Password anti-theft method and device, equipment, storage medium and product
By displaying random obfuscated patterns in the password input area of the password input device and using a heat dissipation device, the problem of high-definition cameras secretly recording passwords is solved, achieving a balance between enhanced security and convenience.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202511489101.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-10-17
- Publication Date
- 2026-01-27
Smart Images
Figure CN121412974A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of financial technology or other related fields, and in particular to a method, apparatus, device, storage medium and product for preventing password theft. Background Technology
[0002] Password input devices are critical human-computer interaction interfaces in financial security systems, widely used in ATMs, POS terminals, and other similar scenarios. Their core components are typically physical keypads or touchscreen virtual keyboards. Users input a personal identification number (PIN) by pressing keys in designated input areas (such as the numeric keypad) to complete identity verification and transaction authorization. These devices directly handle highly sensitive user confidential information, and their security is directly related to the safety of user funds and personal information; therefore, they have always been a key focus of financial security technology.
[0003] To address potential risks during password input, the industry has proposed various protective technologies. The mainstream solutions fall into two main categories: one is a physical privacy shield, which involves adding a flanged shield above the keyboard to physically block onlookers from directly observing the input process; the other is a virtual keypad, which randomly arranges the keys on the screen, dynamically changing each time input is made, aiming to prevent attackers from stealing passwords by memorizing key positions or observing fixed finger movements.
[0004] Despite the aforementioned measures, existing solutions remain ineffective against attacks based on advanced surreptitious photography techniques, posing a significant security challenge. The issue of visual trajectory leakage is particularly prominent. Criminals can conceal high-definition cameras near password input devices, clearly recording the movement of a user's fingers and the precise placement of keys while entering a password. This attack method does not rely on cracking encryption algorithms but directly intercepts visible password information at the source, resulting in an extremely high success rate. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This application provides a method, device, equipment, storage medium, and product for preventing password theft, in order to solve the technical problem that criminals can steal passwords by installing high-definition cameras to capture the movement trajectory of a user's finger when entering a password.
[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a method for preventing password theft, the method being applied to a password input device, the password input device including a password input area for inputting a password, the method comprising:
[0007] In response to the user's target operation on the password input area, a corresponding random obfuscation pattern is generated according to a preset period.
[0008] The generated random obfuscation patterns are sequentially displayed in the password input area so that the camera device obfuscates the movement trajectory of the user's finger when capturing the movement trajectory of the finger in the password input area.
[0009] Secondly, this application provides a password anti-theft device, which is applied to a password input device, the password input device including a password input area for inputting a password, the device comprising:
[0010] The pattern generation module is used to generate a corresponding random obfuscation pattern according to a preset period in response to a user's target operation on the password input area.
[0011] The pattern display module is used to sequentially display the generated random obfuscation pattern in the password input area, so that when the camera device captures the movement trajectory of the user's finger in the password input area, the movement trajectory is obfuscated.
[0012] Thirdly, this application provides an electronic device, including: a processor, and a memory communicatively connected to the processor;
[0013] The memory stores computer-executed instructions;
[0014] The processor executes computer execution instructions stored in the memory to implement the method as described in the first aspect.
[0015] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, are used to implement the method described in the first aspect.
[0016] Fifthly, this application provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the first aspect.
[0017] The password anti-theft method, device, equipment, storage medium, and product provided in this application have the following technical effects:
[0018] This method generates different random obfuscation patterns at preset intervals, creating visual interference in the password input area. This significantly disrupts the integrity of the finger movement trajectory in the image captured by the hidden camera, making it impossible for criminals to clearly identify and track the finger movement from the video recording. This fundamentally prevents the risk of stealing passwords by analyzing visual trajectories. Furthermore, this protection measure does not require changing the user's existing input habits or keyboard layout, nor does it require the user to learn new operating methods. While significantly improving security, it ensures the smoothness and convenience of the password input process. Based on image generation and rendering technology, this method does not rely on specific keyboard physical structures or materials, possessing good versatility and can be widely applied to various touchscreen devices, physical keyboard terminals, and other password input scenarios. Attached Figure Description
[0019] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.
