Safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in intelligent connected automobile

Abstract

The invention discloses a safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in an intelligent connected automobile. According to the method, an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption system and an identity-based batch signature are adopted to realize position privacy protection of the electric vehicle and data integrity and identity authentication in a communication process. Meanwhile, the method operates in turns under a decentralized scheduling mechanism, and allows the electric vehicle to dynamically join or leave the network, so as to ensure that the charging matching scheduling task is quickly and efficiently completed. The method greatly improves the protection of the position privacy and data privacy of the electric vehicle, improves the calculation and matching precision of the position distance between the power supplier and the demand side, and achieves and promotes the bidirectional energy transaction of the electric vehicle.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of intelligent transportation systems, and in particular to a safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent networked vehicle. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, electric vehicles have become increasingly popular as part of intelligent transportation systems, gaining the attention of car owners and manufacturers, and supported by multiple countries. They have become a green solution to environmental problems caused by petroleum-powered cars and their polluting gas emissions. Although car manufacturers continue to improve the specifications of electric vehicle batteries to make them last longer, they still need to be charged frequently during use. Considering the energy storage capacity of electric vehicles and their ability to discharge excess energy and share it with other electric vehicles through bidirectional chargers, car-to-car charging technology can be a practical and efficient solution to reduce the load on existing charging stations. However, car-to-car charging scheduling needs to consider the spatial distribution of electric vehicles, and once the locations of suppliers and demanders and other parameters are received, the best match can be obtained on the central server. However, some private information, such as the locations of demanders and suppliers, may be leaked during data transmission. If the trip and charging information (time, location) are properly analyzed, the user's driving pattern and whereabouts may be exposed. In practice, users are likely to be unwilling to sacrifice personal convenience for the overall benefit of all users.

[0003] Therefore, the emergence of safe and efficient privacy-preserving charging matching solutions has attracted widespread attention from scholars in this field since the emergence of vehicle-to-vehicle bidirectional charging technology. With the extensive and in-depth research on intelligent transportation systems, they have proposed some safe privacy-preserving charging matching solutions, but they all have some security risks to a greater or lesser extent. Due to the high dependence of electric vehicles on location information during the charging matching process, protecting the location privacy of the vehicle means ensuring the confidentiality of data during the communication process. If an attacker correctly deciphers and analyzes the location information of the vehicle, it is likely to expose the owner's home and office location, causing the owner to be unwilling to participate in the V2V charging mode, which in turn affects the widespread deployment of such charging services and the development and growth of intelligent connected vehicles, which is not conducive to the long-term development of intelligent transportation systems. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a safe and efficient privacy-preserving charging matching method in an intelligent connected vehicle, which greatly improves the protection of electric vehicle location privacy and data privacy, improves the accuracy of location distance calculation and matching between power suppliers and demanders, and realizes and promotes two-way energy trading of electric vehicles.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in an intelligent networked vehicle, the method comprising:

[0006] S1: The trusted authority TA generates the public key (n=p1p2) and private key (g=τλ) of the improved Paillier cryptosystem and runs the parameter generator Generate five-tuple Calculate h = e(Q,Q); In addition, TA chooses a secure cryptographic hash function and pick a random number As the key, finally calculate the corresponding public key P pub = x·Q; When an electric vehicle is registered, TA uses its identity information ID i ∈{0,1} * Calculate a key and securely distribute the key to the electric vehicle;

[0007] S2: Energy demand side electric vehicles D i Broadcast its charging demand to all electric vehicles within the communication range. After receiving this request, each electric vehicle S j Pick five random numbers i=1,2,3,4,5, and use their respective public keys to generate ciphertext and At the same time, supplier S j from Select a random number s1 and generate a corresponding signature pair to ensure the integrity of the ciphertext;

