PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING ABUSE OF A USER IDENTIFICATION PROFILE
A data traffic monitoring method with an alarm device and AI analysis addresses fraudulent eSIM misuse in TCUs by detecting deviations in data patterns, preventing unauthorized use and ensuring compliant subscription management.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE102023135250
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-12-14
- Publication Date
- 2025-06-18
AI Technical Summary
The existing systems for telematics control units (TCUs) in vehicles are vulnerable to fraudulent misuse of embedded SIM (eSIM) chips, allowing unauthorized transfer and use of user identification profiles, leading to continued subscription fees for deactivated or scrapped vehicles, especially in business-to-business (B2B) scenarios, with no effective monitoring or prevention mechanisms.
A method involving a data traffic analyst configured to monitor and analyze data exchanges using an alarm device, comparing actual data traffic with expected patterns, and issuing fraud alerts to prevent unauthorized use, utilizing artificial intelligence and a fraud database to detect and respond to deviations from normal usage patterns.
Effectively identifies and prevents fraudulent use of user identification profiles, ensuring continued compliance with subscription agreements and reducing financial losses by remotely deactivating or deleting misused profiles, thereby maintaining secure and authorized communication.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
The invention relates to a method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile.Modern vehicles are often equipped with a telematics control unit (TCU), which provides a wireless connection to the Internet or to certain backend servers (for example a cloud service). In some scenarios, the telematics control unit may also provide a wireless connection to other vehicles in its environment (either via direct vehicle-to-vehicle communication using different V2V standards or indirectly via vehicle-to-infrastructure communication using different V2X standards).In many cases, this wireless connectivity is realized by mobile radio networks operating according to 3GPP radio access technologies, for example 2G GSM, 3G UMTS, 4G LTE, 5G NR (or a future follow-up technology). Because a TCU is on-board a vehicle, it may be connected to and interact with various subsystems distributed throughout the vehicle (e.g., using data buses and / or control buses). Thus, a TCU may collect and / or process and / or transmit sensor data or telemetry data from the vehicle, such as position, speed, engine data, link quality, and the like.In addition, the TCU may provide connectivity to the driver and / or passengers via wireless local area network [WLAN] and / or personal area network [PAN] in the vehicle cabin. The eCall function (automatic triggering of emergency calls in the event of accidents), which is legally prescribed in many markets, can likewise be implemented by the TCU.In summary, it can be said that a TCU may (at least) consist of the following building blocks (Publication 3GPP TS 23.101 entitled: General Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) architecture, section 5.2, contains further details about the terminology used here):a satellite navigation device (GNSS) which ascertains or records the position data of the vehicle (for example latitude, longitude and altitude);a mobile communication unit (referred to as user equipment [UE] in 3GPP terminology) consisting of:a mobile radio modem (referred to as mobile equipment in 3GPP terminology), andsubscriber data or network access information, which are usually stored in the form of user identification profiles (communication profiles) on a SIM [subscriber identification module];electronic circuits for processing the information and / or sensor data collected or made available, such as:a microcontroller,a microprocessor, anda field programmable gate array (FPGA);memory for storing sensor data and / or output information.The mobile radio networks (or also mobile radio systems) considered here are generally of cellular construction and generally comprise a core network CN [core network] and a radio access network RAN [radio access network].If the positioning and navigation are not the main task of this control unit, while its main goal is still to connect the vehicle to a cellular communication network, the term TCU may not be the optimum choice in all cases. Therefore, the term OCU [Onboard Connectivity Unit] is introduced. The OCU comprises a mobile communication unit (and optionally one or more further wireless transceiver modules) and may or may not support other function components such as locating functions or navigation functions.In order to be able to establish a connection to a cellular communication network, a mobile communication unit such as a TCU or an OCU must be equipped with network access information and subscriber data (i.e. a communication profile). This information is stored in the above-mentioned SIM. The SIM stores network-specific information which serves for authenticating and identifying subscribers with which the mobile radio provider [MSP; Mobile Service Provider] maintains a business relationship. The SIM hardware has integrated secure storage functions and encryption functions, which are used, for example, for authentication, authorization and access control. At the beginnings of mobile radio (for example 2G-GSM), SIM was implemented as a removable chip card [ICC; integrated circuit card], which is also referred to as a SIM card. It was made of plastic and intended for insertion into mobile communication devices by the user. There was only one SIM application per SIM card.Later (for example, with the introduction of 3G UMTS), increasing security requirements led to the further development of the SIM to the USIM [Universal Subscriber Identity Module]. Multiple SIM application packages and / or USIM application packages could be accommodated on a removable UICC [Universal Integrated Circuit Card] that was used in mobile communication devices. These UICCs were still plastic cards which the subscriber had to insert into his communication device.The next evolution step was the introduction of the so-called embedded SIM (eSIM) or the so-called embedded UICC (eUICC). This is a chip which is mounted (generally soldered) on the communication platform and offers the functionality of a (separate) SIM or UICC. This therefore cannot be easily removed or replaced. The advantages of modern eSIMs or eUICCs are:improved security by security against manipulation,lower current consumption, anda smaller form factor.Therefore, eUICCs are particularly interesting for machine-to-machine (M2M) and internet of things (IoT) terminals. With the introduction of SIM chips which are permanently installed in the terminal (i.e. in the case of eSIM or eUICC), the subscriber data (communication profiles) had to be developed further to transmittable and protected software packages. An eUICC can generally store a plurality of sets of communication profiles (also called SIM profiles), one of which is activated [enabled], that is to say is recognized by a user terminal [UE] and used for the communication.Within the scope of the present invention, the user terminal [UE] can be part of a telematics control unit (TCU) or onboard connectivity unit (OCU) that is used in a vehicle. For the communication, the network of the mobile network operator (MNO) is used in the activated SIM profile. Profiles other than the activated communication profile are deactivated [disabled] (they are therefore not recognized by the UE and are therefore not used). Future generations of eUICC may also support multiple enabled profiles (MEP), i.e., more than one SIM profile installed in an eUICC may be activated and used simultaneously for communication with more than one cellular modem (or in a cellular modem platform with two different baseband / RF units that may be active simultaneously).The next foreseeable technical development is an even tighter integration of the eUICC into the mobile radio modem platform by integrating the SIM functionality, together with other important functions such as graphics processor (GPU), central processing unit (CPU) and modem functionality, into the main processor of the terminal and forming a so-called system-on-chip [SoC]. With this trend, the embedded SIM (eSIM) becomes the integrated SIM (iSIM). However, it is not yet clear when these i implementations will be mature enough to market in large quantities and whether the iSIM form factor will play an important role in the automotive industry in the future. Indeed, the eSIM chips that we know today and that have been marketed in