[0020] Figure 1 Flowchart of the password anti-theft method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 1 ;
[0021] Figure 2 Flowchart of the password anti-theft method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 2 ;
[0022] Figure 3 This is a schematic flowchart of a method for generating random obfuscation patterns provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0023] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a method for cooling buttons using a heat dissipation control device provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0024] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a fast heat dissipation button structure provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0025] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the password anti-theft device provided in the embodiments of this application;
[0026] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the electronic device structure provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0027] The accompanying drawings illustrate specific embodiments of this application, which will be described in more detail below. These drawings and descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of the concept in any way, but rather to illustrate the concept of this application to those skilled in the art through reference to particular embodiments. Detailed Implementation
[0028] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with this application. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of this application as detailed in the appended claims.
[0029] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. Furthermore, the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure, and application of the relevant data all comply with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards of the relevant countries and regions, have taken necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation access points for users to choose to authorize or refuse.
[0030] It should be noted that the password anti-theft methods, devices, equipment, storage media and products provided in this application can be used in the field of financial technology, or in any field other than financial technology. The application fields of the password anti-theft methods, devices, equipment, storage media and products in this application are not limited.
[0031] To address the problem of stealing passwords by installing high-definition cameras to capture the movement of a user's fingers while entering the password, the inventors considered displaying a confusing pattern in the password input area of the password input device. This confusing pattern acts like camouflage as the user's fingers enter the password. Even if the camera records the password input process, because it simultaneously captures both the finger and the confusing pattern, the pattern obscures the finger's movement, making it impossible for criminals to clearly identify the finger's trajectory. Therefore, the technical concept of this application is:
[0032] The technical solution of this application and how the technical solution of this application solves the above-mentioned technical problems are described in detail below with specific embodiments. These specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be described again in some embodiments. The embodiments of this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0033] Example 1
[0034] This embodiment provides a method for preventing password theft. The method is applied to a password input device, which includes a password input area for inputting passwords. It should be noted that the password input device can be, for example, an ATM, a POS (point of sale) terminal, an access control system and control panel (access authorization device for high-security places such as companies and laboratories), a smart door lock, a mobile terminal device, etc. The password input area of the password input device can be, for example, a physical key array with numbers (0-9) and function keys (confirm, cancel) on an ATM or POS machine, or a virtual keyboard display area rendered on a touch screen device.
[0035] Figure 1 Flowchart of the password anti-theft method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 1 ,like Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:
[0036] S101. In response to the user's target operation on the password input area, generate a corresponding random obfuscation pattern according to a preset period.
[0037] Specifically, this step involves the user's target action on the password input area, such as the user's finger approaching or touching the password input area, which is detected by a capacitive or infrared sensor installed in the password input device. After detecting the target action, the password input device can immediately start a timer to cyclically execute the pattern generation step at a fixed preset period (e.g., 0.3 seconds).
[0038] The pattern generation step could be, for example, at the beginning of each cycle, the processor of the password input device calls a lightweight pseudo-random algorithm (e.g., a linear congruential generator LCG or a random image selected from a pre-generated library of large random images) to quickly generate a brand new, high-contrast random obfuscation pattern, which could be random spots, irregular stripes, rapidly changing color blocks, or any meaningless visual noise.
[0039] S102. The generated random obfuscation patterns are displayed sequentially in the password input area so that the camera device obfuscates the movement trajectory of the user's finger when capturing the movement trajectory of the finger in the password input area.
[0040] In this step, for password input areas with physical buttons, a random obfuscation pattern can be displayed on a semi-transparent screen located below the physical buttons. Alternatively, a projection device can be placed above the physical buttons to project the random obfuscation pattern onto them. For touchscreen devices, the random obfuscation pattern can be directly rendered as the UI background. By generating random obfuscation patterns at preset intervals and sequentially displaying these patterns on the password input area, the random obfuscation pattern on the password input area changes continuously and rapidly. Furthermore, after the user finishes inputting and removes their finger, the sensor detects the end of the operation, the system stops the timer, clears the random obfuscation pattern from the password input area, and returns to standby mode.
