Unmanned aerial vehicle anonymous authentication and identity remote identification method, unmanned aerial vehicle and supervision equipment thereof

Abstract

The application provides a kind of unmanned plane anonymous authentication and identity remote identification method, unmanned plane and its supervision equipment, the method includes: by unmanned plane service provider in advance selecting system main private key and main public key, define attribute set;And by unmanned plane registration process, generate and issue certificate for the unmanned plane;Unmanned plane running process, generate RID data packet that can be anonymous authentication and meet RID rule;RID data packet includes the following information: unmanned plane position, unmanned plane speed, unmanned plane attribute ciphertext, unmanned plane operator's location ciphertext, encrypted unmanned plane public key information, time stamp, group signature;Timing broadcast RID data packet, so that receiver obtains the position and flight speed of unmanned plane according to the received RID data packet. Utilize the scheme of the application, the effective management and privacy protection of unmanned plane can be realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of network security technology, specifically to a method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of drones, drones, and monitoring equipment thereof. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, with the increasing number of drones, the risk of drones being used for illegal activities is also rising, and incidents of drones entering no-fly zones (such as airports and government agencies) occur frequently, seriously threatening public safety. Against this backdrop, some corresponding regulations have been introduced, such as the Remote Identification (RID) regulation, which requires all drones to broadcast a message containing the drone and its operator's identity and location via wireless channel at a minimum frequency of one message per second throughout the entire process from takeoff to landing.

[0003] While RID regulations address traffic management and safety issues, they also introduce a series of privacy and security concerns. For example, RID data broadcast by drones can be vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks, rendering drone identification and management ineffective. Furthermore, by eavesdropping on wireless channels and conducting long-term covert observations, adversaries can track drones during their daily operations and deduce more private information about operators, such as their residence, frequently used flight origins, routes, and destinations, as well as the locations of large commercial delivery company warehouses. To maintain public safety and meet drone privacy requirements, there is an urgent need to explore privacy-preserving remote drone identification technologies and methods.

[0004] To protect privacy, the latest RID rules propose replacing long-term drone identities with session identifiers (i.e., pseudonyms), aiming to reduce the risk of drone privacy leaks by anonymously broadcasting RID messages. Against this backdrop, drone remote identification schemes based on anonymous identity authentication technology have been proposed, which can protect drone identity privacy while complying with RID rules. However, existing remote identification schemes based on anonymous identity authentication either require verification support from dedicated infrastructure (such as a constantly online authority) or only consider the anonymity of the drone's identity without considering the location privacy of the drone operator. This imposes significant administrative overhead on RID packet recipients and central agencies, and drone operators may also be subject to security threats (e.g., in commercial drone and border flight scenarios, the disclosure of drone operator location information could endanger their personal safety). Although recently proposed remote identification schemes that selectively disclose location consider the protection of drone operator location privacy, these schemes still broadcast the drone's identity ID in plaintext, providing attackers with opportunities to identify and track drones. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of drones, as well as drones and their monitoring equipment, to achieve effective management and privacy protection of drones.

[0006] This invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the method comprising:

[0007] The system master private key and master public key are selected in advance by the drone service provider, and an attribute set is defined; and a certificate is generated and issued for the drone through the drone registration process.

[0008] During drone operation, an RID data packet that conforms to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated is generated; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature;

[0009] The RID data packets are broadcast periodically so that the receiver can obtain the drone's location and flight speed based on the received RID data packets.

[0010] Optionally, the process of generating and issuing a certificate for the drone through drone registration includes:

[0011] Receive registration information sent by the drone, the registration information including: drone identity identifier and drone public key;

[0012] Generate a drone certificate based on the drone's public key;

[0013] Send the drone certificate to the drone.

[0014] Optionally, during the operation of the drone, generating RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated includes:

[0015] The drone generates attribute ciphertext according to the access policy;

[0016] The drone operator's location is encrypted to obtain the location ciphertext;

[0017] Generate a group signature, which includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, encrypted drone public key information, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp;

[0018] The RID data packet is generated based on the drone's location, speed, encrypted drone attributes, encrypted drone operator location, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

[0019] Optionally, the process of the UAV generating attribute ciphertext according to the access policy includes: the UAV performing attribute-based encryption on a random number according to the access policy to generate attribute ciphertext.

[0020] Optionally, encrypting the drone operator's location to obtain ciphertext includes: using the random number as a symmetric key to encrypt the drone operator's location to obtain symmetric encrypted ciphertext.

[0021] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0022] After receiving the RID data packet, the receiver decodes the RID data packet to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, as well as the group signature;

[0023] The group signature is verified using the master public key.