recent years for M2M terminals and IoT terminals (including vehicles) have already been in considerable use.A subscriber of mobile services may be a person (for example a person subscribed to a private data plan) or a company or service provider (for example an automotive OEM [original equipment manufacturer] subscribed to numerous data plans for a fleet of vehicles). The first scenario is the B2C usage case [business-to-consumer], the second is the B2B usage case [business-to-business]. In the automotive industry, B2C connections are frequently used for entertainment purposes (e.g., to allow the user to stream music from his preferred streaming provider), while B2B connections are frequently used for telematics services (e.g., to allow the OEM [original equipment manufacturer] to retrieve maintenance data and diagnostic data from his fleet of vehicles). The latter is not noticed by the user. The distinction between B2C services and B2B services is a purely commercial distinction. There are no technical differences between B2C communication and B2B communication (apart from the methods of remote SIM profile provision [RSP]).The GSMA (https: / / www.gsma.com / ) has developed three generations of remote SIM provisioning [RSP] methods in recent years:GSMA specifications SGP.01 / 02 describe the provision of SIM profiles for M2M terminals (the provision being triggered by infrastructure servers in a type of push mode).GSMA specifications SGP.21 / 22 describe the provision of SIM profiles for user terminals (the provision being triggered by the mobile communication device via a human machine interface [HMI] in a type of pull mode). This means that this method requires a certain amount of user interaction and / or confirmation via an HMI.The GSMA specifications SGP.31 / 32 describe the provision of SIM profiles for so-called constrained [constrained] IoT terminals (wherein various profile management operations can be initiated by an IoT profile assistant [IPA] on the terminal controlled by an eNB IoT remote manager [eIM], which is normally located on the infrastructure side). While a first version of SGP.31 (service requirements and system architecture) has been published in April 2022, SGP.32 (technical details including process descriptions) has been published in a version 1.0 in May 2023.All three generations of RSP methods are relevant to the automobile industry: SGP.01 / 02 has been used in many vehicles in recent years and enables RSP to be pushed from the infrastructure, for example for business-to-business (B2B) services. It is expected to replace it with its follow-up technology SGP.31 / 32. SGP.21 / 22 enables the application "bring four own subscription into the car" suitable for business-to-consumer (B2C) services. SGP.31 / 32 can be considered a development of SGP.21 / 22, where the eIM takes on the role of the user.The number of ePTFE chips in use is in the upper three-digit million range worldwide (in all vertical industrial sectors, including the automotive industry), which is a considerable number. Although the eSIM hardware fundamentally offers very good protection against tampering attacks, the eSIM chip mounted on the printed circuit board [PCB] is still physically accessible to defrauders and can still contain valid subscription data (namely at least one SIM profile). This means that fraudsters (for example in a scrap location from vehicles which have reached their end of life) can mechanically separate (for example, solder or solder out) the ePTFE chip from the rest of the mobile radio platform. In this way, they would gate a reasonable amount of eNB chips with valid subscriptions stored therein, which they can then couple to other cellular modems (and thus use in other mobile communication platforms). Further fraudulent use can possibly also be achieved by means of another specific modification or reuse (of parts) of a telematics control unit (TCU) or onboard connectivity unit (OCU), in particular of the mobile communication unit installed therein. A specific modification is present, for example, when software components and / or hardware components are (at least partially) modified by unauthorized third parties.The contract partner (for example a company or service provider, such as a motor vehicle OEM) has no possibility of experiencing such fraudulent behavior. Namely, the contract partner would still have to pay for subscription even if its communication profile (subscriber data) was transmitted to another device and the originally intended purpose of business relationship for the existing data plan was omitted. Because there is no possibility for the contractee in this scenario to find out what has been done on the device side, the contractee would have to pay the fees for many more years.For the B2C application, this problem may not be severe because the user could talk to the mobile network operator and announce the contract. However, for the B2B use case, the problem is dramatic because the automotive OEM typically has no knowledge that certain vehicles are no longer being used, e.g., are scrapped. Namely, without the assistance of the car owner, an automobile OEM cannot know whether a vehicle is scrapped or to be stored in a garage as a collection piece for a few years. This makes it impossible to deactivate SIM profiles initiated on the infrastructure side on the basis of an observed period of inactivity.Proceeding from this, the object of the present invention is to overcome at least partially the disadvantages known from the prior art. The features according to the invention are evident from the independent claims, for which advantageous embodiments are shown in the dependent claims. The features of the claims can be combined in any technically expedient manner, wherein the explanations from the following description and features from the figures, which comprise supplementary configurations of the invention, can also be used for this purpose.The invention relates to a method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile, wherein communication is possible for an individual user exclusively using its individual user identification profile within a mobile communication network, wherein the user is unambiguously identifiable within the communication network by means of this user identification profile, wherein an exchange of data via the communication network between the user and a respective receiver can be carried out in encrypted form, and wherein a data traffic analyzer is furthermore provided which is configured to analyze the data traffic which takes place between the user and a respective receiver, wherein the data traffic analyzer comprises an alarm device for outputting a fraud message, wherein the method executes at least the following steps by means of the data traffic analyzer in the order mentioned: a. monitoring an exchange of data between the user identified by individual user identification profile and at least one receiver; b. comparing the monitored actual exchange of data with a reserved expected exchange of data; and c. outputting a fraud report by means of the alarm device if the monitored actual exchange of data deviates from the expected exchange.In one embodiment, the user is the user of the terminal device, which is individually identifiable by means of the user identification profile. In another embodiment, although the user is the contract partner (generally paying) of an MSP, it is not the owner of the terminal, as in a motor vehicle with a TCU or OCU for a (flat-pay) B2B communication or B2C communication.It should be noted that the user can communicate in another mobile communication network and / or with a further user identification profile (for example as an owner of a motor vehicle with his own) independently of the method presented here (for example also without monitoring). However, a communication is considered here which can be associated with a specific user identification profile, for example within a mobile communication network embodied as a cellular communication network. It should also be noted that the mobile communication network is not necessarily a cellular mobile radio network in one embodiment, but optionally a WLAN, a PAN or else a wired communication network, wherein data traffic likewise takes place here, which may have to be paid for and is therefore assigned to a user identification profile of the user.Although not absolutely necessary for each form of data exchange, the communication channels are tunneled or end-to-end encrypted in standardized fashion. No one other than the user and the respective receiver can know which data and also not what type of data are exchanged. However, even in the (rarely occurring) unencrypted state, data should not be analyzed for its content.The data