[0041] It should be noted that the reason why random obfuscation patterns do not interfere with users' password input is mainly due to the following reasons:
[0042] Selective attention: When a user enters a password, their cognitive focus is highly concentrated on the position of their fingers and the specific key to be pressed. This is an active and purposeful behavior. The dynamically changing background pattern is outside the visual focus (i.e., outside the focal point) and is automatically filtered by the human brain as irrelevant background information, which does not affect the user's positioning of their fingers and key.
[0043] Dynamic visual adaptation: The human eye has a strong ability to adapt to dynamic changes. Although the pattern changes, the physical position of the keys or the border of the virtual keys remains unchanged. This provides users with a stable visual reference system. Users rely on muscle memory and the absolute position of the key layout, rather than the background.
[0044] Visual persistence and information integration: When processing rapidly changing images, the human eye experiences a brief visual persistence effect and can automatically integrate continuous information, filtering out high-frequency jitter, thereby stably perceiving the foreground (fingers and keys).
[0045] The reason why randomized patterns can interfere with camera equipment (covert cameras) is that:
[0046] Cameras record indiscriminately: Hidden cameras are passive recording devices that faithfully record all visual information within their field of view. They have no "attention" to speak of, and each frame of the image they generate is a superposition of the foreground (finger) and the background (confusing pattern).
[0047] Inconsistency between frames: The purpose of the covert photography is to track the movement trajectory of the finger by analyzing consecutive video frames. This method makes the background completely different in each frame. When the attacker tries to separate the clear finger movement trajectory through image processing algorithms (such as frame difference method, background subtraction), he will find that the drastic changes in the background produce a lot of artifacts and noise, making it impossible to effectively separate the continuous and clean foreground target (finger).
[0048] Feature extraction is difficult: Computer vision algorithms rely on extracting stable feature points from images for tracking. Rapidly changing random noise backgrounds introduce a large number of false feature points in each frame, making real feature points (such as fingertips) extremely unstable and causing the tracking algorithm to fail.
[0049] The password anti-theft method provided in this embodiment has the following technical effects:
[0050] This method generates different random obfuscation patterns at preset intervals, creating visual interference in the password input area. This significantly disrupts the integrity of the finger movement trajectory in the image captured by the hidden camera, making it impossible for criminals to clearly identify and track the finger movement from the video recording. This fundamentally prevents the risk of stealing passwords by analyzing visual trajectories. Furthermore, this protection measure does not require changing the user's existing input habits or keyboard layout, nor does it require the user to learn new operating methods. While significantly improving security, it ensures the smoothness and convenience of the password input process. Based on image generation and rendering technology, this method does not rely on specific keyboard physical structures or materials, possessing good versatility and can be widely applied to various touchscreen devices, physical keyboard terminals, and other password input scenarios.
[0051] Example 2
[0052] This embodiment provides a method for preventing password theft. The method is applied to a password input device with a heat dissipation device. It should be noted that the heat dissipation device can be, for example, a miniature fan, an airflow generator, a Peltier element (thermoelectric cooler), or a phase change material heat dissipation unit.
[0053] A Peltier element is a precision, advanced active cooling device that utilizes the Peltier effect for cooling. Its working principle is as follows: when current flows through a circuit composed of two different conductors, heat absorption or release occurs at the junction. The element is attached to a heat-conducting path (such as a copper-aluminum alloy plate). When auxiliary cooling is needed, current is applied, causing its cold end to actively absorb heat conducted from the button, and then the heat is dissipated to the outside of the device through its hot end and an additional cooling system. This element offers advantages such as precise temperature control, no moving parts, quiet operation, and reliability, enabling rapid, targeted cooling.
[0054] A phase change material (PCM) heat dissipation unit is a passive / semi-passive device that utilizes a material's phase change process (such as changing from solid to liquid) to absorb a large amount of heat, serving as a buffer-type auxiliary heat dissipation. Its working principle is as follows: a specific PCM material (such as paraffin wax) is encapsulated and placed within a heat conduction path. When the button temperature rises, the PCM material absorbs heat and melts, storing the heat as latent heat to prevent a rapid temperature increase. When the user ends operation and the system enters an idle state, the heat is slowly released into the environment through the active and passive heat dissipation system, and the material re-solidifies.