[0024] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0025] The drone service provider generates and distributes attribute private keys to the recipient in advance through the recipient registration process;

[0026] The receiver uses the attribute private key to decrypt the encrypted location of the drone operator and obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0027] Optionally, the process of generating and distributing attribute private keys to the recipient through the recipient registration process includes:

[0028] Receive a registration request sent by a recipient, the registration request including: recipient identity information and attribute set;

[0029] Generate the recipient's attribute private key based on the recipient's attribute set;

[0030] The attribute private key is sent to the recipient via a secure channel.

[0031] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0032] The receiver determines whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on the drone's location;

[0033] If so, the RID packet is forwarded to the drone service provider;

[0034] The system receives a response message from the drone service provider, which carries the drone's real identity information.

[0035] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0036] After receiving the RID data packet, the drone service provider uses the master public key to recover the encrypted drone public key information in the RID data packet to obtain the drone's public key.

[0037] The true identity identifier of the drone is obtained based on the drone's public key;

[0038] The drone's true identity identifier is sent to the recipient.

[0039] The present invention also provides a drone, the drone comprising:

[0040] The message generation module is used to generate RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation. The RID data packets include the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature.

[0041] The message sending module is used to periodically broadcast the RID data packets so that the receiver can obtain the location and flight speed of the UAV based on the received RID data packets.

[0042] The present invention also provides a drone monitoring device, the drone monitoring device comprising:

[0043] The receiving module is used to receive RID data packets sent by the drone;

[0044] The decoding module is used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, as well as the group signature;

[0045] The signature verification module is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

[0046] Optionally, the drone monitoring equipment further includes:

[0047] The registration module is used to register with drone service providers and obtain attribute private keys.

[0048] The decryption module is used to decrypt the encrypted location of the drone operator using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0049] Optionally, the drone monitoring equipment further includes:

[0050] The determination module is used to determine whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on its location;

[0051] The identity information acquisition module is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered the no-fly zone; and to receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

[0052] The present invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as UAVs and their monitoring equipment. During system initialization, the UAV service provider (USS) selects the system's master private key and master public key, and defines an attribute set. A certificate is generated and issued to the UAV during the UAV registration process. During UAV operation, a RID data packet conforming to RID rules and capable of anonymous authentication is generated. The RID data packet includes the following information: UAV location, UAV speed, encrypted UAV attributes, encrypted UAV operator location, encrypted UAV public key information, timestamp, and group signature. The RID data packet is broadcast periodically so that the receiver can obtain the UAV's location and flight speed based on the received RID data packet. Using this invention, UAVs can anonymously broadcast verifiable RID messages, and the actual location of the UAV operator is broadcast in encrypted form, improving the security of RID messages and increasing the difficulty for attackers to impersonate, tamper with, or track RID information.

[0053] Furthermore, by utilizing the solution of this invention, recipients can directly authenticate anonymous RID messages from drones without the need for an authoritative institution to be online at all times, thus optimizing the efficiency of RID message management.

[0054] Furthermore, in this invention, the actual location of the drone operator is only disclosed to specific qualified recipients, thereby achieving privacy protection for the drone operator's location and better ensuring the safety of the drone operator. Attached Figure Description

[0055] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly described below. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely some embodiments of the present invention, and those skilled in the art can obtain other drawings based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0056] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method for drones provided by the present invention;

[0057] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating how a drone generates RID data packets in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 3This is a flowchart illustrating how the receiver processes the received RID data packet in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a structure of the UAV provided by the present invention;

[0060] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a drone monitoring device provided by the present invention;

[0061] Figure 6 This is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0062] Figure 7 This is another structural schematic diagram of the drone monitoring equipment provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0063] The specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0064] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0065] While existing remote identification schemes based on anonymous authentication can meet the RID standard and reduce the risk of drone privacy leaks to some extent, the following problems still exist:

[0066] 1) RID regulations require drones to broadcast messages containing the drone's and operator's identity and location via wireless channels. However, the RID information broadcast by drones is transmitted over insecure channels, making it vulnerable to attacks such as spoofing, tampering, and replay, resulting in ineffective drone tracking and management.

[0067] 2) While RID regulations have improved drone monitoring and situational awareness, they have also brought serious privacy issues. Existing solutions either only protect the drone's identity privacy or only protect the drone operator's location privacy, and do not fully meet the privacy protection requirements for remote drone identification.