traffic analysis is software which is executed in a computing device by means of a processor device and, if appropriate, supported by a data memory. The computing device is in this case configured as a separate unit or for carrying out further methods. The computing device is arranged at an MSP, a user, an publisher, a (vehicle) fleet manager or an independent entity as a supervisor and is connected to the data traffic. In one embodiment, the computing device or the data traffic analyzer is located in the core network of the mobile radio network operator [MSP].It should be noted that a fleet manager is considered herein to be an operator of a rental fleet, leasing fleet, or the like. Alternatively or additionally, a fleet manager is an (external) service provider who takes care of a plurality of motor vehicles for a customer, for example as a insurance provider or as a maintenance company (preferably via the IoT [Internet Of Things]).The alarm device is, in one embodiment, pure software. Alternatively or additionally, the alarm device is a (for example separate) physical unit, for example comprising a communication interface for transmitting a fraud message to a user, an MSP, a publisher, a fleet manager or an independent entity as a supervisor device.In one embodiment, step a. is carried out permanently and from the beginning of the creation of the user identification profile, wherein monitoring is preferably carried out in random samples with a time interval from one another. In one embodiment, step a. is executed upon a request from a user, for example, with subscriptions with annual runtime with the subscription pending cancellation deadline for use of the user identification profile. In one embodiment, step a. is started when the user identification profile has reached a predetermined age, for example after the end of a usual minimum duration of a leasing contract and / or a predetermined (for example minimum, maximum or average) holding duration of a motor vehicle, for example after 2 years after creation of the user identification profile, wherein a permanent monitoring is preferably carried out after a delay.The expected exchange is well known in some applications despite an unknown knowledge about the content of the data traffic, for example due to the functions of the relevant terminal and / or its location. For example, due to the type of use, communication with a foreign recipient (server) is excluded or (on the contrary) can be expected. For example, due to the scope of functions of the relevant terminal, a number of receivers is greater or smaller than in the case of fraudulent use of the user identification profile. Furthermore, data traffic is dependent on times of day, for example, such as the movement of the motor vehicle during the impact times (for example on the route between home and work), wherein only when the motor vehicle is moved is a large amount of data (for example navigation services, maintenance data and the like) generated and exchanged.It should be noted that the expected replacement is preferably equipped with tolerances and / or with (expectable) deviations, for example in a ferious time, feitage and weekends. Alternatively or additionally, the data volume is not considered to be relevant, but rather the temporal distribution of a communication because, for example, a high data volume is not a feature which is obvious to fraud in an incident in an IoT application, but already an increased frequency or an irregular frequency because, for example, a software-based IoT application queries data according to a regular pattern and such a pattern does not occur (any longer) or not alone in fraudulent abuse.As described above, the fraud notification is outputted from the alarm device, and then a decision to prevent misuse becomes possible without the need for knowledge about the contents of the data exchange. In one embodiment variant, the fraud report also comprises information about the reliability of the triggered alarm.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the data traffic analyzer is assigned to a respective gateway of the communication network, preferably a gateway for a packet data network.The advantage of such an arrangement is that the possible data traffic can already be determined according to the type of gateway or the type of data passed through the gateway. The gateways establish a connection between the relevant terminal with the user identification profile to an associated communication network, for example the public Internet or a proprietary backend, for example at a vehicle manufacturer or fleet manager. For example, in an application, a specific gateway is used only rarely and / or with a respectively small amount of data because of the type of the relevant terminal, if the relevant terminal or the user identification profile used by it is used according to the intended application. If fraudulent use is now present, the amounts of data will very probably change considerably at a gateway. In one application, the terminal is an IoT component of a motor vehicle, which is connected to the vehicle manufacturer in a communicating manner almost exclusively. In a case of fraud used as a user identification profile in a smartphone, this communication will break down with the vehicle manufacturer and, for example, communicate almost exclusively with the Internet.In one embodiment, however, a distinct change is also observed at a gateway for a packet data network, such as the public Internet, without having access to the content of the data. For example, the user behavior changes considerably. For example, the terminal is a navigation device for an infotainment system of a motor vehicle. The navigation device is operated using proprietary software of the relevant vehicle manufacturer. In this case, for example, a data request is optimized for specific constellations, for example a high transmission reliability during fast driving, i.e. fast or at least frequent node changes with corresponding handovers. By contrast, when used in another IoT device or in a smartphone, such software is not used and, for example, data transmission is optimized for a rather static communication relationship between the terminal currently (fraudulently) used and a node. The time run of a data transmission of the packetized data and / or the data volume thus changes.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the user is an issuer and the user identification profile is implemented in a restricted mobile terminal, and wherein the terminal carries out an exchange of data independently or under external control with the issuer as receiver via the communication network, wherein the terminal is preferably a telematics control unit of a motor vehicle and the issuer carries out obligations from an operating contract with the owner of the motor vehicle by means of the exchange of data.Constrained IoT Device [HMI] refers, for example, to those mobile terminals which are not controllable via a human machine interface [HMI] (see also definitions of NCD and UICD in SGP.31 / 32). For example, a restricted mobile terminal is configured for electronic communication by means of WLAN [wireless local area network], PAN [personal area network], mobile radio [for example a 3GPP standard] or else also via a cable-bound interface (for example for maintenance purposes) such as, for example, a USB connection [universal serial bus].The publisher is, for example, a vehicle manufacturer or fleet operator who (in addition) handles a fleet of motor vehicles. The publisher is the contract partner with a network operator or even a network operator and thus carries the costs of communication between the relevant restricted mobile terminal and its own backend (for example for maintenance monitoring) or services of third-party providers (for example a weather service and / or a provider of digital maps or navigation services).It should be noted that the restricted mobile terminal is not necessarily exclusively connected to the publisher as the receiver. In one embodiment, such a terminal is not (only) communicatively connected to the publisher as a receiver, but for example also or exclusively to a third party provider, such as for example for streaming music and / or video data. Such terminals are often designed for exclusive communication with third-party providers with a (further) user identification profile which is paid by a private user of the relevant terminal itself or directly. The latter case is subject to easier control over fraudulent use than if the publisher is the user or cost carrier of the terminal or user identification profile subject to possible fraudulent use.It is proposed here that the (restricted) mobile terminal is a so-called telematics control unit of a motor vehicle. The data traffic actually carried out and generating costs is often too complex in such a case that this human control is accessible or can be delimited from fraudulent use. For example, however, a sufficiently loadable statement can be made together with the data traffic of identical or comparable telematics control units, for example in the context of a so-called BigData analysis. In this case, for example, a plurality of different telematics control units of the same fleet or of the same publisher can be used for data traffic analyses or comparison operations.