GNSS deception jamming detection method and device and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of satellite network security, in particular to a GNSS deception jamming detection method and device and a medium, and the method comprises the steps: calculating the detection statistics of an nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, the relative acceleration and the pseudo-range observed quantity of the nth satellite; accumulating the detection statistics of the nth satellite at the single moment according to a preset accumulation length, and generating an accumulated detection statistics of the nth satellite; and judging whether the nth satellite has interference deception or not according to the cumulative detection statistic of the nth satellite. The method can be directly applied to an existing commercial GNSS receiver, rapid and effective deception jamming detection is achieved, additional hardware does not need to be added to the commercial GNSS receiver or receiver hardware does not need to be changed, and information such as the position and time service of a user is prevented from being deception.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of satellite network security, and in particular to a GNSS spoofing interference detection method, device and medium. Background Art

[0002] GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) spoofing interference detection technology is one of the important technologies to ensure the safe application of satellite navigation systems. With the widespread application of satellite navigation technology, including in transportation, communications, electricity, finance, aviation, aerospace and other fields, spoofing interference has become a serious safety hazard. GNSS spoofing interference detection has a wide range of applications and urgent needs in civil aviation, intelligent transportation, unmanned driving and other fields. Existing GNSS spoofing interference detection is generally based on the internal parameters of each satellite tracking channel, such as signal quality detection (SQM), power detection, Doppler detection and autonomous integrity detection. Generally, GNSS related parameters are selected for monitoring. First, relevant parameter data is collected in real time, and parameter characteristics such as signal strength, frequency, phase, etc. are analyzed and compared with normal signals to identify possible abnormal characteristics in the signal, such as abnormal changes in signal strength, frequency offset, etc. The detection threshold is calculated based on the probability distribution of normal signal parameters, and then by comparing the possible abnormal characteristics in the signal, when the parameter characteristics are higher than the threshold, it is considered that spoofing interference exists.

[0003] However, the existing spoofing interference detection technology has the following disadvantages: since the parameters required by the existing GNSS spoofing interference detection method are not considered when designing the receiver, the required parameters cannot be directly extracted, and the hardware structure of the receiver must be modified or additional equipment must be added to achieve GNSS spoofing interference; since the existing GNSS spoofing interference detection method has a small detection window and low sensitivity to detection parameters, high-rate data is required and there is a lack of sufficient detection performance for low-rate data (such as 1Hz); since the existing GNSS spoofing interference detection method only uses characteristic values ​​of the current or past period of time, the detection speed is not fast enough.

[0004] Therefore, how to implement GNSS spoofing interference directly on existing commercial GNSS receivers is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0005] The present application provides a GNSS spoofing interference detection method, which can realize GNSS spoofing interference detection with high detection accuracy and high detection speed on an existing commercial GNSS receiver, without adding additional hardware to the commercial GNSS receiver or changing the receiver hardware.

[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme:

[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a GNSS spoofing interference detection method, which is applied to a GNSS receiver, comprising:

[0008] Acquire the GNSS satellite signal received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states, and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signal;

[0009] Calculating the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at a current moment;

[0010] Calculating a detection statistic of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the n-th satellite;

[0011] Accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate a cumulative detection statistic of the n-th satellite;

[0012] It is determined whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

[0013] In a preferred example of the present application, it can be further configured that the calculation of the detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the nth satellite includes:

[0014] Define the pseudo-range observation of the nth satellite as ρ n [k], the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite is The frequency drift of the nth satellite is The detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment is T n [k], then:

[0015]

[0016] in, is the second-order difference sign, Δt is the sampling interval, and c is the speed of light.

[0017] In a preferred example of the present application, it can be further configured that the accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to the preset accumulation length to generate the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite includes:

[0018]

[0019] Where L is the cumulative length, is the cumulative detection statistic.

[0020] In a preferred example of the present application, it can be further set to further include calculating a threshold γ, and the process includes:

[0021] Preset false alarm rate P FA , calculate the frequency drift noise of the user in the previous period of time and second-order pseudorange measurement noise and The sum of the pseudo-range observations ρ of the nth satellite n The measurement noise of [k] is obtained;

[0022] The threshold γ initialization value is calculated based on the data within K seconds after the receiver is turned on and the threshold calculation formula, which is:

[0023]

[0024] Among them, Q -1 is the right-tailed probability function of the chi-square distribution, K is equal to the cumulative length;

[0025] The threshold γ is updated every K seconds, and the updated γ value is calculated using the data collected in the previous K seconds combined with the threshold calculation formula.