[0055] Figure 2 Flowchart of the password anti-theft method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 2 ,like Figure 2 As shown, the method includes:
[0056] S201. In response to the user's target operation on the password input area, generate a corresponding random obfuscation pattern according to a preset period, and detect the current temperature value of the key used for password input in the password input area.
[0057] In this step, the user's target operation on the password input area can be, for example, pressing the password input area. After the pressure sensor built into the password input area detects the pressing operation, it triggers the detection of the key temperature value.
[0058] It's important to note that this step typically involves detecting the current temperature of physical buttons, but it can also detect the current temperature of virtual buttons on a touchscreen. When a user enters a password by pressing a button, their body temperature raises the temperature of the pressed button. Criminals could potentially use a thermal camera to detect the residual heat of the buttons and thus crack the password. Therefore, the purpose of detecting the current temperature of the buttons in this step is to identify buttons that have become too hot and to dissipate their heat, thereby preventing residual heat from causing password leaks. Specifically, this can be achieved by placing temperature sensors at the button locations to detect the current temperature of the buttons.
[0059] S202. The generated random obfuscation patterns are displayed sequentially in the password input area so that the camera device obfuscates the movement trajectory of the user's finger when capturing the movement trajectory of the finger in the password input area.
[0060] Optionally, in response to a user's targeted operation on the password input area, a corresponding random obfuscation pattern is generated according to a preset period, including:
[0061] Detects the pressure value of the user pressing the password input area;
[0062] When the pressure value is greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold, detect the duration of the user's press on the password input area;
[0063] If the pressing duration is less than or equal to the preset duration threshold, a random obfuscated pattern is generated.
[0064] Specifically, the above method only triggers subsequent processes when the pressure applied by the user to the password input area is greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold, preventing accidental triggering by the user. Simultaneously, the method checks whether the pressing duration is less than or equal to a preset duration threshold (e.g., 0.5 seconds). This is because human users typically press keys for a short time when entering a password; conversely, if the pressing duration is too long, it could indicate that criminals are using fingerprint collection devices to collect the user's fingerprints left on the keys, thus triggering an alarm mechanism.
[0065] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the method for generating random confusion patterns provided in the embodiments of this application, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the method includes:
[0066] S301. Identify multiple target points in the password input area;
[0067] In this step, the password input area can be viewed as a two-dimensional plane and digitally mapped to a pixel coordinate system. The X-axis and Y-axis of this coordinate system represent the length and width of the key surface, respectively.
[0068] Furthermore, after determining the grid density, the two-dimensional plane can be divided into a dense array of grid points, where each grid point is a "target point," and its position is determined by a unique pair of coordinates (…). ) Determined, among which and These are integer pixel coordinates (e.g., from the top left corner (0,0) to the bottom right corner (800,480)).
[0069] S302. Determine the fractal noise value corresponding to each target point;
[0070] In this step, for each target point ( The processor of the password input device can substitute its coordinate values into the fractal basis function for calculation. The fractal basis function is:
[0071]
[0072] in, Pi The order of the fractal superposition is fixed at 1 to 4.
[0073] Next, the function pair The four orders = 1, 2, 3, and 4 are calculated and summed respectively, where:
[0074] =1 item generates the base ripple with the longest wavelength;
[0075] =Items 2, 3, and 4 add higher frequency and finer texture details in successive steps.
[0076] It should be noted that this multi-level superposition ensures that the generated noise pattern simultaneously contains low-frequency contours and high-frequency details, covering a spatial frequency range of 1-16Hz, effectively interfering with covert photography devices of different focal lengths. The calculation result is a continuous numerical value, which represents the target point ( The corresponding fractal noise value. The noise values of all target points together constitute a continuous mathematical noise field with complex texture.
[0077] S303. Generate a random confusion pattern based on the fractal noise value.
