TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method and system

By adopting a TEE-based approach in the consortium chain to generate trusted credentials for contract execution and verify transaction integrity, the integrity protection problem of smart contracts is solved, and efficient and secure contract execution and development are achieved.

CN119513859BActive Publication Date: 2025-10-21NAT UNIV OF DEFENSE TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411461741.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-10-18
Publication Date
2025-10-21
Estimated Expiration
2044-10-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The integrity protection of smart contracts in existing consortium chains has problems such as performance bottlenecks, insufficient programming language support, expanded attack surface, and complicated contract development. In addition, there is a lack of an effective contract integrity assessment model, which leads to security and trust issues.

Method used

A TEE-based approach is used to generate trusted credentials with contract integrity status information for contract execution. The contract execution credibility of the transaction is verified through the trusted execution environment TEE, and the transaction is broadcast and verified in the consortium chain to ensure the integrity and trusted execution of the contract.

Benefits of technology

It achieves comprehensive protection of alliance chain smart contracts, improves the verification level and security, enhances the scalability and efficiency of the system, simplifies the contract development process, and reduces the complexity of TEE management.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The application discloses a kind of based on TEE's alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method and system, the application based on TEE's alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method includes: S1, for the transaction generated by contract execution to generate trusted voucher with contract integrity state information;S2, the transaction with trusted voucher is sorted and block is generated and is broadcasted to all nodes in alliance chain;S3, the integrity of trusted voucher carried in the transaction in each node in alliance chain is verified to verify the contract execution credibility of transaction, according to whether successful verification is marked as valid transaction or invalid transaction and submits alliance chain to transaction.This application aims at realizing the integrity protection of alliance chain smart contract, with the advantages of comprehensive protection, high verification level, safe and reliable, good universality, strong expansibility, high efficiency.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of security technology of alliance chains, and specifically to a method and system for protecting the integrity of alliance chain smart contracts based on TEE. Background Art

[0002] Consortium blockchains are maintained by different organizations and ensure the security, reliability, and traceability of transactions between multiple stakeholders. Unlike public blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, consortium blockchain networks are comprised of known participants, but these participants do not necessarily trust each other. In consortium blockchains, all on-chain transactions are executed through smart contracts, executable computer code that runs within the specific environment of the blockchain system and is distributed across different blockchain nodes. Smart contracts are typically written in a high-level programming language (such as Solidity), compiled into binary code or bytecode, and executed within a Docker container or contract virtual machine to mitigate potential vulnerabilities that could impact platform security. Fabric, the most prominent consortium blockchain system, executes smart contracts within Docker containers and supports various high-level programming languages ​​(such as Go, Java, and Node.js) for customizable contract logic. Fabric smart contracts typically run within stateless containers and require interaction with peer nodes. The validity of transactions in Fabric is driven by the smart contract's endorsement policy; only transactions that meet the endorsement policy are considered valid. Fabric transaction execution primarily consists of the following phases: Phase 1. Before calling a smart contract function, the smart contract must be installed and instantiated on the peer node (that is, launched in a Docker container). In the second phase, after the smart contract is installed and instantiated, the client (application) can send a request (transaction proposal) to the peer node to call the smart contract function. This phase is called execution or endorsement. The peer executes the called smart contract function and sends a response back to the client. The transaction response is signed by the peer and contains the execution response message and a read-write set. The read set represents all key-value pairs retrieved from the ledger by the peer using GetState during execution. The write set contains all key-value updates generated by the peer using PutState. When the client collects enough responses according to the endorsement policy, it sends them to the ordering service. In the third phase, the ordering service uniformly sorts the transactions, places them into a block, and sends the block to all peer nodes. In the fourth phase, the verification phase, the peer node verifies whether the transaction satisfies the endorsement policy and whether there are any read-write conflicts between different transactions. Finally, the transaction is recorded in the ledger. The ledger has two components: the blockchain and the world state. The world state is a pluggable database that stores the current values ​​of keys contained in the blockchain, enabling efficient retrieval of the latest state.

[0003] Smart contracts in traditional consortium chains, such as Fabric, run within a predefined set of endorsing nodes. Tampering with endorsement results significantly reduces the difficulty for attackers to compromise the integrity of smart contract computations. This is because the validity of contract results is primarily determined by endorsing nodes, which are only a subset of all peer nodes. This reduces decentralization and security. Furthermore, non-endorsing nodes struggle to verify the correctness of contract execution, raising new security and trust issues. Therefore, ensuring the integrity of smart contracts and the trusted execution of transactions on consortium chains is a critical issue. Furthermore, there is a lack of models and methods for contract integrity assessment, making it difficult to evaluate contract integrity and transaction security changes during contract execution when different security mechanisms are introduced or when different consortium chain organizations are employed. Existing TEE-based contract protection solutions all employ isolation. However, this approach has the following drawbacks: First, since TEE computing resources are typically limited, deploying a large number of contracts or those with large code volumes and storing their associated state within the TEE can create performance bottlenecks. Frequent world switching, in particular, can significantly degrade system performance. Second, existing TEEs typically only natively support the C language and lack sufficient support for popular and complex high-level programming languages ​​used in smart contracts. This increases the difficulty of deploying smart contracts written in different programming languages ​​into TEEs, complicating the smart contract development and deployment process. Furthermore, protecting contracts through isolation will result in the TEE managing an increasing amount of contract code and state, and vulnerabilities in smart contracts may expand the attack surface of the TEE itself.

