A method for identity mutual authentication between multiple hardware interconnections

Abstract

This invention belongs to the field of secure communication technology for IoT devices, specifically relating to a method for mutual identity verification between multiple hardware devices, including the following steps: a dynamic device fingerprint generation step; a two-way challenge-response authentication step; and a secure channel establishment step. This invention features a dynamically changing device identity: each time authentication is performed, the device generates a temporary, unique dynamic fingerprint (based on hardware ID + timestamp + random number), instead of using a fixed key or a long-term valid certificate. Time-limited control: the dynamic fingerprint has a short validity period (e.g., 3-5 minutes), automatically expiring after the timeout, preventing attackers from reusing historical authentication data even if they intercept it. Resistance to copying attacks: because the fingerprint is strongly correlated with time and random number, attackers cannot forge valid historical fingerprints for replay attacks. Mutual verification mechanism: not only does the server verify the client, but the client also verifies the server's identity, completely eliminating the risk of forged devices or "man-in-the-middle" attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of secure communication technology for Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and specifically relates to a method for mutual identity recognition among multiple hardware devices. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of IoT technology, secure interconnection between multiple hardware devices faces significant challenges. Existing technologies mainly suffer from the following problems: Static authentication mechanisms are insecure: they use fixed keys or long-term valid certificates, which are vulnerable to replay attacks and key leakage threats (such as CN104901800A). One-way authentication has drawbacks: it only verifies the client from the server's perspective, and cannot prevent attacks that forge the server (such as CN106161365A). Insufficient support for dynamic networking: Existing solutions are difficult to adapt to scenarios where devices frequently join or leave (such as CN107294727A). High computational resource consumption: Traditional PKI systems are not suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices.

[0003] To address this, a method for identity recognition between multiple hardware devices is provided.

[0004] The information disclosed in this background section is intended only to enhance the understanding of the overall background of the invention and should not be construed as an admission or in any way implying that the information constitutes prior art known to those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide an identity verification method for interconnecting multiple hardware devices, so as to solve the technical problems of identity forgery, low authentication efficiency, and poor dynamic adaptability in the existing technology of interconnecting multiple hardware devices.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A method for identity verification between multiple hardware devices includes the following steps: Steps for generating dynamic device fingerprints; Two-way challenge response certification steps; Steps for establishing a safe passage.

[0007] Preferably, the dynamic device fingerprint is generated by hashing the following elements: Hardware unique identifiers (such as MAC address, chip ID); Current timestamp; cryptographic random number.

[0008] Preferably, the validity period of the dynamic fingerprint is configurable, ranging from 1 to 10 minutes, and it needs to be regenerated after the timeout.

[0009] Preferably, the two-way challenge response authentication step specifically includes: The first device sends an authentication request to the second device, which includes a dynamic fingerprint and a first random number (Nonce_A). After verifying the fingerprint's validity, the second device generates a second random number (Nonce_B) and returns a response message containing: The hash value of the combination of the first random number and the second random number; Digital signature of the second device; The first device verifies the legality of the response message and the authenticity of the signature, completing two-way authentication.

[0010] Preferably, the digital signature employs a lightweight signature algorithm, including any of the following: ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm); Ed25519; HMAC (based on pre-shared keys).

[0011] Preferably, after successful authentication, the two communicating parties establish a secure channel based on a negotiated session key, which is generated in one of the following ways: Based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; Derived from a pre-shared master key; Random numbers generated based on the exchanged during the authentication process.

[0012] Preferably, it also includes a device identity verification step, which writes the successfully authenticated device identity information into the distributed ledger, including any of the following methods: Blockchain-based evidence storage; Distributed hash table (DHT) storage; Local evidence storage in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

[0013] Preferably, when a new device joins the network, the identity history of other devices can be quickly verified by querying the distributed ledger, without having to repeat the complete authentication process.

[0014] Preferably, it supports devices dynamically joining and leaving the network, specifically including: New devices can be quickly added through a dynamic fingerprint registration mechanism; When a device is offline, its dynamic fingerprint is automatically marked as invalid. Devices within the network periodically synchronize their list of trusted devices.

[0015] The present invention also provides a multi-hardware device interconnection and identity recognition system for implementing the method, comprising the following modules: Dynamic fingerprint generation module; Two-way authentication protocol stack; Secure communication engine; Identity verification database; Device management interface.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: 1. Dynamic fingerprinting mechanism effectively defends against replay attacks. Dynamically changing device identity: Each time authentication is performed, the device generates a temporary and unique dynamic fingerprint (based on hardware ID + timestamp + random number), instead of using a fixed key or a long-term valid certificate.