[0078] In this step, the fractal noise value calculated for each target point can be converted into the display grayscale value of that point through a linear mapping function. For example, if the fractal noise value is in the range of 0 to 1, it can be mapped to the standard grayscale value range of 0 to 255.
[0079] Gray value = Fragment noise value × 255;
[0080] As can be seen, the larger the fractal noise value, the higher the corresponding grayscale value. After mapping, points with larger grayscale values are brighter (whiter), and points with smaller grayscale values are darker (blacker). Combining the grayscale values of all target points generates a complete, grayscale fractal noise image in computer memory. This noise image is sent to the display device in the password input area (such as a semi-transparent display screen or a high-resolution LED matrix located below the physical keys) and displayed over the entire password input area. What is ultimately presented to the user and the hidden camera is a constantly changing, complex-textured obfuscated pattern overlaid on the real keys. The above steps, by calculating the fractal noise value of each target point and mapping the fractal noise value to a grayscale value, transform the mathematical fractal geometry algorithm into an effective visual security protection method.
[0081] Further optionally, when the user's finger is detected pressing the password input area, the user's fingerprint data can be obtained, and random noise values can be obtained from the target entropy source. Based on the fractal noise value, random noise value, and fingerprint data, a random obfuscation pattern can be generated.
[0082] Specifically, a capacitive fingerprint sensor array can be integrated into the password input area to acquire the user's fingerprint data. When the user presses their finger on the password input area, a pressure sensor integrated below the input area detects the force signal. The capacitive fingerprint sensor array is then activated and scans the fingertip to generate a matrix of actual fingerprint data. . It is a two-dimensional matrix, with values representing the capacitive sensing intensity of fingerprint ridges and valleys. Simultaneously, the password input device obtains a time-varying white noise function from the target entropy source. Specifically, the target entropy source can be a hardware random number generator (HRNG), which extracts truly random numbers from physical phenomena (such as thermal noise in circuits or quantum effects in semiconductor devices) to ensure the unpredictability and non-repeatability of random noise. The target entropy source can also be the network transmission delay of a password input device; this application does not specifically limit the target entropy source.
[0083] Password input device will , , The mixture is then used to generate the final dynamic noise matrix using the following formula. :
[0084]
[0085] in:
[0086] It is a time variable, and the unit can be seconds;
[0087] The fingerprint data weight can be, for example, 0.15 to 0.25;
[0088] This is a weight for the fractal noise values, for example, it can be 0.7, to ensure that the fractal basis function plays a dominant role in the final generated noise pattern.
[0089] The generated dynamic noise matrix The image can be converted to grayscale using the mapping method provided in this embodiment and displayed in real time in the password input area, covering the entire password input area. The pattern is displayed over time. The system refreshes periodically (e.g., every 0.3 seconds) so that the password input area is always in a rapidly changing and complex visual background as the user's finger enters the password.
[0090] It should be noted that the purpose of using fingerprint data to generate random obfuscation patterns is to make the final obfuscation pattern strongly correlated with the current pressing operation. Since the pressure, angle, and skin moisture of each press are slightly different, the collected fingerprint data will have slight differences. This means that each generated obfuscation pattern is unique, and attackers cannot crack subsequent operations by recording a noisy pattern once.
[0091] Generating random obfuscation patterns using random noise values serves to introduce random noise from the target entropy source, ensuring that the dynamic changes of the noise pattern are completely unpredictable. While fractal basis functions can generate complex static patterns, they are deterministic algorithms. The introduction of random noise completely disrupts any possible periodicity or regularity, making it impossible for attackers to predict subsequent patterns based on preceding ones. Specifically, covert surveillance devices often use algorithms such as frame differencing and background subtraction to track moving targets. These algorithms rely on the temporal correlation of video sequences. A background that changes completely randomly at preset time intervals (e.g., 0.3 seconds) renders the "temporal consistency" assumption upon which these algorithms depend entirely invalid, making it impossible to build an effective background model. This results in a large amount of interference noise, making it impossible to extract clean finger trajectories.
[0092] Optionally, after obtaining the user's fingerprint data, the following fingerprint transmission method can also be performed:
[0093] In response to the fingerprint acquisition request from the target server, obtain random noise values from the target entropy source;
[0094] The fingerprint data and random noise values are mixed to generate hybrid data.