[0068] 3) Anonymous broadcast RID messages can reduce the risk of drones being identified and tracked, but most existing drone anonymous RID technologies rely heavily on the help of third-party online agencies. The recipient needs to forward the RID data packet to the third-party agency for verification and wait for the result, which will cause cumbersome communication and management overhead.

[0069] To address this, the present invention provides a method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This method integrates anonymous authentication technology and attribute-based encryption technology, ensuring the validity and integrity of UAV RID information while protecting the privacy of both the UAV's identity and the operator's location. Furthermore, anonymous messages broadcast by the UAV can be directly and easily authenticated without the involvement of a third-party trusted authority.

[0070] like Figure 1 The diagram shown is a flowchart of an anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method for drones provided by the present invention.

[0071] In step 101, the USS pre-selects the system master private key and master public key, defines the attribute set, and generates and issues a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process.

[0072] First, the USS triggers system initialization by selecting three prime groups of order q: G1, G2, and G... T Elements in groups G1 and G2 can be mapped to group G by a bilinear function e. T The middle part is: G1×G2→G T , where → represents a mapping.

[0073] In addition, USS also chose two hash functions, namely:

[0074] H: {0,1} * →Z q ;

[0075] H1: {0,1} * →G1,

[0076] Where {0,1} * Z represents a string of arbitrary length consisting of either 0s or 1s. q It is a group of integers of order q consisting of elements (0, 1, ..., q-1);

[0077] A hash function H represents a string of arbitrary length consisting of 0s or 1s that maps to a group of integers Z of order q consisting of elements (0, 1, ..., q-1). q superior;

[0078] The hash function H1 represents mapping a string of arbitrary length consisting of 0s or 1s to group G1.

[0079] In addition, USS also randomly selects the value α∈Z q , x∈Z q and y∈Z q and calculate Z = g1 α , Here, the symbol “∈” indicates belonging, g1 is a generator of group G1, and g2 is a generator of group G2.

[0080] In addition, USS also defines the attribute space. Each attribute A i It represents a specific identifier or characteristic.

[0081] In addition, the USS sets the system's master public key and master private key, which are as follows:

[0082] Master key

[0083] The master private key msk = <α,x,y>.

[0084] In this embodiment of the invention, the process of generating and issuing a certificate for the drone through the drone registration process is as follows: receiving a registration request sent by the drone, the registration request including: drone identity identifier (such as the drone's device serial number) and drone public key; generating a drone certificate based on the drone public key; and sending the drone certificate to the drone.

[0085] For example: drone d i Register with USS, assuming drone d i Already possess a unique identity ID i and key pair <sk i ,pk i (These parameters are embedded in the drone during the drone's production, configuration, or deployment phase), including the drone's private key sk. i ∈Z q Drone public key

[0086] During registration, the drone d i Will <ID i ,pk i >Sent to USS.

[0087] Accordingly, USS uses the drone's public key PK i Calculate the drone d i Certificate i B i >, among which t i ∈Z q ​It is a random value arbitrarily chosen by the USS; the USS will issue the certificate. i B i >Sent to drone d i .

[0088] In some non-limiting embodiments, the USS can also generate and distribute attribute private keys to the recipient through the recipient registration process. For example, the USS receives a registration request sent by the recipient, the registration request including: recipient identity information and attribute set; generates the recipient's attribute private key based on the recipient's attribute set; and sends the attribute private key to the recipient through a secure channel.

[0089] For example: USS based on receiver r j attribute set Generate the recipient's attribute private key And send it to the recipient r via a secure channel. j ;in, sk 2,i =H1(At) i ) k , Represents a set of attributes The number of attributes included, k∈Z q It is a random value arbitrarily chosen by USS.

[0090] It should be noted that attribute sets The attributes can be determined according to actual needs, and this embodiment of the invention does not limit them.

[0091] Additionally, it should be noted that recipients can decide whether to register with USS based on their own needs. Even without registration, they can still obtain information such as the drone's location and flight speed, but they cannot obtain some private information, such as the drone operator's location information.

[0092] In step 102, during the operation of the drone, an RID data packet that conforms to the RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated is generated.

[0093] The RID data packet includes the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature.

[0094] In step 103, the RID data packet is broadcast periodically so that the receiver can obtain the drone's position and flight speed based on the received RID data packet.

[0095] The time interval for broadcasting the RID data packets must comply with the RID rules.

[0096] ​like Figure 2 The diagram shown is a flowchart of a UAV generating RID data packets according to an embodiment of the present invention, including the following steps:

[0097] Step 201: The drone generates attribute ciphertext according to the access policy.

[0098] Step 202: Encrypt the drone operator's location to obtain the location ciphertext.

