the traditional Buttyan model, enabling it to more accurately simulate real-world uncertainty and information asymmetry. This improvement enables the model to more realistically reflect the decision-making process of participants under uncertainty, thereby improving its practicality and accuracy.

[0205] 2. Introduce attack messages to improve the security of the protocol.

[0206] By introducing attack messages, this technology enhances the model's ability to analyze potential fraudulent activity, improves the security of rational exchange protocols, and increases the probability of agreement completion, providing a solid foundation for the reliability of electronic transactions. By simulating the sending and receiving of attack messages, the model more realistically reflects real-world transaction environments.

[0207] 3. Automated verification tools based on Uppaal Stratego improve accuracy and credibility.

[0208] Leveraging the Uppaal Stratego formal verification tool, this solution enables automated simulation verification of rational exchange protocols, ensuring they meet predetermined security properties. This automated verification approach improves efficiency and accuracy, enhances the credibility of verification results, reduces the subjectivity and incompleteness of manual analysis, and helps identify potential flaws in protocol design, enabling them to be corrected before deployment. This solution has broad application in a variety of fields, including electronic contracts, micropayment systems, secure communications, online voting, and auctions, improving transaction security while reducing reliance on trusted third parties.

[0209] Based on Figure 1 The same principle as the method shown in , the embodiment of the present invention also provides a rational exchange protocol processing device 20, such as Figure 10 As shown in , the rational exchange protocol processing device 20 may include an acquisition module 210, a dynamic game module 220, a condition determination module 230 and a protocol processing module 240, wherein:

[0210] An acquisition module 210 is configured to acquire a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and both the first participant and the second participant are rational;

[0211] A dynamic game module 220 is configured to conduct a dynamic game based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and obtain the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies;

[0212] The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages.

[0213] In a dynamic game, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0214] A condition determination module 230 is configured to determine, based on the benefits obtained by each participant from acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of a first participant sending a target message when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of a second participant when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol. When the first and second conditions are satisfied, the rational exchange protocol is concluded.

[0215] The agreement processing module 240 is used to process the signing agreement of the rational electronic contract to be processed based on the first condition and the second condition.

[0216] Optionally, the type of the first participant is a cooperative type or a non-cooperative type, and the type of the second participant is a cooperative type.

[0217] Optionally, the dynamic game module 220 is specifically configured to:

[0218] Based on the rational exchange protocol, a participant set, a participant action set, a participant action sequence set, an information set, a participant function, a preference relationship, a participant type, and a participant belief are obtained;

[0219] A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, where each participant acts according to a different strategy to obtain a game result, and all actions in the participant's action set include sending an action containing an attack message;

[0220] Construct a utility function and introduce a penalty value to calculate the benefits each participant gets from taking actions according to different strategies;

[0221] According to the participant set, participant action set, participant action sequence set, information set, participant function, preference relationship, participant type, participant belief, the game results obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, and the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model is constructed.

[0222] Optionally, the first participant is a customer, the second participant is a merchant, and the purpose of the dynamic game is to exchange the item used by the first participant for exchange with the item used by the second participant for exchange, and to maximize the benefit of each participant.

[0223] Optionally, the condition determination module 230, when determining, based on the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol, is specifically configured to:

[0224] For the first participant, the first condition is determined when the payoff corresponding to taking the first action sequence is not less than the payoff corresponding to taking the second action sequence, wherein the first action sequence is that the first participant sends a true message to the second participant during the first round of the game, the second participant sends a true message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant sends a true message to the second participant during the third round of the game; the second action sequence is that the first participant sends an attack message to the second participant during the first round of the game, and if the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game;

[0225] For the second participant, when the corresponding payoff of the second participant sending a target message including a copy of an attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game is greater than 0, the second condition is determined.

[0226] The rational exchange protocol processing device of the embodiment of the present invention can execute the rational exchange protocol processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention. The implementation principle is similar. The actions performed by each module and unit in the rational exchange protocol processing device in each embodiment of the present invention correspond to the steps in the rational exchange protocol processing method in each embodiment of the present invention. For the detailed functional description of each module of the rational exchange protocol processing device, please refer to the description in the corresponding rational exchange protocol processing method shown in the previous text, which will not be repeated here.