[0095] Send the mixed data to the target server.
[0096] Specifically, since user operations on password input devices may require fingerprint verification, malicious actors could directly obtain the user's original fingerprint image or feature data by implanting malware on the terminal or eavesdropping on data transmission channels. To prevent the leakage of user fingerprint data, an encrypted transmission method combining fingerprint data and random noise is used during transmission. The target entropy source can be a hardware random number generator. After obtaining the random noise value, the mixed data can be generated using the following formula:
[0097]
[0098] in:
[0099] For mixed data;
[0100] This is the curve steepness coefficient (for example, it can be 0.8);
[0101] The confusion factor;
[0102] Noise compensation factor ( =1- );
[0103] It is a natural constant (approximately 2.718);
[0104] For fingerprint data;
[0105] This represents random noise.
[0106] During transmission, the mixed data can first be encrypted with high strength using the AES-256 algorithm. Then, the encrypted data can be transmitted to the target server (such as a bank's back-end system) through a secure channel established by the TLS 1.3 protocol.
[0107] Once the target server receives the data, it decrypts it using the corresponding key to obtain the mixed data, and then uses the corresponding algorithm and key information stored in it to perform user authentication.
[0108] S203. Determine whether the current temperature value is greater than the preset temperature threshold.
[0109] Specifically, the preset temperature threshold in this step can be the ambient temperature + 1℃. If the current temperature value of the button is greater than this temperature threshold, it means that the user may have pressed the button to enter a password.
[0110] If so, then execute S204;
[0111] S204. Control the heat dissipation device to dissipate heat from the buttons;
[0112] In this step, if the current temperature of the button is greater than the preset temperature threshold, it means that the user may have pressed the button. To prevent residual heat from the button from leaking the password, a heat dissipation device (such as a miniature fan) is activated to dissipate heat from the button, eliminate residual heat, and prevent criminals from using thermal cameras to obtain the user's input password.
[0113] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the method for heat dissipation of buttons using a heat dissipation control device provided in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 4 As shown, the method includes:
[0114] S401. Determine the reference heat dissipation coefficient of the button;
[0115] In this step, the reference thermal coefficient of the button can be obtained from a pre-stored data, for example, it can be 25.
[0116] S402. Correct the reference heat dissipation coefficient to obtain the corrected heat dissipation coefficient, which is greater than the reference heat dissipation coefficient.
[0117] Since the current temperature of the key is greater than the preset temperature threshold, indicating a significant risk of residual heat, the password input device immediately initiates correction logic, outputting a corrected heat dissipation coefficient, which is greater than the baseline heat dissipation coefficient. The correction logic could be, for example, the baseline heat dissipation coefficient plus an incremental value, where the incremental value could be, for example, 5.
[0118] S403. Based on the corrected heat dissipation coefficient, control the heat dissipation device to dissipate heat from the button so that the heat dissipation coefficient of the button reaches the corrected heat dissipation coefficient.
[0119] The password input device unit sends the corrected heat dissipation coefficient as a control command to the heat dissipation execution unit. This unit then adjusts the operating state of the heat dissipation device, for example, by increasing the speed of the micro fan or increasing the drive current to the Peltier element, so that the effective heat dissipation intensity of the key surface reaches a higher level required by the corrected heat dissipation coefficient, thereby achieving rapid heat removal.
[0120] Figure 4 The proposed solution can instantly activate a more powerful heat dissipation mode when thermal residue is detected on the key. This rapidly removes the heat, compressing the effective window of thermal imaging attacks to an extremely short time frame and fundamentally eliminating the possibility of stealing passwords through thermal residue analysis.
[0121] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a fast heat dissipation button structure provided in an embodiment of this application. This button can be applied to password input devices, such as... Figure 5 As shown, the button includes a metal heat sink with multiple heat dissipation fins connected to it, and the surface of the metal heat sink has a surface coating that comes into direct contact with the user's fingers.