[0017] Time-limited control: Dynamic fingerprints have a short validity period (e.g., 3-5 minutes), after which they automatically expire. Even if an attacker intercepts historical authentication data, they cannot reuse it.

[0018] Anti-copying attack: Because fingerprints are strongly correlated with time and random numbers, attackers cannot forge valid historical fingerprints to carry out replay attacks.

[0019] 2. Two-way authentication ensures the authenticity of the device's identity. Mutual verification mechanism: Not only does the server verify the client, but the client also verifies the server's identity, completely eliminating the risk of counterfeit devices or "man-in-the-middle attacks".

[0020] Challenge-Response Protocol: Ensures the uniqueness of each authentication interaction through nonce and digital signature, preventing session hijacking.

[0021] Device Identity Trust Chain: Each device must undergo strict two-way authentication before joining the network, ensuring the trustworthiness of the entire system from the source.

[0022] 3. Lightweight design suitable for embedded devices Low computational overhead: It employs efficient hash algorithms (such as SHA-256) and symmetric encryption (such as AES-128) to avoid the complex certificate chain verification in traditional PKI systems.

[0023] Small memory footprint: The dynamic fingerprint and authentication data packet structure is simplified, making it suitable for MCUs with limited RAM resources (such as the STM32 series).

[0024] Low-power operation: The certification process is optimized to be completed in milliseconds, making it friendly to battery-powered devices (such as sensor nodes).

[0025] 4. Supports dynamic addition / exit of devices. Plug and play authentication: New devices can quickly register their identity via dynamic fingerprints after powering on, without the need to pre-configure a whitelist on a central server.

[0026] Elastic network expansion: When a device exits, its fingerprint automatically becomes invalid, and other devices quickly update the trust list via blockchain notarization (optional) or local caching.

[0027] Mobile scenario adaptation: Especially suitable for mobile devices such as AGVs and drones to maintain continuous authentication when switching between different network domains.

[0028] 5. Overall performance improvement Reduced operation and maintenance costs: Automated certification processes reduce the need for manual intervention, which is especially suitable for large-scale IoT deployments.

[0029] Compatible with existing protocols: It can be seamlessly integrated with IoT protocols such as MQTT and CoAP without modifying the underlying communication architecture.

[0030] Highly scalable: Easily expandable to cross-domain device interoperability scenarios via the optional blockchain notarization module. Attached Figure Description

[0031] Figure 1 This is a system architecture diagram of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the dynamic fingerprint generation process; Figure 3 This is a sequence diagram for two-way authentication. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of blockchain-based evidence storage. Detailed Implementation

[0032] The technical solution of this invention patent will be clearly and completely described below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. Based on the embodiments of this invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0033] In the description of this invention, it should be noted that the terms "center", "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "inner", "outer", etc., indicating the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, are only for the convenience of describing this invention and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be construed as a limitation on the invention.

[0034] In the description of this invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "installation," "connection," and "joining" should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they can refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they can refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium; and they can refer to a connection within two components. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this invention based on the specific circumstances.

[0035] Static authentication mechanisms are insecure: they use fixed keys or long-term valid certificates, which are vulnerable to replay attacks and key leakage threats (such as CN104901800A). One-way authentication has drawbacks: it only verifies the client from the server's perspective, and cannot prevent attacks that forge the server (such as CN106161365A). Insufficient support for dynamic networking: Existing solutions are difficult to adapt to scenarios where devices frequently join or leave (such as CN107294727A). High computational resource consumption: Traditional PKI systems are not suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices.

[0036] See attached document Figure 1-4 A method for identity verification between multiple hardware devices includes the following steps: Steps for generating dynamic device fingerprints; Two-way challenge response certification steps; Steps for establishing a safe passage.

[0037] Furthermore, the dynamic device fingerprint is generated by hashing the following elements: Hardware unique identifiers (such as MAC address, chip ID); Current timestamp; cryptographic random number.

[0038] Furthermore, the validity period of the dynamic fingerprint is configurable, ranging from 1 to 10 minutes, and it needs to be regenerated after the timeout.

[0039] Furthermore, the two-way challenge response authentication step specifically includes: The first device sends an authentication request to the second device, which includes a dynamic fingerprint and a first random number (Nonce_A). After verifying the fingerprint's validity, the second device generates a second random number (Nonce_B) and returns a response message containing: The hash value of the combination of the first random number and the second random number; Digital signature of the second device; The first device verifies the legality of the response message and the authenticity of the signature, completing two-way authentication.

[0040] Furthermore, the digital signature employs a lightweight signature algorithm, including any of the following: ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm); Ed25519; HMAC (based on pre-shared keys).