[0004] TEE, as a highly secure technology, can create an isolated execution environment for upper-layer software, preventing malware interference and attacks. Leveraging hardware-level security mechanisms, TEEs protect the code and data stored within them from unauthorized tampering, ensuring the integrity of critical data and code. Therefore, TEE integrity protection plays a crucial role in safeguarding sensitive information processing and enhancing system security and defense capabilities, providing a solid security foundation for a wide range of application scenarios. Therefore, implementing integrity protection for consortium blockchain smart contracts based on TrustZone technology holds great promise and remains a key technical challenge awaiting urgent research. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Technical problem to be solved by the present invention: In response to the above-mentioned problems of the prior art, a TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method and system are provided. The present invention aims to achieve integrity protection of alliance chain smart contracts, which has the advantages of comprehensive protection, high verification level, security and reliability, good versatility, strong scalability and high efficiency.

[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0007] A TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method includes the following steps:

[0008] S1, generates a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information for the transaction obtained by contract execution ;

[0009] S2, will be accompanied by a trusted certificate After sorting the transactions, generate blocks and broadcast the blocks to all nodes in the alliance chain;

[0010] S3, each node in the alliance chain verifies the trusted credentials carried by the transaction in the block The integrity of the transaction is verified to verify the credibility of the contract execution of the transaction. Based on whether the verification is successful, the transaction is marked as valid or invalid and submitted to the alliance chain.

[0011] Optionally, in step S1, a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information is generated for the transaction obtained by contract execution. When , the generating function expression of the contract integrity state is:

[0012] ,

[0013] In the above formula, The contract integrity status on the alliance chain, ST =1 means that the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is not damaged, that is, the execution result of the contract is in line with expectations. ST =-1 means the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is destroyed, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, is the set of contract integrity status of all organizations, , The minimum number of endorsement organizations required to reach endorsement agreement between organizations. " indicates AND logic operation, ~ They are No. 1~ The contract integrity status of an organization, is the organization set of the alliance chain, any j Contract integrity status of an organization satisfy , Indicates the j The contractual integrity of the organization is not compromised, Indicates the j The contractual integrity of an organization is compromised and there are:

[0014] ,

[0015] In the above formula, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, For the j The contract integrity status set of the endorsement nodes of each organization, , For the j The set of endorsement nodes within an organization, any i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes satisfy , Indicates the i The contract integrity of the endorsing nodes is not compromised, Indicates the i The contract integrity of the endorsing nodes is destroyed. For the j The minimum number of endorsement nodes that an organization must reach for valid endorsement, and the contract integrity status on the alliance chain 、All j Contract integrity status of an organization And all i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes Forming three levels of contract integrity status in the alliance chain.

[0016] Optionally, in step S1, a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information is generated for the transaction obtained by contract execution. When the trusted certificate The calculation function expression is:

[0017] ,

[0018] In the above formula, is a list of transaction identifiers, the format of which is n >, where H1~H n is a unique identifier for n transactions, A list of transaction identifiers The associated smart contract integrity status information, v(S) includes the set of associated smart contracts in the transaction identifier list I <S1,...,S n Each smart contract S i The contract ID, hash value and security status; The platform security vector is the current security state of the system components on the platform. It consists of the trusted state of the system components stored in the TEE and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the secure object list L; ​A random number generated by TEE to prevent replay attacks. Sign the TEE.

[0019] Optionally, step S1 includes:

[0020] S1.1, the client sends a proposal to the endorsing peer;

[0021] S1.2, the endorsing node executes the proposal through the smart contract;

[0022] S1.3, the endorsing node creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0023] S1.4, the endorsing node returns a trusted certificate The endorsement result is given to the client;

[0024] S1.5, client verifies endorsement result and trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step;

[0025] S1.6, the client will carry a trusted certificate The transactions are submitted to the ordering service for ordering.

[0026] Optionally, before step S1.2, the following steps are included:

[0027] S101, before starting, the endorsing node inserts a hook function into the key component used to control the operation of the contract;

[0028] S102, before starting, the endorsement node loads the trusted agent module that can connect to the TEE through the hook function Hook;

[0029] S103, the endorsing node first starts the trusted proxy module when starting up;

[0030] S104: The trusted proxy module of the endorsement node establishes a connection and session with the TEE of the endorsement node. If the connection and session are established, jump to the next step; otherwise, end and exit;

[0031] S105, TEE initializes the integrity measurement module, security data management module and key management module, wherein the integrity measurement module is used to perform integrity measurement, the security data management module is used to manage the security data obtained by integrity measurement through the security object list L, the table items of the security object list L include objects, hash values ​​and their trusted status, and the key management module is used to provide and generate trusted credentials. Required signatures;

[0032] S106, TEE measures the key components on the REE side used to control contract operation based on the security object list L built into the security data management module;

[0033] S107, TEE updates the status of the security object list L based on the measurement results, and updates the trusted status of the system components and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the security object list L based on the latest status of the security object list L. If the status is normal, jump to the next step; otherwise, end and exit;

[0034] S108: After the endorsement node starts the service, it continues to run and receive proposals from the client. If a transaction proposal is received from the client, it jumps to step S1.2. If a contract installation proposal is received, it jumps to step S109. If a proposal to instantiate an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S113. If a proposal to update an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S117.

[0035] S109: The endorsing node parses the received contract installation proposal to obtain the contract code and signature of the smart contract and passes it to the TEE.