[0122] Specifically, the metal heat sink can be made of copper-aluminum alloy (with a thickness of, for example, 1mm), thus providing rapid heat dissipation after the user enters the password via the button, preventing residual heat on the button surface from causing password leakage. Multiple heat dissipation fins connected to the metal heat sink further enhance the button's heat dissipation capacity. The surface coating can be a scratch-resistant ceramic coating (e.g., 0.2mm thick).
[0123] Furthermore, the button can integrate a temperature sensor, a pressure sensor, and a capacitive fingerprint sensor to obtain the current temperature value of the button, the pressure value of the user's press, and the user's fingerprint data, adapting to the method provided in the aforementioned embodiments.
[0124] Furthermore, this button can be applied to a password input device. When the device detects an anomaly in the pressure sensor beneath the button—for example, if an attacker attempts to pry open the button panel, physically severing the pressure sensor's connection, or if an attacker attempts to remove or replace the pressure sensor, causing the system to detect sensor failure or unexplained drastic changes in readings (such as a persistent zero reading or exceeding the range)—it immediately and permanently erases sensitive security data stored in the device, such as encryption keys, security certificates, and potentially cached user data. This is achieved by applying a high voltage to specific pins of the memory chip or performing multiple overwrite operations, ensuring the data is unrecoverable.
[0125] The password input device can also initiate data erasure when the temperature sensor of the key is disconnected (this usually occurs when an attacker attempts to remove the ceramic coating or heat-conducting plate on the key surface to directly access or peer into the sensor array underneath, an operation that would inevitably damage the temperature sensor wiring laid therein), that is, immediately erase all critical security data in volatile and non-volatile memory.
[0126] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the password anti-theft device provided in an embodiment of this application. The device 60 is applied to a password input device, which includes a password input area for inputting a password. The device 60 includes:
[0127] The pattern generation module 601 is used to generate a corresponding random obfuscation pattern according to a preset period in response to the user's target operation on the password input area.
[0128] The pattern display module 602 is used to sequentially display the generated random obfuscated patterns in the password input area so that the camera device obfuscates the movement trajectory of the user's finger when capturing the movement trajectory of the finger in the password input area.
[0129] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the electronic device structure provided in the embodiments of this application, such as... Figure 7 As shown, the device 70 includes at least one processor 701 and a memory 702. Optionally, the device 70 also includes a communication component 703. The processor 701, memory 702, and communication component 703 are connected via a bus 704.
[0130] In a specific implementation, at least one processor 701 executes computer execution instructions stored in memory 702, causing at least one processor 701 to perform the above-described method.
[0131] The specific implementation process of processor 701 can be found in the above method embodiments, and its implementation principle and technical effect are similar. It will not be repeated here.
[0132] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above-described method.
[0133] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method.
[0134] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, as some steps may be performed in other orders or simultaneously according to this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are all optional embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to this application.
[0135] It should be further noted that although the steps in the flowchart are shown sequentially according to the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless explicitly stated herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and they can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some steps in the flowchart may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages. These sub-steps or stages are not necessarily completed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be performed alternately or in turn with other steps or at least some of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.
[0136] It should be understood that the above-described device embodiments are merely illustrative, and the device of this application can also be implemented in other ways. For example, the division of units / modules in the above embodiments is only a logical functional division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple units, modules, or components may be combined, or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed.
[0137] Furthermore, unless otherwise specified, the functional units / modules in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one unit / module, or each unit / module can exist physically separately, or two or more units / modules can be integrated together. The integrated units / modules described above can be implemented in hardware or as software program modules.
[0138] When integrated units / modules are implemented in hardware, the hardware can be digital circuits, analog circuits, etc. The physical implementation of the hardware structure includes, but is not limited to, transistors, memristors, etc. Unless otherwise specified, the processor can be any suitable hardware processor, such as a CPU, GPU, FPGA, DSP, and ASIC, etc. Unless otherwise specified, the storage unit can be any suitable magnetic or magneto-optical storage medium, such as Resistive Random Access Memory (RRAM), Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Enhanced Dynamic Random Access Memory (EDRAM), High-Bandwidth Memory (HBM), Hybrid Memory Cube (HMC), etc.