[0099] Step 203: Generate a group signature, which includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, encrypted drone public key information, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp.

[0100] Step 204: Generate an RID data packet based on the drone's location, speed, encrypted drone attributes, encrypted drone operator's location, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

[0101] The RID packet includes the following information: <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i C i ,TS i ,σ i >, where lat i For the drone's location, v i For the speed of the drone, c i For the encrypted attributes of the drone, ρ i C is the encrypted location of the drone operator. i TS is used to encrypt the public key information of drones. i For timestamps, σ i The data packet is signed by the group. Therefore, it is clear that the data packet does not reveal the drone's identity information, and the drone operator's location information is also encrypted and protected.

[0102] The following example further illustrates in detail the process by which a drone generates RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated.

[0103] First, drones d i Randomly select two values ​​s1∈Z p and r∈G T And according to the access policy (For example, the USS can set an attribute named COUNTRY and assign different values ​​COUNTRY_1, COUNTRY_2, COUNTRY_3... to each receiver. Drones d) iEncryption can be performed using the access policy COUNTRY = COUNTRY_1, ensuring that only the recipient from country COUNTRY_1 can decrypt it. Attribute-based encryption can then be applied to the random number r to generate the attribute ciphertext c. i = <ct1,ct 2,u ,ct 3,n ,ct4>, where:

[0104]

[0105] Where M is the attribute-based strategy The generated n1-row n2-column monotonically spanned matrix has variables u∈[θ], n∈[n1], where θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in M, s′ is a randomly selected vector with θ elements, s′[u] represents the u-th element of vector s′, τ(·) is the attribute mapping function that maps a row of M to an attribute; v is the target vector of length n2-1; ρ(n)=|k|τ(k)=τ(n), k≤n| represents the ρ(n)th occurrence of attribute τ(n).

[0106] Secondly, drones i Using a random number r as the symmetric key, determine the operator position. Encryption is performed to obtain the symmetric encrypted positional ciphertext. in, This indicates that the operator position is determined by a random number r. Use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption.

[0107] Again, drones d i Randomly select μ∈Z p Z p Let be a group of integers of order q consisting of elements (0, 1, ..., p-1). Calculate the group signature:

[0108] σ i = ′ i B i ′ C i ,π i >;

[0109] Among them, A′ i =A i μ B i ′=B i μ C i =ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i ​), ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i This indicates that the parameter Z in the public key mpk and the random number w∈Z are used. p For drones d i public key pk i Perform ElGmal asymmetric encryption, π u =(s k ,s w h) is the ciphertext c containing attributes u Location ciphertext ρ i UAV location lat i Drone flight speed v i and timestamp TS i Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, namely:

[0110] C i =(W i,1 W i,2 =ElGmal.Enc(Z,pk i )}(lot i ,c i ,ρ i ,v i ,TS i );

[0111] Here, ZKPoK{(x,y)|f(·)} represents the proof value that can prove x and y satisfy the function f without revealing x and y.

[0112] Through the above steps, the drone d i It can generate an anonymous data packet that conforms to the RID regulations and is to be broadcast, i.e. <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i C i ,TS i ,σ i The data packet does not reveal the drone's identity information, and the drone operator's location information is also encrypted and protected.

[0113] Accordingly, after receiving the RID data packet broadcast by the drone, the receiver decodes it into... <lat i ,v i ,c i ,ρ i C i ,TS i ,σ i >Form, and use the master public key mpk to sign the group σ i Verification is performed to authenticate the origin and integrity of the data packets.

[0114] If the above authentication is successful, and the recipient meets the attribute policy for decrypting the drone operator's location (e.g., COUNTRY = COUNTRY_1 above), the recipient can use their attribute private key to decrypt the drone operator's location ciphertext and obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0115] For example: receiver r j Use your own attribute private key calculate:

[0116]

[0117] Where, γ n To satisfy ∑γ n ·M n = (1,0,…,0,0) is a set of vector elements, θ is the maximum number of times the attribute is used in matrix M, I is the set of rows in M ​​where the attribute satisfies the attribute policy of the receiver, ρ(n) represents the ρ(n)th occurrence of attribute τ(n), and the variables u∈[θ], n∈[n1].

[0118] The receiver uses a random key r to encrypt the drone operator's location ρ. i Decryption is performed, i.e., AES.Dec(r,ρ) is calculated. i ), AES.Dec(r,ρ i ) indicates that a random key r is used to ciphertext ρ at a location. i Perform a symmetric decryption operation to recover the drone operator's location.