[0041] Furthermore, after successful authentication, the two communicating parties establish a secure channel based on a negotiated session key, which is generated in one of the following ways: Based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; Derived from a pre-shared master key; Random numbers generated based on the exchanged during the authentication process.

[0042] Furthermore, it also includes a device identity verification step, which writes the successfully authenticated device identity information into the distributed ledger, including any of the following methods: Blockchain-based evidence storage; Distributed hash table (DHT) storage; Local evidence storage in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

[0043] Furthermore, when a new device joins the network, it can quickly verify the identity history of other devices by querying the distributed ledger, without having to repeat the entire authentication process.

[0044] Furthermore, it supports devices dynamically joining and leaving the network, specifically including: New devices can be quickly added through a dynamic fingerprint registration mechanism; When a device is offline, its dynamic fingerprint is automatically marked as invalid. Devices within the network periodically synchronize their list of trusted devices.

[0045] Specifically: Dynamic fingerprint generation Hardware Unique ID Acquisition: Please explain in detail how to obtain the unique identifier of the device (such as the UID register address 0x1FFF7A10-0x1FFF7A18 of the STM32 chip). Example code snippet (pseudocode): uint32_t device_id[3] = *(uint32_t*)0x1FFF7A10; / / Read the 96-bit chip ID.

[0046] Timestamp synchronization: Describe the time synchronization protocol (such as NTP or local RTC calibration). Accuracy requirements (e.g., ±1 second) Random number generation: Specify a cryptographically secure random number generator (such as the true random number module of ARM TrustZone). Entropy source description (e.g., ADC sampling noise) Two-way authentication protocol Example message structure: / / Auth_Req message format { "device_id": "0x1FFF7A10", "fingerprint": "SHA256(UID||timestamp||nonce)", "nonce_a": "0xA3F2C4 }

[0047] Signature algorithm implementation: Specific parameters for ECDSA signatures (such as the secp256r1 curve) Signature verification flowchart (including public key pre-configuration steps) Anti-replay attack measures: Nonce caching mechanism (LRU queue maintains the 100 most recent nonces) Time window limit (reject requests exceeding ±30 seconds) Establishment of safe passage Key negotiation protocol: Example of Diffie-Hellman parameters (prime number p=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA...) Session key derivation functions (such as HKDF-SHA256) Performance optimization: Pre-computed acceleration table (optimized for embedded devices) Session key update cycle (recommended 24 hours) Blockchain Evidence Storage Evidence storage data structure: message DeviceRecord { bytes device_id = 1; bytes fingerprint_hash = 2; uint64 timestamp = 3; bytes previous_hash = 4; }

[0048] Light node verification scheme: SPV (Simplified Payment Verification) Implementation Steps Merkle tree proof generation process Dynamic network management Device online / offline agreement: Heartbeat interval setting (e.g., 30 seconds) Failure threshold (3 consecutive heartbeats lost) List synchronization mechanism: Incremental synchronization algorithm (version number comparison) Conflict resolution strategy (last write takes precedence).

[0049] Example 1: Industrial Internet of Things (IoT) Scenario Hardware configuration: Main control chip: STM32H743 (with hardware encryption engine) Communication module: RS485 + LoRa dual-mode Authentication process: Actual test data for certification latency (average 86ms @ 80MHz clock speed) Interference immunity test (99.2% success rate in 1000 certification cycles under electromagnetic interference environment) Example 2: Smart Home Scene Low power consumption optimization: Dynamic fingerprint generation power consumption: 0.3mJ / time (actual measurement with CC2650 chip) Sleep / Wake Authentication Process User interaction: Physical pairing button triggers authentication Mobile App Visual Authentication Status Supplementary key experimental data: Test items, test methods, index requirements, and actual test results Authentication delay of 100 consecutive authentication attempts ≤ 100ms 82.3 ± 12.4ms Memory usage analysis of Keil compilation results: ≤8KB RAM 6.2KB Anti-replay attack injection of history authentication packet 1000 times, 0 successes, 0 successes. Dynamic networking capability: 50 devices / min; stress test capability: ≥30 devices / min; 53 devices / min A multi-hardware device interconnection and identity recognition system, used to implement the method, includes the following modules: Dynamic fingerprint generation module; Two-way authentication protocol stack; Secure communication engine; Identity verification database; Device management interface.

[0050] In practical use: 1. The dynamic fingerprint mechanism effectively defends against replay attacks. Dynamically changing device identity: Each time authentication is performed, the device generates a temporary and unique dynamic fingerprint (based on hardware ID + timestamp + random number), instead of using a fixed key or a long-term valid certificate.

[0051] Time-limited control: Dynamic fingerprints have a short validity period (e.g., 3-5 minutes), after which they automatically expire. Even if an attacker intercepts historical authentication data, they cannot reuse it.