[0139] If the integrated unit / module is implemented as a software program module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage device (CMD). Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a memory and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned memory includes various media capable of storing program code, such as a USB flash drive, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drive, magnetic disk, or optical disk.
[0140] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have their own emphasis. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments. The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as the combination of these technical features does not contradict each other, it should be considered within the scope of this specification.
[0141] Other embodiments of this application will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. This application is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of this application that follow the general principles of this application and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein. The specification and examples are to be considered exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of this application are indicated by the following claims.
[0142] It should be understood that this application is not limited to the precise structure described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of this application is limited only by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A method for preventing password theft, characterized in that, The method is applied to a password input device, the password input device including a password input area for inputting a password, the method comprising: In response to the user's target operation on the password input area, a corresponding random obfuscation pattern is generated according to a preset period. The generated random obfuscation patterns are sequentially displayed in the password input area so that the camera device obfuscates the movement trajectory of the user's finger when capturing the movement trajectory of the finger in the password input area.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of the random confusion pattern includes: Multiple target points are identified in the password input area; Determine the fractal noise value corresponding to each target point; The random confusion pattern is generated based on the fractal noise value.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of generating the random obfuscation pattern based on the fractal noise value includes: Based on the fractal noise value, the grayscale value of the random confusion pattern corresponding to each target point is determined, wherein the larger the fractal noise value corresponding to each target point, the larger the corresponding grayscale value. The random obfuscation pattern is generated based on the grayscale value corresponding to each target point.
4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of generating the random obfuscation pattern based on the fractal noise value includes: When the user's finger is detected pressing the password input area, the user's fingerprint data is acquired; The random obfuscation pattern is generated based on the fractal noise value and the fingerprint data.
5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of generating the random obfuscation pattern based on the fractal noise value and the fingerprint data includes: Obtain random noise values from the target entropy source; The random obfuscation pattern is generated based on the fractal noise value, the random noise value, and the fingerprint data.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1-5, characterized in that, The step of generating a random obfuscation pattern in response to a user's target operation on the password input area of the password input device includes: Detect the pressure value of the user pressing the password input area; If the pressure value is greater than or equal to a preset pressure threshold, the duration of the user's press on the password input area is detected. If the pressing duration is less than or equal to a preset duration threshold, then the random confusion pattern is generated.
7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, After obtaining the user's fingerprint data, the method further includes: In response to the fingerprint acquisition request from the target server, obtain random noise values from the target entropy source; The fingerprint data and the random noise value are mixed to generate mixed data; The mixed data is sent to the target server.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The password input device further includes a heat dissipation device, the password input area includes keys for inputting a password, and the method further includes, in response to a user's target operation on the password input area: Detect the current temperature value of the button; Determine whether the current temperature value is greater than a preset temperature threshold; If so, the heat dissipation device is controlled to dissipate heat from the button.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The control of the heat dissipation device to dissipate heat from the button includes: Determine the reference heat dissipation coefficient of the button; The reference heat dissipation coefficient is corrected to obtain a corrected heat dissipation coefficient, which is greater than the reference heat dissipation coefficient. Based on the corrected heat dissipation coefficient, the heat dissipation device is controlled to dissipate heat from the button so that the heat dissipation coefficient of the button reaches the corrected heat dissipation coefficient.
10. A password anti-theft device, characterized in that, The device is applied to a password input device, the password input device including a password input area for inputting a password, the device comprising: The pattern generation module is used to generate a corresponding random obfuscation pattern according to a preset period in response to a user's target operation on the password input area. The pattern display module is used to sequentially display the generated random obfuscation pattern in the password input area, so that when the camera device captures the movement trajectory of the user's finger in the password input area, the movement trajectory is obfuscated.
11. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: A processor, and a memory communicatively connected to the processor; The memory stores computer-executed instructions; The processor executes computer execution instructions stored in the memory to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.
12. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that, The device includes a key for entering a password, the key includes a metal heat sink with multiple heat dissipation fins connected to it.
13. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, are used to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.
14. A computer program product, characterized in that, Includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.