[0008] S3: Demand side D i Collect electricity supplier S j The location information ciphertext, randomly select two natural numbers R1 and R2, perform homomorphic operations to generate distance indicators The demander randomly selects a supplier S from the respondents. * , and Sent to other suppliers; due to S * Not received So S * Know that you have been selected as an auxiliary node for the shortest distance calculation;

[0009] S4: Supplier S j Decrypt the received distance indicator using the private key Get the distance information between it and the demand side d = R1[dist(i,j)] 2 +R2, and then re-encrypt d to get Generate its corresponding signature pair (σ j,3 ,σ j,4 ) and returned to the demander D along with the ciphertext i ;

[0010] S5: Demand side D i First use the formula Perform identity and data integrity verification. If the verification passes, the location information will be re-encrypted. Packed into an array And forward it to supplier S * ; If the verification fails, it will be discarded;

[0011] S6: Supplier S * Decrypt the array one by one The distance information in the D is obtained, and the minimum value of the distance indicator is found, and the demander is notified. i The index of the minimum value in the array and its plaintext; once the demand side D i When the best neighboring network node BNN is identified in the supplier, the supplier will be requested to verify whether there is a best neighboring network node BMNN for both parties; if the supplier and the demander are each other's BNN, then both parties will enter the subsequent charging process.

[0012] Preferably, in S3, the demander uses random numbers R1 and R2 to perturb the real location, and homomorphically encrypts the perturbed value to obtain a distance indicator.

[0013] Preferably, in S4, the supplier S j Decrypt the distance information using its own private key and re-encrypt it using the homomorphic property; the re-encrypted ciphertext only has the information of the supplier S randomly selected by the demander. * Decryptable.

[0014] According to the above technical scheme, the present invention adopts an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption system and identity-based batch signature to realize electric vehicle location privacy protection, data integrity and identity authentication during communication; in addition, the method is operated in rounds under a decentralized scheduling mechanism, allowing electric vehicles to dynamically join or leave the network to ensure that charging matching scheduling tasks are completed quickly and efficiently. At the same time, on the basis of protecting the location privacy and data privacy of electric vehicles, the location distance calculation and matching of power suppliers and demanders are carried out, realizing two-way energy trading of electric vehicles.

[0015] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in detail in the following detailed description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0016] The accompanying drawings are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. Together with the following specific embodiments, they are used to explain the present invention but do not constitute a limitation of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:

[0017] Figure 1is a flow chart of a safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent connected vehicle provided by the present invention;

[0018] Figure 2 It is a system framework diagram of a safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent network-connected vehicle provided by the present invention;

[0019] Figure 3 It is a flow chart of information interaction in the distance record acquisition and charging matching stage in the safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in the intelligent connected vehicle provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] The specific implementation of the present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific implementation described here is only used to illustrate and explain the present invention, and is not used to limit the present invention.

[0021] See also Figures 1 to 3 The present invention provides a safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in an intelligent network-connected vehicle, the method comprising:

[0022] S1: The trusted authority TA generates the public key (n=p1p2) and private key (g=τλ) of the improved Paillier cryptosystem and runs the parameter generator Generate five-tuple Calculate h = e(Q,Q); In addition, TA chooses a secure cryptographic hash function and pick a random number As the key, finally calculate the corresponding public key P pub = x·Q; When an electric vehicle is registered, TA uses its identity information ID i ∈{0,1} * Calculate a key and securely distribute the key to the electric vehicle;

[0023] S2: Energy demand side electric vehicles D i Broadcast its charging demand to all electric vehicles within the communication range. After receiving this request, each electric vehicle S j Pick five random numbers i=1,2,3,4,5, and use their respective public keys to generate ciphertext and At the same time, supplier S j from Select a random number s1 and generate a corresponding signature pair to ensure the integrity of the ciphertext;

[0024] S3: Demand side D i Collect electricity supplier Sj The location information ciphertext, randomly select two natural numbers R1 and R2, perform homomorphic operations to generate distance indicators The demander randomly selects a supplier S from the respondents. * , and Sent to other suppliers; due to S * Not received So S * Know that you have been selected as an auxiliary node for the shortest distance calculation;