[0119] Through the above steps, any receiver can verify the legitimacy of the RID data packets broadcast anonymously by the drone, but only receivers that meet certain attribute policies can decrypt the attribute ciphertext and obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0120] In other non-limiting embodiments, the receiver can also determine whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on its location. If the receiver detects the drone... i When a drone enters a no-fly zone, appropriate measures can be taken, such as expelling it or sending an alert to the drone operator to force it to change course or return to its starting point.

[0121] Of course, in some cases, it is necessary to further obtain the drone's true identity and process it accordingly. In such cases, the recipient can [details about the drone's identity]. i The broadcast RID data packet is forwarded to the USS, which obtains the drone's true identity information.

[0122] like Figure 3The diagram shown is a flowchart illustrating how the receiver processes the received RID data packet in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0123] In step 301, the receiver receives the RID data packet broadcast by the drone.

[0124] In step 302, the RID data packet is decoded to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, position ciphertext, and group signature.

[0125] In step 303, the group signature is verified.

[0126] In step 304, after verification, it is determined whether the location of the drone is within the set no-fly zone; if so, step 305 is executed; otherwise, the process ends.

[0127] In step 305, the RID data packet is forwarded to the USS.

[0128] Accordingly, after receiving the RID data packet, the USS uses the master public key to obtain the real identity identifier of the drone and returns the real identity identifier to the receiver.

[0129] Specifically, USS calculates ElGmal.Dec(z,C) i ), recover the drone public key PK i And obtain the drone's d based on the public key information. i Real identity ID i ElGmal.Dec(z,C) i ) indicates that α in the master private key is used to pair the ciphertext C i Perform ElGmal decryption; USS returns a message containing the identity ID to the receiver. i The system sends an ACK message to confirm the correct execution of the identification operation, which the recipient can then use for further processing.

[0130] In step 306, a response message returned by the USS is received, the response message carrying the real identity identifier of the drone.

[0131] In step 307, the action to be taken against the drone is determined based on its true identity. For example, sanctions, charges, or bans may be imposed on the drone.

[0132] The drone anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method provided by this invention can serve as an aid to the RID specification, providing identity privacy for drones and additional location privacy for drone operators. In the application of this invention, it is not required that all receivers register with the USS. If a receiver not registered with the USS receives an RID data packet, that receiver can still obtain the drone's pseudonym (i.e., C).i Information such as location and flight speed.

[0133] One or more embodiments of the drone anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method provided by this invention can achieve the following functions:

[0134] 1) Drones can anonymously broadcast verifiable RID messages, increasing the difficulty for attackers to impersonate, tamper with, and track RID information;

[0135] 2) No authoritative institution needs to be online at all times; recipients can directly authenticate anonymous RID messages from drones, thus optimizing the efficiency of RID message management.

[0136] 3) The actual location of the drone operator is broadcast in encrypted form and disclosed only to specific eligible recipients, thus achieving privacy protection for the drone operator's location.

[0137] The following examples further illustrate the process of achieving the above functions using the method of the present invention.

[0138] In this embodiment, the subjects involved are: USS, a specific drone D1, and receiver R1 that conforms to the attribute policy and receiver R2 that does not conform to the attribute policy. The functions and interaction processes of these different subjects are as follows:

[0139] A. System Initialization and Registration

[0140] This phase includes three parts: USS generating system parameters and keys, drone D1 registration, and receiver R1 registration.

[0141] A1.USS generates system parameters and keys. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0142] First, USS selects three prime groups of order q: G1, G2, and G... T And two hash functions, namely:

[0143] H: {0,1} * →Z q ;

[0144] H1: {0,1} * →G1;

[0145] Elements in groups G1 and G2 can be mapped to group G using a bilinear function e. T The middle part, i.e., G1×G2→G T → indicates a mapping, {0,1} * Z represents a string of arbitrary length consisting of either 0s or 1s. qZ is a group of integers of order q consisting of elements (0, 1, ..., q-1); the hash function H represents mapping a string of arbitrary length consisting of 0s or 1s to a group of integers of order q consisting of elements (0, 1, ..., q-1). q Above; the hash function H1 represents mapping a string of arbitrary length consisting of 0s or 1s to group G1.

[0146] Secondly, USS randomly selects the value α∈Z q , x∈Z q and y∈Z q and calculate Z = g1 α , In this context, the symbol “∈” indicates belonging to; g1 is a generator of group G1, and g2 is a generator of group G2.

[0147] Secondly, USS defines the attribute space. Each attribute A i It represents a specific identifier or characteristic.

[0148] Next, the USS sets the system master public key and master private key:

[0149] Master key

[0150] The master private key msk = <α,x,y>.