[0036] S110, TEE verifies the contract code and signature of the proposed smart contract through the integrity measurement module. If the code and signature verification of the proposal contract pass, jump to the next step; otherwise, it is determined that the installation failed and jump to step S112;

[0037] S111: The endorsement node stores the code of the smart contract on the platform. The TEE registers the contract in the contract entry of the security object list L. If the installation is successful, the process jumps to step S112.

[0038] S112: The endorsing node sends the installation success or failure result as a response with the TEE signature to the client, and then jumps to step S108.

[0039] S113: The endorsing node parses the instantiation request and signature in the received instantiation proposal and passes it to the trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0040] S114: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) re-measures the smart contract specified in the instantiation proposal and updates the corresponding contract entry in the secure object list (L). If the integrity of the smart contract is intact, the process proceeds to the next step; otherwise, the process determines that the instantiation has failed and proceeds to step S116.

[0041] S115: The endorsing node runs the instantiation of the smart contract. During the operation of the smart contract, the trusted execution environment (TEE) regularly monitors the security status of the contract. If the instantiation is successful, the process jumps to step S116.

[0042] S116: The endorsing node sends the instantiation success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment (TEE) signature attached to the client, and then jumps to step S108.

[0043] S117, before the contract is updated, the installation process of the new contract is completed. The endorsing node parses the update request and signature in the proposal for the update of the installed smart contract and passes it to the trusted execution environment TEE;

[0044] S118: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the specified contract code and signature in the contract update proposal through the integrity measurement module. If the verification is successful, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121.

[0045] S119, the endorsement node deactivates the old version of the smart contract. The trusted execution environment TEE checks the status of the old version of the smart contract and updates the security object list L. If the old version of the contract is deactivated, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121;

[0046] S120, the endorsing node starts the new version of the smart contract, updates the corresponding contract entry status in the secure object list L in the trusted execution environment TEE, determines that the update is successful, and jumps to step S121;

[0047] S121, the endorsing node sends the update success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment TEE signature to the client, and jumps to step S108.

[0048] Optionally, in step S1.2, the endorsement node executing the proposal through the smart contract means that the endorsement node executes the proposal through the local smart contract S or executes the proposal by calling another smart contract S' through the local smart contract S across contracts, wherein executing the proposal by calling another smart contract S' across contracts through the local smart contract S includes:

[0049] S201, smart contract S creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0050] S202, smart contract S sends a trusted certificate to other smart contract S' The calling parameters;

[0051] S203, smart contract S' verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit;

[0052] S204, the smart contract S' generates the execution result and creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0053] S205, the smart contract S' will carry a trusted certificate The response is returned to the smart contract S;

[0054] S206, smart contract S verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit;

[0055] In step S207, the smart contract S will continue to execute based on the execution result returned by the smart contract S', obtain the final execution result of the smart contract S and return the execution result to the endorsing node.

[0056] Optionally, step S2 will carry a trusted certificate The transaction sorting process includes the sorting service determining an order for a batch of transactions through a preset consensus algorithm after receiving the batch and linking the transactions to an ordered block. Step S3 also includes verifying endorsements and verifying read-write sets. Verifying endorsements means that after a node receives a new block, it checks whether the endorsement results and trusted credentials of each transaction in the block meet the associated endorsement policy and credibility requirements. Verifying read-write sets means checking whether there is a conflict between the read-write set version of the transaction and the key-value pair.

[0057] In addition, the present invention also provides a TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection system, including an interconnected microprocessor and a memory, and the microprocessor is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method.

[0058] In addition, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program or instruction, and the computer program or instruction is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method through a processor.

[0059] In addition, the present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which are programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method through a processor.

[0060] Compared with the existing technology, the present invention has the following advantages: The TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method of the present invention includes generating a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information for the transaction obtained by contract execution. , will be accompanied by a trusted certificate After the transactions are sorted, blocks are generated and broadcast to all nodes in the alliance chain. Each node in the alliance chain verifies the trusted credentials carried by the transactions in the block. The integrity of the smart contract of the alliance chain is verified to verify the credibility of the contract execution of the transaction. The transaction is marked as a valid transaction or an invalid transaction based on whether the verification is successful and submitted to the alliance chain. The present invention can realize the integrity protection of the smart contract of the alliance chain, and has the advantages of comprehensive protection, high verification level, security and reliability, good versatility, strong scalability and high efficiency. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0061] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the basic process of the method of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0062] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the working principle of the method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0063] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the normal world and secure world of an endorsement node in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0064] Since the contracts of blockchain systems are executed through distributed computing, single-point attacks are usually ineffective, making it difficult to evaluate changes in their security. In order to evaluate the scope of attacks on contract integrity and the changes in the security of alliance chain transactions after the introduction of security mechanisms such as contract integrity protection, this paper proposes a TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method-level system for endorsement mechanisms. Specifically, Figure 1 As shown, the TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method of this embodiment includes the following steps:

[0065] S1, generates a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information for the transaction obtained by contract execution ;

[0066] S2, will be accompanied by a trusted certificate After sorting the transactions, generate blocks and broadcast the blocks to all nodes in the alliance chain;

[0067] S3, each node in the alliance chain verifies the trusted credentials carried by the transaction in the block The integrity of the transaction is verified to verify the credibility of the contract execution of the transaction. Based on whether the verification is successful, the transaction is marked as valid or invalid and submitted to the alliance chain.