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the data traffic analyzer and / or the alarm device can be configured from the outside, preferably by means of the communication network, wherein preferably one or more receivers are determined as the only permitted receivers, wherein particularly preferably communication with an impermissible receiver triggers a fraud message.It is proposed here that the alarm device (or the data traffic analyzer and its results in this respect) can be configured from the outside. For example, such a fraudulent use form has become known or learned (for example by machine), which can be recognized (sufficiently accurately) by the alarm device by means of a feature of the data traffic. The alarm device then receives this information and can then also check the data traffic in the future.In an advantageous embodiment, the alarm device is supplied with the relevant information from the communication network, wherein preferably, moreover, the alarm device also reports back to the communication network. For example, such a report is used by the alarm device for other alarm devices and / or communicated to the user or publisher. For example, this is used to feed a fraud database.In one embodiment, the number of receivers is limited and / or dedicated receivers are allowed in advance. This creates a high level of security against fraudulent use of the user identification profile. In one embodiment, during the initial use (for example over a limited first use period), the permissible receivers or their number is defined, for example learned (preferably by machine).In one embodiment, when communicating with an impermissible receiver or an impermissible number of receivers, monitoring is exacerbated, for example the admissible data set is narrowed. Alternatively or additionally, a fraud message is triggered, whereupon a further use of the user identification profile is preferably (at least temporarily) blocked.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that at least one of the following events is triggered as a result of a fraud message:a receiver or a group of receivers is determined as the only permitted receiver and an exchange of data between the user and the at least one impermissible receiver is blocked;the user identification profile is blocked for communication, at least in the current mobile communication network;the user and / or the publisher receives a request for clarification from the communication network; andthe user identification profile in question is deleted and / or deactivated.By determining one or more receivers as the only allowed receivers and disabling an exchange of data between the user and an impermissible receiver, an (at least basic) functionality is maintained, for example in the case that the probability of fraudulent use is not sufficiently high. Regular use is thus still possible and, if appropriate, only another (further) use is no longer accessible to a user. In the event of a fault, this is not too severely detrimental to a normally manageable nuisance and to remedy this partial blocking in a few hours or days.By blocking the user identification profile for communication, at least in the current mobile communication network, it is ensured that fraudulent use is no longer possible. For example, so-called roaming is a common consequence of fraudulent use because a transfer to the adjacent country is helpful for withdrawal prior to lawful tracking. For example, a long inactivity or a non-transmitted transfer of the user identification profile to the foreign country, but also to a further remote region without a corresponding geolocation signal or handover processes, would be a very probable scenario of fraudulent use in a user identification profile installed in a motor vehicle. The handover processes mentioned here cannot usually be detected at a gateway in the core network of a cellular mobile radio system. This clearly shows that, within the scope of the method proposed here, the computing device or the data traffic analyzer can also be assigned (as required) to other components of the mobile radio system. They are therefore components of the core network [CN; Core Network] and components of the wireless access network [RAN; Radio Access Network].By the user receiving a request from the communication network for clarification, a possibility is created that the user can avert a blocking. The user of the terminal having the relevant user identification profile is aware whether or not the fraud notification is due. In one embodiment, the user identification profile is already blocked before or during the request for clarification. Alternatively, only after a period of time and / or a repeated request for clarification. Preferably, a blocking is prevented or canceled again using a simple but adequate response, particularly preferably purely by machine (i.e. without human checking of the response), via a separate terminal in the manner of a 2-factor verification.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the data traffic analyzer comprises an artificial intelligence, preferably with a MachineL algorithm, wherein the artificial intelligence is preferably a pre-trained transformer, and / or wherein the artificial intelligence is preferably further trained over a predefined period of time during use of the user identification profile by the user.As a sub-area of information, the artificial intelligence [AI] includes all efforts aimed at making machines intelligent. Intelligence is understood to mean the property that a subject enables to act appropriately and predictively in his environment. This includes the ability to recognize and respond to sensory impressions, capture information, process it and store it as knowledge, understand and produce speech, solve problems, and achieve goals. Since the advent of artificial intelligence in 1955, a number of relatively independent sub-disclins have emerged, among others:pattern recognition including speech recognition and handwriting recognition;knowledge modelling including logic programming and inference engines;expert systems, question answer systems and chat messages;machine learning (discussed below);artificial neural networks and deep learning;computer vision;robotics; andUniversal game programs.There are tight connections to the research area of artificial life. The goal of the AI is the ability of an intelligent agent, referred to as artificial general intelligence (or so-called strong AI), to understand or learn each intelligent task that people or other living bodies can handle.Machine learning (ML) is a generic term for artificially creating knowledge from experience: An artificial system learns from examples and can generalize them after completion of the learning phase. To this end, the machine learning algorithms build a statistical model that is based on training data and tested with test data. That is, the examples are not easily learned by the way (the so-called overfitting), but patterns and irregularities in the learning data are recognized. The system may also evaluate unknown data (transfer of learning) or not learn unknown data. From the broad spectrum of possible applications, the following may be mentioned by way of example: automated diagnostic methods, recognition of credit card fraud, stock exchange analyses, classification of nucleotide sequences, speech recognition and text recognition and autonomous systems.A pre-trained transformer is to be assigned to MachineL and allows complex weighting in vector form or tensor form.In the application described here, namely the detection of fraudulent or fraudulent use of a user identification profile, individual use of specific network resources or an individually communicated data set is determined or taken into account within a predefined time period. The determination is to take place in the core network [CN] of a cellular mobile radio system; however, within the scope of the method proposed here, it does not have to remain restricted thereto, as the example with the handover processes describes clearly. Here, the underlying idea is ideally expanded to the radio access network (RAN) of a cellular mobile radio system. For example, the utilization behavior is highly dependent on the person or persons who are using. Assuming that no fraudulent use is present in a first time period after registration of the user identification profile, a customary, i.e. non-fraudulent use can thus be defined, preferably learned, very precisely. Such a time period is started, for example, directly adjacent to the registration or is triggered by a first increased use or by a change in geolocation (for example leaving a factory or car house). The end of the time period is set, for example, after a quarter, half, or whole year from the start time, so that a sufficient amount of data for learning or adjusting the algorithm has been generated. However, in one embodiment, this does not exclude the artificial intelligence from learning further, but preferably under more stringent requirements, such as, for example, a verification of a new detected behavior, for example by means of a request for clarification of a detected deviation from an expected replacement. Knowledge about the behavior of similar mobile terminals in similar situations (for example, relating to time and location) can also be incorporated into the algorithms during learning or adjustment.