[0151] A2. Registration process for drone D1

[0152] The interaction process between the UAV D1 and the USS during this process is as follows:

[0153] (1) The value sk1∈Z is randomly selected from the value of the UAV D1. q Calculate the public key And<ID1,pk1> Send it to USS, where ID1 is the drone's device serial number, representing the drone's identity.

[0154] (2) USS received<ID1,pk1> Then, randomly select a value t1∈Z q And calculate two values ​​A1 and B1 based on the public key pk1 of drone D1, where A1 and B1 satisfy the relationship

[0155] (3) USS settings<A1,B1> Certificate for drone D1, and certificate<A1,B1> Send to drone D1.

[0156] A3. Registration process of receiver R1

[0157] The interaction process between receiver R1 and USS in this process is as follows:

[0158] (1) Recipient R1 initiates a registration request, which includes R1's real identity and attribute set.

[0159] (2) USS based on the attribute set of receiver R1 Randomly select values ​​k∈Z q ,calculate:

[0160]

[0161] in, Represents attribute set The number of attributes included.

[0162] (3) USS sets the recipient's private key and through a secure channel Send to receiver R1.

[0163] B. Anonymous RID message generation

[0164] During this process, drone D1 performs attribute-based encryption, symmetric encryption of the drone operator's position, and generation of a group signature, as detailed below:

[0165] B1. Drone D1 Attribute Base Encryption

[0166] During this process, UAV D1 performs attribute encryption on the symmetric key needed in subsequent step B2 according to the attribute policy. The main encryption process is as follows:

[0167] (1) The drone D1 randomly selects two values ​​s1∈Z p and r∈G T Set r as the symmetric key.

[0168] (2) Based on the preset access attribute strategy D1 calculation for drones:

[0169]

[0170] Where M is the attribute-based strategy Generate a monotonically spanned matrix M with n1 rows and n2 columns. iLet be the i-th row of matrix M; variables j∈[θ], i∈[n1], where θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in M; s′ is a randomly selected vector with θ elements, and s′[j] represents the j-th element of vector s′; τ(·) is the attribute mapping function, which maps a row of M to an attribute; ρ(i)=|k|τ(k)=τ(i), k≤i| represents the ρ(i)-th occurrence of attribute τ(i), and v is the target vector of length n2-1.

[0171] (3) The ciphertext c after the attribute base encryption of UAV D1 is set. <ct1,ct 2,j ,ct 3,i ,ct4>.

[0172] B2. Symmetrical encryption of drone operator positions

[0173] During this process, the D1 drone calculates the ciphertext. in This indicates the operator position of D1 using key r. Perform AES encryption. B3. Drone D1 generates a group signature. The specific process for this step is as follows:

[0174] (1) The UAV D1 randomly selects μ∈Z p And based on the certificate obtained during the registration phase<A1,B1> Calculate A1′=A1 μ B1′=B1 μ .

[0175] (2) Drone D1 calculates C1 = (W1, W2) = ElGmal.Enc(Z, pk1), where ElGmal.Enc(Z, pk1) represents ElGmal asymmetric encryption of the public key pk1 of drone D1 using the parameter Z in the master public key mpk. For example, drone D1 randomly selects w ∈ Z. p Calculate W1 = g1 w W2 = Z w ·pk1.

[0176] (3) The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π of the UAV D1 includes the attribute ciphertext c, the symmetric encrypted ciphertext ρ, the UAV position lat1, the UAV flight speed v1, and the timestamp TS, i.e., the calculation is as follows:

[0177]

[0178] π = k ,s w The specific calculation process for h> is as follows: The UAV D1 randomly selects a value r k ∈Z p and r w ∈Z​p Calculate auxiliary values:

[0179]

[0180] Then calculate the zero-knowledge proof:

[0181] h=H(lat1,c,ρ,C1,v1,R0,R1,R2,TS),s k =sk1·hr k ,s w =w·hr w .

[0182] (4) Set the group signature σ for drone D1 =<A1′,B1′,C1,π> And generate an anonymous data packet that conforms to RID regulations to be broadcast.<lat1,c,ρ,v1,TS,σ> .

[0183] C. Anonymous RID message verification and decryption

[0184] The process consists of three parts: group signature verification, attribute base decryption, and symmetric decryption, as detailed below:

[0185] C1. Whether it's a registered receiver R1 or an unregistered receiver R2, both can use the master public key mpk to verify the legitimacy and integrity of the RID data packets broadcast by drone D1. The specific process is as follows:

[0186] (1) After receiving the broadcast RID data packet, receiver R1 or R2 decodes it into<lat1,c,ρ,v1,TS,σ> form.