[0068] In step S1 of this embodiment, a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information is generated for the transaction obtained by contract execution. When , the generating function expression of the contract integrity state is:

[0069] ,

[0070] In the above formula, The contract integrity status on the alliance chain, ST =1 means that the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is not damaged, that is, the execution result of the contract is in line with expectations. ST =-1 means the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is destroyed, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, is the set of contract integrity status of all organizations, , The minimum number of endorsement organizations required to reach endorsement agreement between organizations. " indicates AND logic operation, ~ They are No. 1~ The contract integrity status of an organization, is the organization set of the alliance chain, which can be expressed as:

[0071] ,

[0072] In the above formula, ~ For the 1st to nth organizations in the alliance chain, ;

[0073] The contract integrity status of any j-th organization satisfy , Indicates that the contract integrity of the jth organization is not compromised, Indicates that the contract integrity of the j-th organization is destroyed, and:

[0074] ,

[0075] In the above formula, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, For the j The contract integrity status set of the endorsement nodes of an organization can be expressed as:

[0076] ,

[0077] In the above formula, For the j The set of endorsement nodes within an organization, any i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes satisfy , Indicates the i The contract integrity of the endorsing node is not compromised (i.e., the results obtained by the endorsing node are as expected). Indicates the i The contract integrity of an endorsement node is compromised (i.e., the result given by the endorsement node does not meet expectations). For the j The minimum number of endorsement nodes required for an organization to reach a valid endorsement. Since malicious nodes hope to tamper with the final transaction, it is assumed here that the malicious results given by malicious endorsement nodes are all the same value, which makes it easier for attackers to affect the final integrity of the contract.

[0078] In this embodiment, a new trusted certificate-based The transaction execution and verification mechanism is used to enhance the trusted verification of contract integrity between endorsement nodes, thereby ensuring the reliability and trustworthy credentials of transactions. Represents the integrity and status of the contract-based transaction Tx execution, involving the integrity and status of the contract and the platform, and reflects the degree of trust between them. As an optional implementation, in step S1 of this embodiment, a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information is generated for the transaction obtained by contract execution. When the trusted certificate The calculation function expression is:

[0079] ,

[0080] In the above formula, is a list of transaction identifiers, the format of which is n >, where H1~H n is a unique identifier for n transactions, A list of transaction identifiers The associated smart contract integrity status information, v(S) includes the set of associated smart contracts in the transaction identifier list I <S1,...,S n Each smart contract S i The contract ID, hash value and security status; The platform security vector is the current security state of the system components on the platform. It is composed of the trusted state of the system components stored in the trusted execution environment (TEE) and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the secure object list (L). A random number generated by the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to prevent replay attacks. Sign the trusted execution environment TEE. Before receiving the transaction, the endorsing node must initialize and complete the trusted contract deployment. During the contract execution phase, when a proposal completes the contract execution, the execution result will be attached with the trusted execution environment TEE's trusted certificate of the transaction and contract integrity. . In the transaction sorting phase, carry trusted credentials The transactions are sorted and broadcast to all nodes. During the transaction verification and submission phase, the nodes verify the trusted credentials. The integrity of the contract is checked to confirm the credibility of the contract execution, and then the endorsement and read-write set verification operations are completed, and the valid transactions that have been successfully verified are submitted to the blockchain.

[0081] like Figure 2 As shown, in this embodiment, step S1 includes:

[0082] S1.1, the client sends a proposal to the endorsing peer;​

[0083] S1.2, the endorsing node executes the proposal through the smart contract;

[0084] S1.3, the endorsing node creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0085] S1.4, the endorsing node returns a trusted certificate The endorsement result is given to the client;

[0086] S1.5, client verifies endorsement result and trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step;

[0087] S1.6, the client will carry a trusted certificate The transactions are submitted to the ordering service for ordering.

[0088] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the normal world and secure world of the endorsement node in this embodiment. The normal world is the world where the rich execution environment (REE) is located, and the secure world is the world where the trusted execution environment (TEE) is located. The normal world and the secure world can call and switch with each other through the security monitor (SMC).

[0089] In this embodiment, the steps before step S1.2 include:

[0090] S101, before starting, the endorsing node inserts a hook function into the key component used to control the operation of the contract;

[0091] S102, before starting, the endorsement node loads a trusted agent module that can connect to the trusted execution environment TEE through the hook function Hook;

[0092] S103, the endorsing node first starts the trusted proxy module when starting up;

[0093] S104: The trusted proxy module of the endorsement node establishes a connection and session with the trusted execution environment TEE of the endorsement node. If the connection and session are established successfully, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the process ends and exits.

[0094] S105, the trusted execution environment TEE initializes the integrity measurement module, security data management module and key management module, wherein the integrity measurement module is used to perform integrity measurement, the security data management module is used to manage the security data obtained by integrity measurement through the security object list L, the table items of the security object list L include objects, hash values ​​and their trusted status (abbreviated as status in the figure), and the key management module is used to provide and generate trusted credentials. Required signatures;

[0095] S106: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) measures the key components on the REE side used to control contract execution based on the security object list L built into the security data management module.

[0096] S107, the trusted execution environment TEE updates the status of the secure object list L based on the measurement results, and updates the trusted status of the system components and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the secure object list L based on the latest status of the secure object list L. If the status is normal, jump to the next step; otherwise, end and exit;

[0097] S108: After the endorsement node starts the service, it continues to run and receive proposals from the client. If a transaction proposal is received from the client, it jumps to step S1.2. If a contract installation proposal is received, it jumps to step S109. If a proposal to instantiate an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S113. If a proposal to update an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S117.