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the data traffic analyzer comprises a fraud database in which information about an expectable exchange is stored.A fraud database has the advantage that events of the past that have occurred there are made usable for the future. In one embodiment, the entries in the fraud database are prepared such that they are directly comprehensible to a human, preferably created by a human. Alternatively or additionally, the fraud database contains experiences based on fraud reports from an alarm device, wherein the experiences which are permanently stored in the fraud database are preferably verified, that is to say that there was actually fraudulent use. For example, fraud messages not verified are held for a predetermined period of time (e.g., one week or one month) and are then deleted if they have not been verified or otherwise caused to be held further. In one embodiment, fraud messages which are not verified or which have been explicitly identified as regular (i.e. non-fraudulent) use are held as positive examples of a probability of the presence of fraudulent use which is not sufficient or at least not sufficient per se.In one embodiment, underthreshold fraud predictive cases are accumulated in the fraud database as a trigger for fraud reporting. In this case, therefore, an individual fraud predictive case is not sufficient for a fraud report, but the presence of a plurality of such subthreshold fraud predictive cases is just sufficient. For example, in the case of the data traffic of a (fraudulently used user identification profile), the data volume per data channel and / or the used data channels have in each case not changed sufficiently greatly from regular use, but the data volume per data channel and the used data channels have changed, so that overall a severe change which can be measured or analyzed by means of the data traffic analysis results.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the data traffic analyzer and / or a fraud database according to an embodiment according to the above description and / or an artificial intelligence according to an embodiment according to the above description is operated by at least one of the following entities:an operator of the mobile communication network;the user of the user identification profile or the publisher according to an embodiment according to the above description; anda separate overhead view device.It should be noted that all, a combination or individual ones of said entities data traffic analysis, fraud database and artificial intelligence are distributed from or distributed to a single one of said entities and / or operated multiple (with, for example, different focus and / or capabilities).The operator of the communication network, for example the MSP or MNO, may have a obligation with respect to his contract partner, for example the publisher. Alternatively or additionally, the operator of the communication network only makes available data from his data traffic analyzers, which make fraudulent use recognizable, for example by virtue of these data having sufficient generality and / or being shared by an publisher by means of the operator with other publishers.The user or the publisher is often the cost carrier and is then intrinsically interested in preventing fraudulent use. It is therefore advantageous if the fraud database or the data traffic analysis is operated by it.Due to the presence of use outside the user's sphere (usually cost carrier) and in the absence of intrinsic motifs at the operator of the mobile communication network, it is advantageous to resolve the conflict of interest via a separate supervisor. This is financialized and / or supervised by the operator of the communication network and the publisher, for example. For example, the separate supervisor is an external service provider.It is furthermore proposed in an advantageous embodiment of the method that the user identification profile is implemented in a telematics control unit or in an onboard connectivity unit, preferably in a motor vehicle, wherein particularly preferably the user is a fleet manager for a plurality of motor vehicles.The telematics control unit [TCU] is for example designed as described in the introduction or as known in the art. Alternatively, the TCU is designed according to an incoming follow-up technology and optionally comprises further functional units in addition to the functions mentioned.If the positioning and navigation is not the main task of this TCU, while its main goal is still to connect the (own) motor vehicle to a cellular communication network, the term TCU may not be the optimum choice in all cases. Therefore, the term onboard connectivity unit [OCU] is introduced here. The OCU comprises an antenna or radio control unit for WLAN, PAN and / or mobile radio (and optionally one or more further wireless transmission / reception modules, preferably for deviating standards and / or carrier waves) and in an optional embodiment additionally supports locating functions and / or navigation functions.The invention described above is explained in detail below in view of the relevant technical background with reference to the associated drawings, which show preferred embodiments. The invention is in no way limited by the purely schematic drawings, it being noted that the drawings are not dimensionally accurate and are not suitable for defining size ratios. It is shown in FIG. 1 : a data exchange within a mobile communication network with a supervisor; FIG. 2 is a diagram of data traffic in a mobile communication network; FIG. 3 : shows a diagram of data traffic in a mobile communication network with fraud database; FIG. 4 : shows a flow diagram of a method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile; FIG. 5 : shows a diagram with the data volume over time with a traffic of traffic type 1; and FIG. 6 : a diagram with the data volume over time with a traffic of traffic type 2.FIG. 1 shows a data exchange within a mobile communication network 2 with a supervisor 24 in a schematic view. Within the mobile communication network 2, a plurality of motor vehicles 12, here purely by way of example four, are connected to the mobile communication network 2 and / or are connected to one another. In this exemplary embodiment, the mobile communication network 2 is provided by means of a satellite 19, wherein the satellite 19 is connected to the supervisory device 24 in a communicating manner (or comprises the latter). Via the satellite 19 as a representative of the mobile communication network 2 simplified here, electronic communication is enabled both between the motor vehicles 12 and between a motor vehicle 12 and various infrastructure components (for example servers to which the user 1, the publisher 9 and / or the fleet manager 15 are assigned). Of course, the mobile communication network 2 can also comprise conventional, i.e. earth-bound, components (such as base stations). In one embodiment, direct communication between a plurality of subscribers is possible (for example by way of so-called V2V communication).In addition, an output device 9 is connected to the communication network 2. The publisher 9 is, for example, a vehicle manufacturer or fleet operator who (in addition) handles a fleet of motor vehicles 12. The publisher 9 can be contract partners with a network operator or even a network operator itself and thus carry the costs of communication between the relevant restricted mobile terminal 10 and its own backend (for example