[0025] S4: Supplier S j Decrypt the received distance indicator using the private key Get the distance information between it and the demand side d = R1[dist(i,j)] 2 +R2, and then re-encrypt d to get Generate its corresponding signature pair (σ j,3 ,σ j,4 ) and returned to the demander D along with the ciphertext i ;

[0026] S5: Demand side D i First use the formula Perform identity and data integrity verification. If the verification passes, the location information will be re-encrypted. Packed into an array And forward it to supplier S * ; If the verification fails, it will be discarded;

[0027] S6: Supplier S * Decrypt the array one by one The distance information in the D is obtained, and the minimum value of the distance indicator is found, and the demander is notified. i The index of the minimum value in the array and its plaintext; once the demand side D i When the best neighboring network node BNN is identified in the supplier, the supplier will be requested to verify whether there is a best neighboring network node BMNN for both parties; if the supplier and the demander are each other's BNN, then both parties will enter the subsequent charging process.

[0028] In this embodiment, in order to resist various external and internal attacks, it is preferred that the demander uses random numbers R1 and R2 in S3 to perturb the real location, and homomorphically encrypts the perturbed value to obtain a distance indicator, rather than directly encrypting the real location information. This ensures that the supplier cannot infer the location privacy of the electric vehicle by obtaining the distance information of the vehicle.

[0029] At the same time, preferably in S4, the supplier S jDecrypt the distance information using its own private key and re-encrypt it using the homomorphic property; the re-encrypted ciphertext only has the information of the supplier S randomly selected by the demander. * This will ensure that the demand side will not be able to obtain the location information of other suppliers. * When it is notified, it gets the plain text of the distance indicator, after which it is able to obtain the actual location information of the matching provider.

[0030] The following provides a specific implementation method to illustrate the safe and efficient privacy protection charging matching method in the intelligent networked vehicle provided by the present invention:

[0031] 1. Solution initialization:

[0032] In the initialization phase of the scheme, it is assumed that there is a trusted authority TA, which is responsible for starting the entire system. TA selects two large prime numbers (p1, p2) for the improved Paillier cryptosystem based on the given security parameter κ, where |p1|=|p2|=κ. Then, TA generates the public key (n=p1p2) and private key (g=τλ) of the improved Paillier cryptosystem.

[0033] At the same time, given another security parameter TA will run the parameter generator Generate quintuple And calculate the value h = e(Q,Q). In addition, TA chooses a secure cryptographic hash function and choose a random number As the key, finally calculate the corresponding public key P pub =x·Q.

[0034] When the vehicle is registered, TA will i ∈{0,1} * Calculate a key And distribute this key securely to the vehicle.

[0035] 2. Data Request and Collection:

[0036] 2.1: Demand side D i Broadcasts charging demand information to all nearby electric vehicles within communication range;

[0037] 2.2: After receiving this request, the electric vehicle S as the supplier j Pick five random numbers i=1,2,3,4,5, and use their respective public keys to generate the following ciphertext:

[0038]

[0039] 2.3: To ensure Data integrity of supplier S j from Select a random number s1 and generate a signature pair (σ j,1 ,σ j,2 ) is as follows:

[0040]

[0041] Among them, TS represents the current timestamp;

[0042] Finally, supplier S j Generate a message:

[0043]

[0044] And send this message Msg to the demander D i .