[0098] S109: The endorsing node parses the received contract installation proposal to obtain the contract code and signature of the smart contract and passes it to the trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0099] S110, the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the contract code and signature of the proposed smart contract through the integrity measurement module. If the code and signature verification of the proposed contract pass, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the installation is judged to have failed and the process jumps to step S112;

[0100] S111: The endorsing node stores the smart contract code on the platform. The trusted execution environment (TEE) registers the contract with the contract entry in the secure object list (L). If the installation is successful, the process goes to step S112.

[0101] S112: The endorsing node sends the installation success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment (TEE) signature attached to the client, and then jumps to step S108.

[0102] S113: The endorsing node parses the instantiation request and signature in the received instantiation proposal and passes it to the trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0103] S114: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) re-measures the smart contract specified in the instantiation proposal and updates the corresponding contract entry in the secure object list (L). If the integrity of the smart contract is intact, the process proceeds to the next step; otherwise, the process determines that the instantiation has failed and proceeds to step S116.

[0104] S115: The endorsing node runs the instantiation of the smart contract. During the operation of the smart contract, the trusted execution environment (TEE) regularly monitors the security status of the contract. If the instantiation is successful, the process jumps to step S116.

[0105] S116: The endorsing node sends the instantiation success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment (TEE) signature attached to the client, and then jumps to step S108.

[0106] S117, before the contract is updated, the installation process of the new contract is completed. The endorsing node parses the update request and signature in the proposal for the update of the installed smart contract and passes it to the trusted execution environment TEE;

[0107] S118: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the specified contract code and signature in the contract update proposal through the integrity measurement module. If the verification is successful, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121.

[0108] S119, the endorsement node deactivates the old version of the smart contract. The trusted execution environment TEE checks the status of the old version of the smart contract and updates the security object list L. If the old version of the contract is deactivated, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121;

[0109] S120, the endorsing node starts the new version of the smart contract, updates the corresponding contract entry status in the secure object list L in the trusted execution environment TEE, determines that the update is successful, and jumps to step S121;

[0110] S121, the endorsing node sends the update success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment TEE signature to the client, and jumps to step S108.

[0111] In this embodiment, smart contracts can access other smart contracts to call other functions or traverse different ledgers (interoperability), thereby achieving complex business modularization and circumventing the resource limitations of a single contract. The contract execution process often involves multiple smart contracts. For example, in a business contract execution workflow involving multi-party asset transactions and loans, the commercial contract will call different loan contracts for execution through a bridge contract. During the execution process, a lack of trust between smart contracts may cause errors to propagate along the contract call chain. Therefore, during the transaction execution process of cross-contract calls, the integrity of the smart contract and the contract execution platform must be verified during contract execution to ensure the trusted execution of the contract call chain. In cross-contract call scenarios, the integrity of the contract can be verified through the trusted credentials of the trusted execution environment (TEE), thereby ensuring the reliable propagation of the integrity of the contract call chain. Specifically, in step S1.2 of this embodiment, the endorsement node executing the proposal through the smart contract means that the endorsement node executes the proposal through the local smart contract S or executes the proposal through the local smart contract S' by cross-contract calling other smart contracts S', where the execution of the proposal through the local smart contract S' by cross-contract calling other smart contracts S' includes:

[0112] S201, smart contract S creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0113] S202, smart contract S sends a trusted certificate to other smart contract S' The calling parameters;

[0114] S203, smart contract S' verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit;

[0115] S204, the smart contract S' generates the execution result and creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ;

[0116] S205, the smart contract S' will carry a trusted certificate The response is returned to the smart contract S;

[0117] S206, smart contract S verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit;

[0118] In step S207, the smart contract S will continue to execute based on the execution result returned by the smart contract S', obtain the final execution result of the smart contract S and return the execution result to the endorsing node.

[0119] In this embodiment, the trusted certificate will be carried in step S2 The transaction sorting process includes the sorting service determining an order for a batch of transactions through a preset consensus algorithm after receiving the batch and linking the transactions to an ordered block. Step S3 also includes verifying endorsements and verifying read-write sets. Verifying endorsements means that after a node receives a new block, it checks whether the endorsement results and trusted credentials of each transaction in the block meet the associated endorsement policy and credibility requirements. Verifying read-write sets means checking whether there is a conflict between the read-write set version of the transaction and the key-value pair.

[0120] During the initial system deployment, the endorsing node (peer) launches the trusted proxy module upon startup. The trusted proxy module maintains a secure context and session with the TEE to access secure measurement services. Hooks inserted into the peer node invoke the trusted proxy module, which in turn invokes the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (TEE) to trigger measurement events. The design of these hooks decouples the peer from the original logic, ensuring that the normal execution logic of the original peer node is not affected and allowing for flexible logic customization. The hooks inserted into the peer perform TEE-based measurement verification at key points in the smart contract lifecycle. The trusted proxy module interprets events triggered by the hooks, executes corresponding measurement actions, and issues alerts if malicious behavior is detected. When the trusted proxy module establishes a connection with the TEE, the TEE verifies the integrity of the peer node and system components to ensure the peer is trustworthy. A forged peer will be unable to establish a connection with the TEE and thus fail to generate trusted credentials. The transaction collector in the trusted agent module ensures that trusted credentials can be generated in batches for transactions within a specified time period, thereby improving the efficiency of trusted credential generation. The lifecycle of a trusted contract measured and verified by the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is as follows: Phase 1: Contract Registration. To ensure the integrity and reliability of the contract, the contract must first be registered with the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Developers submit the contract code and send it to the endorsing node for installation. During installation, the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the contract's signature and stores the baseline value information in the TEE's secure object list (L). Phase 2: Instantiation Verification. Before contract instantiation, the TEE remeasures and verifies the contract's integrity. If the contract's measurement results match the contract's baseline value stored in the secure object list (L), the contract can be successfully instantiated and the state of the secure object list (L) is updated. Otherwise, if the verification fails, the contract's instantiation is rejected. Phase 3: Runtime Monitoring. After the contract is launched, the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) monitors the contract's security status, updates, and maintains the contract's integrity. Phase 4: Contract Update. When a contract is updated, the new contract needs to be re-verified by the trusted execution environment (TEE). The trusted execution environment (TEE) needs to ensure that the new contract can only be instantiated after the original contract is deactivated and update the security object list (L) status. The result of the contract update will be returned to the client with a trusted execution environment (TEE) certificate.