[0227] Among them, the above-mentioned rational exchange protocol processing device can be a computer program (including program code) running in a computer device, for example, the rational exchange protocol processing device is an application software; the device can be used to execute the corresponding steps in the method provided in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0228] In some embodiments, the rational exchange protocol processing device provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented in a combination of software and hardware. As an example, the rational exchange protocol processing device provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be a processor in the form of a hardware decoding processor, which is programmed to execute the rational exchange protocol processing method provided by the embodiment of the present invention. For example, the processor in the form of a hardware decoding processor can adopt one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), DSPs, programmable logic devices (PLDs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other electronic components.

[0229] In other embodiments, the rational exchange protocol processing device provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented in software. Figure 10 A rational exchange protocol processing device stored in a memory is shown, which can be software in the form of a program and a plug-in, and includes a series of modules, including an acquisition module 210, a dynamic game module 220, a condition determination module 230 and a protocol processing module 240, for implementing the rational exchange protocol processing method provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0230] Based on the same principle as the method shown in the embodiments of the present invention, an electronic device is also provided in the embodiments of the present invention, which may include but is not limited to: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer programs; the processor is used to execute the method shown in any embodiment of the present invention by calling the computer program.

[0231] In an alternative embodiment, an electronic device is provided, such as Figure 11 As shown, Figure 11 The electronic device 4000 shown includes: a processor 4001 and a memory 4003. The processor 4001 and the memory 4003 are connected, for example, via a bus 4002. Optionally, the electronic device 4000 may further include a transceiver 4004, which can be used for data exchange between the electronic device and other electronic devices, such as data transmission and / or data reception. It should be noted that in actual applications, the number of transceivers 4004 is not limited to one, and the structure of the electronic device 4000 does not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of the present invention.

[0232] Processor 4001 can be a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a general-purpose processor, a DSP (Digital Signal Processor), an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It can implement or execute the various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the present disclosure. Processor 4001 can also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, or a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor.

[0233] Bus 4002 may include a path for transmitting information between the above components. Bus 4002 may be a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus. Bus 4002 may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 11 Only one thick line is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0234] The memory 4003 may be a ROM (Read Only Memory) or other type of static storage device that can store static information and instructions, a RAM (Random Access Memory) or other type of dynamic storage device that can store information and instructions, or an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read Only Memory) or other optical disk storage, optical disk storage (including compact discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), a magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.

[0235] The memory 4003 is used to store application code (computer program) for executing the solution of the present invention, and is controlled by the processor 4001. The processor 4001 is used to execute the application code stored in the memory 4003 to implement the content shown in the above method embodiment.

[0236] Among them, the electronic device can also be a terminal device, Figure 11 The electronic device shown is only an example and should not limit the functions and scope of use of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0237] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed on a computer, the computer can execute the corresponding content of the aforementioned method embodiments. According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer program product or computer program is also provided. The computer program product or computer program includes computer instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium. A processor of a computer device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium and executes the computer instructions, causing the computer device to execute the methods provided in the various implementations of the aforementioned embodiments.

[0238] It should be understood that the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the possible implementation architecture, functions and operations of the methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each box in the flowchart or block diagram can represent a module, program segment, or a part of code, and the module, program segment, or a part of code contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the box can also occur in a different order than the order marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two boxes represented in succession can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each box in the block diagram and / or flowchart, and the combination of the boxes in the block diagram and / or flowchart, can be implemented using a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or operation, or can be implemented using a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0239] The computer-readable storage medium provided by the embodiments of the present invention may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media may include, but are not limited to, an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. In the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, device, or device.

[0240] The computer-readable storage medium carries one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by the electronic device, the electronic device executes the method shown in the above embodiment.

[0241] The above description is merely an illustration of preferred embodiments of the present invention and the underlying technical principles. Those skilled in the art should understand that the scope of the present invention is not limited to technical solutions formed by specific combinations of the aforementioned technical features. It also encompasses other technical solutions formed by any combination of the aforementioned technical features or their equivalents, without departing from the aforementioned concepts. For example, a technical solution formed by replacing the aforementioned features with (but not limited to) technical features with similar functions disclosed in this invention.