[0187] (2) Recipient R1 or R2 uses the master public key mpk and the group signature σ =<A1′,B1′,C1,π1> ,calculate:

[0188]

[0189] (3) Receiver R1 or R2 verifies whether the equation H(lat1,c,ρ,C1,v1,R0,R1,R2,TS)=h holds true. If it holds true, it means that the data packet comes from a registered drone and the content has not been tampered with.

[0190] C2. Unlike the group signature verification above, attribute-based decryption can only be performed by the registered receiver R1 whose attributes satisfy the encryption policy, as detailed below:

[0191] (1) Receiver R1 uses its own attribute key calculate Where γ i To satisfy ∑γ i ·Mi A vector = (1,0,…,0,0) The elements in M; τ(·) is the attribute mapping function, which maps rows of M to an attribute; I is the set of row indices of attributes in M ​​that satisfy the attribute policy of the receiver; ρ(i)=|k|τ(k)=τ(i),k≤i| indicates the ρ(i)th occurrence of attribute τ(i); variables j∈[θ], i∈[n1], θ represents the maximum number of times an attribute is used in matrix M; v is the target vector of length n2-1.

[0192] (2) After obtaining ξ, the receiver recovers the random key.

[0193] C3. Symmetric decryption can only be performed by a registered receiver R1 that satisfies the attribute policy. Specifically, receiver R1 uses the key r recovered in step C2 to perform the AES.Dec(r,ρ) operation to obtain the drone operator's location calculation. AES.Dec(r,ρ) represents a symmetric decryption operation on ρ using key r.

[0194] D. Drone Identity Disclosure: This mainly includes RID packet forwarding and drone identity recovery, as detailed below:

[0195] (1) The specific process of forwarding the UAV RID data packet is as follows: the receiver R1 or R2 first confirms that the UAV D1 has entered the no-fly zone, and then forwards the RID data packet broadcast by D1 to the USS.

[0196] (2) The main process for identifying the D1 drone includes:

[0197] First, based on the RID data packet of drone D1, USS calculates the public key pk1 = W2 / W1 of drone D1 using α in the master private key. α The USS retrieves the drone's real identity ID1 based on the public key pk1. Then, the USS returns an ack message containing the identity ID1 to R1 or R2, which can then be used by the receiver R1 or R2 for further processing.

[0198] Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a drone, such as Figure 4 The diagram shown is a structural schematic of a drone provided by the present invention.

[0199] The drone 400 includes: a message generation module 401 and a message sending module 402. Wherein:

[0200] The message generation module 401 is used to generate RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation; the RID data packets include the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature.

[0201] The message sending module 402 is used to periodically broadcast the RID data packet so that the receiver can obtain the location and flight speed of the UAV based on the received RID data packet.

[0202] Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a drone monitoring device, such as... Figure 5 The diagram shown is a structural schematic of a drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0203] The drone monitoring device 500 includes the following modules:

[0204] The receiving module 501 is used to receive RID data packets sent by the UAV;

[0205] Decoding module 502 is used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, as well as the group signature;

[0206] The signature verification module 503 is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

[0207] like Figure 6 The diagram shown is another structural schematic of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0208] and Figure 5 Compared to the example shown, Figure 6 The drone monitoring device 500 shown further includes: a registration module 601 and a decryption module 602. Wherein:

[0209] Registration module 601 is used to register with the drone service provider and obtain the attribute private key;

[0210] The decryption module 602 is used to decrypt the encrypted location of the drone operator using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

[0211] like Figure 7 The diagram shown is another structural schematic of the drone monitoring device provided by the present invention.

[0212] and Figure 5 Compared to the example shown, Figure 7 The drone monitoring device 500 shown further includes: a judgment module 701 and an identity information acquisition module 702. Wherein:

[0213] The determination module 701 is used to determine whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on the drone's location;

[0214] The identity information acquisition module 702 is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered the no-fly zone; and to receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

[0215] The aforementioned judgment module 701 and identity information acquisition module 702 can also be applied to Figure 6 The illustrated embodiment.

[0216] The specific implementation methods of each module in the above-mentioned drones and drone monitoring equipment can be referred to the description in the previous embodiments of the present invention, and will not be repeated here.

[0217] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited to the described order of actions, because according to the present invention, some steps can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to the present invention.

[0218] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0219] In the several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed device can also be implemented in other ways.

[0220] The present invention also provides a storage medium, which is a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, the computer program being executable when it runs. Figure 1 or Figure 2 or Figure 3 The method shown may include some or all of the steps. The storage medium may include read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk, or optical disk, etc. The storage medium may also include non-volatile memory or non-transitory memory, etc.