[0121] The endorsement policy in this embodiment defines the minimum set of organizations required to endorse a transaction for it to be valid. The endorsement policy of a contract in Fabric can be a flexible combination of AND, OR, and OutOf. The logical combination of AND and OR can be represented by the universal OutOf, so OutOf is used as an example in this embodiment. The condition for a successful contract endorsement is that there is only one set of nodes that meet the endorsement policy and give the same execution result with a valid signature. Endorsement policy:

[0122] OutOf(2,'Org1.member','Org2.member', 'Org3.member')

[0123] Any two members of Org1, Org2, and Org3 are required to give the same contract execution results and provide valid signatures. The following is the definition of contract integrity and contract integrity status in the consortium chain:

[0124] Definition 1: Contract integrity: Contracts on the consortium chain execute transactions and provide calculation results that meet expectations.

[0125] The contract integrity status on the alliance chain in this embodiment , the contract integrity status of all j-th organizations And all i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes The formation of three levels of contract integrity within the consortium chain allows for contract integrity to be divided into three levels: node level, intra-organization level, and inter-organization level. Node-level contract integrity refers to the fact that the contract of a single endorsing node produces expected computational results. Intra-organizational contract integrity refers to the fact that the contract of the endorsing node within the organization produces computational results that meet the endorsement success conditions and meet expectations. Inter-organizational contract integrity refers to the fact that the computational results on the consortium chain meet the endorsement success conditions and meet expectations, i.e., the ultimate contract integrity. Node-level contract integrity impacts intra-organizational contract integrity, which in turn impacts the ultimate contract integrity between organizations.

[0126] Definition 2, Contract Integrity Status: Whether the calculation results given by the contract on the alliance chain meet expectations.

[0127] In this embodiment, the contract integrity status model is divided into three layers: node, intra-organization, and inter-organization. Node-level contract integrity is violated when an endorsement node gives an unexpected calculation result. In-organization contract integrity is violated when an endorsement node in the organization gives an unexpected calculation result that meets the endorsement success conditions. The contract integrity status within the organization is represented as st The final integrity of the contract is destroyed when the alliance chain gives an endorsement result that meets the endorsement success conditions but does not meet the expected results. The final integrity of the contract between organizations is expressed as ST For simplicity, we do not consider situations such as network congestion or downtime. Therefore, the contract integrity status of organization j is expressed as follows:

[0128] ,

[0129] Assume that a transaction requires approval from at least T organizations to be considered valid.

[0130] The final integrity state of a smart contract can be expressed as:

[0131] ,

[0132] t, T and Larger values ​​provide stronger protection for contract integrity. However, practical considerations such as privacy and performance often limit the range of options. This model is used to analyze integrity issues during contract execution, while the integrity of on-chain data relies on the inherent tamper-resistance of the blockchain. Based on this contract integrity model, simulations based on different assumptions, such as attacker capabilities, peer node defense capabilities, and consortium chain organizational structures, can quickly assess transaction security variations in different scenarios, guiding the security design of consortium chain systems.