[0045] 3. Distance record collection:

[0046] 3.1: Execute encryption and auxiliary computing node selection: Demand side D i Collect Supplier S j The location information ciphertext performs homomorphic operations to generate distance indicators Then randomly select an auxiliary node S * Perform subsequent calculations. Specifically include:

[0047] 3.1.1: Demand side D i After receiving Msg, verify the signature pair (σ j,1 ,σ j,2 ) is correct:

[0048]

[0049] In order to improve the efficiency of signature verification, the scheme can also perform a batch verification process of signatures, as follows:

[0050]

[0051] Where j∈{1,2,,...,M};

[0052] 3.1.2: If formula (3) or formula (4) is verified to be correct, the demand side D i From supplier S j Where to collect ciphertext And generate two random numbers R1 and R2; then, for each supplier S j , demand side D i For each supplier Sj Both perform the following homomorphic operations:

[0053]

[0054] 3.1.3: Demand side D i To each supplier S j Send encrypted distance indicator and from a randomly selected responding supplier S * What you get there However, for S * The response does not include This ensures that S * Know that you are selected and can assist in calculating the shortest path.

[0055] For all except S * Other S j , demand side D i Will be from Select a random number s2 from the above and generate a signature pair (σ i,1 ,σ i,2 ) is as follows:

[0056]

[0057] For S * , demand side D i from Select a random number s3 from the above and generate a signature pair (σ i,1 ￠,σ i,2 ￠) is as follows:

[0058]

[0059] 3.2: Re-encryption of distance information: Provider S j Decrypt the received distance indicator using the private key And calculate Finally, it is returned to the demander D i . Specifically include:

[0060] 3.2.1: In addition to S * Each supplier other than S j Verify the signature pair (σ i,1 ,σ i,2 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0061]

[0062] SupplierS * Verify the signature pair (σ i,1 ￠,σ i,2The specific steps are as follows:

[0063]

[0064] If formula (8) or formula (9) is satisfied, supplier S j From the demand side D i There collect the ciphertext of the distance indicator

[0065] 3.2.2: After receiving the range indicator, in addition to S * Each supplier other than S j Perform the following decryption operations:

[0066]

[0067] 3.2.3: In addition to S * Each supplier other than S j The following actions are performed to process the received distance indicator and respond accordingly:

[0068]

[0069] 3.2.4: In addition to S * Each supplier other than S j Select one from The random number s4 and generate a signature pair (σ j,3 ,σ j,4 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0070]

[0071] 4. Realize charging matching:

[0072] 4.1: Preprocessing of distance ciphertext: Demand side D i Pack the re-encrypted location information into an array Then forward it to supplier S * . Specifically include:

[0073] 4.1.1: Demand side D i Verify the signature pair (σ j,3 ,σ j,4 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0074]

[0075] In order to improve the efficiency of signature verification, the scheme can also perform batch verification of signatures, which allows multiple signatures to be verified at the same time, reducing repeated calculation work and improving the overall verification speed. The specific steps are as follows:

[0076]

[0077] 4.1.2: If formula (13) or formula (14) is verified to be correct, the demand side D i From supplier S j There, these ciphertexts are collected and all responses are stored in an array Forward to S * , the specific steps are as follows:

[0078]

[0079] 4.1.3: For S * , demand side D i Select one from The random number s5 is generated and the signature pair (σ i,3 ,σ i,4 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0080]

[0081] 4.2: Determine the shortest path: Supplier S * Decrypt the array one by one The distance information in the , find the shortest path and its index, and then finally notify the demander D i . Specifically include:

[0082] 4.2.1: Supplier S * Verify the signature pair (σ i,3 ,σ i,4 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0083]

[0084] 4.2.2: If formula (17) is verified to be correct, supplier S * Each set of data in the array will be decrypted in turn. The specific steps are as follows:

[0085]

[0086] Among them, d w represents the distance between the w-th supplier and the demander. Specifically, w is an integer whose value range is from 1 to M, including 1 and M.

[0087] 4.2.3: Supplier S * By comparing d w The value of the shortest distance indicator d min . Then, S * Select one from The random number s6 and generate a signature pair (σ j,5 ,σ j,6 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0088]

[0089] 4.3: Identifying the best supplier: Demand side D i Determine the best neighboring network node BNN and notify the other party to search for BNN. If both parties have each other's BNN, then establish the best neighboring network node BMNN for both parties to achieve charging matching. Specifically include:

[0090] 4.3.1: Demand side D i Verify the signature pair (σ j,5 ,σ j,6 ), the specific steps are as follows:

[0091]

[0092] 4.3.2: Once the demand side D i After identifying the best neighboring network node BNN in the supplier, it will request the supplier to verify whether there is a best neighboring network node BMNN for both parties. If the supplier and the demander are each other's BNN, then both parties will enter the subsequent charging process.