[0026] In a preferred example of the present application, it can be further configured that the step of judging whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite includes:

[0027] According to the accumulated detection statistics of the nth satellite calculated in real time According to the size of the threshold γ, it is determined whether there is GNSS spoofing interference on the nth satellite.

[0028] In a preferred example of the present application, it can be further configured to include:

[0029] If the nth satellite is determined to have no interference deception, the receiver positioning and timing solution is performed on the signal of this satellite; otherwise, the receiver positioning and timing solution is prohibited for the signal of this satellite.

[0030] In a second aspect, the present application provides a GNSS spoofing interference detection device, the device comprising:

[0031] A data acquisition module is used to obtain the GNSS satellite signals received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states, and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signals;

[0032] A detection statistics module is used to calculate the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at a current moment; and calculate the detection statistics of the nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the nth satellite;

[0033] A cumulative detection statistic module, used for accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate a cumulative detection statistic of the n-th satellite;

[0034] The judgment module is used to judge whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

[0035] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method as described in any one of the above items are implemented.

[0036] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a program stored thereon, wherein when the program is executed by a processor, a GNSS spoofing interference detection method as described in any one of the above items is implemented.

[0037] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, comprising computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method as described in any one of the above items.

[0038] In summary, compared with the prior art, the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application has at least the following beneficial effects: it can be directly applied to existing commercial GNSS receivers to achieve fast and effective deception interference detection, without adding additional hardware to the commercial GNSS receiver or changing the receiver hardware, thereby preventing the user's location, timing and other information from being deceived. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 A flowchart of a GNSS spoofing interference detection method provided for one embodiment of the present application.

[0040] Figure 2 A structural diagram of a GNSS spoofing interference detection device provided for one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0041] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0042] In one embodiment of the present application, a GNSS spoofing interference detection method is provided. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0043] S100: Acquire the GNSS satellite signal received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states, and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signal.

[0044] Specifically, the GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) machine is a commercial GNSS receiver.

[0045] S200: Calculate the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at a current moment.

[0046] S300: Calculate the detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the nth satellite.

[0047] In a preferred embodiment, the calculating the detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the nth satellite comprises:

[0048] Define the pseudo-range observation of the nth satellite as ρ n [k], the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite is The frequency drift of the nth satellite is The detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment is T n [k], then:

[0049]

[0050] in, is the second-order difference sign, Δt is the sampling interval, and c is the speed of light.

[0051] S400: Accumulate the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate a cumulative detection statistic of the n-th satellite.

[0052] In a preferred embodiment, the step of accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite includes:

[0053]

[0054] Where L is the cumulative length, is the cumulative detection statistic.

[0055] Specifically, the preset cumulative length is a cumulative length set by a user.

[0056] S500: Determine whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

[0057] In a preferred embodiment, the threshold γ is calculated, and the process includes:

[0058] Preset false alarm rate P FA , calculate the frequency drift noise of the user in the previous period of time and second-order pseudorange measurement noise and The sum of the pseudo-range observations ρ of the nth satellite n The measurement noise of [k] is obtained;

[0059] The threshold γ initialization value is calculated based on the data within K seconds after the receiver is turned on and the threshold calculation formula, which is:

[0060]

[0061] Among them, Q -1 is the right-tailed probability function of the chi-square distribution, K is equal to the cumulative length;

[0062] The threshold γ is updated every K seconds, and the updated γ value is calculated using the data collected in the previous K seconds combined with the threshold calculation formula.

[0063] Specifically, the threshold is calculated using historical data. After the threshold value is obtained, the accumulated detection statistics of the nth satellite calculated in real time are calculated. According to the size of the threshold γ, it is determined whether there is GNSS spoofing interference on the nth satellite.

[0064] In this embodiment, the method is a set of software that can be directly applied to existing commercial GNSS receivers to achieve fast and effective spoofing interference detection without adding additional hardware to the commercial GNSS receiver or changing the receiver hardware, thereby preventing the user's location, timing and other information from being spoofed.

[0065] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0066] If the nth satellite is determined to have no interference deception, the receiver positioning and timing solution is performed on the signal of this satellite; otherwise, the receiver positioning and timing solution is prohibited for the signal of this satellite.

[0067] In specific implementation, when solving the receiver position and time (positioning and timing), according to the judgment result of interference deception, the satellite group with abnormal signals, that is, the interference deception, will be excluded, that is, the relevant information will not be used for solution.