for maintenance monitoring) or services of third-party providers (for example a weather service and / or a provider of digital maps or navigation services).A motor vehicle 12 is shown in more detail here and comprises a (restricted) mobile terminal 10 (for example as part of a telematics control unit 11 with geolocation service or an onboard connectivity unit 14) having a processor 18 and an eNB chip 27, wherein the mobile terminal 10 is connected to a data interface 17 (shown here as antenna), for example as part of or in communication with an onboard network or onboard computer. The (activated) user identification profile is linked to the eSIM chip 27. Mobile terminals 10 are referred to as restricted terminals 10, for example, if they are controllable solely via an electronic communication, i.e. not via a human-machine interface [HMI]. For example, the restricted mobile terminal 10 is configured for electronic communication by means of WLAN [wireless local area network], PAN [personal area network], mobile radio [for example a 3GPP standard] or else via a cable-bound interface (for example for maintenance purposes) such as, for example, a USB connection [universal serial bus].The actually carried out and cost-generating data traffic 5 is often too complex in such a case or generally also peer-to-peer encrypted, so that this human control is withdrawn or normal use can only be limited with difficulty from fraudulent use by humans. For example, however, a sufficiently loadable statement can be made together with the data traffic 5 of identical or comparable telematics control units 11, for example on the basis of known properties and / or within the scope of a so-called BigData analysis.In Fig. 2 a diagram of data traffic 5 in a mobile communication network 2 is shown. A user 1 of a mobile terminal 10 is individually identifiable by means of an active user identification profile in the eSIM chip 27. The user identification profile has been transmitted to the eSIM chip 27 before the data transmission and has been installed or bound there. The user identification profile is not transmitted with each communication.However, each communication requires certain elements from the activated user identification profile.Although the owner of the user identification profile is the receiver 3 (and at the same time the transmitter and / or receiver 3 of the data assigned to the services) and thus the causer of the data traffic 5, in the case of a telematics control unit 11 or onboard connectivity unit 14, it is not (at least not for each application) the contract partners of the mobile radio service provider ([MSP; mobile service provider] or [MNO; mobile network operator]) and therefore not the user 1, as defined herein. It should be noted that here only the aspect is considered in which the publisher 9 is the user 1, but which also uses a user identification profile which is generally separate from other forms of use (for example within a motor vehicle 12) such as telephony. For example, used in a motor vehicle 12, a B2B communication is carried out for on-board diagnosis (wear, maintenance cycles and others), which communication may remain invisible to the user 1. On the basis of the user identification profile, the owner or the terminal 10 is identifiable and authorized (within the scope of a fee-based service contract) to obtain access to a packet data network 8 (for example the Internet). For this purpose, in the sphere of the MSP, firstly a (serving) gateway 16 and then one or more (here pars-pro-toto two) (communication network 2) gateways 7 are provided, of which at least the serving gateway 16 is blocked, that is to say can no longer be used, by the mobile radio service provider (or, if desired, the payment contract partner) for a deactivated or deleted user identification profile. For this purpose, it is configured in such a way that a data flow and, in addition, a data volume 20 can be detected for the accounting. However, what the content of this data is is not detectable. Here, two channels assigned to the shown gateways 7 are shown within the mobile communication network 2, for example for diagnostic data of the mobile terminal 10 in conjunction with the (server from a) publisher 9 and for communication with (servers from) third-party providers or freely accessible services of the Internet, for example for navigation data, traffic situation, weather situation and further useful information. It should be noted that the user identification profile is physically fixed (in a chip, for example a separate so-called SIM card or an embedded chip such as the eUICC [embedded universal integrated circuit card]) and can therefore be unusable in an indistinguishable manner both for the mobile radio service provider and for the publisher 9 by means of (physical) separation from the associated terminal 10 or by (fraudulent) re-use (for example by means of the previously described targeted modification of software components and / or hardware components) of the terminal 10 from the side of the communication network 2.It is now proposed here that this mobile communication network 2 is upgraded by an alarm device 6 and data traffic analyzers 4. The alarm device 6 is integrated into a central data traffic analyzer 4, for example. The data traffic analyser 4 is in turn connected in a communicating manner to the specific data traffic analysers 4 assigned in each case to a gateway 7 or channel. This allows a detection directly where a data flow and a data volume 20 are detected, which can uncover fraudulent use of the user identification profile. For this purpose, a predetermined confidence threshold is set up in the alarm device 6, which confidence threshold is fixed (for example a maximum value for a data volume 20 per time or period) or is learned (for example by means of a self-learning, preferably back-amplifying, artificial intelligence). In one embodiment, the number of receivers 3 is limited and / or only pre-determined receivers 3 are permitted. This creates a high level of security against fraudulent use of the user identification profile. For example, during the initial use (for example over a limited first use period), the permissible receivers 3 or their number is defined, for example learned (preferably mechanically).Here, it is also (purely optionally) proposed that the alarm device 6 (or the data traffic analyzer 4 and its results in this respect) can be configured from the outside by means of the direct data connection. For example, such a fraudulent use form has become known or learned (for example by machine), which can be recognized (sufficiently accurately) by the alarm device 6 by means of a feature of the data traffic 5. The alarm device 6 then receives this information and can also subsequently check the data traffic 5 in the future. In this exemplary embodiment, the alarm device 6 is fed with the relevant information from the user 1 or respectively publisher 9 (i.e. configured, compare configuration arrow 25), wherein, in addition, (purely optionally) the alarm device 6 also reports back to the user 1 or respectively publisher 9 (compare report arrow 26). For example, such a report is used by the alarm device 6 for other alarm devices 6 and / or communicated to the user 1 or publisher 9. For example, a fraud database 13 (not shown in FIG. 2 for reasons of better clarity) is fed therewith. The report of the alarm device 6 consists, for example (in conclusion or inter alia):the identification of a chip for a user identification profile (for example the so-called EID [eUICC Identifier]);the user identification profile (for example the so-called ICCID [integrated circuit card identifier]);the location at which fraud or abuse has been detected (identification of the country, state and / or city);details about the mobile radio network (country identifier of the network, MSP / MNO identifier, identifier of the mobile radio cell, and others); anddate and time at which the confidence threshold of the data traffic analyzer 4 was reached or exceeded.In one embodiment, the information to the alarm device 6 for the purpose of configuration (by means of the configuration arrow 25) can consist, for example (finally or inter alia), of the same (or similar) elements as the above-described elements of the reports (by means of the report arrows 26) in order, for example, to define or restrict the location or the type of the mobile terminals 10 whose data traffic 5 is to be analyzed (for example compared with a reserved expected exchange of data) (for example if a possible initial forecast is given).In FIG. 3 a diagram of data traffic 5 in a mobile communication network 2 with fraud database 13 is shown. The architecture shown is comparable to the illustration in FIG. 2 and in this respect