[0052] Anti-copying attack: Because fingerprints are strongly correlated with time and random numbers, attackers cannot forge valid historical fingerprints to carry out replay attacks.

[0053] 2. Two-way authentication ensures the authenticity of the device's identity. Mutual verification mechanism: Not only does the server verify the client, but the client also verifies the server's identity, completely eliminating the risk of counterfeit devices or "man-in-the-middle attacks".

[0054] Challenge-Response Protocol: Ensures the uniqueness of each authentication interaction through nonce and digital signature, preventing session hijacking.

[0055] Device Identity Trust Chain: Each device must undergo strict two-way authentication before joining the network, ensuring the trustworthiness of the entire system from the source.

[0056] 3. Lightweight design suitable for embedded devices Low computational overhead: It employs efficient hash algorithms (such as SHA-256) and symmetric encryption (such as AES-128) to avoid the complex certificate chain verification in traditional PKI systems.

[0057] Small memory footprint: The dynamic fingerprint and authentication data packet structure is simplified, making it suitable for MCUs with limited RAM resources (such as the STM32 series).

[0058] Low-power operation: The certification process is optimized to be completed in milliseconds, making it friendly to battery-powered devices (such as sensor nodes).

[0059] 4. Supports dynamic addition / exit of devices. Plug and play authentication: New devices can quickly register their identity via dynamic fingerprints after powering on, without the need to pre-configure a whitelist on a central server.

[0060] Elastic network expansion: When a device exits, its fingerprint automatically becomes invalid, and other devices quickly update the trust list via blockchain notarization (optional) or local caching.

[0061] Mobile scenario adaptation: Especially suitable for mobile devices such as AGVs and drones to maintain continuous authentication when switching between different network domains.

[0062] 5. Overall performance improvement Reduced operation and maintenance costs: Automated certification processes reduce the need for manual intervention, which is especially suitable for large-scale IoT deployments.

[0063] Compatible with existing protocols: It can be seamlessly integrated with IoT protocols such as MQTT and CoAP without modifying the underlying communication architecture.

[0064] Highly scalable: Easily expandable to cross-domain device interoperability scenarios via the optional blockchain notarization module.

[0065] The foregoing description of specific exemplary embodiments of the invention is for illustrative and explanatory purposes. These descriptions are not intended to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed, and it will be apparent that many changes and variations can be made in accordance with the foregoing teachings. The exemplary embodiments were chosen and described in order to explain the specific principles of the invention and its practical application, thereby enabling those skilled in the art to implement and utilize various different exemplary embodiments of the invention, as well as various different choices and variations. The scope of the invention is intended to be defined by the claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A method for identity cross-attestation between multiple hardware, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Steps for generating dynamic device fingerprints; Two-way challenge response certification steps; Steps for establishing a safe passage.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: The dynamic device fingerprint is generated by hashing the following elements: Hardware unique identifiers (such as MAC address, chip ID); Current timestamp; cryptographic random number.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The validity period of the dynamic fingerprint is configurable, ranging from 1 to 10 minutes, and it needs to be regenerated after the timeout.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: The two-way challenge response authentication steps specifically include: The first device sends an authentication request to the second device, which includes a dynamic fingerprint and a first random number (Nonce_A). After verifying the fingerprint's validity, the second device generates a second random number (Nonce_B) and returns a response message containing: The hash value of the combination of the first random number and the second random number; Digital signature of the second device; The first device verifies the legality of the response message and the authenticity of the signature, completing two-way authentication.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises: The digital signature employs a lightweight signature algorithm, including any of the following: ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm); Ed25519; HMAC (based on pre-shared keys).

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: After successful authentication, the two communicating parties establish a secure channel based on a negotiated session key, which is generated in one of the following ways: Based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; Derived from a pre-shared master key; Random numbers generated based on the exchanged during the authentication process.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: It also includes a device identity verification step, which writes the successfully authenticated device identity information into the distributed ledger, including any of the following methods: Blockchain-based evidence storage; Distributed hash table (DHT) storage; Local evidence storage in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the identity of the plurality of hardware is mutually authenticated. When a new device joins the network, it can quickly verify the identity history of other devices by querying the distributed ledger, without having to repeat the entire authentication process.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: Supports devices dynamically joining and leaving the network, specifically including: New devices can be quickly added through a dynamic fingerprint registration mechanism; When a device is offline, its dynamic fingerprint is automatically marked as invalid. Devices within the network periodically synchronize their list of trusted devices.

10. A multi-hardware device interconnection identity mutual recognition system, used for implementing the method of any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that Includes the following modules: Dynamic fingerprint generation module; Two-way authentication protocol stack; Secure communication engine; Identity verification database; Device management interface.

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