[0093] Through the above technical solution, the method uses an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption system and identity-based batch signature to achieve electric vehicle location privacy protection, data integrity and identity authentication during communication; at the same time, the method is operated in rounds under a decentralized scheduling mechanism, allowing electric vehicles to dynamically join or leave the network to ensure that charging matching scheduling tasks are completed quickly and efficiently. In addition, on the basis of protecting the location privacy and data privacy of electric vehicles, the location distance calculation and matching of power suppliers and demanders are carried out, realizing two-way energy trading of electric vehicles.

[0094] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the specific details in the above embodiments. Within the technical concept of the present invention, a variety of simple modifications can be made to the technical solution of the present invention, and these simple modifications all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0095] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the present invention will not further describe various possible combinations.

[0096] In addition, various embodiments of the present invention may be arbitrarily combined, and as long as they do not violate the concept of the present invention, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed by the present invention.

Claims

1. A safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent connected vehicle, characterized in that: The method comprises: S1: The trusted authority TA generates the public key (n=p1p2) and private key (g=τλ) of the improved Paillier cryptosystem and runs the parameter generator Generate five-tuple Calculate h = e(Q,Q); In addition, TA chooses a secure cryptographic hash function and pick a random number As the key, finally calculate the corresponding public key P pub = x·Q; When an electric vehicle is registered, TA uses its identity information ID i ∈{0,1} * Calculate a key and securely distribute the key to the electric vehicle; S2: Energy demand side electric vehicles D i Broadcast its charging demand to all electric vehicles within the communication range. After receiving this request, each electric vehicle S j Pick five random numbers i=1,2,3,4,5, and use their respective public keys to generate ciphertext and At the same time, supplier S j from Select a random number s1 and generate a corresponding signature pair to ensure the integrity of the ciphertext; S3: Demand side D i Collect electricity supplier S j The location information ciphertext, randomly select two natural numbers R1 and R2, perform homomorphic operations to generate distance indicators The demander randomly selects a supplier S from the respondents. * , and Sent to other suppliers; due to S * Not received So S * Know that you have been selected as an auxiliary node for the shortest distance calculation; S4: Supplier S j Decrypt the received distance indicator using the private key Get the distance information between it and the demand side d = R1[dist(i,j)] 2 +R2, and then re-encrypt d to get Generate its corresponding signature pair (σ j,3 ,σ j,4 ) and returned to the demander D along with the ciphertext i ; S5: Demand side D i First use the formula Perform identity and data integrity verification. If the verification passes, the location information will be re-encrypted. Packed into an array And forward it to supplier S * ; If the verification fails, it will be discarded; S6: Supplier S * Decrypt the array one by one The distance information in the D is obtained, and the minimum value of the distance indicator is found, and the demander is notified. i The index of the minimum value in the array and its plaintext; once the demand side D i When the best neighboring network node BNN is identified in the supplier, the supplier will be requested to verify whether there is a best neighboring network node BMNN for both parties; if the supplier and the demander are each other's BNN, then both parties will enter the subsequent charging process.

2. The safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent connected vehicle according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S3, the demander uses random numbers R1 and R2 to perturb the real location, and homomorphically encrypts the perturbed value to obtain the distance indicator.

3. The safe and efficient privacy-protected charging matching method in an intelligent connected vehicle according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S4, supplier S j Decrypt the distance information using its own private key and re-encrypt it using the homomorphic property; the re-encrypted ciphertext only has the information of the supplier S randomly selected by the demander. * Decryptable.

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