reference is made to the preceding description without exclusion of generality. In contrast to the embodiment according to FIG. 3, a fraud database 13 is arranged here (purely optionally) in the sphere of the mobile radio service provider and furthermore no (direct) communication between the publisher 9 and the alarm device 6 is shown (or not established).Fraud database 13 has the advantage that events of the past that have occurred there are made usable for the future. For example, the entries in fraud database 13 are prepared in such a way that they can be directly understood by a human, i.e., created by a human, for example. Alternatively or additionally, fraud database 13 contains experiences based on fraud reports from an alarm device 6, wherein the experiences which are permanently stored in fraud database 13 are verified, i.e., are to be assigned to an actual fraudulent or fraudulent use of a user identification profile. For example, fraud messages not verified are held for a predetermined period of time (e.g., one week or one month) and are then deleted if they have not been verified or otherwise caused to be held further.For example, underthreshold fraud predictive cases are accumulated in fraud database 13 and used as a trigger for a fraud message. In this case, therefore, an individual fraud predictive case is not sufficient for a fraud report, but the presence of a plurality of such subthreshold fraud predictive cases is still sufficient (compare FIGS. 5 and 6 ). For example, in the case of the data traffic 5 of a user identification profile (used fraudulently or improperly), the data volume per data channel and / or the type or number of the used data channels have in each case not changed sufficiently greatly from a regular use, but the data volume per data channel and the type or number of the used data channels have changed in such a way that overall a severe change which can be measured or analyzed by means of the data traffic analyzer 4 results.FIG. 4 shows a flow diagram of a method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile. The following description will refer to the foregoing descriptions.Step a. is carried out permanently, sporadic or on the occasion and from the beginning of the creation of the user identification profile, wherein monitoring is carried out permanently or in random samples with a time interval from one another. In one exemplary embodiment, step a. is carried out upon a request from a user 1, for example, in the case of subscriptions with annual runtime with an pending cancellation deadline of the subscription for the use of the user identification profile. Alternatively or additionally, step a. is started when the user identification profile has reached a predetermined age, for example after the end of a usual minimum duration of a leasing contract and / or a minimum holding duration of a motor vehicle 12, for example after 2 years after the creation of the user identification profile, wherein a permanent monitoring is preferably carried out after a delay.In step b., the monitored exchange of data is compared with a reserved expected exchange of data. The expected exchange is well known in some applications despite an unknown knowledge about the content of the data traffic 5, for example due to the functions of the relevant terminal 10 and / or its type and / or its location. For example, communication with a foreign receiver 3 is excluded due to the use. For example, due to the functional scope of the relevant terminal 10, a number of receivers 3 is greater or smaller than in the case of fraudulent use of the user identification profile. Furthermore, for example, data traffic 5 depends on times of day, such as, for example, the movement of motor vehicle 12 during the periods of impact (for example, on the route between home and work), wherein only when motor vehicle 12 is moved, a large amount of data (for example, navigation services, maintenance data and the like) arises and is exchanged.Subsequently, in step c., a fraud message is output by means of the alarm device 6 if the monitored exchange of data deviates from the expected exchange. As described above, the fraud notification is outputted from the alarm device 6, and then a decision to prevent misuse becomes possible without the need for knowledge about the contents of the data exchange.In FIG. 5, a diagram with the data volume 20 over time 21 is shown. The ordinate shows the data volume 20 and the abscissa the time 21 (of a curve) of an accumulated data traffic 5 of a plurality of user identification profiles within the period of time under consideration. The period is, for example, one day. The two marked areas represent the main usage periods 22, 23 with the largest data traffic 5 at the respective point in time. For example, at 8 am and 18 am in the evening, wherein most traffic and thus most data usage takes place for loT monitoring and / or traffic line services, a distribution of a so-called traffic type 1 takes place. At the gateways 7 of the system architecture (compare FIG. 2 or 3 ), the individual data traffic 5, that is to say data traffic assigned to a user identification profile, is measured and compared with the data traffic 5 shown here and the current time 21, and an experience is thus created. Alternatively or additionally, monitoring of the type of data can be displayed by means of the data traffic analyzer 4. For example, a comparison between continuous data traffic 5 and peak load data traffic and / or class(s) of that service(s) and / or traffic direction (transmission compared to reception or uplink compared to downlink) is thus possible. The data traffic 5 shown here is typical for example of a B2C data traffic pattern. Thus, such data traffic 5 is rather unusual for an IoT application (compare traffic type 2 in FIG. 6 )Furthermore, the data traffic analyzer 4 is set up in such a way that it recognizes specific data end points (for example APN, gateway 7, 16, or others) and thus monitors or recognizes changes with respect to the forwarding of data to these end points. This can include monitoring the type of the contacted infrastructure components (servers) or the service(s) used.Alternatively or additionally, these functions of the data traffic analyzer 4 can be displayed or trained by means of an artificial intelligence, wherein, inter alia, the experiences from the fraud database 13 can be used as training data for this purpose. Comparing previous data usage patterns (possibly collected using machine learning techniques over many subscriptions (contracts, data plans, and others) of the same type and / or over time 21) with potentially different current data usage patterns would then result in informed detection decisions being made as to whether a particular data usage pattern for a particular subscription under investigation (commonly referred to as test data in machine learning) is still falling into a first category (e.g., typical automotive behavior) or a second category (e.g., non-automotive behavior).The following advantages result from the use of the data traffic analyzer 4 within the gateways 7: 1) changes in the usage patterns of the data traffic 5 can be detected (in particular a shift from typical automobile behavior to non-automobile behavior, for example). In FIG. 2), informed decisions may be made to identify user identification profiles that are subject to fraud or abuse. 3) The publisher 9 (for example the automobile manufacturer in the case of a B2B application) can be informed. In addition, a fraud database 13 may help identify chips with user identification profiles (or even the user identification profiles themselves) stored therein that have been removed or soldered (i.e., mechanically separated) from a first mobile communication platform to prevent those chips with user identification profiles (with valid subscription information stored therein) from being coupled to and used in another mobile terminal 10.Further, fraud database 13 may help identify mobile terminals 10 that have been selectively modified (e.g., by modifying software components and / or hardware components by unauthorized third party for the purpose of abuse) to prevent such modified mobile terminal 10 from being usable (with valid subscription information stored therein). Finally, the deactivation of the corresponding user identification profiles and / or the termination of the contracts can be triggered on the basis of this. 6) The issuer 9 (for example, an automobile manufacturer in the case of a B2B application) can save a lot of money.In FIG. 6, a diagram with the data volume 20 over time 21 with a data traffic 5 of traffic type 2 is shown. The ordinate shows the data volume 20 and the abscissa the time 21 within a period of time under