Claims

1. A rational exchange protocol processing method, characterized in that: include: Obtaining a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and the first participant and the second participant are both rational; A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies are obtained. The improved Buttyan model is a Buttyan model that introduces participant types, participant beliefs, and attack messages; The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages. In a dynamic game, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during a first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during a second round of the game. The first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during a third round of the game. The first participant's corresponding gain does not include a penalty value, and the second participant's corresponding gain is a loss cost. The penalty value refers to the penalty value incurred by the first participant when the first participant sends the attack message to the second participant during the first round of the game and the attack message is recognized by the second participant in the second round of the game. The loss cost refers to the gain received by the second participant when the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game. Based on the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of the first participant sending the target message when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol is determined, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of the second participant when complying with the protocol rules in the rational exchange protocol is determined. When the first and second conditions are met, the rational exchange protocol is concluded. Based on the first condition and the second condition, the processing of the rational electronic contract signing agreement to be processed is realized; The first condition that needs to be satisfied for the probability of a first participant sending a target message when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, and the second condition that needs to be satisfied for the benefit of a second participant when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, based on the benefit obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, include: For the first participant, the first condition is determined when the payoff corresponding to taking a first action sequence is not less than the payoff corresponding to taking a second action sequence, wherein the first action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the first round of the game, the second participant sending a true message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant sending a true message to the second participant during the third round of the game; the second action sequence is an action sequence formed by the first participant sending an attack message to the second participant during the first round of the game, and if the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sending a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant choosing to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game; For the second participant, when the corresponding payoff of the second participant sending a target message including a copy of an attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game is greater than 0, the second condition is determined.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The type of the first participant is a cooperative type or a non-cooperative type, and the type of the second participant is a cooperative type.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The dynamic game based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol is performed to obtain a Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and at the same time, the game results and benefits obtained by each participant according to different strategies are obtained, including: Based on the rational exchange protocol, a participant set, a participant action set, a participant action sequence set, an information set, a participant function, a preference relationship, a participant type, and a participant belief are obtained; A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, where each participant acts according to a different strategy to obtain a game result, and all actions in the participant's action set include sending an action containing an attack message; Construct a utility function and introduce a penalty value to calculate the benefits each participant gets from taking actions according to different strategies; According to the participant set, participant action set, participant action sequence set, information set, participant function, preference relationship, participant type, participant belief, the game results obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, and the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model is constructed.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The first participant is a customer, the second participant is a merchant, and the purpose of the dynamic game is to exchange the item used by the first participant for exchange with the item used by the second participant for exchange, and each participant maximizes the benefit.

5. A rational exchange protocol processing device, characterized in that The method for processing a rational exchange protocol according to claim 1 is adopted, wherein the device comprises: an acquisition module, configured to acquire a rational exchange agreement, wherein the rational exchange agreement includes a first participant and a second participant, and both the first participant and the second participant are rational; A dynamic game module is used to conduct dynamic games based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, obtain the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model, and obtain the game results and benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies; The dynamic game process is a process in which each participant takes actions according to different strategies and obtains game results and benefits. An action is an action in which one of the two participants sends different types of messages to the other participant or withdraws from the agreement. Different types of messages include real messages and attack messages. In a dynamic game, when a first participant sends an attack message to a second participant during the first round of the game, and the attack message is not recognized by the second participant, the second participant sends a target message containing a copy of the attack message to the first participant during the second round of the game, and the first participant chooses to withdraw from the protocol during the third round of the game; a condition determination module, configured to determine, based on the benefits obtained by each participant from acting according to different strategies, a first condition that must be satisfied for the probability of a first participant sending a target message when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, and a second condition that must be satisfied for the benefits of a second participant when complying with the protocol rules of the rational exchange protocol, wherein the rational exchange protocol is concluded when the first and second conditions are satisfied; The agreement processing module is used to process the rational electronic contract signing agreement based on the first condition and the second condition.

6. The device according to claim 5, characterized in that The type of the first participant is a cooperative type or a non-cooperative type, and the type of the second participant is a cooperative type.

7. The device according to claim 6, characterized in that The dynamic game module is specifically used to: Based on the rational exchange protocol, a participant set, a participant action set, a participant action sequence set, an information set, a participant function, a preference relationship, a participant type, and a participant belief are obtained; A dynamic game is conducted based on the improved Buttyan model and the rational exchange protocol, where each participant acts according to a different strategy to obtain a game result, and all actions in the participant's action set include sending an action containing an attack message; Construct a utility function and introduce a penalty value to calculate the benefits each participant gets from taking actions according to different strategies; According to the participant set, participant action set, participant action sequence set, information set, participant function, preference relationship, participant type, participant belief, the game results obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, and the benefits obtained by each participant acting according to different strategies, the Buttyan model game tree corresponding to the improved Buttyan model is constructed.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that: The method comprises a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 when executing the computer program.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 is implemented.

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