[0221] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer program are loaded or executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired or wireless means.

[0222] The embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail above. Specific implementation methods have been used to illustrate the present invention. The descriptions of the embodiments above are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and systems of the present invention, and are merely some, not all, embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention, and the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention. Therefore, any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), characterized in that, The method includes: The system master private key and master public key are selected in advance by the drone service provider, and an attribute set is defined; and a certificate is generated and issued for the drone through the drone registration process. During drone operation, an RID data packet that conforms to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated is generated; the RID data packet includes the following information: drone position, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator position ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature; The RID data packets are broadcast periodically so that the receiver can obtain the drone's position and flight speed based on the received RID data packets; during the operation of the drone, the generation of RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated includes: The drone generates attribute ciphertext according to the access policy; The drone operator's location is encrypted to obtain the location ciphertext; Generate a group signature, which includes the following information: the drone's certificate information, encrypted drone public key information, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof includes the following information: the attribute ciphertext, the location ciphertext, the drone's location and flight speed, and a timestamp; The RID data packet is generated based on the drone's location, speed, encrypted drone attributes, encrypted drone operator location, encrypted drone public key information, group signature, and current time.

2. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of registering a drone and generating and issuing a certificate for the drone includes: Receive registration information sent by the drone, the registration information including: drone identity identifier and drone public key; Generate a drone certificate based on the drone's public key; Send the drone certificate to the drone.

3. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, The attribute ciphertext generated by the drone according to the access policy includes: The drone performs attribute-based encryption on the random number according to the access policy, generating attribute ciphertext.

4. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 3, characterized in that, The encryption of the drone operator's location to obtain the ciphertext location includes: The random number is used as a symmetric key to encrypt the drone operator's location, resulting in a symmetrically encrypted location ciphertext.

5. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: After receiving the RID data packet, the receiver decodes the RID data packet to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, as well as the group signature; The group signature is verified using the master public key.

6. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 5, characterized in that, The method further includes: The drone service provider generates and distributes attribute private keys to the recipient in advance through the recipient registration process; The receiver uses the attribute private key to decrypt the encrypted location of the drone operator and obtain the drone operator's location information.

7. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of generating and distributing attribute private keys to recipients through recipient registration includes: Receive a registration request sent by a recipient, the registration request including: recipient identity information and attribute set; Generate the recipient's attribute private key based on the recipient's attribute set; The attribute private key is sent to the recipient via a secure channel.

8. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 5, characterized in that, The method further includes: The receiver determines whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on the drone's location; If so, the RID packet is forwarded to the drone service provider; The system receives a response message from the drone service provider, which carries the drone's real identity information.

9. The method for anonymous authentication and remote identification of unmanned aerial vehicles according to claim 5, characterized in that, The method further includes: After receiving the RID data packet, the drone service provider uses the master public key to recover the encrypted drone public key information in the RID data packet to obtain the drone's public key. The true identity identifier of the drone is obtained based on the drone's public key; The drone's true identity identifier is sent to the recipient.

10. A drone used in the drone anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method according to any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, The drone includes: The message generation module is used to generate RID data packets that conform to RID rules and can be anonymously authenticated during operation. The RID data packets include the following information: drone location, drone speed, drone attribute ciphertext, drone operator location ciphertext, encrypted drone public key information, timestamp, and group signature. The message sending module is used to periodically broadcast the RID data packets so that the receiver can obtain the location and flight speed of the UAV based on the received RID data packets.

11. A drone monitoring device for use in the drone anonymous authentication and remote identity recognition method according to any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, The drone monitoring equipment includes: The receiving module is used to receive RID data packets sent by the drone; The decoding module is used to decode the RID data packet to obtain the drone's position and flight speed, as well as the group signature; The signature verification module is used to verify the group signature using the master public key.

12. The drone monitoring equipment according to claim 11, characterized in that, The drone monitoring equipment also includes: The registration module is used to register with drone service providers and obtain attribute private keys. The decryption module is used to decrypt the encrypted location of the drone operator using the attribute private key to obtain the drone operator's location information.

13. The drone monitoring equipment according to claim 11 or 12, characterized in that, The drone monitoring equipment also includes: The determination module is used to determine whether the drone has entered a no-fly zone based on its location; The identity information acquisition module is used to forward the RID data packet to the drone service provider after the judgment module determines that the drone has entered the no-fly zone; and to receive a response message returned by the drone service provider, wherein the response message carries the real identity information of the drone.

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