consideration. The period of time is again one day here, for example. The data traffic 5 shown here is typical for example of a B2B data traffic pattern. In this case, the data traffic 5 is the largest just in the early morning hours of a day and the rest of the day is rather low. For example, the early morning hours are the typical time slots in which diagnostic data is retrieved from the vehicles or software updates are provided for the vehicles. The distribution of the data traffic 5 is referred to as traffic type 2. By comparing the two traffic types, a comparison of the data can thus be made by means of the data traffic analyzer 4; in addition, a finer, more accurate consideration of the data traffic 5 is possible by means of the fraud database 13. Fraud database 13 comprises the following parameters, for example:the identification of the chip on which the user identification profile is stored. This is, for example, a 32-digit eUICC identifier which defines a globally unique serial number for chips with user identification profiles as in GSMA SGP.29.the unique identifier for identifying a user identification profile located, for example, in an eUICC, as defined in ITU-T E.118.The name of the reporting issuer 9.The identification number of the reporting issuer 9 (if allocated).The country, i.e. the home market, of the reporting publisher 9.The date and time at which such an entry was recorded in the fraud database 13.the period of fraud, i.e. a from / to date range in which the fraud message(s) took place(s).the fraud country code for identifying the country in which the fraud occurred.The category of fraud, for example a code for identifying a specific type of fraud, which is reported to support the ascertainments.A type allocation code [TAC] which is used, for example, for identifying the mark / model and the associated details (normally the first 8 digits of an IMEI [International Mobile Equipment Identity]).The international mobile terminal identifier 10 [IMEI] which, if known, is associated with the identified user identification profile chip identifier (EID).a counter which indicates the number of times the identifier of the user identification profile chip [EID; eUICC Identifier] has been marked overall. This entry can be generated by the system, for example.The database history of a specific user identification profile chip, i.e. the history of all entries for adding or removing EIDs from an EID fraud list.the risk score which has calculated and stored a risk value for each identifier of the user identification profile chips.The invention relates to a method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile, wherein an exchange of data over the communication network between a user and a respective receiver can be carried out in encrypted form, and wherein a data traffic analyzer is furthermore provided, which is configured to analyze the data traffic between the user and the respective receiver, wherein the data traffic analyzer comprises an alarm device for outputting a fraud message, wherein the method comprises at least the following steps are carried out in the order mentioned: a. monitoring an exchange of data between the user identified by individual user identification profile and at least one receiver; b. comparing the monitored actual exchange of data with a reserved expected exchange of data; c. outputting a fraud report by means of the alarm device if the monitored actual exchange of data deviates from the expected exchange.With the method proposed here for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile, fraudulent use of a user identification profile in the context of an IoT application can be identified. Furthermore, the corresponding user identification profile can be deactivated or deleted remotely (if necessary).List of reference characters1 User 2 Communication network 3 Receiver 4 Data traffic analyzer 5 Data traffic 6 Alarm device 7 Gateway (packet data network) 8 Packet data network 9 Publisher 10 Mobile terminal 11 Telematics control unit 12 Motor vehicle 13 Fraud database 14 Onboard connectivity unit 15 Fleet manager 16 Gateway (serving) 17 Data interface 18 Processor 19 Satellite 20 Data volume 21 Time 22 Early Main use period 23 Late Main use period 24 Supervisor 25 Configuration arrow 26 Report arrow 27 eNB chip
Claims
Method for monitoring abuse of a user identification profile, wherein communication is possible for an individual user (1) exclusively using its individual user identification profile within a mobile communication network (2), wherein the user (1) is unambiguously identifiable by means of this user identification profile within the communication network (2), wherein an exchange of data via the communication network (2) between the user (1) and a respective receiver (3) can be carried out in encrypted form, and wherein a data traffic analyser (4) is furthermore provided, which is configured to analyse the data traffic (5) which takes place between the user (1) and a respective receiver (3), wherein the data traffic analyser (4) comprises an alarm device (6) for outputting a fraud message, wherein the method at least the following steps are carried out by means of the data traffic analyzer (4) in the order mentioned: a. monitoring an exchange of data between the user (1) identified by individual user identification profile and at least one receiver (3); b. comparing the monitored actual exchange of data with a reserved expected exchange of data; and c. outputting a fraud report by means of the alarm device (6) if the monitored actual exchange of data deviates from the expected exchange.Method according to claim 1, wherein the data traffic analyser (4) is assigned to a respective gateway (7) of the communication network (2), preferably a gateway (7) for a packet data network (8).Method according to Claim 1 or Claim 2, wherein the user (1) is an issuer (9) and the user identification profile is implemented in a restricted mobile terminal (10), and wherein the terminal (10) carries out an exchange of data independently or in a controlled manner with the issuer (9) as receiver (3) via the communication network (2), wherein preferably the terminal (10) is a telematics control unit (11) of a motor vehicle (12) and the issuer (9) carries out obligations from an operating contract with the owner of the motor vehicle (12) by means of the data exchange.Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data traffic analyser (4) and / or the alarm device (6) can be configured from the outside, preferably by means of the communication network (2), wherein preferably one or more receivers (3) are determined as the only permitted receivers (3), wherein particularly preferably communication with an impermissible receiver (3) triggers a fraud message.Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein at least one of the following events is triggered as a result of a fraud message: - a recipient (3) or a group of recipients (3) is determined as the only allowed recipient (3) and an exchange of data between the user (1) and the at least one impermissible recipient is blocked; - the user identification profile is blocked for communication, at least in the current mobile communication network (2); - the user (1) and / or the publisher (9) receives a request for clarification from the communication network (2); and - the relevant user identification profile is deleted and / or deactivated.Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data traffic analyzer (4) comprises an artificial intelligence, preferably with a MachineL algorithm, wherein preferably the artificial intelligence is a pre-trained transformer, and / or wherein preferably the artificial intelligence is further trained over a predefined period of time during use of the user identification profile by the user (1).Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data traffic analyser (4) comprises a fraud database (13) in which information about an expectable exchange is stored.Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data traffic analyser (4) and / or a fraud database (13) according to claim 7 and / or an artificial intelligence according to claim 6 is operated by at least one of the following entities: - an operator of the mobile communication network (2); - the user (1) of the user identification profile or the publisher (9) according to claim 3; and - a separate supervisor (24).Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the user identification profile is implemented in a telematics control unit (11) or in an onboard connectivity unit (14), preferably in a motor vehicle (12), wherein particularly preferably the user (1) is a fleet manager (15) for a plurality of motor vehicles (12).
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