[0133] In summary, in this embodiment of the TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method, when an endorsement node (peer node) is initially deployed, a hook function Hook is inserted into the peer node's key code segments, a trusted proxy module is built within the peer node, and an integrity monitoring module, a secure data management module, and a key management module are built within the trusted execution environment (TEE). When the peer node first runs, the trusted proxy module establishes a secure connection with the trusted execution environment (TEE). The TEE verifies the integrity of key components in the REE operating system, such as blockchain programs and configuration files. The integrity monitoring module of the TEE performs integrity measurements on key components of the REE-side system. When the peer starts, if the integrity measurement result verified by the TEE matches the baseline value of the default security object list within the TEE, the peer node's trusted proxy module is allowed to establish a connection with the TEE; otherwise, the connection is rejected. In the contract measurement scenario, when the peer node's hook function Hook is called during the installation, instantiation, operation, and update of a contract, it will determine the current contract status based on the security object list L within the TEE and perform corresponding operations. Specifically, during installation, the Peer node will measure and verify the integrity of the contract file based on the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and obtain and store the contract's baseline value in the security object list L. During instantiation, the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) will measure the contract file (including the image) and compare it with the baseline value. If there is a mismatch, instantiation will not be allowed. During operation, the security status of the contract and the platform will be monitored and the security object list L will be updated in real time. When updating the contract, first verify that the status of the old version of the contract is deactivated, and then verify the integrity of the new contract. If the integrity of the new contract is not damaged and the old contract is deactivated, the contract update is allowed. The hash algorithm for measurement can be SHA256. In the transaction endorsement scenario, before the transaction is endorsed, the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) will provide the current contract and platform's trusted credentials, which are generated based on the security object list L. For a Peer node, if it receives proposal requests for multiple endorsement transactions, it will call the trusted agent module to obtain the trusted credentials after the corresponding contract execution is completed. The trusted proxy module is always running and accepting transaction credential generation requests. It obtains batches of transaction information to be proven through the transaction collector and uniformly calls the trusted execution environment (TEE) to generate the corresponding trusted credentials and returns them to the peer node. The peer node encapsulates the trusted credentials in the endorsement response and returns it to the client. The client verifies the endorsement response and trusted credentials. If the endorsement policy is met, it submits them to the sorting service to generate a block and broadcasts it to all peer nodes. Finally, the peer node verifies the trusted credentials again before uploading the transaction to the chain.In cross-contract calls, when a smart contract S calls another smart contract S' for execution, first, the called smart contract S' must verify whether the call request comes from the trusted smart contract S through the trusted credentials provided by the smart contract S before execution, thereby preventing malicious contract calls. On the other hand, after the execution is completed, the smart contract S' also needs to provide the trusted credentials in the execution result to return to the smart contract S. The smart contract S can use the trusted credentials to verify that the response received from the smart contract S' has not been tampered with. The security design and analysis of the alliance chain architecture, based on the proposed contract integrity model, simulates the alliance chain organizational structure, attacker capabilities, node defense capabilities, etc. in different scenarios, and quickly obtains the changes in transaction security after the integrity protection mechanism is introduced in the alliance chain, thereby guiding the architectural design of the alliance chain system. It can be seen that the alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method based on the trusted execution environment TEE in this embodiment can achieve integrity protection of the alliance chain smart contract based on the trusted execution environment TEE, and has the advantages of comprehensive protection, high verification level, security and reliability, good versatility, strong scalability, and high efficiency.

[0134] In addition, this embodiment also provides a TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection system, including an interconnected microprocessor and a memory, and the microprocessor is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method.

[0135] In addition, this embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program or instruction, and the computer program or instruction is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method through a processor.

[0136] In addition, this embodiment also provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which are programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method through a processor.

[0137] Those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application may be in the form of methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-readable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code. The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, may be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the steps in the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can guide a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific way, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a product including the instruction device, which implements the function specified in the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, so that a series of operation steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0138] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment. All technical solutions based on the concept of the present invention are within the scope of protection of the present invention. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, various improvements and modifications that do not depart from the principles of the present invention should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method, characterized in that: The steps include: S1, the endorsement node executes the proposal through the smart contract, and generates a trusted certificate with contract integrity status information for the transaction obtained by the smart contract execution through the endorsement node's trusted execution environment TEE The generating function expression of the contract integrity state is: , In the above formula, The contract integrity status on the alliance chain, ST =1 means that the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is not damaged and the execution result of the contract is in line with expectations. ST =-1 means the integrity of the contract on the alliance chain is destroyed, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, is the set of contract integrity status of all organizations, , The minimum number of endorsement organizations required to reach endorsement agreement between organizations," " indicates AND logic operation, ~ They are No. 1~ The contract integrity status of an organization, is the set of organizations in the alliance chain, and the contract integrity status of any j-th organization satisfy , Indicates the j The contractual integrity of the organization is not compromised, Indicates the j The contractual integrity of an organization is compromised and there are: , In the above formula, Representation Statistics The number of elements with a median value of 1, is the contract integrity status set of the endorsement node of the jth organization, , For the j The set of endorsement nodes within an organization, any i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes satisfy , Indicates the i The contract integrity of the endorsing nodes is not compromised, Indicates the i The contract integrity of the endorsing nodes is destroyed. For the j The minimum number of endorsement nodes that an organization must reach for valid endorsement, and the contract integrity status on the alliance chain 、All j Contract integrity status of an organization And all i The contract integrity status of the endorsing nodes Forming three levels of contract integrity status in the alliance chain; The trusted credential The calculation function expression is: , In the above formula, is a list of transaction identifiers, the format of which is n >, where H1~H n is a unique identifier for n transactions, A list of transaction identifiers The associated smart contract integrity status information, Includes the set of smart contracts associated with the transaction identifier list I <S1,...,S n Each smart contract S i The contract ID, hash value and smart contract security status; The platform security vector is the current security state of the system components on the platform. It is composed of the trusted state of the system components stored in the trusted execution environment (TEE) and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the secure object list (L). A random number generated by the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to prevent replay attacks. Sign the TEE;​ S2, which is accompanied by a trusted certificate through the sorting service After the transactions are sorted, blocks are generated and broadcast to all nodes in the alliance chain; S3, each node in the alliance chain verifies the trusted credentials carried by the transaction in the block The integrity of the transaction is verified to verify the credibility of the contract execution of the transaction. Based on whether the verification is successful, the transaction is marked as valid or invalid and submitted to the alliance chain.

2. The TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Step S1 includes: S1.1, the client sends a proposal to the endorsing peer; S1.2, the endorsing node executes the proposal through the smart contract; S1.3, the endorsing node creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ; S1.4, the endorsing node returns a trusted certificate The endorsement result is given to the client; S1.5, client verifies endorsement result and trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; S1.6, the client will carry a trusted certificate The transactions are submitted to the ordering service for ordering.