[0068] In this embodiment, the problem that the deviation of the positioning and timing results exceeds the user's acceptable range before the spoofing signal is detected is avoided, and the system has the ability to continue to provide normal positioning and timing in the presence of spoofing interference.

[0069] This application also provides a GNSS spoofing interference detection device, see Figure 2 As shown, the device comprises:

[0070] The data acquisition module 100 is used to obtain the GNSS satellite signals received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signals;

[0071] The detection statistics module 200 is used to calculate the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at the current moment; calculate the detection statistics of the nth satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the nth satellite;

[0072] The cumulative detection statistics module 300 is used to accumulate the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite;

[0073] The judgment module 400 is used to judge whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

[0074] The functional implementation of each module in the above-mentioned GNSS spoofing interference detection device corresponds to the steps in the above-mentioned GNSS spoofing interference detection method embodiment, and its functions and implementation processes will not be repeated here one by one.

[0075] The present application also provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method as described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0076] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a program is stored, wherein the computer-readable storage medium refers to a carrier for storing data, which may include but is not limited to a floppy disk, an optical disk, a hard disk, a flash memory, a USB flash drive and / or a memory stick, etc., and the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices. The working process, working details and technical effects of the computer-readable storage medium provided in this embodiment can be found in the above embodiment of a GNSS spoofing interference detection method, which will not be repeated here.

[0077] The application also provides a computer program product, comprising computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method as described in any of the above embodiments.

[0078] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in the present application can include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).

[0079] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. In order to make the description concise, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification. The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present application, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this field, without departing from the concept of the present application, several deformations and improvements can be made, which all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of this application shall be based on the attached claims.

Claims

1. A GNSS spoofing interference detection method, characterized in that: Applications in GNSS receivers, including: Acquire the GNSS satellite signal received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states, and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signal; Calculating the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at a current moment; Calculating a detection statistic of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the n-th satellite; Accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate a cumulative detection statistic of the n-th satellite; It is determined whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

2. The GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The calculating the detection statistic of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the n-th satellite comprises: Define the pseudorange observation of the nth satellite as ρ n [k], the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite is The frequency drift of the nth satellite is The detection statistic of the nth satellite at a single moment is T n [k], then: in, is the second-order difference sign, Δt is the sampling interval, and c is the speed of light.

3. The GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step of accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite includes: Where L is the cumulative length, is the cumulative detection statistic.

4. The GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claim 3, characterized in that: It also includes calculating the threshold γ, and the process includes: Preset false alarm rate P FA , calculate the frequency drift noise of the user in the previous period of time and second-order pseudorange measurement noise and The sum of the pseudo-range observations ρ of the nth satellite n The measurement noise of [k] is obtained; The threshold γ initialization value is calculated based on the data within K seconds after the receiver is turned on and the threshold calculation formula, which is: Among them, Q -1 is the right-tailed probability function of the chi-square distribution, K is equal to the cumulative length; The threshold γ is updated every K seconds, and the updated γ value is calculated using the data collected in the previous K seconds combined with the threshold calculation formula.

5. The GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The determining, according to the accumulated detection statistics of the n-th satellite, whether the n-th satellite has interference deception comprises: According to the accumulated detection statistics of the nth satellite calculated in real time According to the size of the threshold γ, it is determined whether there is GNSS spoofing interference on the nth satellite.

6. The GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claim 5, characterized in that: Also includes: If the nth satellite is determined to have no interference deception, the receiver positioning and timing solution is performed on the signal of this satellite; otherwise, the receiver positioning and timing solution is prohibited for the signal of this satellite.

7. A GNSS spoofing interference detection device, characterized in that: include: A data acquisition module is used to obtain the GNSS satellite signals received by the receiver, and extract the pseudo-range observations, on-orbit motion states, and satellite frequency drifts of all visible satellites at the current moment in the GNSS satellite signals; A detection statistics module, used to calculate the relative acceleration between the GNSS receiver and the nth satellite according to the on-orbit motion state of the nth satellite at a current moment; Calculating a detection statistic of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to the satellite frequency drift, relative acceleration and pseudorange observation of the n-th satellite; A cumulative detection statistic module, used for accumulating the detection statistics of the n-th satellite at a single moment according to a preset accumulation length to generate a cumulative detection statistic of the n-th satellite; The judgment module is used to judge whether the n-th satellite has interference deception according to the cumulative detection statistics of the n-th satellite.

8. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a program, wherein when the program is executed by a processor, the GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

10. A computer program product comprising computer instructions, characterized in that: When the computer instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the GNSS spoofing interference detection method according to claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

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