3. The TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method according to claim 2 is characterized in that: Step S1.2 includes: S101, before starting, the endorsing node inserts a hook function into the key component used to control the operation of the contract; S102, before starting, the endorsement node loads a trusted agent module that can connect to the trusted execution environment TEE through the hook function Hook; S103, the endorsing node first starts the trusted proxy module when starting up; S104: The trusted proxy module of the endorsement node establishes a connection and session with the trusted execution environment TEE of the endorsement node. If the connection and session are established successfully, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the process ends and exits. S105, the trusted execution environment TEE initializes the integrity measurement module, security data management module and key management module, wherein the integrity measurement module is used to perform integrity measurement, the security data management module is used to manage the security data obtained by integrity measurement through the security object list L, the table items of the security object list L include objects, hash values ​​and their trusted status, and the key management module is used to provide and generate trusted credentials Required signatures; S106: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) measures the key components on the REE side used to control contract execution based on the security object list L built into the security data management module. S107, the trusted execution environment TEE updates the status of the secure object list L based on the measurement results, and updates the trusted status of the system components and the Merkle root of the system component list items in the secure object list L based on the latest status of the secure object list L. If the status is normal, jump to the next step; otherwise, end and exit; S108: After the endorsement node starts the service, it continues to run and receive proposals from the client. If a transaction proposal is received from the client, it jumps to step S1.

2. If a contract installation proposal is received, it jumps to step S109. If a proposal to instantiate an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S113. If a proposal to update an installed contract is received, it jumps to step S117. S109: The endorsing node parses the received contract installation proposal to obtain the contract code and signature of the smart contract and passes it to the trusted execution environment (TEE). S110: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the contract code and signature of the proposed smart contract through the integrity measurement module. If the code and signature verification of the proposed contract pass, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the installation is judged to have failed, and the process jumps to step S112. S111: The endorsing node stores the smart contract code on the platform. The trusted execution environment (TEE) registers the contract with the contract entry in the secure object list (L). If the installation is successful, the process goes to step S112. S112: The endorsing node sends the installation success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment (TEE) signature attached to the client, and then jumps to step S108. S113: The endorsing node parses the instantiation request and signature in the received instantiation proposal and passes it to the trusted execution environment (TEE). S114: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) re-measures the smart contract specified in the instantiation proposal and updates the corresponding contract entry in the secure object list (L). If the integrity of the smart contract is intact, the process proceeds to the next step; otherwise, the process determines that the instantiation has failed and proceeds to step S116. S115: The endorsing node runs the instantiation of the smart contract. During the operation of the smart contract, the trusted execution environment (TEE) regularly monitors the security status of the contract. If the instantiation is successful, the process jumps to step S116. S116: The endorsing node sends the instantiation success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment (TEE) signature attached to the client, and then jumps to step S108. S117, before the contract is updated, the installation process of the new contract is completed. The endorsing node parses the update request and signature in the proposal for the update of the installed smart contract and passes it to the trusted execution environment TEE; S118: The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) verifies the specified contract code and signature in the contract update proposal through the integrity measurement module. If the verification is successful, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121. S119, the endorsement node deactivates the old version of the smart contract. The trusted execution environment TEE checks the status of the old version of the smart contract and updates the security object list L. If the old version of the contract is deactivated, the process jumps to the next step; otherwise, the update is determined to have failed and the process jumps to step S121; S120, the endorsing node starts the new version of the smart contract, updates the corresponding contract entry status in the secure object list L in the trusted execution environment TEE, determines that the update is successful, and jumps to step S121; S121, the endorsing node sends the update success or failure result as a response with the trusted execution environment TEE signature to the client, and jumps to step S108.

4. The TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method according to claim 2 is characterized in that: In step S1.2, the endorsement node executes the proposal through the smart contract, which means that the endorsement node executes the proposal through the local smart contract S or calls other smart contracts S' through the local smart contract S to execute the proposal. The execution of the proposal through the local smart contract S and other smart contracts S' includes: S201, smart contract S creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ; S202, smart contract S sends a trusted certificate to other smart contract S' The calling parameters; S203, smart contract S' verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit; S204, the smart contract S' generates the execution result and creates a trusted certificate with contract integrity information ; S205, the smart contract S' will carry a trusted certificate The response is returned to the smart contract S; S206, smart contract S verifies the trusted certificate If the verification is successful, jump to the next step; otherwise, report an error and exit; In step S207, the smart contract S will continue to execute based on the execution result returned by the smart contract S', obtain the final execution result of the smart contract S and return the execution result to the endorsing node.

5. The TEE-based alliance chain smart contract integrity protection method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Step S2 will carry trusted credentials The transaction sorting process includes the sorting service determining an order for a batch of transactions through a preset consensus algorithm after receiving the batch and linking the transactions to an ordered block. Step S3 also includes verifying endorsements and verifying read-write sets. Verifying endorsements means that after a node receives a new block, it checks whether the endorsement results and trusted credentials of each transaction in the block meet the associated endorsement policy and credibility requirements. Verifying read-write sets means checking whether there is a conflict between the read-write set version of the transaction and the key-value pair.

6. A TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection system, comprising an interconnected microprocessor and memory, characterized in that: The microprocessor is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program or instruction stored therein, characterized in that: The computer program or instruction is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method described in any one of claims 1 to 5 through a processor.

8. A computer program product comprising a computer program or instructions, characterized in that The computer program or instruction is programmed or configured to execute the TEE-based consortium chain smart contract integrity protection method described in any one of claims 1 to 5 through a processor.

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